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Abstract!
!
This thesis uses data gathered from twenty-six semi-structured interviews with asylum 
seekers and eighteen area support workers and volunteers in three UK dispersal regions 
– Glasgow, Yorkshire and Humber, and the North East of England – to explore residents’ 
perceptions of their housing and community experiences under the Home Office’s 
‘COMPASS’ project. Through individual accounts with refugee and asylum support service 
staff, I highlight specific housing conditions ranging from the quality of housing to 
respondents’ perceptions of safety and community inclusion. For those who experienced 
moves during the transitional period between contracts, I gather observational accounts of 
the practical, psychological and physical effects of being moved, which include the 
management of children moving schools or residents being placed further away from 
shopping facilities, support services and health care practices.!!
The empirical research is situated within a historical account of British immigration policy 
dating back to the twelfth century and a theoretical framework of Foucault’s biopower and 
the expansion of Deleuze’s ‘society of control’. Attempting to distance this research from 
alternative theories of biopower, such as that of Agamben and Hardt and Negri, which I 
argue conflate biopolitical and sovereign methods of control, I demonstrate the resistive 
capacity of asylum seekers through their engagement with support agencies or their 
individual decisions to disengage their contact with housing provider representatives. 
Through an analysis of interview responses using purposive coding methods, I assess the 
extent to which current UK housing practices represent a deliberate policy of ‘deterrence’ 
and the degree to which contracts with multinational private security firms reflect a 
neoliberal strategy of privatisation and market creation concurrent with state aims toward 
population management and control.!!!
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Introduction!!
! At the outset of this research project, I had in mind an entirely different series of 
aims and objectives. In late 2010, asylum and refugee services in the United Kingdom 
were facing a transformative period; funding cuts and diminished access to charitable 
grant resources were impacting services’ abilities to meet the needs of communities that 
had come to rely on them for critical advice and support. The charity, Refugee Action, 
published a report in January 2011 that highlighted the many areas of its service affected 
by a reduction in Home Office funding, which included a 63 per cent cut to its One Stop 
Service, a 50 per cent cut to its Initial Accommodation Wraparound Service and a full 
termination of funding for the charity’s Refugee Integration and Employment Service. As a 
result, Refugee Action shut offices in four cities and reduced services in three others 
(Refugee Action, 2011: p. 1). Around the same time, in November 2010, the Ministry of 
Justice released its Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England in Wales, a 
document that set out the coalition government’s aims to reduce Legal Aid spending by 23 
per cent, which would represent a £350m savings per annum by 2014-15 (Ministry of 
Justice, 2010: p. 5). In response, Anne Singh, an immigration lawyer, and Frances 
Webber, a retired immigration barrister, published a report itemising the effects Legal Aid 
cuts would have on the lives of destitute asylum seekers, which included possible threats 
to their ‘fundamental human rights’ (Singh and Webber, 2010: p. 6). In this climate of 
diminished access to legal and practical support, I believed that an important investigation 
might be one that analysed interview data collected from asylum and refugee support staff 
responding to questions about the ways in which these cuts were impacting their abilities 
to deliver services and the effects these changes were having on the conditions and 
circumstances of asylum seekers living in the UK. It is a subject I hope to return to in the 
future, though such an effort would follow the work of others (see: Webber, 2012; James 
and Killick, 2012; Morris and Barr, 2013; Webber, 2013; Cobb, 2013). Instead, 
developments in the management of asylum seekers’ dispersed housing in late 2011 
necessitated a change of research focus.!
! There were reports in Autumn 2010 that Home Office contracts with two local 
authorities, Birmingham City Council and Glasgow City Council, to house asylum seekers 
under the government’s dispersal scheme were unlikely to be renewed. The official 
explanation for Birmingham City Council’s decision to end its five-year contract with the 
government was that it needed its properties for its ‘own people’ (Councillor John Lines 
quoted in BBC News, 2010). The breakdown in negotiations between Glasgow City 
Council and the Home Office were due to a disagreement ‘on the costs of housing asylum 
seekers’ (Damien Green, quoted in Hansard, 2010). The cessation of these contracts 
introduced a gap in housing provision, which was to be filled with a new set of contracts. 
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In early 2012, I was invited to attend a meeting in Sheffield that included a small number 
of academics, two employees of the then UK Border Agency and two representatives from 
the private security firm, G4S, one of the ‘preferred bidders’ on the new dispersal housing 
contract called COMPASS, an acronym for ‘Commercial and Operational Managers 
Procuring Asylum Support Services’. The details of this meeting are discussed in chapter 
4, section 4.4, though three points that arose from this meeting fundamentally shaped my 
decision to alter my research trajectory. First, the grounds upon which G4S was awarded 
the contract included the fact that its bid was both financially and technically competitive, 
according to the representatives in attendance. Second, the firms tasked with delivering 
accommodation to destitute asylum seekers viewed the contract as an opportunity to 
expand the breadth of their companies’ services. Stephen Small, the Managing Director of 
Immigration and Borders at G4S, explained that the corporate vision for asylum housing 
was the expansion of a new ‘asylum market’. Finally, both G4S and UKBA representatives 
stated that contractors on the COMPASS project were not duty-bound to consult Local 
Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) when moving families and children to newly 
sourced accommodation.!
! Some initial research questions formed on the back of these points. For instance, if 
the Home Office selected G4S as a preferred bidder on financial grounds, what impact - if 
any - would cost savings have on the quality and location of asylum housing following the 
transition to the COMPASS programme? As G4S had no experience in providing housing, 
particularly to vulnerable groups, was the decision to select the firm on ‘technical’ grounds 
due to its preexisting contracts with the Home Office to manage immigration removal 
centres and provide asylum transportation? How might asylum seekers with prior 
experiences in detention or removal services respond to the knowledge that they were 
being housed by an organisation involved in both of these services? Small’s description of 
‘asylum markets’ made me question the extent to which the Home Office’s discretionary 
delivery of accommodation support for destitute asylum seekers may be transformed from 
a service into a valorised commodity. Lastly, if an expectation to minimise disruption to 
families was solely contractual, what oversight would exist to ensure that the well-being of 
asylum seekers and their dependents was being acknowledged and practiced in the 
delivery of the COMPASS project? These questions helped me formulate a new research 
agenda, which I detail in the next section. However, I wish to begin by addressing some of 
the regional legislation informing domestic policies, as the laws and practices of the UK 
Government and its contractors do not exist within a hermetically sealed environment; 
they represent an interpretation and implementation of European asylum strategies and 
are ostensibly bound by the expectations and requirements enshrined in EU law.!
! In proceeding with a review of asylum housing within the United Kingdom, 
particularly the introduction of a marketised system of provision in which private firms are 
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the exclusive contract holders of the government’s dispersal strategy, it is important to 
situate the UK’s asylum policies within a broader regional context. While the interview 
data and historical framework presented in this thesis centre largely on the UK experience 
and specific legislative developments within Britain, European law and international 
agreements exist as both the foundations upon which domestic policies are established 
and, often, as the primary inhibiting measures limiting state action.!
! In October 1999, the European Council met at Tampere and identified the need for 
a concerted policy response to asylum. It determined that a common asylum system was 
required to correspond to the refugee rights established within the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and its 1967 amendment. The introduction of regulations and directives since 
that time have expanded EU member states’ responsibilities and established minimum 
standards states must apply to their domestic asylum practices. Toshkov and de Haan 
(2013) identify some of the these key policies. They cite the 1990 Dublin convention as 
being significant in that it required asylum seekers to claim in the first EU country they 
arrived in; the responsibilities of each EU member state as they related to application 
assessment are enshrined in the 2003 Dublin II Regulation (p. 663). Additionally, the 2003 
Reception Centres Directive and 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive ensured that member 
states met minimum standards relating to access to legal aid, health care, education and 
housing (ibid: 663; ). Furthermore, Directive 2013/32/EU introduced ‘common procedures 
for granting and withdrawing international protection’ (Ch. 1, Art. 1). In addition to 
establishing common application review procedures, Articles 19 through 21 dictate that 
member states provide free legal assistance to asylum seekers during the initial 
application stages and upon appeal. However, it grants states the discretion to limit the 
distribution of free legal assistance ‘only to those who lack sufficient resources’ (Art. 21, 
para. 2(a)), effectively allowing states to establish their own boundaries of financial need 
as long as they meet the minimum requirements of provision established in previous 
legislation.!
! While EU regulations are designed to standardise asylum provision across 
member states, discretionary approaches to asylum support have resulted in disparities in 
the nature and level of services offered. More broadly, an imbalance exists in the 
admission rates and distribution of asylum seekers across the EU member states with 
some states admitting proportionally more asylum seekers than others. For instance, 
using countries’ GDPs as a basis of comparison, Toshkov and de Hann (2013) determine 
that some countries, such as Greece, Sweden, Norway and Belgium, receive a 
disproportionately higher number of applications compared to other member states (p. 
678). They state that ‘[t]he persistent inequality of the asylum burden is bad news for the 
sustainability of the common asylum policy’ (ibid: p. 681). This imbalance is coupled with a 
moderate disparity in the percentage of positive decisions member states grant asylum 
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seekers from specific countries:!!
[I]n 2009, applicants from Afghanistan face 30 per cent positive decisions in 
Austria but only 3 per cent in the Netherlands. Serbs have a less than 2 per 
cent chance in most countries, but a 10 per cent chance in Belgium. The 
recognition rate for Eritreans ranges from a whopping 78 per cent in Germany 
to less than 5 per cent in the Netherlands and Malta. For Iraqis the rate is 79 
per cent in France but 8 per cent in Great Britain […].!
(Toshkov and de Hann, 2013: p. 676)!!
Despite European efforts to standardise national responses to inflows of asylum 
claimants, the management of asylum seekers and the provision for those who are 
destitute upon arriving in the United Kingdom are largely contingent upon domestic 
solutions. James Fry (2006) explains that asylum is an area in which a cohesive European 
response remains elusive: ‘[A]sylum is still determined by EU member states’ national 
laws, which vary significantly’ (p. 97).  While European Council directives ostensibly aim to 
make asylum reception more ‘liberal’ across EU states by instituting ‘provisions that 
increase the rights of actual asylum-seekers’ (Hansen and King, 2000 in Kaunert and 
Léonard, 2012: p. 1400), restrictive domestic legislation and social control practices 
sometimes hinder the advancement of progressive responses to asylum inflows. 
Throughout chapters 2 and 3, I identify eras in which English and British immigration 
policy has developed counter to its commitments to broader international agreements and 
imperatives. With consideration to the European context, I turn now to the specific aims 
and objectives of this thesis.!!
Research aims and literature overview!!
! In order to develop a significant and original contribution to the fields of migration 
studies and political theory, I have adopted four primary aims for this thesis. First, I 
challenge concepts of sovereignty and ‘bare life’ as best-fit descriptors of asylum seekers' 
experiences within the United Kingdom. While it is useful to adopt these terms as a way of 
reflecting the extremity of individual and collective experiences within the asylum system, 
limitations exist. It is therefore necessary to employ different concepts, such as Foucault's 
biopower and Hollifield's ‘liberal paradox’ to better reflect the prospect of resistance within 
the society of control and highlight the state's duality of purpose: the promotion of 
neoliberal ideals and a commitment to protecting the population through restrictive migrant 
management practices. Second, by way of historical analysis, I develop the trajectory of 
state racism as it pertains to the control of immigration. The purpose in this is to 
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emphasise the exclusionary practices of the state and the tactics of control operating 
primarily on non-white migrants, as the logics of restrictionism and state imperatives to 
ensure the protection of society and the citizen-ideal continue to inform current asylum 
policies and practices. Third, I present the first multi-regional analysis of asylum seekers’ 
experiences during and following the transition to COMPASS housing, the UK 
government’s privatised asylum accommodation programme. Asylum seekers’ first-hand 
accounts alongside the perspectives of employees and volunteers within the field of 
refugee and asylum support illuminate the extent to which the COMPASS programme and 
the tactics of private security firms and their subcontractors have resulted in further 
challenges for asylum seekers dispersed across the United Kingdom on a no-choice 
basis. Following an analysis of the interview data, points of comparison between dispersal 
regions can be made, for instance in regards to the differences and similarities of 
COMPASS provision and the benefits and challenges faced in regions where the support 
environment is relatively robust, as in Glasgow, or dependent on smaller over-subscribed 
drop-in services, as in the North East of England and West Yorkshire. Finally, I argue that 
asylum seekers’ expression of individual agency, either in directly combatting the 
conditions of their experiences or in employing assistance from the asylum support 
community, reinforce the adopted theoretical positions of biopower and resistance while 
undermining representations of asylum seekers as a population wholly subjected to the 
dictates of sovereign power. !
! Challenging Agambenian representations of asylum seekers as bare life, the thesis 
argues in favour of Michel Foucault’s more plural notion of biopower. In situating UK 
asylum policy within a historical legislative context, the thesis argues that biopolitical forms 
of population control in England and Britain extend back to the 13th century. The thesis 
also argues that conflicting aims of exclusion and neoliberal marketisation have 
necessitated the perpetuation of asylum seekers’ containment within securitised zones of 
control. A description of 26 asylum seekers’ experiences within COMPASS housing alone 
is insufficient in situating these experiences within a theoretical and historical context, 
which I believe is necessary in analysing the extent to which a privatised and securitised 
asylum housing service might alter the conditions of destitute asylum seekers’ support in 
the United Kingdom. I argue that the COMPASS programme represents a form of 
population management that serves an exclusionary function in that destitute asylum 
seekers’ are dispersed to areas around the UK on a no-choice basis - as they have been 
since the introduction of the dispersal policy within the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act - 
to areas that may lack support networks or feature adverse conditions, such as poverty or 
community hostility. However, there is also an inclusionary function operating in the 
delivery of COMPASS services due to market dependence upon asylum seekers’ 
presence within supported housing and their detention within immigration removal centres 
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around the country.!
! There is an initial temptation to apply Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) theory of bare life 
to the experiences of asylum seekers living within dispersed housing, particularly given 
some of the conditions described in interviews conducted with 26 asylum seekers and 19 
asylum support agency staff, which included descriptions of asylum seekers’ dispersal into 
unsanitary and unhygienic environments, their placement in areas far from support 
services and access to essential dietary requirements, and their association of dispersed 
housing with previous traumas within and outside the United Kingdom (see: chapters 6 
and 7). Agamben refers to bare life as life that is ‘exposed and threatened on the 
threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable’ (Agamben, 
1998: p. 28). He adapts Carl Schmitt’s ‘state of exception’ to describe spaces (the ‘camp’) 
in which the rule of law is suspended through the use of a legal allowance, which provides 
the state the capacity to ‘ban’ bare life or ‘to say that anyone may harm him’ (ibid., pp. 
105-105). Agamben’s work has been influential in the construction of some 
representations of asylum seekers’ experiences within the UK and elsewhere (see: Edkins 
and Pin-Fat, 2005; Perera, 2002; Evans, 2003), and I have also employed the concepts 
presented in Agamben’s State of Exception and Homo Sacer to reflect the extremity of 
asylum seekers’ experiences within COMPASS housingHowever, I contend that the use of 
Agamben’s notion of bare life is limiting for two reasons: 1) it neglects the individual 
agency of asylum seekers and their access to support through legal and advocacy 
channels, and 2) it fails to acknowledge the value asylum seekers represent for agents of 
social control, particularly those profiting from their management and/or incarceration.!
! I therefore I turn to Foucault’s more nuanced concept of ‘biopower’ in the first 
chapter to better reflect the experiences of asylum seekers within the COMPASS 
programme. As the interview data reveals (see: chapter 8), while the COMPASS 
experience has been dominated by feelings of discomfort and isolation, a number of 
respondents took direct action in either confronting housing officers about their conditions 
or using refugee and asylum support services to initiate desired changes to their 
experience. Within the framework of biopower, individuals are ‘in a position to both submit 
to and exercise this power. […] [P]ower passes through individuals’ (Foucault, 2004: p. 
29). I employ Foucault’s biopower to demonstrate the networked nature of power through 
institutions beyond the state (i.e. the incorporation of private security firms and the co-
option of certain charitable organisations in the management and containment of asylum 
seekers) and to challenge representations of asylum seekers as perennial victims of a 
‘Leviathan’ state, as they can also be agents of power and resistance. As Foucault states, 
to better reflect power relations it is crucial that we analyse power apparatuses ‘only if we 
do not see them as an overall unity, only if we do not try to derive them from something 
like the Statist unity of sovereignty’ (Foucault, 2004: p. 45). Contributions from Coleman 
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and Grove (2009), Darling (2009; 2011), Stoler (1995) and others help in articulating a 
form of biopower that contrasts with Agamben’s and provide further support for critical 
theoretical engagement. In chapter 1, I point to Hollifield’s concept of the ‘liberal paradox’ 
to highlight the seemingly incompatible state aims of pursuing an exclusionary policy 
toward asylum seekers while at the same time promoting the neoliberal tenets of 
marketisation and privatisation. The COMPASS programme, I argue in chapters 3 and 4, 
is best understood within the dichotomous contexts of the market expansion of asylum 
service provision and the political imperative of limiting ‘illegitimate’ immigration through 
deliberate tactics of isolation and unease.!
! Experiences within dispersed housing do not occur within a legislative vacuum; 
logics of exclusion and containment extend to other historical eras, most recently to 
conditions under previous dispersal programmes following the introduction of the 1999 
Immigration and Asylum Act. However, in the second chapter, I draw on other historical 
periods to argue that current biopolitical objectives and tactics represent one point in an 
evolution of policies directed at the isolation and containment of migrant groups on the 
basis of race. Employing the concept of ‘state racism’ introduced by Foucault (2004) and 
adopted by Fekete (2001) and Tyler (2010), I conduct a historical analysis of policies and 
practices from the 13th century to the late 20th century to demonstrate the biopolitical 
objectives of the state and the techniques of power that have been employed in the 
management of immigrant populations in order to construct ‘belonging’ upon racial and 
nationalistic constructions of the citizen. I suggest that legislative and rhetorical 
developments in the 1960s led to racially exclusionary practices adopted by both 
Conservative and Labour Party leaders, which have endured through to modern controls 
placed upon the entry and oversight of asylum seekers in the United Kingdom. While I rely 
on archival material from the National Archives in Kew and the Enoch Powell collection at 
the Churchill Archives Centre at the University of Cambridge, a number of secondary 
sources are helpful in developing this historical analysis. The work of Abrahams (1895) 
and Mundill (2003) are crucial in framing early exclusionary practices, such as the 
expulsion of England’s Jewish population in the 13th century. Gainer (1972) and Wray 
(2006) provide historical and critical context for developments in immigration policy from 
1905 through 1920, and Studlar (1974) offers important background information for a 
discussion of Enoch Powell’s influence on the trajectory of UK immigration policy from 
1971 onward.!
! In chapter 3, I draw on theoretical perspectives from Esposito (2008; 2013), 
Walters (2004) and Darling (2011) to develop the exclusionary functions of citizenship and 
the logics underpinning attitudes justifying asylum seekers’ containment. Esposito’s 
concept of ‘immunisation’ frames the detention and management of asylum seekers in 
biological terms; in this view the state isolates foreign agents while allowing their brief 
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exposure to the body politic in order to develop a resistance to and ultimately to eradicate 
the threat of the ‘other’. I contend that while useful in demonstrating the subjugation of 
abject communities, including asylum seekers, ‘immunisation’ does not adequately 
address the value asylum seekers represent in the marketised environment of private 
security. Equally, Walters’s (2004) notion of ‘domopolitics’, which is adopted and adapted 
by Darling (2011) to situate methods of social control dominating the management of 
asylum seekers as representative of a politics of ‘home’, is ultimately insufficient in 
reflecting the valorisation occurring alongside logics of exclusion within the privatised 
asylum housing estate.!
! At the outset of chapter 4, I address the early development of the United 
Kingdom’s dispersal policy with an analysis of the 1998 White Paper, Fairer, Faster, 
Firmer and a reflection on some of the parliamentary support and resistance to plans laid 
out in that document. I argue that objectives of discomfort underpin the government’s 
dispersal policies and develop an overview of dispersal since the 1999 Immigration Act; 
this is supported through reference to the works of Kissoon (2010), Phillips (2006) and 
Silove et al (2000). The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to a description of 
COMPASS, the contemporary roles of G4S and Serco as detention and transportation 
contractors to the UK government and some of the concerns, official and otherwise, of the 
firms’ performance in the delivery of the COMPASS contracts to date.!
! Chapters 5 through 8 represent the bulk of my empirical research findings. 
Chapter 5 features responses from employees and volunteers within the asylum support 
service sector who provide perspectives on the transition to the COMPASS project from 
previous providers and offer holistic views of asylum seekers’ experiences within 
properties subcontracted by G4S and Serco to firms in West Yorkshire, the North East of 
England and Glasgow. In chapter 6, interviews with asylum seekers living in COMPASS 
properties provide perspectives on the transition process. In addition, residents’ responses 
about prior trauma experienced within and outside the United Kingdom help demonstrate 
some of the compounding vulnerabilities some face within the dispersal programme, 
which at times are amplified through feelings of exposure and isolation within COMPASS 
housing. In chapter 7, I focus on asylum seekers’ responses to the conditions within 
dispersed properties, acknowledging the few instances in which respondents were 
satisfied with their accommodation, and highlighting the psychological and physiological 
effects many reported that they endured living in unsanitary conditions or in unwelcoming 
environments. Examples of resistance and subjugation are reflected in residents’ 
descriptions of their interaction with housing agency staff. Chapter 8 is dedicated to 
representing examples of resistance within the society of control. I use asylum seekers’ 
descriptions of their own proactivity in making complaints to housing providers about poor 
living conditions and the emphasis many placed on the importance of third-party support 
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agencies in forwarding their needs on to primary and secondary housing providers. It is 
here that Foucault’s biopower better reflects asylum seekers’ lived experiences within the 
COMPASS programme.!!
Research methodology!
!
! In designing a research plan for this thesis, it was important to select the best 
method for representing detailed, individual accounts of asylum housing experiences. As 
such, the decision to pursue in-depth semi-structured interviews was informed following a 
review of literature outlining best practice in qualitative research. Martin Packer’s The 
Science of Qualitative Research (2011) was particularly useful in developing a robust, 
critical defence of qualitative methods in the study of asylum seekers’ perceptions of life 
within COMPASS accommodation. Packer explains that qualitative research is ‘good for 
historical ontology’, a phrase he adopts from Foucault, which Packer interprets as a ‘form 
of investigation’ (original emphasis, p. 6). He continues, stating that such an investigation 
‘would include both “genealogical” and “archeological” components and have an “ethical” 
aim. That is to say, it would include a historical dimension, attentive to genesis and 
transformation without reducing them to the linear unfolding of a unidimensional 
“progress”’(ibid: p. 6). This perspective informed my decision to pursue an interview 
method that developed a trajectory of asylum seekers’ experiences over time in order to 
capture the crosscutting effects of life within the asylum system, as housing represents a 
single - if significant - element of a complex series of management and control practices. 
This interpretation of qualitative research also provides respondents scope to discuss 
experiences of prior trauma without feeling that they are straying off course of the 
researcher’s stated aims and objectives.!
! The selection of a primary research methodology was also dependent upon a 
critical reflection of valued, political terms like ‘vulnerable’ and ‘asylum seeker’. 
Vulnerability can, at times, suggest a lack of agency or autonomy. To classify asylum 
seekers as a vulnerable community is problematic in that it perpetuates assumptions of 
continual victimisation, while at the same time appropriately captures the risk involved in 
exposing asylum seekers to the potential dangers of reprisal by state authorities. As 
agency and resistance remains an important factor in asylum seekers’ experiences, I 
prefer to conceptualise the asylum experience as a highly compromised existence. 
Indeed, even adopting the term ‘asylum seeker’ suggests an implicit acceptance of the 
political categorisation of refugees who have not yet been validated as such. Smith and 
Pitts (2007) identify this as a problem with naming, which they believe constitutes a 
‘political act’ (p. 9). They also explain that a secondary problem with naming is the fact 
that it ‘involves the identification of specific communities and groups in a manner that 
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draws them to the attention of the state when previously they were “invisible” or 
overlooked’ (ibid: p. 9). One of the dangers in producing a publicly accessible piece of 
work is that the researcher potentially exposes her respondents to a level of attention and 
scrutiny they had hitherto avoided; the imperative for caution and anonymity therefore 
becomes paramount within the research agenda. !
! The primary qualitative interview data used to support the theoretical and practical 
analyses of asylum seekers’ experiences within the UK Government’s current dispersal 
programme, the COMPASS project, was collected through 46 semi-structured interviews 
conducted from May to September 2013. Twenty-six of these interviews were conducted 
with asylum seekers who had recent experience of living in a property managed by one of 
three subcontractors: Jomast in the North East of England, Orchard and Shipman in 
Glasgow and Cascade Homes in West Yorkshire. Jomast and Cascade were 
subcontractors to G4S while Orchard and Shipman was a subcontractor to Serco on the 
Home Office’s COMPASS housing programme. Eighteen interviews were conducted with 
representatives from a variety of refugee and asylum support agencies, which included 
drop-ins, integration networks, registered charities, non-profit organisations and larger 
organisations, such as the Scottish Refugee Council and the North of England Refugee 
Service. The final interviewee was secured early during the research process as I was 
developing the historical narrative intended to support the theoretical and empirical 
research analyses. The former Home Secretary, Rt. Hon. David Blunkett MP, met with me 
at his advice surgery in Sheffield on 02 November 2012 to address questions about the 
Labour Government’s development of immigration controls in the early 2000s and some of 
the justifications the Home Office had in continuing to detain asylum seekers and their 
families at immigration removal centres around the country. An extended extract of this 
interview appears near the end of the second chapter. !
! I used the snowball sampling method to gain access to asylum seekers, support 
workers and service employees. As Bilger and Van Liempt (2009) state, ‘[s]nowball 
sampling is a way to facilitate access to respondents where they represent a 
comparatively small population or where some degree of specific trust is required to 
initiate the contact’ (Bilger and Van Liempt, 2009: p. 124). Jacobsen and Landau (2003) 
argue that this approach is limited by the potential for bias inherent within a small sample 
size of connected individuals from a specific community (Jacobsen and Landau, 2009: p. 
190). Interrogating the efficacy of common refugee research methods is undoubtedly a 
worthy endeavour, and I acknowledge potential limitations to this research within this 
methodology. However, this thesis is rooted in a belief that it is necessary to give 
individual voices within abject communities the space and time to develop into singular 
and interweaving narratives in order to develop a fuller understanding of their lived 
experiences (see: Stewart, 2005). I use qualitative research methods to provide a rich, 
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nuanced and authentic view of transition under COMPASS from the service users 
themselves. !
! I made efforts to engage a diverse range of interviewees in order to represent 
different experiences of transition and life within the COMPASS housing programme. The 
determination to select three geographical regions for this doctoral thesis was made on 
the basis of four factors. First, each region, Glasgow, the North East of England and 
Yorkshire and Humber are designated dispersal areas within the Home Office’s dispersal 
scheme for destitute asylum seekers. This allows for comparative analyses between 
regions as well as an investigation into how housing allocation may have changed in each 
region over time. Second, to both broaden the population sample and avoid region-
specific factors that might have skewed individual experiences or perceptions, it was 
necessary to select respondents that could reflect on accommodation experiences in 
areas in which housing was managed by a different subcontractor within the COMPASS 
programme. Third, the decision to include Glasgow was due to the fact that Serco was the 
primary contractor in the region rather than G4S in both Yorkshire and Humber and the 
North East of England, and because Glasgow has developed an organised series of 
integration networks since the introduction of dispersal. I wished to explore the degree to 
which the presence of interconnected support agencies may have altered - if at all - 
asylum seekers’ housing experiences in Glasgow compared to the other two regions. 
Finally, financial limitations and my proximity to the Yorkshire and Humber region informed 
my decision to use Leeds as a primary research geography over cities like Birmingham or 
Manchester.!
! In terms of gaining access to refugee research participants, Harrell-Bond and 
Voutira (2007) state that ‘the challenge for the researchers is to identify and bypass the 
obstacles that stand between them and the refugees’ (Harrell-Bond and Voutira, 2007; p. 
295). To surmount this challenge I initiated contact with gatekeepers in close contact with 
asylum seekers (Bloch, 1999), initially employing a purposive sampling method in order to 
approach employees and volunteers at various support agencies in the designated 
regions via e-mail or telephone. This was preceded by researching some of the available 
agencies within each area, including local asylum and refugee drop-in services, larger 
services like the Scottish Refugee Council and the North of England Refugee Service and 
a variety of charities and non-profit organisations. Representatives from these 
organisations, who had built up a level of comfort and trust with individual asylum seekers 
accessing their services were able to facilitate the arrangement of interview dates and 
times with asylum seekers. This snowballing sampling method provided me access to a 
marginalised community which would otherwise have been extremely limited (Bilger and 
Van Liempt, 2009: p. 124). One of the potential limitations to this method included the fact 
that I was only able to meet with asylum seekers who were accessing support services; 
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those who were not accessing these services for a variety of reasons are not represented 
within this research. However, approaching gatekeepers from geographically diverse 
organisations mitigated the risk of ‘over-dependence on one network’ (Bloch, 1999; p. 
372). The snowballing method was also useful in accessing housing service employees. 
For instance, over the course of my interviews with support agency staff in Glasgow, I was 
put in contact with a former employee of Orchard and Shipman; that individual agreed to 
an interview and her observations are presented in chapter 6.!
! The decision to use semi-structured, face-to-face interviews rather than 
questionnaires or focus groups was founded upon this perceived need to identify, record 
and contextualise the actual experiences of those who went through the process of 
transitioning to the COMPASS programme. The views of asylum seekers and support 
agency staff were necessary to provide both first-hand observations of the conditions 
within dispersed housing as well as in-depth biographical accounts of the physiological 
and psychological effects of living within COMPASS properties. Representatives from 
support agencies were able to provide wider regional perspectives that may otherwise 
have not been reflected in the interviews with individual asylum seekers. Having a 
relatively small sample size was necessary, because it allowed me more time with each 
interviewee and provided respondents the opportunity to address a variety of questions 
and expand at length on other observations that were not fixed within the constraints of a 
questionnaire. As a result, interviews ranged between 30 minutes to two hours, with the 
average interview lasting about one hour and twenty-five minutes. I used a series of pre-
prepared questions, which included reference to housing conditions, community 
experiences, reflections on dispersal areas and other topics in order to ensure that my 
primary research objectives were being met. However, I also encouraged respondents to 
speak about their experiences in an open-ended fashion where time allowed in order to 
enrich the collected data and give space for respondents to unload concerns or 
frustrations, as many did. In total, transcriptions from interview recordings and notes 
amounted to approximately 400,000 words.!
! Interviews were primarily conducted on-site at drop-ins or at centres designed for 
the purpose of receiving asylum seekers on a regular basis. This allowed respondents to 
speak with me in a familiar, ‘neutral’ location (Stewart, 2005: p. 505), and it also prevented 
the need for them to expend resources or extra time in order to participate. Further, it 
ensured a degree of safety both for respondents and myself, as agency support staff were 
present at these locations. On five occasions, I met asylum seekers in their homes, but in 
each instance, prior contact had been facilitated through a third-party support worker and 
in all instances but one, I had met the respondent at a local agency prior to conducting the 
interviews at their nearby residences. All but two interviews with support agency staff were 
conducted on-site at the organisations’ offices. One interview was conducted in a quiet 
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environment at a local library and another outside a local restaurant. Where possible, I 
provided potential interviewees with an information sheet outlining the aims of the project 
prior to our meeting. As some interviews with asylum seekers were ad hoc on a day I was 
attending one of the drop-in sessions, I provided this document prior to our interview the 
same day. For those that requested, I read the document aloud before beginning. Further 
detail about the informed consent process is provided in the section below, titled ‘Ethical 
considerations’. One interview required the use of a translator. While the primary 
respondent spoke rudimentary English and understood the nature and purpose of my 
research and felt confident in consenting to participate, he requested that a trusted friend 
help in the translation of the questions and responses. The translator was also presented 
with the information contained on the information sheet and signed the informed consent 
form alongside the primary respondent.!
! My primary exclusion criteria was age. Due to ethical concerns and the limits of the 
ethics approval I was granted through the university, I did not interview anyone under the 
age of 18. The youngest asylum seeker interviewed was 22 years old while the oldest was 
51. The median age of the asylum seekers interviewed was 34.5 years; the mean age 
was similar at 35.5 years. The views of children are extremely important in assessing the 
full effects of living within dispersed accommodation and some of the impacts the 
transition into the COMPASS may have had on children’s experiences. I relied on 
accounts of parents with children who were able to provide secondary perspectives on 
their children’s emotional and physiological responses to their housing conditions. I did not 
exclude anyone on the basis of their ability to speak English, but I realise that I was likely 
put in contact with asylum seekers that support staff felt could best articulate their feelings 
about their accommodation experience. There were no doubt many asylum seekers 
whose limited command of English excluded them from participation in this doctoral 
research project, and I acknowledge it as a limitation in the representativeness of the data 
collected. Any others that were passively excluded from this research included asylum 
seekers that did not access the organisations I approached for the purposes of this thesis 
and those that I was not put in contact with by support agency staff.!
! I endeavoured to include a representative sample of respondents across all age 
ranges provided they were over 18 years old, to include an even spread of individuals 
identifying as male or female and to ensure both single asylum seekers and those with 
families were represented in the research. Due to limitations already acknowledged, my 
use of the snowballing sampling method meant that I interviewed those I was directed to 
and who were willing to participate in the research. Of the 10 asylum seekers interviewed 
in Glasgow, nine identified as female and one as male. All nine respondents living in the 
North East of England in the cities of Middlesbrough and Sunderland were male. Of seven 
respondents in West Yorkshire, three asylum seekers were female and four were male. 
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Eight respondents had dependent children living with them in the United Kingdom. Four 
respondents reported having children outside the United Kingdom. Interview respondents 
came from a variety of countries, which included but were not limited to: Pakistan, 
Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iran, Rwanda, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Lebanon and Algeria. The 
average amount of time respondents had lived in the United Kingdom at the time of the 
interview was just over five years; the greatest period was 13 years, and the shortest was 
two months. The average length of time since each respondent had made their first 
asylum claim within the United Kingdom was three years; the most recent claimant initially 
applied for asylum within two months of our interview and the longest period since an 
initial claim was 12 years.!
! For the purposes of anonymity, all responses from asylum seekers were 
anonymised. They were first coded based on date and location of interview and then 
given pseudonyms. In future, I would consider recommending that the respondent provide 
their own pseudonym to allow greater input on the part of the participant. In the case of 
agency support staff, I gave respondents to option to have their comments affiliated with 
them or their organisation or to have either association (or both) fully anonymised. In the 
small number of cases in which anonymity was sought, I used pseudonyms. David 
Blunkett agreed to have his comments attributed to him. Each respondent was asked if 
they were willing to be recorded for the sole purpose of producing transcriptions for the 
purposes of this thesis. For those that opted out, I did not use a recording device and 
instead relied on handwritten notes which I later anonymised and coded; handwritten 
notes were also taken during interviews in which a recorder was present.!
! My analysis of the interview data included a full transcription of all recorded 
material and handwritten notes. A dependency on handwritten notes was necessary in 
cases in which the respondent did not consent to the interview being recorded. As King 
and Horrocks (2010) explain, ‘there are circumstances where you may be forced to rely on 
written notes, and where such notes can be of value in the absence of a recording’ (p. 47). 
In my analysis of the interviews, handwritten notes were an important initial resource for 
developing common themes across different interviews. While King and Horrocks also 
indicate that transcription of all interviews in full may sometimes be unnecessary (2010: p. 
143), I believe the process was essential in developing common themes within interview 
responses. Transcriptions also allowed for the isolation of specific quotes used to highlight 
individual interpretations or reflections on asylum seekers’ COMPASS housing 
experiences. Transcripts were organised based on the location of the interview, the 
interview date and the order in which an individual was interviewed. For instance, if two 
people were interviewed in West Yorkshire on 19 September 2013, the second 
interviewee was labeled: WY-19/09/13-02. These labels along with biographical details, 
such as age, sex, and current housing provider were entered into a spreadsheet to allow 
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for statistical comparisons to be made. Pseudonyms were also generated at this stage. A 
thematic analysis of anonymised interview transcripts - or attributable transcripts, where 
consent was given - was conducted using a selective coding method and the NVivo 
software suite, version 10 for Windows. I was aware of the subjectivities involved in 
developing themes, as the researcher’s biases and research interests can influence the 
decision to select certain themes over others. King and Horrocks were again helpful in 
building awareness of this particular problem. They state that ‘[I]dentifying themes is never 
simply a matter of finding something lying within the data like a fossil in a rock. It always 
involves the researcher in making choices about what to include, what to discard and how 
to interpret participants’ words’ (2010: p. 149). With these considerations in mind, I aimed 
to focus on the use of descriptive codes - codes that emanated from the transcripts - 
rather than apply interpretive codes early in the coding process. I considered the 
observation of Ryan and Bernard (2000) as quoted in Packer (2011): ‘[T]hemes are 
abstract (and often fuzzy) constructs that investigators identify before, during and after 
data-collection’ (p. 58). In developing my coding structure, I adopted Packer’s view that 
thematic analysis is generally inductive and tracks themes ‘common to several 
interviews’ (2011: p. 58). The large amount of interview data necessitated a selective 
method, though where persistent themes arose from the data, I included these in my 
analysis. For example, while I had not asked a specific question about the stigmatisation 
arising from destitute refused asylum seekers’ dependence upon the Home Office-issued 
Azure card, it arose as an issue for enough respondents that I coded for it and include 
mention of these experiences in chapter 7, section 7.4. In chapter 6, I provide a 
comprehensive explanation of my coding procedures related to the thematic analysis of 
asylum seekers’ interview responses. Appendix 3 includes a full list of the clusters and 
nodes used. !!
Ethical considerations!
!
! A core focus of my research examines the impact of the entry of privatised security 
firms into housing services on asylum seekers’ housing experiences, perceptions of their 
own mental and/or physical health, family life and established social and community 
bonds. To investigate this, I conducted a series of purposive, semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews with a range of people, including asylum seekers, asylum support agency staff 
and volunteers, one public official, and one former staff member of an organisation 
subcontracted by Serco to house asylum seekers in Glasgow. Naturally, ethical concerns 
arise in relation to interviewing highly vulnerable groups and other members of the 
community. Underpinning the whole of this thesis is a firm belief that a fundamental way of 
limiting the potential risks to vulnerable interviewees such as asylum seekers is to 
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maintain full transparency as a researcher. Therefore, in this section, I detail the ethical 
considerations that informed my approach to data collection and my interview 
methodology, and the practical steps taken to ensure the safety, comfort and trust of the 
interviewees who spoke to me of their experiences.!
! Addressing the ethical imperatives of qualitative research, particularly in the 
context of interviews with respondents from marginalised communities, necessitates a 
careful exploration of the potential impacts of participants’ inclusion within such a study. 
Kimmel (1988) writes that ‘one of the investigator’s primary responsibilities is to fulfil 
subjects’ expectations of anonymity and confidentiality [as] this obligation is intricately 
related to informed consent’ (p. 89). While I explain my efforts to ensure interview data 
remained anonymous and confidential later in this section, it is necessary to emphasise 
the significance of informed consent and to reinforce its importance in this piece of 
research. I accept Kimmel’s description of informed consent as an ethical and moral 
imperative; he asserts:!!
The moral justification for informed consent is that the individual who is to 
submit to research should be given full opportunity to exercise judgement in 
order to determine what will be done to his or her mind and body.!
(Kimmel, 1988: p. 28)!!
Under typical university ethics committee rules, achieving the full informed consent of 
research participants involves full, unambiguous disclosure of the research aims and the 
implications of a participant’s inclusion within the study. Additionally, an informed consent 
form is provided to the potential interviewee so that their consent is documented in writing. 
In the case of this research, I have achieved both of these aims, as all participants 
received information sheets describing the research and all participants completed 
informed consent documents. However, this is a problematic process, particularly given 
the potential risk of exposure for participants from marginalised communities. As Miller 
and Bell (2002) indicate, the promise of anonymity is not always enough to put 
participants at ease. They state that ‘[i]ndividuals who identify themselves as socially 
excluded or belonging to a marginalised group, are unlikely to formally consent in writing 
to participation in a study’ (p. 54). While this was not the case for participants in this 
research, this reflection is useful in considering the potential for missed opportunities and 
the silenced voices due to the institutionalised nature of common ethics approval 
processes.!
! An overarching consideration was the potential for emotional distress on the part 
of an interviewee, whether caused by the recollection of painful or traumatic experiences, 
increased stress due to lower levels of English language proficiency, or anxiety regarding 
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potential implications that participation could have on their housing situation or 
immigration status. Many of the practical steps taken throughout the data gathering 
process were designed to mitigate this potential as far as possible. I sought to reassure 
participants from the beginning of my contact with them. To identify individual asylum 
seekers for interview purposes, I initially approached asylum agency support staff, first 
gauging their own willingness to participate in voluntary interviews in relation to my 
research, and then working with them to find asylum seeker respondents. The level of 
trust these staff members had already developed amongst service users was invaluable to 
my recruitment efforts. In most cases, they were able to explain my intentions to potential 
participants prior to any formal request made by myself. By working with support staff to 
facilitate my engagement with asylum seekers, I was able to reassure potential 
interviewees, and ensure their full understanding of the nature of my research, the 
reasons I approached them for voluntary participation in my project and the potential 
benefits such research might have in ensuring a better understanding of the housing 
conditions of destitute asylum seekers within the United Kingdom. The reliance on 
‘gatekeepers’ like support agency staff in accessing marginalised communities does 
present potential problems, however. One such issue is the fact that individuals from 
marginalised groups may feel compelled to participate in the research if asked by a 
person in a position of relative authority. Miller and Bell (2002) explain that the use of 
gatekeepers, which is ‘implicit within […] professional research guidelines’, assumes that 
‘providing consent is “voluntary” [and] “coercion” is deemed not to have occurred. Yet such 
an assumption ignores the potentially complex power dynamics that can operate around 
access and consent’ (p. 56). My efforts to avoid these types of assumptions included 
meeting individually with asylum seekers and ensuring that they were fully aware that their 
participation was fully voluntary. However, the use of gatekeepers in itself and the sense 
of obligation potential respondents may have had to participate in the research may still 
be subject to scrutiny. Another possible limitation to relying on gatekeepers is the fact that 
the pool of respondents from the asylum seeking community was limited to those that 
were known to service support workers and those accessing such services. Citing Muñoz 
(1983), Kimmel (1988) writes that ‘in our well-intended attempts not to coerce people into 
our research programs, we may be withholding valuable resources from those most in 
need (p. 78). In other words, the benefits of participation in the research project, such as 
having experiences acknowledged and chronicled, are unavailable to those who were not 
sought for participation. Given the difficulty in accessing willing respondents of 
marginalised groups like asylum seekers, the likelihood of omitting important voices is 
undoubtably high. However, I hope that in providing a relatively diverse sample of 
interview respondents within other practical constraints of this research, I have helped 
minimise the effects of non-participation due to selection biases.!
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! Once I received a prospective participant’s informal agreement to voluntarily 
participate in an interview, I presented each potential interviewee with an information 
sheet and consent form for his or her review (either in person or via e-mail or post). I 
attempted to alleviate any sense of pressure or stress by ensuring that each participant 
was consistently reminded throughout the entire process that his or her participation was 
entirely voluntary, and that they could freely opt out of their inclusion in the research 
project at any time, including after the interview process. On the date of the interview, I 
provided the interviewee with a paper copy of the information sheet and consent form, 
offering the opportunity to ask any further questions or opt out of the interview process 
prior to signing the consent form. In the one instance in which a translator was used, the 
translator received the same information sheet as the primary interviewee and signed a 
declaration asserting their willingness to participate in a facilitatory role in the research 
project.!
! While mindful of the need to present a rich dataset for my intended research, I was 
also compelled to ensure that asylum seekers participating in the study could be free from 
fear of reprisal by their housing provider, confident that their immigration status would 
remain unaffected and aware of the support options available to them if our conversations 
were to unearth particularly distressing memories. I have therefore coded my data sets 
fully, particularly that information that relates to asylum seekers, and used pseudonyms for 
all asylum seeker interview subjects. I ensured all respondents were aware that their 
information would be fully anonymised, and within this thesis, I have removed identifying 
particulars from all asylum seeker data including name, exact age, country of origin, 
detailed family composition, exact date of arrival, their specific locality of residence and 
their asylum application status. Where anonymity was requested by support or housing 
staff, I generalised their professional position and region and used pseudonyms where 
required. To protect personal data, I managed my data in accordance with the 
requirements of the ELMPS Committee. For instance, I ensured that recordings, 
transcriptions and consent forms were held securely though a variety of encryption 
techniques and careful storage. Marshall and Rossman (2011) highlight the need for 
reciprocity within qualitative research, which they identify as ‘giving time to help out 
[respondents], providing informal feedback, making coffee, being a good listener, or 
tutoring’ (p. 121). Given the financial constraints of self-funded research, participants were 
not paid for taking part in this project. I did not have the excess resources to commit to 
offering an incentive for participation. While this may have limited the scope of my 
research in that I was only able to interview those willing to participate without a financial 
incentive, I avoided the ethical concerns relating to the potential for coercion or unfulfilled 
expectations. I did not offer research participants any reimbursement of expenses apart 
from one instance in which I paid for a respondent’s bus fare. However, I believe 
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reciprocity was achieved in other respects, including Marshall and Rossman’s informal 
methods like listening carefully and conscientiously to individuals’ accounts. I also 
participated in small ways, such as donating clothing to a drop-in service where I sourced 
interviewees for this thesis.!
! In closing, I aim to highlight a final consideration that underpins my approach 
toward methodological practice and informs the entirety of the thesis. The importance of 
reflexivity within the research process is particularly acute in the context of pursuing an 
investigation of asylum seekers’ housing experiences within the United Kingdom. 
Reflexivity is an active process, which demands the researcher remain engaged with a 
critical view of their position within the research and the subjectivities and biases he or 
she brings to the research environment. King and Horrocks (2010) describe reflexivity in 
the following way:!!
[R]eflexivity responds to the realisation that researchers and the methods they 
use are entangled in the politics and practices of the social world. This 
realisation brings about the unavoidable acceptance that doing social research 
is an active and interactive process engaged in by individual subjects, with 
emotions and theoretical and political commitments.!
(p. 126)!!
In pursuing this research, I have maintained an objective stance while realising that my 
own experiences and biases continue to shape my ontological perspectives. In my view, 
the researcher cannot be fully extracted from his or her own ideologies, as such 
‘underlying beliefs and ideologies […] formulate and drive the research’ (ibid: p. 128). 
Instead, I believe that it is necessary to pursue what Gill (1995 cited in King and Horrocks, 
2010) describes as accountable reflexivity; once we ‘have accepted that research cannot 
be value-free, we should actually be explicit about particular agendas’ (ibid: p. 134). This 
may mean seeking to go beyond ‘doing no harm’ and instead becoming an active 
participant in the promotion of respondents’ well-being.!
! MacKenzie et al. (2007) explain that researchers of vulnerable groups must do 
more than simply ‘do no harm’; the researcher must ‘aim to bring about reciprocal benefits 
for refugee participants and/or communities’ (MacKenzie et al., 2007: p. 301). Throughout 
this thesis, I hope to provide a full and impartial account of individual experiences; in 
future, I aim to publish generalised findings from my collected data in order to raise public 
awareness of asylum seekers’ perceptions of their experiences within the COMPASS 
housing estate. During the course of my research, a potential respondent was detained in 
an immigration removal centre before our interview could take place. Upon the individual’s 
request, I provided contact details for Public Interest Lawyers in Birmingham. That person 
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was eventually released from detention, but I do not know their whereabouts and have not 
had further contact. While there are compelling arguments to be made for maintaining full 
distance from research subjects and remaining purely observational as an individual 
researcher, I find that Baillot et al. (2013) put forth a more convincing perspective; they 
state that, in some cases, emotionality is appropriate when dealing with human suffering, 
loss and distress and that too great a reliance on ‘neutrality’ and ‘professional distance’ 
can be harmful. Throughout this thesis, I have pursued an impartial approach to the 
research process, but did not prioritise emotional disengagement in my interviews with 
research participants. 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Chapter 1: Navigating theories of biopower!
!
! Much of the literature on refugee experiences within the British asylum process 
depicts state power as both sweeping and repressive; the inherent exclusiveness of 
citizenship and the securitisation of migrant populations are presented as key components 
of state restrictionism. Reports of oppressive immigration policies and asylum seekers’ 
enforced destitution seem to confirm the representation of the British state as the supreme 
arbiter of exclusion. Asylum seekers’ restricted access to housing and the construction of 
their ‘otherness’ are articulated as designs of a British state intent on preventing them 
from developing a sense of domestic belonging within the country (Silove, Steel et al. 
2000; Darling, 2011; Tyler, 2010). It is argued that, through legislation, the state utilises 
apparatuses of power to entomb asylum seekers within a perpetual state of ‘inclusive 
exclusion’ within Britain’s borders (Diken, 2004; Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005). Indeed, as I 
address in chapter 2, immigration policies and practices over the last millennium reaffirm 
the state’s pedigree of exclusionary attitudes and tactics in the management of migrant 
populations. More recent techniques of state power, such as the indefinite detention of 
asylum seekers, the incarceration of asylum-seeking children and the UK government’s 
no-choice dispersed housing policy for destitute asylum seekers further demonstrate the 
state’s ability to frame asylum-seeking within the language of external threats and 
domestic vulnerability. These positions are at times at odds with the state’s commitments 
to international human rights agreements and its duties to protect minority groups from 
domination by majority will. Bloch and Schuster (2005) refer to the United Kingdom’s 
policies of dispersal, deportation and detention as weapons in the ‘state’s arsenal of 
control’; they state that the use of these tactics has intensified (Bloch and Schuster, 2005: 
p. 508). Emma Stewart (2005) writes that attention must be paid to ‘the “vulnerable” 
individual [and the] state mechanisms which cause or exacerbate experiences of 
vulnerability’ (Stewart, 2005: p. 509). These representations of state power help formulate 
an understanding of the legal apparatuses and logics underpinning exclusionary forms of 
immigration control.!
! The carceral logic of the UK government’s asylum policy is illuminated in Bloch 
and Schuster’s (2005) identification of three manifestations of state control operating on 
asylum seekers lives: detention, dispersal and deportation. ‘[T]hese measures’, they write, 
‘have become an integral part of the migration regime in the course of a decade’ (p. 493). 
These forms of control are interrelated in the sense that they each represent an attempt to 
limit individual agency and demarcate the boundaries of inclusion for asylum-seeking 
populations. Bloch and Schuster reveal the exclusionary function of each strategy, stating:!!
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While deportation is an explicit form of exclusion from the territory of the state, 
detention is both ‘enclosure’ within a camp or prison, and exclusion from the 
receiving society. Dispersal, perhaps counter-intuitively, is also a form of 
exclusion […]. Dispersal takes away asylum seekers’ freedom to choose 
where they settle in Britain and so doing it removes them from kinship and 
other social networks as well as community organisations that are known to be 
crucial in the early stages of settlement (Carey Wood et al. 1995; Bloch 2002; 
Robinson et al. 2003).!
(Bloch and Schuster, 2005: p. 493)!!
These forms of control are related at an operational level as well. Companies, such as 
Serco and G4S, which have been contracted to transport asylum seekers to airports for 
deportation and between detention facilities are now the very firms operating asylum 
housing under the UK government’s current dispersal programme, COMPASS. However, 
while connections can be made between these expressions of state control, it is important 
to remain mindful, as Bloch and Schuster do, that these tactics are distinct and do not 
operate on all asylum seekers in a total or uniform way. For instance, not every asylum 
seeker has been detained, though many may have experienced exclusionary practices 
during their initial claim period, throughout appeals processes or following their no-choice 
dispersal. In addition, while the private operators of detention and dispersal may be 
representatives of the same security firms, individual employees will be bound by different 
expectations based on the nature of the service and specific contractual obligations. 
Indeed, it is the very lack of cohesiveness and predictability in the management of asylum 
seekers that perhaps best demonstrates government aims to undermine asylum seekers’ 
sense of belonging within the country.! !
! Joel Migdal’s (2001) distinction between the ‘image’ and ‘practices’ of the state is 
useful in demonstrating the plurality of power within and outside the organisation of the 
state while it simultaneously maintains an exterior guise of ‘a dominant, integrated, 
autonomous entity that controls, in a given territory, all rule making, either directly through 
its own agencies or indirectly by sanctioning other authorised organisations’ (Migdal, 
2001: p. 16). Within this framework, the state’s commitments to humanitarianism can exist 
alongside its practice of isolating and excluding asylum seekers from access to full 
support or the ability to seek paid work. Migdal’s ‘state-in-society’ model deconstructs the 
notion of the state as a unitary actor with a well-formed ideological vision. For Migdal, ‘the 
state is constructed and reconstructed, invented and reinvented, through its interaction as 
a whole and of its parts with others. It is not a fixed entity’ (ibid., p. 23). This perspective 
helps develop a more critical understanding of the techniques of power expressed 
throughout formal and informal networks and between individuals and various agencies. 
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The theme of this thesis - the privatisation of asylum housing - depends on a construction 
of state power that allows for both formal and informal expressions of power as outcomes 
of individual relationships and the discretionary practices of state-contracted organisations 
like G4S, Serco and their respective subcontractors. Equally important is the capacity for 
resistance within models of containment and isolation, something that is not always 
addressed in literature on asylum and refugee studies, though some writers have taken 
care to acknowledge that state actors do not necessarily share a unitary vision 
(Shacknove, 1993: p. 518; Gill, 2010 in Darling, 2011: p. 270). Certain qualitative and 
critical studies aside (see: Bailey, 2009; Baynham, 2006; Crawley, 2010), asylum seekers 
are not always ascribed the same level of independent agency attributed to those seeking 
to exclude them. This may be due, in part, to the nature of the questions being asked of 
asylum seekers in interviews aimed at depicting their experiences of anxiety, destitution 
and social exclusion. Much focus has been on asylum seekers’ continued subjugation and 
victimisation through state policy, the media and public opinion. Paradoxically, it is within 
the popular press, in which asylum seekers are often portrayed as exploitative or 
subversive, that they are attributed a semblance of agency. News stories emphasising 
asylum seekers’ penchant for criminality or their engagement in ‘welfare tourism’ paint 
them as active figures seeking to extract value out of the country; this is an image 
decidedly different to that of the victimised asylum seeker who exists in a perpetual state 
of passivity and silent fear. This representation of asylum seekers and migrants as active 
figures coming to the United Kingdom with malignant intent is also a dominant political 
narrative proposed by the mainstream parties, at least since the late 1980s. !
! In the last decade, a range of literature has emerged linking the plight of the 
asylum seeker and other migrants to the oppressive designs of the British state as a 
totalising force; the work of Giorgio Agamben has been particularly influential in 
expressing the relationship between ‘bare life’ and the sovereign power of the state in 
instituting exclusionary tactics and draconian policies (see: Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005; 
Schinkel, 2009; Klein and Williams, 2012; Perera, 2002; Evans, 2003). Agamben has 
effectively returned the sovereign to pre-eminence in his representation of biopower, and 
in so doing, deviates markedly from the form of diffuse biopower Michel Foucault offers in 
The History of Sexuality and in his lectures at the Collège de France. I argue that an 
overemphasis on sovereign power results in a neglect of the immanent powers arising 
from within the population itself. While many of the techniques of power operating within 
and above the population result in the vilification of asylum seekers and an emphasis of 
their otherness, various nodes of power exist which serve to qualify and even contradict 
those narratives. As Stefano Lucarelli (2010) writes of his interpretation of biopower, ‘the 
relation of power to the subject or, more precisely to the individual, cannot be based 
merely on subjection’ (Lucarelli, 2010: p. 121). The research findings in this dissertation 
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are more consistent with the positions adopted by Papastergiadis (2006), Owens (2009), 
Darling (2009), Mountz (2011) and Ramadan (2012), who find Agamben’s analysis of 
‘bare life’ and sovereign supremacy lacking in its ability to address the multitudinous 
actors involved in the repression and advocacy of asylum seekers and neglects the 
possibility for resistance both within and against the state. Imogen Tyler (2006) offers 
another critical reflection on Agamben’s work. She writes:!!
In [Agamben’s] hands, the refugee becomes a sentimental trope […]. 
Agamben proposes that radical politics must oppose the very idea of “legality”. 
However, it is patently unclear how opposing legality per se can translate into 
material forms of opposition to the detention of asylum-seekers, or indeed be 
mobilised in ways that will grant asylum-seekers the possibility of the agency 
that they desperately require.!
(Tyler, 2006: p. 197)!!
As Tyler suggests, the agency of asylum seekers exists and it is often facilitated through 
legal opposition to state rulings and the work of refugee and asylum agencies functioning 
with marginalised groups’ interests in mind. Indeed, it is through the very apparatuses of 
the state and its legal system that effective challenges against asylum seekers’ treatment 
have been achieved. Through the use of data collected on asylum seekers’ experiences 
within current government housing schemes and qualitative interviews with refugee and 
asylum seeker service representatives, I offer further empirical grounding for the 
theoretical and practical work offering counter narratives to Agamben’s ‘bare life’. 
Agamben’s notions of the ‘state of exception’ and the ‘camp’ help develop a 
conceptualised view of asylum seekers’ containment and management within securitised 
zones, such as detention, which exist ‘outside the juridical order’, but are still subject to 
the ‘force of law’ (see: Agamben 1998; 2005).!
! My intention is not to abandon the Agambenian notion of power as expressed 
through the state, as the state wields an unquestionable degree of control over asylum 
seekers’ lives. Indeed, even for Foucault, the state remained an important site of 
biopolitical influence. As Ann Stoler (1995) explains, Foucault is aware that ‘state 
institutions foster and draw on new independent disciplines of knowledge and in turn 
harness these micro-fields of power as they permeate the body politic at large’ (Stoler, 
1995: p. 28). With this in mind, I wish to return to a Foucauldian understanding of power, 
which states that power is decentralised and ‘not appropriated in the way that wealth or a 
commodity can be appropriated‘ (Foucault, 2004: p. 29). This opens the door for the 
familiar discussion of how state power has been used to control and subjugate asylum 
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seekers, but also explains the avenues of resistance that can develop through the very 
same mechanisms that repressive policies generate.!
! In the move toward a presentation of state power more akin to Giorgio Agamben’s 
‘state of exception’ or a top-down approach to sovereignty, as presented by Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri (2000), the subtleties of Foucault’s original concept have been 
somewhat blunted. The most concise explanation of Michel Foucault’s concept of 
biopower is found within the first volume of The History of Sexuality, and while he further 
articulates its core features during a 1976 lecture at the Collège de France, he never 
returns to the concept directly (Gane, 2008: p. 353). As Rabinow and Rose (2006) 
indicate, Foucault’s promise to ‘flesh out his sweeping generalisations’ on biopower in 
later volumes of The History of Sexuality remains largely unfulfilled (Rabinow and Rose, 
2006: p. 196), and the underdevelopment of Foucault’s specific brand of biopower has 
placed it at risk of misinterpretation and misappropriation. The potential for multiple 
readings is reinforced by the fact that Foucault actively encourages others to consider 
themselves free to use his material for their own purposes, referring to his own proposals 
as ‘instruments’ (Gane, 2008: p. 354). This does not mean, however, that Foucault is 
wholly indifferent about the ends to which his concepts are used. In the opening of 
Foucault’s lecture on 07 January 1976, he tells his audience:!!
Ultimately, what you do with [my ideas] both concerns me and is none of my 
business. It is none of my business to the extent that it is not up to me to lay 
down the law about the use you make of it. And it does concern me to the 
extent that, one way or another, what you do with it is connected, related to 
what I am doing.!
(Foucault, 2003: p. 2)!!
! While Foucault encourages the dissemination of his ideas, it is unclear what he 
would deem an appropriate use of his material. Foucault’s turn away from direct 
discussions of biopower in subsequent lectures left a void that has since been filled with 
new interpretive approaches that have not always remained faithful to his initial concept. 
The work of Giorgio Agamben, for instance, bears greater resemblance to Foucault’s 
description of disciplinary societies and traditional sovereign power than it does to the 
‘society of control’.!
! For Foucault, the development of biopower is very much dependent on specific 
conditions arising throughout European history from the seventeenth century onward, and 
it is debatable whether these concepts were ever intended to be transferrable to other 
eras and circumstances. Mathew Coleman and Kevin Grove (2009) suggest that 
Foucault’s theory of biopower is both ‘time-specific and place-specific’, and that any use 
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outside of its original setting must be exercised with caution; they refer to biopower as a 
‘geographically and historically grounded investigation of state power’ (Coleman and 
Grove, 2009: pp. 489, 491). Rabinow and Rose share this view, stating: ‘The concept of 
biopower - like that of discipline - was not trans-historical or metaphoric, but precisely 
grounded in historical, or genealogical, analysis’ (Rabinow and Rose, 2006: p. 199). The 
basis for this strict interpretation of Foucault’s theory is evidenced in his own writing. He 
describes the development of biopower as a sequential event that began with the 
development of a power over the body during the seventeenth century. The maximisation 
of human potential and the ‘extortion’ of the body’s capabilities became predominant 
themes within the disciplinary society of this period. From the eighteenth century onwards, 
as pandemic health threats waned, greater emphasis was placed on regulating 
populations within what both Foucault and Deleuze refer to as ‘the society of 
control’ (Deleuze, 1995; Foucault, 1998: pp. 139, 142).!
! While the society of control may have its roots in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Foucault does not discourage the application of his concepts to other situations. 
In fact, he actively promotes the use of his ideas for new purposes, referring to his notions 
as ‘schemata’ for others to ‘do what [they] like with them’ (Foucault, 2003: p. 2). Perhaps 
the larger point of concern is not the transposition of biopower from an eighteenth century 
context to that of our modern era, but the confusion of the concepts of discipline and 
regulation. In his lectures, Foucault proposes that there has been a turn away from 
disciplinary power identifiable by its carceral forms of punishment toward a ‘new 
technology of power’ that acts on ‘man-as-species’ rather than ‘man-as-body’ (Foucault, 
2003 in Macey, 2009: p. 188; Foucault, 2003: p. 242). While disciplinary techniques are 
still present in this new form of ‘bio-power’, both the mechanisms and intended use of 
power are vastly different. Biopower is understood as ‘the power to make live’ and let die 
rather than the power to make die and ‘let live’ (Foucault 2003: p. 247).!
! As biopolitical strategies are aimed at the promotion of life rather than the constant 
threat of death present in the disciplinary power of the sovereign, the dynamics between 
the state and its subjects are altered. It is within this new biopolitical space that the 
defence of the population results in its purification through the filtering out of 
abnormalities, or outsiders (Foucault, 2003: p. 257). In this respect, Agamben’s 
description of the ‘sacred man’ as one that is abandoned rather than overtly killed 
corresponds closely to Foucault’s explanation of ‘state racism’, identified by the state’s 
efforts to ‘separate out the groups that exist within a population’ (Foucault, 2003: p. 255). 
Where Agamben falters is in reinstating what Peter Gratton (2006) regards as a ‘retro-
version’ and ‘naive view of power’ - the power of the sovereign - which Foucault was 
attempting to move away from in his lectures and within the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality (Gratton, 2006: p. 446). Foucault explains that power arising within the 
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population cannot be viewed as simply an expression of sovereign power. Power is 
expressed through a series of discrete networks and interactions. He writes: ‘We have to 
abandon the model of Leviathan, that model of ... a unitary man who contains all real 
individuals, whose body is made up of citizens but whose soul is sovereignty’ (Foucault, 
2003: p. 34). The technology of power, as expressed through biopower represents a ‘new 
body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads that, while they might not be infinite in 
number, cannot necessarily be counted’ (ibid., p. 245). Foucault is clear in his distinction 
between ‘the mechanisms of discipline’ and the ‘apparatuses of security’, but theorists like 
Agamben and Hardt and Negri, who fail to maintain the dividing lines between these two 
concepts, threaten to further obfuscate the meaning of biopower. While a misreading of 
biopower may seem unimportant when isolated within individual texts, the significance is 
greater when these altered views become the basis for real-world responses to policy 
proposals. To adopt Agamben’s outlook as a working model, Darling explains, would result 
in the rejection of the state’s categorisation of life, but also the denial of the possibility of 
political resistance within existing frameworks (Darling, 2009: pp. 652-653). This would do 
little to measurably improve the experiences of asylum seekers living in destitution or 
detention.!
! Foucault does not promise to provide a grand theory of power, but rather an 
‘analytics’ of power relations that are unshackled by the common representation of power 
as both centralised and repressive (Foucault, 1998: p. 82). In his analysis, Foucault is 
attempting to move away from ‘rule-governed […] forms of power which have a single 
centre.’ He believes power can be understood better through ‘looking at its extremities, at 
its outer limits at the point where it becomes capillary’ (Foucault, 2003: p. 27). It is through 
this peripheral form of power, which exists within the population rather than above it, that 
the relationships between asylum seekers, the state, private firms, voluntary organisations 
and local residents are articulated. Foucault’s ‘infinitesimal mechanisms’ of power 
therefore emerge as a useful lens through which to illustrate asylum seekers’ struggle for 
legitimation (ibid., p. 30). I continue this chapter with a review and critique of Agamben’s 
representation of state power and his description of the ‘camp’, and I assess the 
appropriateness of applying the theory to recent asylum housing developments. The 
theory of biopower presented by Agamben and Hardt and Negri will be contrasted with 
Foucault’s initial concept and I will consider the implications this approach has had on 
refugee and asylum research. I contextualise Foucault’s concept of biopower within the 
historical and contemporary developments of immigration and asylum policy in order to 
emphasise the capacity for resistance existing within populations that Agamben either 
neglects or disregards outright. While resistance does not take the form of Hardt and 
Negri’s utopian ‘multitude’, opposition to the state’s so-called ‘deliberate policy of 
destitution’ (Darling, 2009: p. 246) exists within government, civil society and legal 
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institutions. I conclude by returning to Foucault’s presentation of ‘state racism’ and 
describing the ways in which the biopolitics of border maintenance and belonging are 
converging into the very homes asylum seekers inhabit.!!
1.1 The Agambenian dimension to asylum studies!!
! Giorgio Agamben’s introduction of the concept of ‘bare life’ in Homo Sacer (1998) 
triggered a deluge of academic literature that has either embraced or rejected his view of 
the refugee (and by extension, the asylum seeker) as the archetypical biopolitical 
construction of the sovereign state. Those wishing to emphasise the indeterminacy of 
asylum seekers’ territorial belonging and their plight as victims of the full might of state 
power are apt to adopt Agamben’s views, while those arguing for greater 
acknowledgement of asylum seekers’ agency and capacity for resistance are more likely 
to contest them. The debate often centres on Agamben’s interpretation of sovereignty and 
the many critiques levelled against him concentrate on his supposed misunderstanding or 
misrepresentation of Foucault’s notion of biopower. While those criticisms will be 
addressed later in this section, I begin with a brief overview of Agamben’s concepts and 
consider the ways in which his ideas have been considered by writers in the area of 
asylum studies. !
! Agamben advances Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty, which positions the 
sovereign as ‘he who decides upon the state of exception’ (Agamben, 1998: p. 11; 
Schmitt, 1996 in Bredekamp, 1999: pp. 251-252). In this view, the sovereign is a totalising 
force that is capable of using the law to place himself outside the juridical order to initiate 
a state of exception (Schmitt, 1985 in Agamben, 1998: p. 15). The sovereign is, therefore, 
both the source and the beneficiary of a legal system that allows it to act with the ‘force of 
law’ while remaining external to the juridical order (Agamben, 2005: p. 39). During states 
of emergency, the sovereign can suspend the rule of law and act outside of it until 
circumstances are normalised. However, the determination as to when a situation is under 
control remains the prerogative of the sovereign, and while Schmitt conceived of the state 
of exception as a response to extraordinary circumstances, Agamben adopts Walter 
Benjamin’s view that ‘the state of exception has become the rule’ (Benjamin, 1942 quoted 
in Agamben, 2005: p. 6). To demonstrate this, Agamben points to the passage of the 
U.S.A. Patriot Act in 2001 and the erasure of ‘any legal status of the individual’ as an 
example of a sovereign power instituting the state of exception in perpetuity (Agamben, 
2005: pp. 3-4). Indeed, President Barack Obama’s decision to endorse the 2011 National 
Defense Authorization Act might be identified as a further entrenchment of this exception 
as it allows American citizens to be held indefinitely without trial (Nakamura, 2011). 
Agamben also points to the 1929 Emergency Powers Act as an example in British history 
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when the sovereign was granted the power to declare a state of emergency (Agamben, 
2005: p. 19). A brief consideration of the development of UK immigration policy over the 
last two hundred years reveals equally illustrative examples of the expansion of the 
exception-as-rule.!
! While the 1793 Aliens Act was issued in response to an influx of French refugees 
and popular fears that rebellious attitudes would spill over into Britain (Walters, 2002: p. 
278; Saunders, 2003: p. 25), it was intended as a temporary measure (Dinwiddy, 1968: p. 
194). So too was the 1905 Aliens Act, which expanded the Secretary of State’s control 
over border management and empowered immigration officers and medical officers to 
refuse entry to unwanted migrants (Aliens Act 1905, s.1(1), s.3, s.8(4) in Wray, 2006: pp. 
311-312). Following the First World War, however, the emphasis on temporary measures 
shifted to an adherence to long-term restrictions and expanded discretionary powers in 
the hands of individual immigration officials and the Home Secretary. When the war drew 
to a close, the provisions of the 1914 Aliens Registration Act, which hastily granted great 
latitude to the Home Secretary in regards to the deportation of aliens, were extended to 
peacetime and renewed year on year until the 1971 Immigration Act was introduced 
(Coleman, 1987: p. 1145; Money, 1997: p. 699; Bloch and Schuster, 2005: p. 494). The 
expanded discretion given to immigration officers in the 1971 Act and the Home 
Secretary’s power to detain ‘persons pending examination or pending removal from the 
United Kingdom’ represented a codification of powers previously limited to exceptional 
circumstances (Immigration Act 1971, s4(2)(d), Sch. 2). With the expansion of detention 
centres, the introduction of dispersal schemes and the reduction of benefits provided to 
destitute asylum seekers in subsequent policies, the British government relegated asylum 
seekers to an interstitial space between recognition and abandonment; their presence 
was acknowledged only insofar as they were actively banned from involvement with and 
engagement in British society. !
! The object of exception, whether represented by untried Guantanamo Bay 
prisoners or asylum seekers detained in Yarl’s Wood or Brook House, is one who is 
inclusively excluded under sovereign authority. In Homo Sacer, Agamben defines the 
‘sacred man’ as one who cannot be sacrificed, but whose murder is not condemnable 
(Agamben, 1998: p. 71). In other words, the ‘sacred man’ represents a life that is unworthy 
of acknowledgement through spiritual ritual and is so worthless that his death is not 
punishable by law. The ‘sacred man’ is, according to Agamben, one who exists ‘outside 
both human and divine law’ (ibid., p. 73); where such ‘bare life’ does appear within the law, 
it arises as an active exclusion. In Agamben’s words:!!
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At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the 
state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden 
foundation on which the entire political system rested.!
(ibid., p. 9)!!
! For Agamben, this ‘bare life’ is most plainly exposed in the camp, an extreme 
‘space of exception’ where the interned and the refugee become the embodiment of bare 
life in their absolute abjection and the ambiguity of their belonging. Though concealed 
from society behind walls and barbed wire, detainees are nevertheless under scrutiny of 
constant guard with their daily activities carefully routinised. The methods of surveillance 
and techniques of population control employed to secure these groups represent a 
suspension of the rule of law where the exception has become the norm. The 
perpetuation of a ‘state of danger’ must always be maintained, as the secure society 
depends on the ceaseless identification and categorisation of the foreign; social identity is 
derived from this exclusion of the other (ibid., p. 169, pp. 173-174). Agamben stresses the 
fact that the camp is not representative of a total absence of juridical order. Instead, the 
camp is the expression of the sovereign’s ability to frame the exception within the juridical 
order itself (ibid., p. 170).!
! Agamben’s concepts have been influential in asylum research, and his description 
of bare life has been used as a way of illustrating the lived experiences of asylum seekers 
whose existence is acknowledged mainly through their ostracism from the rights and 
recognition of citizens. These accounts can be persuasive in positioning the asylum 
seeker as a victim of the state’s violent authority and they demonstrate the potential futility 
in waging political resistance against the machine of the state, which utilises surveillance 
and exclusion as its favoured instruments of control. Brian Turner (2007) has described 
these mechanisms as part of an ‘immobility regime’ which seeks to ‘protect residential 
populations’ by restricting access into its territory and reinforcing an ontology of the 
criminal migrant (Turner, 2007: p. 289). Adopting Agamben’s description of camps as 
spaces of exception where the rule of law no longer applies, Turner points to other 
‘camps’, such as gated communities and prisons, where the chief aim is protection from 
foreign dangers both without and within.!
! Turner’s contribution to social theory is his proposition that the development of 
spaces of exception and processes of ‘bio-sequestration’ have extended far beyond the 
walls of the concentration camp and have taken shape in the form of an ‘enclave society’ 
where ‘governments and other agencies seek to regulate spaces and ... immobilize flows 
of people, goods and services’ (ibid., p. 290). This envelopment of segments of the 
population into enclaves where the rule of law is suspended allows the state to reaffirm its 
sovereignty and encompass the whole of society under a unified ‘moral arch’ (Corrigan 
 37
and Sayer, 1985 in Turner, 2007: p. 295). Turner writes that the positioning of the migrant 
as a ‘hostile stranger’, which society needs to be protected against is ‘closely related to 
conceptions about rights and membership of the household’ (Turner, 2007: p. 298). This 
domestic-themed approach to citizenship and belonging is similar to the concept of 
‘domopolitics’ advanced by William Walters (2004) and Jonathan Darling (2011), which 
encompasses methods of securitisation and governance and the ‘reconfiguring of the 
relations between citizenship, state and territory’ (Walters, 2004: p. 241).!
! Domopolitics is a way of conceptualising issues of international security and 
population management within the context of the home. Walters explains that domopolitics 
is underpinned by a logic of protecting ‘“our” values, “our” way of life’ (ibid., p. 247). By 
situating the other as something outside the domestic space that is deviant and criminal, 
the state manufactures a need for greater securitisation and tighter border controls. The 
defence of society does not end at the territorial boundary of the nation-state, as the 
foreigner is capable of breaching this boundary both legally and illegally. Securitisation is, 
therefore, internalised with new sites of surveillance emerging within the state; the state 
develops techniques to aid in the classification and the pacification of perceived threats 
(ibid., p. 251). Through this process, the state is able to develop a narrative of the asylum 
seeker that is marked by illegitimacy and danger.!
! Jonathan Darling has adopted the concept of domopolitics to describe the British 
state’s method of dispersing asylum seekers to different locations around the country. 
Since the adoption of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, asylum seekers have faced 
compulsory, non-negotiable relocation to areas outside London and the South East. 
Darling writes that the ‘machinery of dispersal ... acts as a mode of regulation on a 
population constructed as disorderly and threatening’ (Conlon, 2010 and Gill, 2009 in 
Darling, 2011a: p. 267). Crucially, Darling has linked this process of surveillance and 
population management to the methods of practice adopted by asylum seeker 
accommodation providers. When Darling was writing in 2011, the housing of asylum 
seekers was largely carried out through contractual agreements between the government 
and various consortia of local authorities and private companies. He explains that the 
government ‘designates the location and form that accommodation takes’ and this 
represents a ‘significant power in disciplining and controlling the lives of those 
accommodated within a system of domopolitics’ (Darling, 2011: p. 268). Today, it might be 
argued that the government has expanded its reach into asylum seekers’ lives by 
abandoning its contracts with local governments and instead making deals with the 
nation’s three largest private security firms: Serco, Reliance  and G4S. Notable for their 1
 Reliance was acquired by Capita in August 2012. All references to Reliance in this thesis are 1
related to the period of the acquisition of the COMPASS contract, which occurred before the Capita 
change.
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involvement in the detention and transportation of asylum seekers, these companies have 
been viewed as an extension of the state with an ever greater capacity to monitor and 
report on the movements of asylum seekers housed by their subcontractors. Having 
maintained close ties with the UK Border Agency as managers of many of its detention 
and removal centres, these firms have developed poor reputations amongst asylum 
seekers and some fear the prospect of life under the gaze of virtual government agents. 
Grayson (2012), addresses the potential for detention-like surveillance in the delivery of 
COMPASS housing provision:!!
Target, a subcontractor for G4S administering asylum housing provision in 
Sheffield, explained that it would monitor its residents and report to the UK 
Border Agency if it believed asylum seekers were engaged in suspicious 
activity, involved in paid employment or ‘living beyond the means of their 
support.!
(Grayson, 2012)!!
! Agreements with private security firms also raise questions about the 
government’s accountability for potentially controversial human rights practices conducted 
by its business partners. Since the introduction of the 1971 Immigration Act, private 
companies have carried out the administration of many of the United Kingdom’s detention 
centres. Bevan (1986) explains that private security personnel are not members of a 
‘police force [and are] not therefore subject to the normal guidance over detention 
conditions such as the Police Disciplinary Code’ (Bevan, 1986: p. 355). The diversification 
of G4S, Reliance and Serco into the asylum housing market raises further questions 
about the limits of responsibility and the ineffectiveness of international human rights 
agreements in protecting the lives of asylum seekers housed by these corporations. For 
instance, while the UK is currently bound by Article 3 of the European Commission on 
Human Rights, which prevents it from engaging in ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’, the 
obligations of private subcontractors are more ambiguous. While individual employees of 
security firms may face legal consequences for questionable actions, it is difficult to 
implicate the state in these matters, as it has effectively outsourced its ethical and 
humanitarian responsibilities. Failed asylum seekers are therefore left exposed not only to 
the physical and emotional traumas associated with destitution and abandonment, but 
possible subjection to the excessive use of force without adequate recourse for complaint.  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Indeed, as Darling states, ‘the failed asylum seeker is effectively rendered homo sacer’ by 
being denied the right to work and access to adequate means of support (Darling, 2009: 
p. 651).! !!
1.2 Challenging Agamben and considering asylum housing through a new lens: 
Hollifield’s ‘Liberal Paradox’!!
! Darling (2009) explains that Agamben neglects the possibility for a political 
challenge to the state’s hegemonic control over life. For Agamben, the current order is 
flawed, and the sovereign’s construction of bare life must be dismissed categorically. 
Quoting Mills (2004), Darling states that Agamben ‘rejects any notion of immanent 
resistance and argues instead for the necessity of a messianic event’ (Mills, 2004 quoted 
in Darling, 2009: p. 660). However, Darling argues that political and ethical appeals are 
still possible even when operating within the constraints of the sovereign ban (Darling, 
2009: pp. 655-656). He points to the flawed but partial attempt by Tony Blair’s Labour 
government to introduce the Gateway Protection Programme, which welcomes ‘legitimate’ 
refugees into the country through a process separate from the typical asylum route. The 
government offers 750 vulnerable refugees a chance to settle in the UK following a series 
of health inspections and lifestyle and language tests which are intended to aid in their 
assimilation into the country (ibid., p. 658; Home Office 2012b). The biopolitical 
implications of this scheme are clear, Darling writes, as it reinforces the exclusionary 
asylum policies already in place and represents another method for which the state can 
exercise its sovereign ban through the use of evaluations and monitoring; the programme 
is, however, of some benefit to those it serves (Darling, 2009: p. 661).!
! There are other examples Darling could have used to contest Agamben’s 
reduction of biopower to ‘the power of the sovereign’ (ibid., p. 660). For instance, the 
success of campaigns that have overturned government policies on immigration have 
generally arisen from within the population with the support of activist groups and 
supportive lawyers. Struggles to block deportations, end the practice of child detention 
and reverse discriminatory immigration rules are often initiated with individual cases that 
are advanced through the efforts of a network of committed people. For instance, 
following a Supreme Court ruling in October 2011, the Home Office was compelled to 
change its spousal visa policy from a requirement that the foreign applicant and UK-born 
partner each be twenty-one years of age to an expectation that they be at least eighteen. 
Diego Quila failed in his application for a marriage visa due to the fact that he and his wife, 
Amber Aguilar, were both under twenty-one when he applied. The High Court sided 
against Quila and Aguilar and the case was brought forward to the Court of Appeal, which 
found the Home Office in violation of the couple’s human rights. The Home Office made a 
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subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, but the previous decision was upheld and the 
immigration legislation was found to be in conflict with the UK’s commitments to Article 8 
of the ECHR. The couple benefited from the case’s high profile and the fact that they were 
supported by a lawyer and charity - Richenda Buxton, a solicitor for the Joint Council for 
the Welfare of Immigrants - that espouse a commitment to human rights. !
! More recently in March 2015, the local campaign ‘Close Campsfield’ was 
successful in persuading the government to withdraw its planning application to expand 
Campsfield Immigration Centre in Oxfordshire from 256 to 566 places. The government 
recently announced plans to close Haslar immigrant detention centre near Portsmouth, 
and proposed a 28-day time limit on the detention of asylum seekers and migrants (Close 
Campsfield, 2015; Fishwick, 2015; Hansard, 2015). Similar organisations, such as the 
Migrants’ Rights Network, have made other appeals to Parliament on behalf of 
immigrants, in the hope that restrictive policies will be reversed. In response to the 
expansion of G4S and other firms into the housing asylum market, the South Yorkshire 
Migration and Asylum Group (SYMAAG) has teamed with small asylum service providers 
to identify cases in which asylum seekers have experienced adverse living conditions 
under the watch of private security companies; their ultimate aim is to bring an end to the 
government’s contract with the organisations (SYMAAG, 2012; Van Steenbergen, 2012). 
These resistance efforts serve to qualify the view that UK asylum policy and practice 
represent an omnipotence of state power. Instead, power is expressed through the actions 
and interactions of multiple agencies, some closely aligned with state agendas and others 
in direct opposition to them.!
! Agamben’s concepts remain useful insofar as they help illustrate the extremity of 
asylum seekers’ experiences. Indeed, in chapters 6 and 7, I rely heavily upon an 
Agambenian perspective to highlight the conditions of asylum seekers’ housing and the 
degree to which respondents’ viewed their experiences within COMPASS accommodation 
as reflective of a state of utter abjection. However, there are additional grounds with which 
Agamben’s conceptions of sovereign power and bare life can be critiqued, particularly if 
the political complexities of the UK government’s privatised asylum housing regime can be 
fully realised. Within the context of neoliberal state agendas, such as the advancement of 
markets and the openness of corporate competition, the management of asylum seekers 
is also informed by neoliberal imperatives. It is helpful, therefore, to engage with the work 
of James Hollifield, who unpacks some of the incongruities of a purely restrictionist 
approach to immigration within neoliberal systems. His notion of the ‘liberal paradox’, 
which I detail below, can be adapted to inform the competing influences of market 
liberalisation and sovereign imperatives of domestic protectionism at play within the 
context of asylum housing in the United Kingdom.!
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! Hollifield (2004) explains that immigration presents a challenge to the sovereignty 
of the nation-state, ‘in the sense that the (unauthorised) movement of individuals across 
national boundaries can violate the principle of sovereignty, which requires a degree of 
territorial closure’ (Hollifield, 1994; Sassen, 1996; Joppke, 1998 in Hollifield, 2004: p. 887). 
Hollifield continues, stating that a movement of migrants within the territory of the state 
threatens the state’s ability to carry out one of its essential functions: its ability to ‘identify 
its population vis-à-vis other states’ (ibid: p. 887). However, the state is also compelled to 
ensure that it promotes and facilitates the expansion of free markets and capital. This has 
historically entailed, Hollifield argues, the state’s acceptance of ‘the growing trend towards 
internationalisation of markets for capital, goods, services and labor’ (ibid: 896). There 
exists, therefore a ‘liberal paradox’ between market openness and the closure of borders 
in an effort to protect the ‘sanctity of the social contract’ of citizenship (Hollifield, 1998: p. 
623). Hollifield (2004) identifies the First World War period as representing a significant 
shift in European states’ attitudes toward immigration, as fear of infiltration and ‘othering’ 
overshadowed economic objectives of expanded labour forces; restrictionism became 
particularly acute following the Cold War, as the political capital acquired from accepting 
refugees from communist states waned. Despite states’ entry into international 
agreements, such as the Geneva Convention, which establish rights for refugees, asylum 
seekers have increasingly become a burden to the state, as their presence fuels ‘the 
perception among Western publics that immigration is raging out of control’ (p. 899). 
Hollifield’s historical mapping of European restrictionism toward immigration broadly 
corresponds with trends I identify in chapter 2. For instance in the UK context, there was a 
rapid increase in the issuance of legislation restricting immigration from the early 20th 
century onward beginning with the introduction of the 1905 Aliens Act (see section 2.1.3). !
! The scope of Hollifield’s ‘liberal paradox’ extends beyond domestic policies of 
nation-states and seems best fit in an analysis of international responses to the 
precipitous increase in migration - particularly refugee migration - over the last thirty years. 
Indeed, Hollifield suggests that previous models of the state, such as Rosecrance’s 
‘trading state’ with its focus on free trade and ‘economic openness’ (1986 in Hollifield, 
2004: p. 888), must give way to notions of an emergent ‘migration state’. Hollifield offers a 
conceptual ultimatum: ‘[I]f states want to promote freer trade and investment, they must 
be prepared to manage higher levels of migration’ (ibid: p. 902). He explains that ‘[a] 
model that integrates immigrants, markets, and rights is more promising than push-pull or 
transnational models alone in accounting for the volume and composition of immigration 
flows’ (Hollifield et al., 2008: p. 95). These sorts of macro-level prescriptions go beyond 
the ambitions of this thesis, but I believe that the underlying concept of the liberal paradox 
is useful in describing the British state’s seemingly incompatible imperatives of creating a 
restrictive, exclusionary environment for asylum seekers while at the same time 
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attempting to maintain its commitments to marketisation and the privatisation of public 
services. If the responsibility of asylum housing rests solely with the state, then state aims 
to exclude or even remove asylum-seeking populations from its territory can remain a 
primary aim. However, in opening up asylum accommodation provision to market forces, 
with preferred bidders and profit margins, the state has introduced a wholly conflicting 
imperative of ensuring an asylum-seeking population exists within state borders in order to 
promote and facilitate the expansion of a developing ‘asylum market’. Agamben’s 
proposition that the sovereign ‘ban’ is responsible for the extremity of migrants’ 
experiences is unhinged by both the capacity of resistance within the society of control 
and the injection of market ideologies into the management practices of the state. While 
private firms may be carrying out certain exclusionary functions of the state, including 
objectives of creating a ‘hostile environment’ to disrupt asylum seekers’ sense of 
belonging within the UK (see chapter 4, section 4.3.2 and chapter 7, section 7.5), they are 
also motivated by the prospect of future returns on investment and reliant on a population 
(or ‘asset’) with which to ensure profitability (see chapter 3, section 3.2 and chapter 4, 
section 4.2). To further explore the limitations of Agamben’s perspective, it is useful to 
develop Foucault’s concept of biopower in further detail, as it provides a clearer reflection 
on the dynamics underlying the asylum management regime.!!
1.3 Foucault’s ‘biopower’ in context!
!
! Foucault’s concept of biopower was not necessarily intended to be a firm 
theoretical model. Katia Genel (2006) and Tom Frost (2010) affirm that Foucault offers a 
‘hypothesis of power’ rather a ‘thesis’ of power, which others like Agamben have 
subsequently attempted (Genel, 2006: p. 43; Frost 2010: p.546). Coleman and Grove 
reiterate this point, stating that Foucault’s ‘speculative approach to the concept’ should be 
taken ‘as an incitement to experiment rather than as a definition to be abided 
by’ (Coleman and Grove, 2009: p. 490). While these are sensible precautions, Foucault’s 
‘experiment’ has a few discernible boundaries, which should serve to shape the 
appropriate use of his ideas. The key features that will be addressed in relation to asylum 
research are: 1) the role of power as life-affirming rather than life threatening; 2) the non-
repressive expressions of power; 3) the immanence of power within populations; 4) the 
management of populations through surveillance and statistics; and 5) the ‘killing’ of the 
other through established state racism. The ultimate objective in extrapolating the concept 
of biopower onto the field of asylum research is to highlight the inadequacy of the 
Agambenian approach to power, as it neglects the important capacity for resistance that 
exists within populations. The development of asylum policy and the transformation of the 
asylum service sector cannot be viewed exclusively through the lens of oppressiveness 
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and totalitarianism when the state is bound by its own international agreements and 
consistently held to account by civil society and legal advocates for its persistent 
inattention to human rights considerations.!
!  At its core, biopower features the promotion of life within given populations. 
Foucault explains that the key difference between the disciplinary societies prior to the 
eighteenth century and the securitised societies that emerged afterward is the emphasis 
on the management, administration and development of life rather than the incessant 
threat of death (Foucault, 1998: pp. 136-137; Foucault, 2003: p. 240). This proposition 
seems antithetical to the experience of the Jews during the Second World War, but 
Foucault reasons that violence is now justified in terms of safeguarding ‘entire populations’ 
rather than defending ‘the name of a sovereign’ (Foucault, 1998: p. 137). Whether or not 
biopower can be utilised as a blanket explanation for the type of racism exhibited by the 
Third Reich is a debatable matter (see: Bernasconi, 2010). However, biopower is a helpful 
way of tracking the development of immigration policy within the United Kingdom over the 
last three centuries, as much of the rhetoric surrounding the need to tighten the borders 
has been shaped around a need to protect the British population from foreign ‘invasion’.!
! Given Foucault’s genealogy of biopower, it is little surprise that Britain’s first major 
piece of immigration legislation arrived in 1793 with the introduction of the Aliens Act. At 
the time, some feared that foreign interests would inculcate a sense of rebelliousness into 
British national identity and weaken British character. Edmund Burke warned that the 
French Revolution would introduce doctrinal transformation resembling the Reformation 
(Armitage, 2000: p. 632). In an animated scene within the House of Commons in 
December 1792, Burke zealously announced that he wanted ‘to keep the French infection 
from this country; their principals from our minds, and their daggers from our 
hearts’ (Cobbett, 1806-1820 cited in Russell, 1997: p. 2). The 1793 Aliens Act promised to 
keep this contagion out by limiting foreign entry into the country (Saunders, 2003: p. 25). 
Similar motivations prompted supporters of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, a 
piece of legislation that introduced mandatory work permits as a way of limiting 
Commonwealth immigration into the country. In a memorandum by the Home Secretary 
issued in October 1961, the reasons for controls were made clear:!!
The case for control by Her Majesty’s Government rests mainly upon two 
considerations - the strain imposed by coloured immigration on the housing 
resources of certain local authorities and the dangers of social tension 
inherent in the existence of large unassimilated coloured communities.!
(CAB, 129/107, 1961: para. 2)!!
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! Concern over limited resources, such as housing and welfare services, have long 
dominated the rhetoric surrounding the need for greater controls. Those advocating firmer 
restrictions on the entry of foreigners point to the long waiting lists for council houses as a 
reason ‘native’ Britons should be prioritised over outsiders. Emotive accounts of British 
residents who have had to wait years or be placed in inappropriate accommodation while 
asylum seekers and other migrants continue to be housed are common (see: Green, 
2009; Salkeld, 2011). In 2010, this belief precipitated the Birmingham City Council’s 
decision to end its contract with the UKBA to house asylum seekers. In addition, those 
asylum seekers Birmingham still had a duty to house under the terms of the previous 
contract were placed last on housing lists with preference given instead to ‘citizens of [the] 
city’. The city’s councillor for housing, John Lines, stated that the decision was ‘in the 
interests of local people’ (BBC News, 2010; Doyle, 2010). Councillor Lines further 
articulated his views about unwanted residents, stating: ‘The asylum seekers arrive here, 
they have a blooming family and they keep having children - it’s a burden on the 
system’ (Bloxham, 2010). Similar sentiments shaped the debate about the introduction of 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Act. In February 1961, Sir John Smyth called for a 
dispersal system not unlike the one introduced nearly forty years later in an effort to 
alleviate the burden on London authorities. During a House of Commons debate, Smyth 
lamented the fact that immigrants could be housed on a needs basis:!!
[I]t does not make sense to me that thousands and thousands more people 
should be allowed to come in every year and to have priority over persons 
who have been living in the area for a long time.!
(Hansard, 1961: c1956)!!
! These attitudes, which are reflexive of the views held by many constituents, 
indicate that ‘techniques and tactics of domination’ (Foucault, 2003: p. 34) manifest 
themselves at the lowest level of society and work their way up to the state level rather 
than necessarily being imposed from above. Agamben’s ‘ban’ on the sacred man 
becomes an action of the population as much as it does of the sovereign, though this is 
not always clearly communicated in his writing. Invoking Hobbes’ Leviathan, Agamben 
declares that the creation of bare life is the ‘original activity of sovereign 
power’ (Agamben, 1998: p. 6). He writes that ‘the foundation of sovereign power is to be 
sought ... in the sovereign’s preservation of his natural right to do anything to anyone, 
which now appears as the right to punish’, in this case, the unwanted migrant - ‘a new 
living dead man’ (ibid., p. 106, p. 131). For Foucault, however, this preoccupation with 
sovereignty clouds a more nuanced reality, which includes apparatuses of power arising 
from individual subjectivities that comprise ‘local tactics of domination’ (Foucault, 2003: p. 
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46). Just as restrictive policies arise from a variety of subjectivities, so too does the 
potential for resistance.!
! Crucial to Foucault’s development of biopower, and largely absent from the 
Agambenian explanation, is that power is not always repressive. In fact, Agamben directly 
opposed Foucault on the critical issue of sovereign power as an expression of the 
exception. Foucault stresses the importance of being able to ‘rid ourselves of a juridical 
and negative representation of power’ and to ‘cease to conceive of it in terms of law, 
prohibition, liberty, and sovereignty’ (Agamben, 1998: p. 90). Power, insomuch as it exists 
as a latticework of technologies and techniques of control, is impartial. The discriminatory 
nature of power, or power as it is expressed through particular institutions, is dependent 
upon a ‘political rationality’, which Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller (2010) describe as 
stemming from constructed moralities like ‘freedom, justice’ and ‘citizenship (Rose and 
Miller, 2010: pp. 276-277). This rationality is the basis upon which states justify their use 
of specific apparatuses of power, but opposing rationalities exist both within and outside 
government that challenge the narrative of the asylum seeker as interloper. This is 
perhaps most evident in high profile court rulings that have gone against Home Office 
decisions and reversed standing immigration rules that were at odds with the United 
Kingdom’s international human rights commitments. In very limited instances, the 
government is challenged on policies that threaten rights, but as these rights are 
themselves much disputed, asylum seekers invariably inhabit the murky space between 
recognition and exclusion. Legislation ensures that rights are distributed asymmetrically 
based on immigration category with all persons subject to immigration control (PSICs) 
lacking the full set of rights available to UK citizens. However, legal advocates and civil 
society can oppose restrictive policies, and successful resistances are often attributable to 
the work of small but highly mobilised organisations and activist groups and their 
proponents within government.!
! Mole and Meredith (2010) state that ‘[a] key attribute of national sovereignty is the 
right of states to admit or exclude aliens from their territory’ (Mole and Meredith, 2010: p. 
10). Rarely is such sovereignty ceded willingly; the 1950 Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees (CSR) are significant exceptions. The United Kingdom’s ECHR 
obligations represent one of its greatest challenges in securing ‘Fortress Britain’ from the 
claims of asylum seekers. Following the European community’s decision to effectively 
abandon its humanitarian responsibilities to Jewish refugees at the Evian Conference in 
July 1938 and the 1948 adoption of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), the UK government joined with other Council of Europe nations in 
rebranding itself as a nation committed to human rights. However, despite the fact that 
Great Britain entered freely into the agreement, the ECHR has remained a proverbial 
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thorn in the side of consecutive British governments for decades, particularly in relation to 
Article 3, which prohibits signatories from subjecting anyone to ‘inhuman or degrading 
treatment’, and Article 8, which ensures the ‘right to respect’ one’s ‘private and family life’. !
! Home Secretary David Blunkett declared in January 2003 that any efforts to curb 
asylum claims would stop short of abandoning the United Kingdom’s ECHR obligations, 
but Tony Blair was more elusive. Bracing against the potential ineffectiveness of the 2002 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act in stemming the flow of asylum seekers into the 
country, Blair warned that the Labour government would consider ‘fundamentally looking 
at the obligations [the UK government has] under the convention on human 
rights’ (Wintour, 2003). In 2005, David Cameron proposed leaving the ECHR altogether 
and as Prime Minister, he suggested that the European court be reformed to prevent it 
from becoming little more than a ‘small claims court’ (Landale, 2012; Watt, 2012). Theresa 
May advocated the abandonment of the Human Rights Act and she condemned Article 8 
ECHR for its potential for ‘misinterpretation’ and implied that British courts have 
continually allowed asylum seekers to ‘drive a coach and horses through [Britain’s] 
immigration system’ (Easton, 2011; Hennessy, 2011).!
! By limiting access to welfare and housing benefits, the British government can 
effectively manoeuvre around human rights obligations while appearing to adhere to its 
international commitments. However, the negative impact its policies of deterrence have 
had on asylum seekers have brought the state’s ability to abide by international 
agreements into question. With the introduction of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, 
destitute asylum seekers’ level of income support was reduced to 70 per cent of that of 
British citizens. According to a report conducted by the Children’s Society, in 2012 a single 
asylum seeker was likely to receive slightly more than half the income support of a UK 
citizen (Ramesh, 2012). Rosemary Sales (2002) has stated that the 1999 Act’s 
introduction of a voucher system and the practice of mandatory dispersal ‘serve[d] to 
isolate [asylum seekers] from society and promote intense social exclusion’ (Sales, 2002: 
p. 456). Despite the relative freedom British lawmakers have in ensuring asylum seekers’ 
continued destitution, there are times when the government’s active eschewal of human 
rights is plainly exposed and legally challenged. Furthermore, the deliberate removal of 
legal aid from all but a small number of asylum matters has made it impossible for 
destitute asylum seekers to use the law; exclusion is reinforced by denying asylum 
seekers access to lawyers and also denying funding to the lawyers who are prepared to 
take on this work.!
! Challenges to Section 55 of the 2002 Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act and 
the Court of Appeal’s ultimate ruling against the government highlight the potential for 
resistance from below using the tools of state. Section 55 is often cited as an example of 
the state’s efforts to enforce destitution amongst asylum seekers with the ultimate aim of 
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dissuading others from making the journey to Britain. The controversial provision denied 
destitute asylum seekers all housing and financial support if they failed to announce their 
asylum claim ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’ upon entry into the United Kingdom (HM 
Government 2002: s55(1); Stewart, 2005: p. 502). Many considered the move to be a 
deliberate act of institutionalised destitution in which the state sought to delegitimise 
asylum seekers’ presence in the country. The director of Shelter, Adam Sampson, offered 
his damning rebuke of Section 55, stating that the provision ‘made a mockery of the notion 
of human rights‘ (Local Government Chronicle, 2004; Shelter, 2004 in Cunningham and 
Tomlinson, 2005: p. 254). Indeed, the case for Section 55 was reinforced emphatically 
within Parliament. Peter Lilley, MP for Hitchen and Harpenden, warned that ‘[asylum 
seekers] prefer, and are advised, to make their claim for asylum once they have entered 
the country rather than at a port, as it then becomes more difficult to deport 
them’ (Hansard, 2003: c73WH). However, not everyone within government was as 
convinced of the necessity of such a provision. Karen Buck confronted Lilley directly, 
asking if he was aware that the Home Office conducted a research project (see: Robinson 
and Segrott, 2002) that concluded asylum seekers are largely unaware of the benefits 
available to them in Britain prior to arriving (Hansard, 2003: 75WH). Neil Gerrard, MP for 
Walthamstow, openly challenged proponents of the ‘late claimants’ provision, stating that 
little evidence existed to support the view that in-country applicants were any less likely to 
be genuine than those claiming asylum immediately upon arrival. During a House of 
Commons sitting in 2003, he expressed his doubts:!!
The rationale presented for each of the past four [Immigration] Acts - the 
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, the Asylum and Immigration Act 
1996, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, and the Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act 2002 - is that benefit support acts as a draw and that cash in 
asylum seekers’ hands leads to more applications. It is assumed that genuine 
asylum applicants would apply at the port of entry the minute that they 
stepped off the boat or plane and would not apply in-country. No hard 
evidence has ever been produced that backs up those claims.!
(Hansard, 2003: c78WH)!!
! The legality of Section 55 came under further scrutiny in a series of court cases 
that questioned the Home Office’s ability to adhere to Article 3 of the ECHR. In the 
Limbuela, Tesema and Adam cases, the courts determined that rough sleeping and even 
the potential of destitution resulting from the Home Office’s refusal of support amounted to 
a breach of Article 3 (Donald and Mottershaw, 2009: p. 12; Morris, 2010: pp. 59-61). Upon 
the Court of Appeal’s review of these cases in 2005, it found that Section 55 was ‘unlawful 
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in violating article 3’ (Limbuela, EWCA, para 149 in Morris, 2010: pp. 63-64). Later, the 
House of Lords rejected a Home Office appeal and ultimately sided with the Court of 
Appeal’s finding that Section 55 was incompatible with the United Kingdom’s commitment 
to the ECHR (Morris, 2010: pp. 65-66). In his concluding remarks, Lord Brown thought it 
fruitless to judge the ‘state’s conduct as active or passive’, but affirmed that ‘street 
homelessness would cross the threshold into article 3 degrading treatment’ (Regina v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKHL 66 2005: para 92, 101).!
! If, as Agamben tirelessly asserts, the state of exception is increasingly becoming 
the norm, one would expect that the state would exercise its sovereignty in all instances 
and operate exclusively outside the rule of law every time its interests were compromised. 
If international agreements and declarations of human rights are simply mechanisms that 
reaffirm the pre-eminence of the state as sovereign (Agamben, 1998: p. 128), it is unclear 
why the state inhibits itself by ever ceding its authority in the first place. Perhaps such a 
consideration spurred David Cameron’s wilful declaration that ‘the right to a family life is 
not an inalienable right’, as he responded to the British courts’ commitment to Article 8 of 
the ECHR (Press Association, 2011a). However, the state does not operate as a hive 
mind; its trajectory is rarely fixed and the motivations of its actors seldom uniform. For 
instance, Cameron’s comments contrast greatly to those of Emrys Roberts, the MP for 
Merionethshire, who stated in 1950:!!
With all our faults, the rule of law is the most precious part of our European 
heritage, and in a world where the great struggle emerges more and more 
clearly as one between tyranny and freedom, the adoption in Europe of a 
Convention of Human Rights binding on all Governments would uplift the 
hearts of men and women everywhere.!
(Hansard 1950: c207)!!
What is revealed in cases like the successful appeals against Section 55 and the victory in 
overturning the artificial age limits placed on spousal visas is that the executive state is 
not the sole retainer of power. Power permeates all forms of societal organisation and is 
present as much within the population as it is above it. Foucault articulates this clearly, 
stating:!!
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it 
comes from everywhere […] power is not an institution, and not a structure; 
neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one 
attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.!
(Foucault, 1998: p. 93)!
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This observation has been perhaps most clearly illustrated by the significant success 
individuals, small organisations and activist lawyers have achieved in challenging the 
state on legal grounds. As Morris (2010) states, the courts are reliant on the whole of civil 
society ‘in identifying cases, furnishing evidence, and shaping the judgements’ (Morris, 
2010: p. 67). While the exploration of theories of biopower help articulate the path for 
resistance within the ‘society of control’, it remains important to acknowledge the ways in 
which biopower can also be expressed through forms of subjugation. The same 
immanence of power that allows for resistance can also provide the conduit through which 
populations are exposed to abject conditions on the part of the state or those it employs to 
carry out its social control agendas.!
! In the context of this research, biopower is an expression of relationships between 
individuals and institutions. Therefore, asylum seekers living in COMPASS housing may 
exhibit features of ‘bare life’ even if a capacity for combatting their treatment exists within 
individual action or appeals to support organisations and legal apparatuses. The coercive 
power of the state can operate through its contractual agreements with third parties, such 
as G4S, Serco and their subcontractors on the COMPASS housing project. Both positive 
and negative experiences within dispersed housing can shape the relationship and 
therefore power outcomes between asylum seekers and the staff tasked with overseeing 
their accommodation environment. I return to a specific discussion of asylum seekers’ 
living conditions within COMPASS housing and their interactions with housing agency staff 
in chapter 6. In the following chapter, I return to a more traditional view of the state and 
highlight the ways in which the treatment of asylum seekers in the twenty-first century has 
been shaped and articulated through immigration policies spanning one thousand years. 
State objectives of isolating and excluding foreigners and refugees have a long history in 
Britain, and it is important to go back further than the 1905 Aliens Act to view the routes of 
exclusionary logics. 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Chapter 2: Patterns of Exclusion: A History of UK Immigration Control!!
! In this chapter, I explore the historical use of state legislation as a method of 
building and protecting national identity through the labelling of the ‘other’ and through the 
implementation of explicit policies of exclusion. I argue that the strategies implemented to 
control immigrant populations and regulate their inflow are examples of Foucault’s ‘state 
racism’, which Mark Duffield (2006) describes as ‘a counter-historical means of defending 
and reasserting sovereign power’ and a ‘strategization of power that allows a society 
dedicated to life to reclaim death, in all its physical and social forms, in order to protect life 
itself’ (Duffield, 2006: pp. 69-70). The purpose here is to express how the migrant (and, in 
later years, the asylum seeker) is presented as illegitimate and undeserving of legal 
protection and welfare provision, and how, upon these grounds, the need for surveillance 
and containment is articulated. Increasingly restrictive immigration control practices, such 
as detention and dispersal, have reinforced the narrative of the parasitic and criminal 
‘other’ and have contributed to the perpetuation of these assumptions within the media 
and amongst the British citizenry.!
! Berkeley et al. (2005) write that ‘[t]he frequency of immigration reportage ... 
marked by a general tone of crisis and negativity, contributes to a receiving social context 
where constructive debate is difficult’ (Berkeley et al., 2005: p. 24). As a result, resistances 
against the state based on altruistic or humanitarian grounds are strained as the migrant 
is continually divorced from her or his humanity; it is perhaps within the level of policy that 
Agamben’s homo sacer is the most closely realised.!
! Reviews of immigration policies alone can suggest a unanimity amongst state 
actors that rarely exists. When successive legislation is represented merely as an 
intensification of sovereign exclusionary practices, traces of dissent within government 
and individual parties are sometimes lost. For instance, Studlar (1978) suggests that the 
1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act represented a willingness by the Labour Party to ‘put 
stringent controls on immigration’ (Studlar, 1978: p. 56). However, this observation ignores 
opposition such as Ben Whitaker’s (MP for Hampstead), who in February 1968 believed 
the proposed bill amounted to racial discrimination. Speaking during parliamentary 
debates, Whitaker declared:!!
[E]very hon. Member knows that, if the impending influx of people had been 
white, the Bill would never have appeared ... If the Labour Party is to mirror 
the prejudice of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, why should there be 
a Labour Party?!
(Hansard, 1968: c1341)!!
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Whilst the presentation of state power within this chapter will at times more closely reflect 
Agamben’s depiction of the sovereign, it is done with consideration of the opposition 
present both within government and amongst civil society. In addition, rather than simply 
presenting contemporary immigration legislation as the most exclusionary to date, I situate 
current policies within their historical context, showing that justifications for exclusion have 
remained a feature of immigration policy for decades, even centuries.!
! Within literature describing the development of British immigration policy over the 
last twenty years, authors have emphasised the unprecedented restrictiveness of recent 
policies. Speaking of legislation introduced after 1993, Beth Humphries (2004) highlights 
the proliferation of ‘increasingly repressive and punitive measures [intended] to 
discourage groups affected from coming to Britain’ (Humphries, 2004: p. 100). Similarly, 
Liza Schuster (2005) states that the policies of Britain, France, Germany and Italy ‘all 
have in common the increasingly draconian response to asylum-seekers since the 
1990s’ (Schuster, 2005: p. 606). The post-1951 Geneva Convention era has been 
described as essentially ‘benign’, during which period the British government adopted ‘an 
essentially laissez faire’ approach toward refugee immigration with an emphasis on 
integration that was uniquely ‘British’ (Zetter, Griffiths et al. 2005: p. 171). Within this 
context, the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act represented a ‘radical point of departure in 
British asylum policy’ (ibid., p. 171). These representations of Britain’s past can highlight 
the intensification of exclusionary policies over time, but as Kushner (2010) explains, they 
also threaten to ‘distort’ the true history of migrant and refugee experiences in Britain, 
which have been marked by repeated subjugation and, at times, violence (Kushner, 2010: 
275).!
! Enoch Powell stated in 1968: ‘To be integrated into a population means to become 
for all practical purposes indistinguishable from its other members’. For Powell, this was 
all but impossible due to ‘marked physical differences’ between the New Commonwealth 
immigrant and ‘native’ Britons (Powell, 2007). British immigration policy has, in many 
instances, reinforced Powell’s view and exacerbated the issue through the 
institutionalisation of segregation by limiting migrants’ working hours, limiting their access 
to public funds and requiring those from certain countries to register with the police. Still, 
Prime Minister David Cameron cites immigrants’ own inability to integrate as the leading 
contribution to the failure of state multiculturalism (BBC News, 2011), and efforts to limit 
immigration remain a legislative priority. In the words of Home Secretary Theresa May, 
current policy is designed to admit only those ‘who benefit Britain, the brightest and best 
[…] [and] the gifted who entertain [British citizens]’; the aim of the government is to reduce 
the number of immigrants attempting to enter the country and to incentivise the retreat of 
those already here (May, 2012). While modern legislation has indeed introduced 
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increasingly restrictive rules upon migrants’ entry and residency in the UK, they follow a 
long history of exclusionary practices.!
! The control of immigration and the exclusion of specific populations is a recurring 
theme in the development of British identity. Agamben posits that the sovereign’s 
differentiation between who should belong politically and who should be excluded has 
been identified as one of the core functions of the state (Agamben, 1998b: p. 8). As the 
distinction between the deserving and undeserving of state recognition has become 
increasingly more acute over the last one hundred years, it is useful to identify periods in 
British history during which this separation of the ‘other’ from the citizen was refined and 
articulated. The purpose of this chapter is not to highlight the many similarities found in 
immigration legislation introduced over the last millennium, though parallels do emerge, 
but to suggest that the impetus behind modern immigration controls is deeply rooted in 
British history, which problematises efforts of reforming policy on humanitarian grounds. 
Human rights approaches to securing the state’s recognition of refugees and asylum 
seekers is difficult, as migrant communities have historically been viewed as tangential 
publics that are not entitled to the same rights as those of state citizens. From a nationalist 
standpoint, the very existence of migrant groups presents a threat to national order, and 
the ultimate aim of immigration controls often appears to be the ‘elimination of the 
biological threat’ of the foreigner to protect the population within (Foucault, 2003: p. 256). 
Agamben suggests that even human rights laws must be considered in relation to this 
national biopolitical agenda, as they are ultimately the design of the state seeking to 
protect its population (Sieyès, 1985 and Sewell, 1988 in Agamben, 1998: pp. 130-131). 
The state can therefore maintain its duty to protect its citizens by applying exceptional 
rules to migrant groups, effectively fulfilling the state’s political aims, while maintaining 
harmony with ‘universal’ human rights legislation.!
! Kushner argues that members of both the Labour and Conservative Parties fear 
‘national culture’ is in danger of dilution and that an emphasis of inherent cultural 
difference is used as a tactic to maintain separation between ‘natives’ and outsiders 
(Kushner, 2010: p. 260). British immigration policies are aimed at confining migrants to the 
social periphery long enough for them to return to their countries of origin without having 
altered the British complexion. For instance, the British government discontinued the Post-
Study Work visa to prohibit students from staying in the country following the completion 
of their degrees (Gower, 2012). In addition, foreign workers may only remain in the 
country for up to six years as temporary migrants, and they may only settle in the UK if 
they earn £35,000 or more (Home Office, 2012e: para. 245HF d(ii)(2)). It is within the area 
of asylum policy, however, that the government’s biopolitical aims are most acute, as it 
actively attempts to deter migrants from staying by prohibiting them from working for at 
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least twelve months after claiming asylum and by removing most avenues of support 
beyond that which the state directly controls.!
! In this chapter, I argue that successive governments’ use of biopolitical techniques 
to manage migrant populations represent attempts to ‘protect’ British society from the 
threat of the foreigner and to maintain a narrative of immigrants’ illegitimacy. Initially, the 
development of these controls required justification through the declaration of states of 
emergency, such as the temporary need to protect against the revolutionary spirit of 
French refugees in the late 18th century or the poverty and disease of Jews entering 
Britain from Russia in the early 1900s. Throughout the course of the 20th century, 
however, the exception became the rule and the powers of detention, dispersal and 
deportation were consolidated into the hands of the executive arm of the British state, 
providing the Home Secretary with virtually full discretionary powers over migrant 
populations. Again, it is here where Agamben’s ‘state of exception’ model is effective 
where ‘bare life’ is not.!!
2.1 Exclusionary precedence: a history of immigration controls from 1290 to 1920!
!
[Areas of Great Britain] are already undergoing the total transformation to 
which there is no parallel in a thousand years of English history.!
(Enoch Powell, speech, 20 April 1968)!!
2.1.1 1290: Edward I’s Expulsion of the Jews!!
! Edward I’s writs of July 1290, which ordered the expulsion of England’s Jewish 
community were not border controls in the strictest sense, as they did not bar the entry of 
specific populations in the manner that more modern legislation has restricted the entry of 
persons subject to immigration control. However, throughout the thirteenth century, 
England’s Jewish community was exposed to a series of population controls similar to 
those affecting modern migrants, such as restrictions on where they could live and the 
type of employment they could pursue. The Crown also maintained surveillance over their 
movements and earnings. For years, the Jewish community provided an important source 
of revenue for English monarchs. Richard I and Henry III offered Jewish moneylenders 
protection from the violence of indebted barons and knights in return for the ability to 
extract exorbitant amounts of money from the Jewish community (Abrahams, 1894: pp. 
87, 91). The monarchy soon learned that incentives were inadequate, and sought to 
tighten its grip on the Jewish community. Following massacres instigated by indebted 
knights and barons against Jews in York and other English cities in 1190, King Richard 
instituted new financial policies, which safeguarded records and made Jewish finances 
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completely transparent to the Crown. In 1219, a royal edict disallowed Jews from leaving 
the country, due in large part to wealth they commanded, which the King needed to fund 
his crusades and which the Church required for its vast building projects (Abrahams, 
1894: pp. 84-85; Letters of John Peckham in ibid., p. 96). In 1245, Henry III decreed that 
Jews could only settle in those towns where their ‘co-religionists had hitherto been 
accustomed to live’ (Prynne; Madox in Abrahams, 1894, p. 90). The Crown maintained 
strict control over financial transactions; records of the debts managed by Jewish usurers 
had to be held in chests (archae) that the King’s officers could inspect at any time 
(Abrahams, 1895b: p. 250). Jews were forbidden to engage socially with Christians and in 
1275, Edward I denied them the opportunity to work as money lenders (Singer, 1964: p. 
134; Ovrut 1977: p. 228). In addition to lacking the skills to take up other lucrative work, 
Jews were excluded from other employment areas and left to fall into poverty or continue 
working as usurers illegally. Conditions were compounded at various points throughout 
the thirteenth century, as barons, knights and other debtors sought to destroy evidence of 
the debts owed to Jewish collectors. These attacks, along with the king’s exploitive 
taxation and the severe limitations placed on their activities, left England’s Jews virtually 
destitute at the time of the 1290 expulsion.!
! There is general agreement amongst historians of this period that the decision to 
remove the Jews was based upon prejudice, economic exploitation and an English fear of 
cultural annihilation. Abrahams writes that the Jews were portrayed as 
‘peculiar’ (Abrahams, 1895a: p. 455); they ‘remained far more alien to the masses of 
people around them than even the Normans, in whose train they had come to 
England’ (Abrahams, 1894: pp. 76-78). According to Robert Stacey (2003), in some 
accounts, Jews were associated with child killing and excrement (Stacey, 2003: p. 52). 
Robin Mundill (2010) speaks of a ‘common belief that before selling meat to Christians the 
Jews had their children urinate on it to induce sickness and death’, which resulted in the 
‘prohibitions against Christians buying food from Jews’ (Trachtenberg, 1943 in Mundill, 
2010: p. 71). While Stacey criticises Mundill for using outdated material in describing 
hostile publics and Mundill has himself attempted to downplay the significance of racist 
nationalism in the expulsion of 1290 (Mundill, 1998: pp. 252, 260; Stacey, 2011), there is 
little disagreement that the Jewish community was being discriminated against. It was at 
the request of Edward’s mother, Eleanor of Provence, that Jews were forced to vacate her 
‘dower towns’ of Gloucester, Worcester and Cambridge in 1275 (Abrahams, 1895a: p. 
444; Mundill, 2003: p. 57). A steady wave of public animosity toward the Jews since the 
first waves of immigrants arrived from France during the 11th century resulted in the 
continued disparagement and vilification of their community.!
! Singer (1964) highlights the economic motivations behind the expulsion, 
suggesting that the Jews’ declining fortunes by the end of the thirteenth century made the 
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king less dependent upon them. He states: ‘[W]ith a change in their financial fortunes, 
Jews were no longer welcome’ (Singer, 1964: p. 117). Stacey proposes that the real 
financial incentive for the expulsion was the promise of taxes from England’s Christian 
subjects upon the Jews’ removal. English knights had refused to pay taxes while Jews 
operated as moneylenders, resulting in Edward I’s statute prohibiting them from 
employment as usurers. When they were finally ejected, Stacey suggests that Edward 
benefited from ‘the largest single grant of taxation in the history of medieval England’ 
following the Jews’ expulsion in 1290 (Stacey, 2003: pp. 53-4).!
! The Jews’ removal can also be seen as a result of a crisis of national identity in 
England. England’s Christian public sought protection from the threat of a foreign 
contagion and Edward I acquiesced by restricting Jews’ movements and then ultimately 
drove them out altogether. Henry III’s 1245 decree and Edward I’s 1275 Statute of the 
Jewry can be viewed in biopolitical terms when considering the rhetoric used in protecting 
the native population, which English monarchs pursued long before Foucault’s ‘birth of 
biopolitics’ in the 18th century. When Pope Gregory IX wrote to the archbishop of 
Canterbury in 1229 (see: Vincent, 1996), it was not Jews’ wealth that concerned him, but 
the possibility of intermarriage between Christians and Jews; he also feared that Jews’ 
hiring of Christian servants would lead to the defilement of Christian women. In his letter, 
Gregory appealed for stricter enforcement of an earlier policy, which required Jews to 
wear badges (signa) distinguishing them from Christians. It would take another quarter 
century and further pressure from the Church before Henry III would finally follow through 
with Gregory’s request to rigorously impose the wearing of badges (Vincent, 1996: p. 
219). Edward followed suit and continued the enforcement of the policy throughout the 
1270s and beyond (Mundill, 2003: p. 59). This emphasis on the protection of life, or at 
least English life, suggests that elements of Foucault’s ‘biopower’ predate his ‘birth of 
biopolitics’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (see: Foucault, 1998: p. 141). The 
technologies of power adopted to manage immigration and the justifications made for their 
implementation therefore come to represent one of the earliest transitions from the 
disciplinary society to the control society.!
! In the context of modern immigration legislation, the policies of Henry III and 
Edward I seem strikingly contemporary. English monarchs succeeded in debasing the 
Jews from their position of economic predominance through excessive taxation and by 
instituting a series of controls that both isolated and stigmatised them. The 1275 Statute of 
Jewry can be viewed as an early example of a policy intended to make a minority 
community destitute, as it prohibited Jews from money lending, which, as Stacey 
suggests, had become the ‘economic backbone of English Jewish life’ (Stacey, 2003: p. 
41). In 1962, the government of the United Kingdom instituted a work voucher scheme 
that limited Commonwealth immigrants’ ability to access employment in the country. Forty 
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years later, asylum seekers in the United Kingdom faced destitution when they were 
prohibited from working pending a decision on their applications (Lee, 2007: p. 4). Despite 
the former Labour Minister of Immigration, Beverley Hughes’ protestation in 2003 that the 
UK government was not intentionally impoverishing people, Section 9 of the 2004 
Immigration and Asylum (Treatment of Claimants) Act empowered the Home Office to 
withdraw welfare provision for failed asylum seekers, leaving them with little to no form of 
income (Cunningham and Tomlinson, 2005: p. 253; Hughes, 2003 in ibid., p. 257).!
! The legacy of medieval population controls extends even further into the modern 
institutionalisation of registration and dispersal practices. Under Henry III, Jews admitted 
into England were expected to register with the Justices of the Jewish Exchequer (Patent 
Rolls, 1216-1225 in Stacey, 2003). Centuries later, the 1914 Aliens Restriction Act 
required non-British citizens to register with the police, a practice continued today for 
persons subject to immigration control from specific countries whose leave to remain in 
the UK exceeds six months (Page, 1915 in Reinecke, 2009: pp. 325-6; Home Office, 
2012e: Part 10, para. 326(2)(i)). Henry III’s 1245 decree that Jews be restricted to living in 
specific towns throughout England can be viewed as an early iteration of the dispersal 
policies introduced in the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act. Throughout the thirteenth 
century, resentment of the Jews led to their expulsion from English towns. In order to 
alleviate tensions, and to bring the Jews and their finances under tighter surveillance, 
Henry III and Edward I restricted Jews to specific towns within Britain (Singer, 1964: p. 
129; Mundill, 2003: pp. 57-58). Abrahams describes the situation as one in which Jews 
were:!!
[…] [c]rowded as unwelcome intruders into a small and decreasing number of 
towns, without legal standing or industrial skill, hated by the people and 
declared accursed by the Church, they were bidden to support themselves 
under conditions which made the task impossible.!
(Abrahams, 1895b: p. 253)!!
! The expulsion of the Jews from thirteenth century towns represented an attempt to 
‘protect’ the townspeople of England from the menace of the foreigner (Singer, 1964: p. 
129). Today, dispersal policies are intended to alleviate the ‘burden’ on local authorities in 
London and the South East, as a reduction in the concentration of asylum seekers in 
these areas is believed to diminish cultural tensions and prevent the development of 
‘refugee ghettos’ in British cities (Boswell, 2001: p. 1; Diken, 2004: p. 91). However, 
Britain’s dispersal policy comes at a human cost; many dispersal areas lack strong 
community support networks and are devoid of the essential services asylum seekers 
depend upon. Asylum seekers have suffered racist abuse and low incomes in dispersal 
 57
areas where unemployment is high and residents are predominantly white (Hayter, 2003: 
p. 11; Spicer, 2008: p. 496). The government’s decision to abandon housing contracts with 
local authorities and voluntary organisations in favour of deals with private security giants 
G4S and Serco has resulted in diminished conditions for many asylum seekers, a subject 
I return to in subsequent chapters.!
!  When members of the English Jewish community were expelled in 1290, ship 
commanders were sourced for carrying out deportation. After departing London, one 
ship’s master instructed his Jewish passengers to disembark on a sandbar. When the tide 
came in, he left them to drown and seized all of their possessions. Following the incident, 
the master of the vessel was hanged for his actions (Abrahams, 1895a: p. 446). In 2011, 
G4S was fined $285,000 Australian dollars for the 2008 death of an Aboriginal man in its 
custody (Perth Now, 2011; Sambrook, 2011). After a deportee died in 2010 while being 
restrained by G4S guards on a flight from Heathrow, the private security officers were 
initially not charged with any crime and subsequently found not guilty of manslaughter 
(Lewis and Taylor, 2012b; Taylor and Booth, 2014). Agamben’s proposal that the 
sovereign creates categories of ‘bare life’ and prolongs the subjugation of zoē must be 
adapted to emphasise the role of the population in carrying out society’s biopolitical 
functions. In 1290 a medieval ship’s master plundered destitute Jews of their worldly 
belongings before leaving them for dead. Today, asylum housing providers have an 
opportunity to extract surplus value out of the detention, transportation and housing of 
asylum seekers in Britain.!!
2.1.2 1793: The Enemy Within!!
! The 1793 Act was introduced on the eve of war with France; it limited the entry of 
French foreigners and restricted their movements once they were in the country. The 
policy was intended to prevent the spread of revolution to Britain. For some in Parliament, 
immigration was the channel through which the seeds of rebellion flowed, as if the 
transference of dissent from one society to another depended on a physical conduit: the 
immigrant. When a remedy was sought in days leading to war with France, the 1793 Act 
empowered the state to remove the migrant element. William Walters (2002) explains that 
the ‘targets’ of deportation and population controls are the ‘political enemies of the state - 
agitators, subversives, revolutionaries - who undermined its authority.’ The 1793 Act was 
no exception as it represented a ‘direct response to fears of revolution’ (Walters, 2002: p. 
278). For Edmund Burke, a fierce opponent of the French Revolution, French Jacobins 
posed a threat to the fabric of the British state. He warned that ‘France [had] endeavoured 
[…] to sew the seeds of enmity among nations, and destroy all local attachments, calling 
them narrow and illiberal’ (Speeches, Vol. IV in Stanlis, 1953: p. 405). Pre-dating Enoch 
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Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech by 175 years, Edmund Burke evoked violent imagery to 
emphasise the immigrant threat. During the second reading of the proposed Aliens Act on 
28 December 1792, Burke claimed that thousands of knives were being fashioned in 
Birmingham and he asserted that it was becoming increasingly necessary ‘to keep the 
French infection from [Britain],’ because where the French travelled, bloodshed was sure 
to follow. At the climax of his histrionic oration, Burke flung a dagger to the floor of the 
House of Commons to depict the tangible threat the British state faced (Roscoe 1930: 67; 
Russell 1997: 2). It is perhaps no surprise that Edmund Burke also advocated an 
alternative approach to human rights laws, believing that different rights should apply to 
British citizen to those from without. The rights of the Englishman, Burke believed, were 
more ‘secure and definite’ than the rights of other men (Agamben, 1998: p. 127; Isin and 
Turner, 2007: p. 13). While fellow Members of Parliament Charles James Fox and Richard 
B. Sheridan openly criticised Burke, the Pitt Government nevertheless passed the Aliens 
Bill, which went into effect on 10 January 1793 (Russell, 1997: pp. 11-12; Fehlings, 2002: 
p. 66).!
! The effect of the legislation on the French migrant in 18th century was extreme. 
Aliens were required to register upon their arrival into Britain and Parliament was given 
the power to deport people deemed to be a threat to the state; anyone failing to comply 
with a deportation order faced capital punishment (Sibley, 1906b: pp. 408-409; Fehlings 
2002: p. 70). During a sitting of the House of Lords in 1858, Lord Brougham recalled:!!
[T]he old Alien Act was attended with many abuses and grievances, one of 
which was the sending parties abroad to the very places from which they had 
escaped, so that they were hurled, as it were, into the lion’s mouth.!
(Hansard, 04 February 1858 in Thornberry, 1963: p. 417)!!
! While the Act was intended to stave off an influx of French immigrants ostensibly 
for the purpose of preventing revolution in Britain, Roscoe (1930) and Russell (1997) 
advance two theories that suggest the Aliens Act served purposes beyond those 
articulated publicly. For Roscoe, the ultimate aim of the legislation was to limit foreign 
immigrants’ ability to seek refuge in Great Britain. He cites a letter from the king to Lord 
Grenville, which states: ‘[M]y own inclination would tend to oblige every one of that 
perfidious nation [France] here, either to go into [military service against France] or, by the 
Aliens Act, be removed from this country’ (Roscoe, 1930: p. 67). Alternatively, Russell 
suggests that the British government was ‘capitalising on the unrest elsewhere in the 
country in order to suppress radical activity within London’ after food shortages had given 
rise to riots (Russell, 1997: p. 1). Elizabeth Sparrow (1998) states that immigration 
controls were justified on the grounds that they would prevent the development of a 
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French-inspired revolution, though they were in fact an ‘extraordinary extension of policy 
powers’ (Sparrow, 1998: pp. 281-282): it was the former lieutenant-general of Lyon, 
Claude Antoine Rey, who drafted the 1793 Act. Sparrow suggests that the bill’s renewal 
three years later went seamlessly because it was grounded in the need to protect British 
subjects; however, the real result was the government’s deployment of police officers to 
conduct surveillance on ‘both foreigners and British nationals’ (Sparrow, 1998: pp. 
282-283). The 1793 Aliens Act was therefore as much an exercise in domestic policing as 
it was a check on immigrant numbers. The passage of the bill represents an early 
demonstration of the state’s ability to legitimise its use of force over both the native 
population and migrant communities through means of legislation. Indeed, it is perhaps 
more useful to view the 1793 Act as a ‘tactic’, rather than a law, as it symbolised the ‘very 
specific’ use of power with ‘population as its target’ (Foucault, 2007: p. 108).!!
2.1.3 The Aliens Act, 1905!!
! The 1905 Aliens Act has often been identified as a significant milestone in British 
immigration policy, particularly for the powers it vested in the Secretary of State, many of 
which still remain with the Home Office and individual immigration officers. Jill Pellew 
(1989) writes that the 1905 Act represents the ‘first modern act to regulate alien 
immigration into Britain’ (Pellew, 1989: p. 369). For Steve Cohen (2002), the Aliens Act set 
the baseline for ‘[t]he dominant ideological position prevailing today in respect to 
controls‘ (Cohen, 2002: pp. 519-520). The period leading up to 1905 was marked by the 
large migration of Jewish refugees from Russia and other European states following 
pogroms and revolutionary strife in their homelands. After a Polish student murdered the 
Czar of Russia in 1881, the Russian government struck back at Jews with the introduction 
of the ‘May Laws’, which severely limited the Jewish community’s ability to trade and 
acquire property (Gainer, 1972: p. 1). Between 1870 and the early 1900s, Jews were 
reported to have ‘migrated by the million’ (Gartner, 1960 in Jones, 1977: p. 78). While 
most Jewish migrants that entered Britain during this period were continuing on to 
America, a number remained within the country and their presence lead to increased 
tensions among local populations (Pellew, 1989: p. 370). By the turn of the century, Britain 
was home to more Eastern European immigrants than any other country aside from the 
United States (Jones, 1977: p. 69). Gainer (1972) writes that the arrival of so many Jewish 
refugees and economic migrants during this period meant that the lines of distinction 
between ‘immigrants’ and ‘Jews’ were blurred, so they were often accepted as analogous 
terms (Gainer, 1972 in Jones, 1977: p. 68).!
! The official response to Jewish immigration was mixed. Jones (1977) writes that 
Britain was considered to be a country with a rich ‘tradition of asylum’ that was ‘hallowed’ 
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and ‘entrenched’ (Jones, 1977: p. 69). A number of people in government, particularly 
Socialists and members of the Liberal Party, viewed asylum from oppression as a basic 
human right. It was considered a moral imperative to support a man fleeing from 
persecution. In a letter to the Times in 1904, Winston Churchill wrote that nothing 
worthwhile could come from abandoning ‘the old tolerant and generous practice of free 
entry and asylum to which this country has so long adhered and from which it has so 
greatly gained’ (Winder in Wray, 2006: p. 304). Others were less concerned with 
humanitarian concerns and were more apprehensive about the possible negative 
economic impact a decline in immigration would bring. The Liberal Party MP, Herbert 
Samuel, declared that the government had ‘no right to shut out oppressed people merely 
because they are poor’, but placed emphasis on the disruption to free trade that would 
correspond with reduced migration. (Gainer, 1972: pp. 144, 149).!
! Arnold White, a journalist staunchly opposed to open borders, wrote that ‘Free 
Trade is a fetish’ and warned that the right of asylum would eventually lead to the demise 
of the English working class (White in Gainer, 1972: p. 154). White further accused 
migrants of carrying with them a societal disease, and the point was raised during 
Parliamentary Debates in 1890 that a solution was needed ‘to prevent [Britain] from 
becoming the dust heap of Europe’ (Jones, 1977: p. 77). Llewellyn Atherley-Jones 
attempted to counter claims of immigrants’ propensity to carry disease by reminding the 
House of Commons that the London Medical Officer of Health found the ‘standard of 
health among the foreign labourers [to be] higher than amongst the [British] working 
classes’ (Hansard, 1905a: cc791-2). Still, the image of the disease-ridden migrant proved 
difficult to shake, and it was thought that immigrants contributed to the perpetuation of 
sweatshops in Britain, because they guaranteed a source of cheap labour. As a result, 
native workers were also exploited. An economist wrote that poor immigrants possessed 
‘a natural aptitude’ for low-paid, degrading work and that their ‘presence in our large cities 
furnishes the corner-stone of the vicious system’ (Hobson, 1891 in Gainer, 1972: pp. 
84-85).!
! Despite public pressures to stem the tide of migration into Britain, some politicians 
feared that vocal condemnation of Jewish immigrants would be viewed as anti-Semitic. 
Public officials had to choose their words carefully in order to avoid sounding bigoted 
(Jones, 1977: p. 72). Sir Charles Dilke criticised proponents of anti-immigration legislation 
stating that refusing Jewish asylum seekers could be considered anti-Semitic and might 
undermine the long-standing tradition of asylum in the UK (Gainer, 1972: p. 151). Those 
officials that did support protectionist legislation approached the matter obliquely, all the 
while stating their respect for the Jewish people (Garrard; Dummett and Nicol in Wray, 
2006: p. 310). Public opinion encouraged the development of immigration controls, but 
few wanted to be perceived as racist or exclusionary. Politicians had to therefore couch 
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their policy aims in amorphous phraseology that both condemned and praised migrants at 
the same time. Helena Wray (2006) writes that governments ‘rationalise anti-immigration 
measures in terms that both minimize the moral claim of the immigrant and maximise the 
humanitarian aspect of the policy’ (Wray, 2006: pp. 305-306).!
! The Government initially reacted to the influx of Jewish immigrants by accepting 
them into the country with the expectation that the voluntary sector would support those 
that were destitute, a policy which very closely mirrors current trends in modern Britain. 
Catherine Jones (1977) suggests that, because the Poor Law had no provision for 
assisting Jewish immigrants, the responsibility of ensuring their wellbeing fell upon the 
Jewish Board of Guardians and other voluntary agencies. This allowed the Government to 
avoid having to publicly support immigrants (Jones, 1977: p. 115). However, the public 
and the more vocal opponents of the Government’s laissez-faire immigration control 
practices were pushing for a more restrictive approach. Arnold White continued to lambast 
the Government’s methods and as a member of Earl Compton’s Committee, a body that 
set out to tackle unemployment, White and fellow Committee members submitted a 
resolution to the Prime Minister ‘condemning unrestricted immigration’ (Gainer, 1972: p. 
81). As such pressures continued to mount, the Government began taking the first steps 
toward placing limits upon the types of people allowed to enter the country.!
! The Aliens Act was designed to serve two primary functions: the restriction of 
immigration to certain ports of call and the deportation of ‘undesirable’ migrants. The Act 
characterised an ‘undesirable immigrant’ as one that either could not produce evidence 
that he was capable of ‘decently supporting himself and his dependents’, was a ‘lunatic or 
an idiot’ that might become a ‘charge’ on public coffers, was a criminal, or was already 
under an expulsion order under the terms of the Act (Aliens Act, 1905: s1(3:a-d)). This 
applied to ‘alien steerage passenger[s]’ that had no intention to proceed ‘to some 
destination out of the United Kingdom’. The Act also limited the vessels considered to be 
‘immigrant ships’ to those carrying ‘more than twenty alien steerage passengers’ (ibid., 
s8(1:a-b)(2)). This restricted the effectiveness of the Act, as persons arriving on smaller 
vessels with fewer migrants aboard were not even screened (Pellew, 1989: pp. 382-384).!
! The Aliens Act features some rudimentary guidelines for determining which 
immigrants should be allowed into the country, and which ones should be refused. While 
the Act was mainly concerned with keeping criminals and destitute migrants from entering 
Britain, it was not intended to exclude people that identified themselves as political or 
religious refugees (Instruction to Immigration Officers, 1906 in Wray, 2006: p. 312). This 
was met with ire in the House of Commons when Claude Hay, MP for Shoreditch Hoxton, 
appealed to the Home Secretary for greater restrictions:!!
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I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view 
of his intention to extend the hospitality of these shores to all foreign persons 
who allege they are suffering from religious or political persecution, he will take 
the necessary measures to prevent such persons from becoming a burden 
upon the poor districts of the great cities of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 
and to prevent the hospitality extended to foreigners who allege they are 
distressed becoming a charge upon the national funds.!
(Hansard, 1906: c1241)!!
Immigration officers were instructed to give people making claims of asylum under these 
grounds the benefit of the doubt (Gladstone letter, 1906 in Pellew, 1989: p. 377). Wray 
suggests that this instruction may in fact be illegal as Section 7(5) of the Act states that 
the ‘onus of proving that that person is not an alien shall lie on that person’ (Wray, 2006: p. 
313; Aliens Act, 1905: s7(5)). However, this stipulation distinguishes between aliens and 
non-aliens, not between aliens and asylum seekers. An asylum seeker is an alien by the 
very fact that he is a foreign national seeking refuge in another state, so Wray’s 
observation may be in error. In any case, it appears that border officials’ dedication to the 
dictates of the Aliens Act was often casual, and decisions were made at the level of 
personal mood or bias.!
! The Home Office response to its immigration duties correlated closely with those 
by the Government. The Aliens Act was a product of a Conservative government that had 
very little life left in it. By December 1905, Liberals came into office and were left with 
managing a policy that had never been popular amid their ranks. They were, however, 
powerless to repeal the Act, because a suggestion of ending entry limitations would have 
been political suicide (Wray, 2006: p. 319). As Home Secretary, Winston Churchill 
unsuccessfully pushed for an alteration to the appeals process to be decided by third-
party courts as opposed to immigration boards managed by the Home Office (Pellew, 
1989: p. 376). Churchill continued to fight the Act’s expansion, rejecting a bill that 
proposed that each alien would be required to notify the state every time he left one 
residence for another (Jewish Chronicle, 5 May 1911 in Wray, 2006: p. 319). The 
ceaseless discordance in the execution of the law left the Aliens Act largely ineffectual. In 
1906, border staff inspected roughly 70 per cent of the immigrants arriving to the country; 
this number dropped to under 60 per cent by 1913 (Pellew, 1989: p. 384).!
! General fears for Britain’s economic health and the individual worker’s concern for 
job security meant that focus turned toward the stream of foreigners entering the country, 
who were perceived to be stealing employment positions from British nationals. This 
notion was challenged in 1903 when the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration said that 
it could find no evidence that immigrants were supplanting natives in British jobs (Wray, 
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2006: p. 309). When Rowland Hunt, MP for Ludlow, suggested that the presence of 
foreigners was suppressing British wages, Under Secretary Ellis Griffith replied: ‘It is 
possible that the immigration of aliens may tend to lower wages in certain industries, but I 
have no definite evidence to support this view’ (Hansard, 1913b: c2257). After announcing 
that British jobs were safe from alien incursion, the Royal Commission on Alien 
Immigration recommended that the Government establish an Immigration Department 
consisting of officers that would weed out ‘undesirable’ immigrants and those ‘likely to 
become a charge upon public funds’ (Gainer, 1972: pp. 159-160). In a move strikingly 
similar to more modern legislation that penalises airline companies for carrying 
‘illegitimate’ asylum seekers to Britain (Willman and Knafler, 2009: p. 18), the Royal 
Commission recommended that shipping companies that delivered immigrants of ‘bad 
character’ to Britain’s shores were to be made responsible for covering the expenses 
relating to their deportation (Gainer, 1972: p. 160).!
! Concerns about joblessness were compounded by the state of the British 
economy in the early twentieth century. Rising rates of unemployment and a decrease in 
British exports likely led to increased wariness toward the entry of skilled and unskilled 
migrants. According to Aldcroft and Richardson (1969), the degeneration of Britain’s 
economy prior to the Second World War was ‘most pronounced before 1913’; its rate of 
growth lagged behind the US, Russia and Japan (Aldcroft and Richardson, 1969: p. 8). 
Sidney Pollard writes, ‘highly fluctuating unemployment was a most obtrusive 
characteristic of the age’ (Pollard, 1989: p. 84). Britain’s inability to carry its success 
forward from the late industrial period has been attributed to a number of factors, such as 
a lack of entrepreneurial spirit amongst British businessmen, a maintenance of antiquated 
manufacturing techniques and an educational establishment that focused more on 
classical instruction than science (Aldcroft and Richardson, 1969: p. 16; Elbaum and 
Lazonick, 1984: pp. 568-572; Pollard, 1989: p. 169). However, immigrants often became 
the preferred target of blame for the state of the British economy. Stricter legislation was 
seen as a way to protect British workers from the onslaught of cheap, foreign labour 
during a time when Britain’s economic growth had flatlined.!
! The Aliens Act marked the beginning of institutionalised immigration control under 
the purview of the British government. It established the Home Office as the central body 
responsible for officially monitoring Britain’s borders, which before had mainly focused on 
ensuring the nation’s security from criminality and other threats to the state. Today, the 
popular press has a tendency to place asylum seekers in the same category as criminals. 
Indeed, the Government’s policy of detaining some asylum seekers in facilities that share 
a striking resemblance to prisons is likely rooted back to a point when the same 
government body responsible for monitoring criminality in Britain was made responsible 
for enacting the Government’s anti-immigration policies. On 5 December 1905, a Liberal 
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government inherited a policy it initially opposed and only half-heartedly carried out, 
leading to mistakes and the interjection of personal bias on the part of immigration 
officers. But, however enfeebled the Aliens Act may have been, it was not abandoned. It 
set a precedent that was to be expanded upon and intensified in subsequent years. By 
1914, the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act was established, which further limited 
the freedoms of immigrants and citizens by declaring that a British woman who married an 
alien was subsequently an alien herself (Baldwin, 2001: p. 522). The 1905 Aliens Act laid 
the groundwork for an official policy toward immigration that became ever more 
exclusionary and it legitimised the public perception of aliens as a threat to Britain’s social 
and economic security.!!
2.1.4 Aliens Restriction Act 1914!!
! With the outbreak of war with Germany in 1914 and the ever mounting fear that 
German spies were running amok in the United Kingdom, the British government sought 
to intensify its surveillance of foreigners wishing to enter the country and those already 
present within. For some within the Liberal Government, the 1905 Act was seen as 
woefully inadequate to deal with the threat of enemy aliens, and it was decided that more 
restrictive measures were needed. In his appeal to the War Cabinet for an extension of 
the provisions of the 1914 Act into peacetime, Home Secretary Edward Shortt described 
the deficiencies of the 1905 Aliens Act and the benefits gained from introducing wartime 
legislation:!!
The powers [introduced in the 1905 Aliens Act] were very incomplete and 
there can be no doubt that they failed to prevent the immigration of a number 
of undesirable aliens and also that many undesirables were left in this country 
owing to the reluctance of Courts to recommend expulsion […].!!
At the outbreak of War, as the Committee pointed out, “a much more drastic 
control of aliens immediately became necessary, and the day after the 
declaration of War the Aliens Registration Act, 1914, was passed […] 
[introducing] measures of exclusion, deportation, arrest, and generally drastic 
supervision and control.!
(CAB 24/76 1919)!!
! When the Act was passed on 5 August, it introduced provisions that limited the 
movements of aliens within the UK and prohibited them from living in specific areas of the 
country, particularly near coasts or military establishments (Hansard, 1914b: c589; 
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French, 1978: p. 366). Expanding upon the powers granted to the Home Secretary in the 
1905 Act, enemies remaining in the country had to join a police register and the Home 
Office was empowered to inter and expel those it deemed to be a threat (Morgenstern, 
1949: p. 346; French, 1978: p. 366). Home Secretary Reginald McKenna stated that the 
in tent ion of the Act was to ‘ remove any ground whatever for publ ic 
apprehension’ (Hansard 1914a: c565). In order to achieve this, the police were authorised 
to investigate any suspected cases of espionage and were expected to arrest and detain 
aliens regarded as spies. Under the 1911 Official Secrets Act, those found to be 
‘prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State’ who had either committed or were ‘about 
to commit’ an offence against the British state could be ‘apprehended and detained in the 
same manner as a person who [was] found guilty of committing a felony’ (Official Secrets 
Act, 1911: ch. 28 s1(1), s6). Within a month of the introduction of the 1914 Act, the 
Commissioner of Police reported that officers had ‘thoroughly investigated all cases where 
they had reason to suspect espionage, as well as some 8,000 or 9,000 reported to them 
by members of the public’ (Hansard, 1914a: c564). However, of all those investigated, 
only 90 were detained (ibid., c564). Still, the Home Office continued to arrest Germans 
civilians and over ten thousand of them were placed in custody by mid-September 1914; 
the scope of the internment programme was so large and the availability of detention 
facilities so limited that the Home Secretary ‘had to agree to the release of over 1,000 
prisoners on parole’ (French, 1978: p. 638).!
! Due to the vast discretionary powers made available to the Secretary of State 
within the bill, the 1914 Aliens Registration Act is perhaps the best example within early 
UK immigration policy of the juridical ‘exception’ being instituted in response to a 
perceived state of emergency; rights typically guaranteed were suspended for the ‘good’ 
of the nation. In effect, as Carl Schmitt states, the capacity to suspend the law was built 
into the juridical order itself (Schmitt, 1985 in Sartori, 1989: p. 68). While an argument 
might be made that the 1793 Aliens Act was itself a response to a state of emergency, it 
was different from the 1914 Act in one crucial respect: Parliament retained the power of 
deportation. Once the government had reserved itself the right to detain and deport, the 
next logical step was to extend this power into peacetime.!!
2.1.5 Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919 & Aliens Order 1920!
! !
! As the First World War drew to a close, it became clear to lawmakers that an 
extension of the provisions of the 1914 Aliens Restriction Act might be desirable following 
an end to hostilities. In July 1919, Mr Doyle asked the Home Secretary if the Home Office 
would make ‘any discrimination between German and other alien immigrants’ and if the 
conditions of the Aliens Act would continue ‘after the signing of Peace and after the 
 66
ratification of the terms of Peace’ (Hansard, 1919a: c1143). At the time, new immigration 
legislation was already being proposed, and the Home Secretary was on course to gain 
even greater control over the admission of foreigners into the country. For instance, the 
amount of officers monitoring borders was to be increased and they were to be made 
answerable directly to the Home Office (Hansard, 1919b: c544).!
! When the new immigration bill was signed into law, it significantly expanded the 
powers of the Home Secretary. Under Section 1, the powers granted to the state by the 
1914 Act were exercisable not only during a state of war or when danger was imminent, 
but ‘at any time’ (Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1919: s1(1)). Similar to current 
border officials’ discretionary power in determining asylum seekers’ ages in the absence 
of appropriate identification, in 1919, the state could determine ‘what nationality [was] to 
be ascribed to aliens in doubtful circumstances’ (ibid., s2(1)(I)). Those found ‘likely to 
cause sedition or disaffection’ could be imprisoned (ibid., s3(1-2)) and, under Section 
10(1), all ‘former enemy aliens’ were barred from entering the United Kingdom for a total 
of three years following the introduction of the Act. Crucially, the 1919 Act extended the 
state of emergency into peacetime, and while it was intended to expire one year after 
ratification, the act was in fact renewed annually until the introduction of the 1971 
Immigration Act that replaced it (Coleman, 1987: p. 1145).!
! From an Agambenian perspective, the 1919 Act represents the moment in British 
history when the exceptional approach to immigration control became normalised and the 
foreigner became subject to the authority of the Home Secretary. Roscoe writes of the 
introduction of the Act:!!
[I]t places a foreigner outside the protection of the law, entirely in the power of 
the Secretary of State ... and under the supervision of the police, and curtails 
his liberty; he has not the rights of a British subject which was the legal 
position of the friendly alien.!
(Roscoe, 1930: p. 70)!!
When the 1920 Aliens Order was released the following year, aliens seeking work were 
required to register with the police (Panayi, 1991 in Saunders, 2003b: pp. 31-32) and all 
aliens wishing to land in the United Kingdom were required to fill in landing cards and 
undergo inspection by an immigration officer; those failing to comply could be detained 
and deported by the Home Secretary (Aliens Order, 1920 s1(1)(a) in Steiner, 1951: p. 362; 
Coleman, 1987: p. 1146; Solomos, 2003 in Bloch and Schuster, 2005b: p. 494; Welch and 
Schuster, 2005: p. 337). With the introduction of the Acts of 1919 and 1920, the seeds of 
modern immigration legislation were fully sewn. When the 1971 Act appeared half a 
century later, the precedence of exclusion was ingrained in British policy.!
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!
2.2 ‘We have been here before’ - constructing the ‘undeserving’ !
!
! As seen with the development of immigration control from 1793 to the early 20th 
century, the classification of migrants as criminal and deviant has been an important 
method for proponents of stricter regulations to elicit support for their efforts to purge 
Britain of its unwanted alien presence. Following the unrest that spread throughout 
London, Birmingham, Manchester and other cities throughout Britain in August 2011, 
historian David Starkey announced on Newsnight that ‘whites have become black’, 
seemingly suggesting that lawlessness on the streets was something foreign and 
unattributable to a more reserved and previously unadulterated white British culture 
(Quinn, 2011). Writing for The Daily Mail, Melanie Phillips blamed a ‘victim’ culture for 
creating a class of immigrants whose attitudes and practices were leading British heritage 
into a state of structural and moral decay (Phillips, 2011). While these views were by no 
means universal, and were subsequently criticised (see: Jones 2011a; Jones 2011b; 
Quinn, 2011), they reflected a common anxiety that foreigners represent a threat to 
security and national identity. In analysing data gathered in two YouGov polls before and 
after the 2011 unrest, Matthew Goodwin and colleagues at Nottingham University 
concluded that there had been a ‘statistically significant’ rise in respondents’ prejudices 
toward foreigners in the aftermath of the disturbances (Taylor, 2011). !
! The demonisation of the ‘other’ and the creation of what Stanley Cohen (2002) 
refers to as ‘folk devils’ is instrumental in developing a narrative of the asylum seeker that 
is both exploitive and destructive. As a result, policies of deterrence no longer have to 
appeal to humanitarian sentiments as immigrants’ humanity is stripped away through 
descriptions of migrant barbarity and brutishness. During periods of unrest in 1958 and 
1981, for instance, accounts of immigrants’ lawlessness were used to push for more 
restrictive controls; while these descriptions cannot be said to causally relate to the 
introduction of stricter policies, they were certainly effective in evoking emotive responses 
and played into popular feelings of discontent regarding cultural intrusions into the ‘British 
way of life’. Few people were as adept at constructing the image of the perfidious and 
aggressive foreigner as Enoch Powell, a man Roy Lewis (1979) has credited with defining 
the ideology of British Conservatism in the twentieth century (Lewis, 1979: p. ix).!
! While many of Powell’s contemporaries would likely have disagreed with Lewis’s 
claim, including perhaps Edward Heath, Powell’s bold, public outcries against unfettered 
immigration allowances enjoyed extensive popular support. His stance on the migration of 
New Commonwealth immigrants, while initially rebuked by Conservatives, soon became a 
cornerstone of party objectives in the early 1970s. Layton-Henry (1992) suggests that the 
Conservatives owed Powell a debt of gratitude for their 1970 general election victory; it 
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was his speeches that prompted the party’s movement toward stricter immigration 
policies, an approach that seemed to resound with the public (Layton-Henry, 1992: p. 83). 
Powell’s influence on policy should not be over-exaggerated: he was not universally 
popular amongst his peers and was becoming progressively more marginalised by his 
own party by the early 1970s. Nevertheless, elements of his stance on immigration did 
make their way into official policy in the 1971 Immigration Act, such as his notion that 
immigrants should be offered a degree of monetary support to be ‘re-patriated’ to their 
countries of origin.!
! Powell drew a clear distinction between immigrants and British ‘natives’, and 
suggested that a distinction be made between ‘coloured’ migrants and those arriving from 
Ireland or other Western nations. In a BBC interview in September 1969, Trevor 
Huddleston asked Powell ‘why the presence of a coloured immigrant group is 
objectionable, when the presence of a non-coloured immigrant is not’. Powell responded 
by stating that ‘the reason why the whole debate in this country on immigration is related 
to coloured immigration, is because there has been no net immigration of white 
Commonwealth citizens’ (Powell, 1992: p. 186). Moreover in his famous speech in 
Birmingham, Powell stated that because of ‘marked’ differences of ‘colour’, the integration 
of ethnic migrants would be ‘difficult’ (ibid., p. 167). Powell’s obsession with emphasising 
the massive influx of New Commonwealth migrants into the UK is evidenced in his 
painstaking analyses of immigration statistics, as well as the numerous letters he sent to 
statisticians and other politicians warning of the imminent threat that ethnic minority 
migrants posed to the British economy and way of life. Powell collected printouts featuring 
the net balances of foreign nationals moving into and out of the UK under the 1971 
Immigration Act. On one such document, he placed tick marks next to the figures for 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand and conspicuously omitted their numbers from his 
tally of migrants entering and exiting Britain (POLL 8/2/2: Immigration Act 1971 statistics, 
Net Balances Jan-Mar 1973). It is hard not to form the impression that Powell is making 
an exception for white migrants and focusing instead on the ‘coloureds’ he believed would 
be unable to adequately integrate into British culture.!
! From Powell’s perspective, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act and the 1965 
legislation that followed had done nothing substantially to quell the amount of immigrants 
coming to Britain. The Labour Party was so fearful of losing political ground to the 
Conservatives that it took an increasingly restrictionist approach to immigration policy, 
which gave ‘supporters of immigration control’ like Enoch Powell the knowledge that they 
‘had the upper hand and that they could dictate the political agenda’ (Layton-Henry, 1992: 
p. 79). Empowered by the surprise success of Peter Griffith’s electoral campaign in 
Smethwick while pursuing an ‘openly anti-immigration’ stance (Hartley-Brewer, 1965 in 
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ibid., p. 77), Powell sought to give a voice to the ‘silent majority’ that wanted to see an end 
to black and Asian migration into Britain.!
! At a Conservative Association meeting on 20 April 1968, Powell gave his now 
infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech. In it, Powell states that, as a Member of Parliament, it 
is his duty to bring to light controversial matters that affect ‘ordinary’ citizens (Powell, 
1992: p. 162). Using anecdotal stories from constituents, Powell displays the immigrant as 
a disrupter of the peace and as someone who would take advantage of an old, 
unassuming British widow. It is not the immigrant who suffers, Powell states, but the 
native Briton. ‘The discrimination and the deprivation, the sense of alarm and of 
resentment, lies not with the immigrant population but with those among whom they have 
come and are still coming’ (ibid., p. 165). Immigrants, Powell claims, are such a strain on 
resources that native British women cannot find hospital beds upon which to give birth and 
British children are unable to pursue an education because immigrant children have 
overrun schools (ibid., p. 166). Powell claims that he wants no special treatment for 
immigrants or citizens, but declares that a citizen should have the ‘right to discriminate in 
the management of his own affairs’ (ibid., p. 164). Powell makes a few Conservative policy 
suggestions including dropping support for the Race Relations Bill, bringing the net 
migration of New Commonwealth migrants down to zero and offering a stipend to those 
immigrants wishing to return to their countries of origin (ibid., p. 164). In closing, Powell 
warns that race relations are in danger of becoming as bad in the UK as they are in the 
US. Likening Britain to ancient Rome, Powell declares that he sees ‘the River Tiber 
foaming with much blood’. The only solution, he warns, is the cessation of immigration 
(ibid., pp. 168-169).!
! The immediate reaction to Powell’s speech was varied. Before the full public 
response had been heard, Edward Heath ousted Powell from the Shadow Cabinet fearing 
his words to be a political liability for the Conservatives (Spencer 1997: p. 143). Labour 
and Conservatives alike condemned Powell’s racist overtones and the press watched 
closely to see what the future would bring for Powell’s career. To the surprise of many, but 
perhaps not to Powell himself, his speech became the rallying cry for a significant portion 
of the public that perceived a similar ‘coloured’ migrant ‘problem’, and to whom his 
proposed solutions appealed. Gallup poll results between 1964 and 1969 highlight a 
significant increase in Powell’s popularity following his speech. Respondents were asked 
to select whom they thought should replace Edward Heath if he were to retire. In April 
1968, prior to Powell’s speech, only 1 per cent of respondents favoured Powell. A month 
later, the results from the same poll had Powell ranked first amongst his rivals and 
enjoying 24 per cent of respondents’ preferences (Gallup, 1968 in Studlar, 1974: p. 379). 
Powell received thousands of letters supporting his stance, many providing anecdotal 
stories to support his claims. A Conservative MP who wished to remain anonymous wrote 
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a letter of particular interest, stating that the old-age pensioners in his constituency, who 
comprised 40 per cent of its population, were ‘almost without exception,’ behind Enoch 
Powell (POLL 8/1/8: MP's letter to Powell, 19 November 1968). As Powell’s popularity 
increased, his fellow Conservatives began changing tack. In a speech in York on 20 
September 1968, Edward Heath declared, ‘The time has come when the legislation 
relating to the entry of aliens … should be brought together with the law relating to 
Commonwealth immigrants and be placed on the basis of permanent legislation’ (POLL 
8/2/2: Conservative Research Department, 'Notes on current politics, Home Office affairs', 
4 August 1969, p. 40).!
! It is important not to exaggerate Powell’s ability to sway public opinion. Powell’s 
ability to sway public opinion and the decisions of the Conservative Party were limited: he 
was in near constant conflict with his peers, and the elements of his ideology that did 
make their way into policy were significantly watered down. For instance, when the 1971 
Immigration Act final came into law, the amount of money allotted for the purpose of 
repatriating immigrants was negligible (Spencer, 1997: p. 144). Powell’s impact on public 
opinion regarding this specific matter is unclear. In Studlar’s analysis of Powell’s impact on 
public attitudes about ‘colour issues’, he finds that prior to Powell’s speech, ‘public opinion 
had strongly endorsed the Government’s action in passing the 1968 Immigrant 
Act’ (Studlar, 1974: 376). In a Gallup Poll conducted in March 1968, 59 per cent of 
respondents stated that the repatriation of immigrants should be encouraged. In May, 
following Powell’s speech, this level rose only slightly to 63 per cent (Gallup, 1968 in 
Studlar, 1974: 377).!
! Powell’s popularity amongst his fellow MPs was variable. Conservatives tended to 
avoid backing his pronouncements outright because of their extremity. Labour MPs 
outwardly castigated Powell, but quietly backed anti-immigration policies due to their 
electoral promise. Some, however, were not afraid to express themselves. Labour MP 
David Ennals spoke to a congregation of immigrants outside a Sikh temple at Gravesend, 
declaring:!!
[Enoch Powell] made his speech not in Parliament but with the calculated 
intention of getting as much space as possible in the Sunday Press. I view 
with revulsion the way he must have sat gloating over the inches devoted to  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his speech, and I hope that many will speak out against the philosophy 
advocated in that speech … [Powell] gravely misjudged and underestimated 
[British tolerance].!
(POLL, 8/1/8: 'Space Calculation', Daily Telegraph clipping, 15 November 
1968)!!
! Some Conservatives were similarly critical. In his semi-autobiographical account of 
Britain’s economic decline, Conservative MP Aubrey Jones of Birmingham criticised 
Powell’s desire to cut spending on social services and referred to him as ‘hopelessly 
wrong’ (Jones, 1985: p. 12). Unlike Powell, Jones believed immigration would boost 
Britain’s economy, not hamper it, and believed it would enhance the productivity of the 
domestic labour force (Jones, 1985: p. 16-17). Over time, Powell’s relationship with the 
Conservative Party diminished further; in a series of correspondence with fellow 
Conservative MP, Reginald Maudling, Powell expresses concern regarding the number of 
students and visitors entering Britain whose settlement was not being recorded in 
immigration statistics. At first, Maudling affirms that ‘while some Commonwealth citizens 
admitted as visitors and students are allowed to stay permanently, others admitted for 
settlement decide to leave’. The only way to get an accurate representation of net 
migration figures, Maudling suggests, would be to have the Home Office ‘interview 
everyone who leaves the country as well as those who enter’, something he deems 
impractical (POLL, 8/2/2: Maudling, letter to Powell, 24 September 1970). When Powell 
further pursues the matter in a subsequent letter, Maudling offers a curt reply that the 
comment ‘will be of interest to the Office of Population, Censuses, and Surveys […]. I am 
therefore passing a copy of the correspondence to Keith Joseph [Conservative MP, 
Secretary of State for Social Services]’ (POLL, 8/2/2: Maudling, letter to Powell, 8 October 
1970). When Powell was later distressed by the ‘under-numeration’ of immigration figures 
in the 1971 census, he proposed to David Owen, MP of the Department of Health and 
Social Security, that the Census data be compared to figures produced by the Department 
of Education and Sciences. In a response letter, Owen critiques Powell’s methods stating 
that his findings suggest an ‘element of doubt’ and that his calculations are ‘most 
hazardous’ (POLL, 8/2/2: Owen, letter to Powell, 14 October 1975). A 1973 Times article 
announced that the Census office disagreed with Powell’s figures and an office official 
reported that ‘independent checks … don’t support any significant under-enumeration in 
the census’ (POLL, 8/2/2: 'Census office challenges Mr Powell's figures', The Times 
clipping, 26 November 1973).!
! Taking into account Powell’s alienation from the Conservative Party and his 
personal decision to break away from it in the early 1970s, much can still be said about 
the lasting influence of his ideology on the future course of the Conservative Party and the 
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stance both major parties took toward immigration. By the late 1990s, New Labour and 
Conservative views on immigration were almost indistinguishable. In response to 
Conservative criticism of Labour’s approach to immigration, Tony Blair responded that 
Conservatives ‘know perfectly well that we have been legislating on it, from 1998 
onwards, and tightening the system – often in the face of their opposition’ (Blair, 2005). In 
January 2010, David Cameron declared that net immigration of around 200,000 was ‘too 
much’. He preferred to ‘see net immigration in the tens of thousands rather than the 
hundreds of thousands’ (Prince, 2010). Indeed, the fact that the coalition government has 
been unable to meet its target of reducing immigration to a level below 100,000 people - 
net migration to the UK increased to 243,000 by August 2014 - was criticised by the 
opposition leader, Ed Miliband, as a sign of political weakness (Travis, 2014; BBC News, 
2015).!
! The combined legacy of 1960s legislation and Powell’s mustering of anti-migrant 
sentiment was the development of consensus between the Labour and Conservative 
Parties on immigration objectives. With the introduction of the 1971 Immigration Act, 
‘patrials’, or those Commonwealth migrants who could claim hereditary links to a parent or 
grandparent born in Britain, were eligible for citizenship while ‘non-patrials’ were not. As 
Lisa Hassan (2000) suggests, patrials were ‘usually white’ (Hassan, 2000: p. 187). 
Powell’s omission of citizens of Australia, New Zealand and Canada from his calculations 
of net Commonwealth migration was a practice adopted in official policy. The 1971 
legislation also introduced the power to detain migrants, a practice heavily adopted 
throughout the 1990s and expanded through to the present period. In 2013, 30,400 
immigrants entered detention up from 27,000 in 2011 (UK Home Office, 2014 in Silverman 
and Hajela, 2015: p. 3). All but four detention facilities in the United Kingdom are operated 
by private companies, including G4S and Serco (ibid., p. 3).!
! The connection between immigration and criminality has a long heritage in Britain. 
The denouncement of immigration on the grounds that it introduces criminal elements into 
Britain has been perpetuated for hundreds of years. During the seventeenth century, 
French Huguenots escaping persecution in France arrived in England to accusations of 
being Catholic spies seeking to undermine the English way of life (Hintermaier, 2000: p. 
440). Wray (2006) and Greenslade (2005) describe the manner in which Jewish 
immigrants arriving in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were cast as 
criminals in both the press and amongst politicians (Wray, 2006: p. 9; Greenslade, 2005: 
p. 314). David French (1978) examines the effect of ‘spy fever’ on debates surrounding 
British immigration policy in 1905 and beyond (French, 1978). Negative positions on 
immigration were far from unanimous in each of these instances, and significant 
opposition remained at least early on in the development of British immigration policy. For 
instance, in response to the presence of German nationals living in Britain in the early 
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1900s, the War Office sought to register all foreign nationals living in Britain during 
peacetime, but this was met with heavy opposition from the Labour Party (ibid., p. 359). 
Even Winston Churchill, who in 1911 proposed an immigration bill that aimed to further 
penalise those protecting illegal immigrants and empower the government to deport 
foreigners found guilty of a crime (Wrigley, 2002: p. 305), was forced to concede that the 
presence of foreigners did not appreciably affect crime rates. When asked whether rising 
crime levels were directly attributable to the increase in immigration between 1909 and 
1910, Churchill replied that the proportion of foreigners in prison in England and Wales 
had decreased by fifty per cent in the years between 1904 and 1910. ‘[I]t is clear’, he 
stated, ‘that the number of aliens who come to this country does not sensibly affect the 
matter, if the point is tested by comparing the number of aliens received in prison on 
conviction with the number of all convicted prisoners in England and Wales’ (Hansard, 
1911: cc277). However, the construction of migrants as criminal persisted, and continues 
to in the present era.!
! When Enoch Powell stood before the Conservative Association meeting in April 
1968, he was careful to stress more than immigration reform; his sense of ‘foreboding’ 
extended to those migrants already present in the United Kingdom whose ‘colour’ made 
integration ‘difficult’ and who, in Powell’s opinion, had no intention to integrate in the first 
place. He recommended re-emigration for those migrants already present, as such a 
solution would be the only way to avert disaster:!!
If all immigration ended tomorrow, the rate of growth of the immigrant and 
immigrant-descended population would be substantially reduced, but the 
prospective size of this element in the population would still leave the basic 
character of the national danger unaffected. […] Hence the urgency of 
implementing now the second element of the Conservative Party’s policy: the 
encouragement of re-emigration.!
(Powell, 2007)!!
Powell’s descriptions of migrants’ deviance and criminality accentuated the extent of the 
problem and his lurid account of a pensioner being ‘abused’ by ‘two Negroes’ served to 
reinforce his point. Predating Wilson and Kelling’s infamous 1982 Atlantic Weekly article 
by nearly 15 years, Powell used the imagery of broken windows to warn of more serious 
crime to come. He described the shoving of faeces through a letter box as if it were a 
metaphor for the entire British experience.!
! Powell’s representations have been channeled into more modern reactions to 
migrant presences in the United Kingdom, and asylum seekers in particular have been 
portrayed with a similar sense of ominousness. Nigel Farage, leader of the UK 
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Independence Party, has said that the ‘basic principle’ of Powell’s speech was sound and 
remarked that ‘[h]ad we listened to [Powell], we would have much better race relations 
than we have got’ (Mason, 2014). UKIP’s rise in popularity has corresponded with 
suggestions that the Conservative Party is attempting to retain supporters by taking a 
firmer stand on immigration (Watt, 2013). Business Secretary Vince Cable has intimated 
that contemporary panic surrounding immigration is comparable to the fervour that Powell 
incited over four decades ago (Wintour, 2013b). Today, migrants continue to be associated 
with criminality. Examples abound in Daily Mail headlines, and the fervour surrounding the 
presence of foreign ‘criminals’ like Abu Qatada coupled with fears of ‘swamping’ by 
asylum seekers, has resulted in the coalition government’s condemnation of immigration 
judges and its denouncement of the Human Rights Act and Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which protects migrants’ rights to private and 
family life (Hennessy, 2012). Home Secretary Theresa May’s resolve to abandon the 
ECHR was seemingly strengthened following the government’s difficulty in deporting 
Qatada, as she stated that ‘all options - including withdrawal from the convention 
altogether - should remain on the table’ (Travis, 2013). Official antipathy toward 
immigrants, particularly asylum seekers, stands at odds with the government’s formal 
obligations to honour the spirit of international human rights agreements dating back to 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1950 signing of the ECHR and the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.!
! The immigration policies developed throughout the 1990s and 2000s, which I 
detail further in chapters 3 and 4, reveal the extent to which the Labour Party viewed 
immigration as a political problem. With the issue of Commonwealth migration effectively 
controlled after the 1981 Nationality Act abolished birthright citizenship, new populations 
were singled out for control. Given the steep rise in the number of refugees seeking 
asylum in the United Kingdom throughout the late 1990s,  asylum seekers became a 2
primary target for control. In 1995, the year before the introduction of the 1996 Asylum and 
Immigration Act, principal asylum applicants accounted for 34.3 per cent of all net 
migration into the United Kingdom. By 1999, the percentage rose to 59.8 per cent before 
eventually dropping to its 2013 level of 12.6 per cent (ONS, Long-Term International 
Migration, 2013). While White Papers including 1998’s Fairer, Faster and Firmer and 
2002’s Secure Borders, Safe Havens delineated the Labour government’s attitudes 
toward the perceived influx of asylum seekers, the following statement from a personal 
interview with the former Home Secretary, David Blunkett, illuminates the logic 
underpinning the Blair government’s use of detention as a social control measure and its 
 In 1987, the United Kingdom received 4,256 asylum applications. The number of applications hit a 2
total of 84,130 in 2003 and following a reduction to just under 18,000 in 2010 rose to 23,507 in 
2013 (Blinder, 2014: p. 2).
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aims to incorporate civil society in the management of destitute asylum seekers and their 
dependents:!!
I didn’t come into politics to have a major part of my time as it was when I was 
Home Secretary dealing with heart-rending asylum cases - people who didn’t 
want to return to their home country - not least to do with children, but we had 
to. And we had to, because if people weren’t cooperating on removal and they 
absconded when you freed them from secure centres, then you have no 
choice but to do something […].!!
The other thing I said was: ‘Well the people who are campaigning so 
vigorously and are so hurt and upset - why don’t we agree that they have the 
families in their homes and they act as guarantor for them?’ I didn’t get any 
takers. This has to be a civil society as well as a governmental issue. 
Fortunately for the current coalition, the number of asylum seekers coming to 
this country […] partly because of the measures we took (the closure of 
Sangatte, the liaison offices in airports, the security immigration offices on 
northern European coasts), all measures we had taken over the last decade - 
have resulted in asylum claims being something like 20 per cent of those I was 
dealing with in 2001/2. Unfortunately, they’ve taken a very illiberal line on 
economic migration and work permits […].!
(Rt Hon David Blunkett MP, Interview, 02 November 2012)!!
! Reference to human rights or the state’s humanitarian duties are conspicuously 
absent from Blunkett’s assessments of how asylum seekers should be managed within 
securitised environments. Though he later credited Britain’s role in the establishment of 
human rights law - ‘those basic agreed international rights we [Britain] were instrumental 
in developing in the first place back in 1951’ (ibid.) - Blunkett’s language centres more on 
the state’s need to control asylum seekers under the assumption that if not in detention, 
they would ‘abscond’. Secondly, his comments reflect the neoliberal logic upon which the 
distinctions between deserving and undeserving migrants are founded: those who can 
contribute to the economy of the United Kingdom are deemed acceptable while those 
seeking to enter the country on humanitarian grounds - no matter their potential for 
economic contribution - are presented as a population that requires management, 
incarceration and, ultimately, removal.!
! In charting the course of English and British immigration policies from the 13th 
century to the 1960s, it is evident that exclusionary tactics are embedded within the 
country’s legislative culture. While the specific populations targeted for exclusion and 
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removal have changed over time, from the Jews of the 1200s to the French Huguenots of 
the 18th century and the West Indian migrants of the 1960s, the practice and governance 
of exclusion remain central to the state’s defence of society through biopolitical 
mechanisms of control and restrictionism. The establishment and reinforcement of 
‘Britishness’ has depended upon the identification of an alien ‘other’ whose presence 
defines the boundaries of belonging. Refinements to the definition of citizenship through 
the 1960s, with the introduction of the 1971 Immigration Act and finally, the 1981 British 
Nationality Act, served to delimit the boundaries of legitimacy. To exist outside the 
category of citizen is to remain subject to increasingly discretionary immigration rules. In 
the following chapter, I expand on notions of identity and employ various theoretical 
approaches to help develop an understanding of the logics underpinning current policies 
and practices concerning asylum seekers within the United Kingdom. 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Chapter 3: The governance of exclusion: sovereignty, immunity 
and the securitisation of home!
!
! In this chapter, I turn briefly to interpretations of British legislative history that 
present restrictions as methods of population management intended to demarcate the 
boundaries between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ of state recognition and support 
(Sales, 2002). This is followed by a consideration of the debates surrounding state 
sovereignty and the British state’s obligations under international human rights 
agreements. I demonstrate that the UK government does not operate within a legislative 
vacuum; appeals to Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), for instance, are important avenues of resistance against efforts to deny the 
rights of refugees. Coupled with the actions of charities, voluntary organisations, lawyers 
and activists from a variety of disciplines, legislative duties remain the primary method of 
combatting restrictionist policies. Executive responses to these forms of resistance have 
been manifest in cuts to legal aid, the defunding of charitable organisations and one-stop 
services and the regular denunciation of international human rights law by prominent 
members of the coalition government.  The admission of small numbers of refugees in 3
one-off displays of British magnanimity, such as the acceptance of 4,000 Kosovan 
Albanians in the late 1990s and the coalition government’s January 2014 commitment to 
admit 500 Syrians have resulted in a varied public response. However, as many authors 
have previously indicated, reactions to the arrival and continued presence of asylum 
seekers in the United Kingdom are generally and increasingly negative (see: Welch and 
Schuster, 2005; Statham, 2003; Greenslade, 2005; Hubbard, 2005). In this chapter, I 
demonstrate that the construction of asylum seekers is linked to fears of racial incursion 
and the criminality viewed to be inherent to non-white British residents and foreigners. 
Responses to the 2011 British riots, such as those by David Starkey and Melanie Phillips, 
illustrate the degree to which societal disorder is linked to the presence and continued 
influx of non-white migrants. I argue that a culture of securitisation has arisen to rein in the 
 Conservative politicians including David Cameron, Theresa May and Chris Grayling 3
have advocated for the abandonment of the 1998 Human Rights Act and the UK’s 
eventual withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights (Travis, 2013). 
Attorney General Dominic Grieve warned against a British withdrawal from the ECHR, as 
it would undermine an ‘international order’ that Britain has played an important role in 
developing (Brogan, 2013), and Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister, has expressed his 
intent to challenge Conservatives’ attempts to abandon the Human Rights Act (Stratton, 
2011). Citing public views on immigration between 1997 and 2001, Mulvey (2010) writes 
that the acceptance of Kosovan refugees did not engender ‘widespread hostility’ (Mulvey, 
2010: p. 450). A YouGov/Times poll conducted in late January 2014 revealed that 47 per 
cent of respondents did not support Britain’s admission of a few hundred Syrian refugees 
as compared to 39 per cent that supported the move and 14 per cent that reported that 
they did not know (Jordan, 2014).
 78
‘foreign’ element already present within the United Kingdom and to channel new arrivals 
into a carceral system of perpetual precariousness. Drawing and extending on the work of 
Bülent Diken (2004), I consider the extent to which immigration arrival and removal 
centres can be likened to the ‘camp’, a space of exception where asylum seekers are 
relegated to a position of bare life. I close with a brief consideration of governmentality 
and the tactics of exclusion employed in the governance of asylum policies and question 
whether the entry of private security into the management of asylum housing represents 
an extension of the state of exception.!!
3.1 Forging Britishness: Explanations of Identity Construction!
!
! Multiple interpretations of the United Kingdom’s exclusionary immigration practices 
position controls within the frameworks of identity construction, cultural protectionism and 
biopolitical responses to the introduction of foreign bodies. For instance, Jock Young 
(2003) suggests that the insecurities arising out of a perceived loss of community in the 
era of late modernity has led people to seek out a ‘firm identity’ in ‘nationalism, 
fundamentalism [and] racism’ (Young, 2003: p. 457). Through his discussion of immunity, 
Roberto Esposito (2013) implies that the creation and perpetuation of community is 
dependent upon a negation; commonality amongst diverse people is established through 
their mutual rejection of their obligations toward foreigners (Esposito, 2013: pp. 45, 59). 
These explanations go beyond simple denouncements of inherently racist publics and 
instead situate social exclusion within a more Foucauldian perspective in which state 
expressions of power give way to goals of societal preservation.!
! As popular views of asylum seekers are moulded and amplified in news reports 
highlighting the threat they pose to ‘native’ citizens, these explanations are useful in 
understanding why policies of restrictionism and securitisation are a prevalent feature of 
modern controls. They help provide insight into why successive UK governments have 
pursued what the Joint Committee on Human Rights describes as a ‘deliberate policy’ of 
‘destitution’ (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2007: p. 24). The reasoning behind 
measures like Section 55 of the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, which 
denied support to asylum seekers who did not claim asylum within a reasonably 
practicable period, is rendered less arbitrary when viewed through the lens of nationalist 
paternalism and societal protectionism. Likewise, the privatisation of asylum housing can 
be seen as both a product of neoliberal marketisation and an indirect attempt to render 
asylum seekers’ living experiences so uncomfortable that voluntary return becomes a 
more attractive prospect to them (see: Bigo, 2002 and Darling, 2011), an impression 
confirmed by an associate of a former interview subject who explained that the 
interviewee in question had decided to return to her country of origin for this very reason 
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(WY-L-05, Interview, 06 September 2013). Nevertheless, despite the efforts of successive 
Home Secretaries to make destitution a negative incentive for attempting to sustain a 
refused asylum claim, figures from agencies contracted to provide assisted voluntary 
return show that despite often very severe privations, a very small percentage of asylum 
seekers are prepared to return to their countries of origin or transit countries for a complex 
variety of reasons that differ according to each individual circumstance (Giner, 2007: p. 
254; Quinn, 2013: p. 11). Crawley, Hemmings and Price (2011) explain that the number of 
asylum seekers choosing voluntary return in 2009 was less than two per cent of the total 
number living in the UK. They surmise that ‘[t]he low level of voluntary return is indicative 
of the clear decision of refused asylum seekers to choose a life of destitution rather than 
accept state support on the condition of returning to their country of origin’ (Crawley, 
Hemmings and Price, 2011: p. 61). !
! The goals of privatisation and restriction are not always complementary; the 
creation of a housing market dependent upon asylum seekers as residents is not 
necessarily compatible with government aims to reduce the number of asylum applicants 
seeking state-contracted housing support. Private firms like Serco and G4S profit from the 
maintenance of populations in perpetual states of indeterminacy. The companies’ 
contracts in the United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, South Africa and elsewhere are 
testament to this reality. However, such organisations also serve an expulsive function in 
carrying out transportation and escort services. Once again, superficial explanations of 
state sovereignty and the inevitable reduction of asylum seekers to a status of ‘bare life’ 
are contrasted with a more nuanced manifestation of power, in which asylum seekers 
exist at the nexus between commodification, exclusion and resistance. This is reflected 
most acutely in the housing experiences of asylum seekers within the COMPASS 
programme who carry with them an aggregate of experiences ranging from destitution and 
detention to moments of agency and defiance. These experiences exist within a 
continuum in which the separation between state surveillance and private provision is 
sometimes difficult to discern; matters are made more complicated given the fact that 
former public officials have transitioned into prominent positions within private security 
companies. !
! For example, G4S hired former Home Secretary, John Reid, as a Group 
Consultant in 2008 (Syal, 2009). Michael Hickley, writing for the Mail Online, criticised the 
appointment as it was shortly followed by G4S’s successful acquisition of a four-year 
contract providing security guards at military locations across the country (Hickley, 2009). 
In early 2011, Phil Wheatley, former Director General of HM Prison Service, was hired as 
a consultant to G4S. The managing director of the firm’s care and justice services 
declared that Wheatley’s experience would ‘be of enormous benefit as we seek to develop 
our care and justice portfolio around the world’ (Banks quoted in Doward, 2010). Despite 
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resistance from the Prison Officers’ Association, in March of the same year, G4S was 
awarded a fifteen-year contract to operate prisons in Wolverhampton and Birmingham for 
£750 million (Sambrook, 2013).!
As I detail in chapter 6, a number of asylum seekers housed by G4S, Serco and 
their subcontractors had prior knowledge of these firms and strongly believed that the 
companies’ primary goals were profit-seeking. Further support to this interpretation was 
provided when Jeremy Stafford of Serco and Stephen Small of G4S confirmed during a 
Home Affairs Select Committee meeting on asylum that they were, in the words of MP 
David Winnick, ‘in the business […] to make a profit’ (House of Commons, 2013b). 
Representatives of G4S and Serco are clear that the firms aim to enter into new markets 
and assimilate services previously provided through the state. From G4S’s acquisition of 
the Department for Work and Pensions’ ‘Welfare to Work’ scheme in 2011 to recent 
revelations that the Department of Education is seeking to outsource children’s social 
services to Serco and G4S, the precedent for such expansion already exists (Parker, 
2013; Butler, 2014). The extent to which G4S and Serco play a role in the governance of 
state surveillance practices is an issue explored in later chapters, though critics of these 
companies’ entry into the asylum housing market emphasise their administration of the 
state’s deliberate policies of destitution and exclusion. John Grayson (2014) writes that 
‘asylum housing managed by G4S and Serco has exposed [asylum seekers to] the 
everyday abuse and disrespect […] by the Home Office and their contractors’ (Grayson, 
2014). In this view, asylum seekers serve a dual role as units of value production and 
bodies marked for banishment. In academic literature, particularly that which emphasises 
the state’s role in isolating and ostracising unwanted groups, asylum seekers have often 
been represented solely in the latter capacity. While I argue that this is an insufficient 
construction of asylum seekers’ experiences, it remains important to explore the 
interpretations of the state’s basis for exclusion, as these factors remain significant 
features of asylum seekers’ lives.!
! The existence of the COMPASS project reveals a connection between two hitherto 
largely discrete and non-conversing literatures; there is a wide range of literature on 
issues of state racism and exclusionary imagined communities, while another body of 
work addresses the neoliberal marketisation of state services, in particular the state’s 
delegation of its monopoly on the use of force to private actors. Within the exclusionary 
logics of state policy aiming to ban and remove asylum seekers and the neoliberal 
phenomenon of ever-expanding marketised services lies a fundamental paradox: asylum 
seekers are ‘bad’, but asylum markets are ‘good’. However, one cannot exist without the 
other; the system then becomes one of a perpetual performative punishment rather than 
one of direct expulsion. Agamben’s ‘camp’ - or more broadly, spaces of exception - are 
central for symbolic reasons of visual containment as well as the function they serve in 
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maintaining an ever-growing asylum market. Agamben is partially correct in describing the 
‘ban’ and the creation of ‘bare life’, but he misses a critical element beyond the agency of 
those banned: the need to sustain the very profitable industry of death (and life) as much 
as the state must sustain bare life and the perpetuation of a state of exception. It is a 
global industry and one that states arguably rely on in order to maintain their other two 
objectives.!
! The literature on this industry is broad in scope, particularly in reference to the 
detention estates of the United States and Australia. Indeed, Anne McNevin (2007) 
addresses Hollifield’s ‘liberal paradox’ with specific reference to the detention of asylum 
seekers in Australia through the use of private security firms, stating that this paradox can 
be understood as ‘the trend amongst contemporary states towards greater transnational 
open-ness in the economic arena alongside growing pressure for domestic political 
closure’ (McNevin, 2007: p. 611). Evans (2003) employs the notions of the camp and 
exceptional spaces in her description of the Australian detention estate, which in 2003, 
was entirely ‘operated by Australasian Correctional Management (AC), a wholly owned 
subsidiary of U.S. private prison giant, Wackenden Inc.’ (Evans, 2003: p. 164). 
Mukhopadhyay (2009) describes the United States’ use of private firms in maintaining a 
market for the detention of bodies: the United States ‘has implemented a system that 
targets the immigrant community and burdens taxpayers by facilitating profit for the private 
corporations who run detention facilities’ (Mukhopadhyay, 2009: p. 701).!
! Writing from a Canadian perspective, where this practice is still in its early stages 
of expansion relative to the maturely developed detention estates in the US, Australia and 
the UK, Tamara Vukov (2003) refers to national borders as the sites at which ‘imagined 
communities are generated in part through state policies, particularly immigration 
polices’ (Vukov, 2003: p. 335). For Vukov, the maintenance of borders is associated with 
‘an institutionalised state project’ of reaffirming citizens’ right to live through outsiders’ 
exposure to death; state racism represents a return of ‘the sovereign right’ in the 
management of foreign bodies (ibid., pp. 337-338). In Vukov’s estimation, the state’s role 
in securing the population is associated with the ‘sense of threat or panic’ generated 
through ‘media spectacles and governmental polices’ (ibid., pp. 338, 340). She highlights 
the way in which anti-immigrant sentiment in Canada is perpetuated through ‘racialised 
and sexualised’ representations of societal threats within the media; she notes the well-
established association of asylum seekers with criminality (ibid., pp. 340, 344). !
! I return to the criminalisation and demonisation of asylum seekers as a method of 
identity construction later in this chapter, but Vukov’s depiction of the Canadian 
experience is supported in similar literature outlining the construction of national identity 
through the identification of the ‘other’ as an articulation of difference. Jock Young (2003) 
explains that the development of national identity is made possible through the 
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‘designation of the immigrant as an Other, an alien group as opposed to the supposed 
cultural normality of the indigenous population’ (Young, 2003: p. 455). Young states that 
this process is particularly pronounced in the era of late modernity in which ‘economic 
insecurity and uncertainty of identity’ demand ‘a fixed identity based on the notion of a 
cultural essence which is reaffirmed, rediscovered and elaborated upon’. He writes: ‘This 
essentializing of the self, the allocation of oneself and one’s kith and kin, firm virtues 
rooted in the culture is inevitably accompanied by the essentializing and denigration of the 
other’ (ibid., pp. 456-457). !
! Similarly, Roxanne Doty (1996) states that ‘national identity is constructed vis-à-vis 
the representation of the “other”’ (Doty, 1996: p. 236). Reiterating Hobsbawm’s 
observation, Doty explains: ‘Nations do not make states, but rather states make 
nations’ (Hobsbawm, 1992 in Doty, 1996: pp. 240-241). National identity formation, Doty 
explains, is closely tied to an identification of difference on the basis of race. To 
demonstrate this, she describes the trajectory of British immigration legislation from the 
introduction of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act to the establishment of separate 
levels of citizenship within the 1981 British Nationality Act. The 1962 Act, which introduced 
employment vouchers for Commonwealth immigrants, was racist in concept and 
execution. Doty highlights the Labour Party’s opposition to the Act on the grounds that it 
was ‘bare-faced, open race discrimination’ (Patrick Gordon Walker, 1961 quoted in Doty, 
1996: p. 245). There are clear limitations to Doty’s estimation of the expansion of racist 
immigration policies. As I explained in the previous chapter, exclusionary immigration 
policies have been defended on the grounds of racial purification since the 1905 Aliens 
Act and beyond. Arguably, state racism is a feature of a much earlier era; for Foucault 
(2004), it ‘has been in existence for a very long time’ before the ‘emergence of […] 
biopower that inscribes it in the mechanisms of the State. […] As a result, the modern 
State can scarcely function without becoming involved with racism at some point, within 
certain limits and subject to certain conditions’ (Foucault, 2004: p. 254). For Bauman 
(2004), the creation of ‘wasted lives’, or those lives that ‘either could not or were not 
wished to be recognized or allowed to stay’ is a feature of modernity and thus, an outcome 
of trajectories toward mass literacy and urbanisation (Bauman, 2004: p. 5).!
! So, while events surrounding the introduction of the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act serve to confirm Doty’s estimation that it was pivotal in the establishment 
of a racially exclusionary precedent within British immigration policy, Doty does not extend 
her development of state racism to the formative development of the modern state, and 
therefore does not fully address the degree to which this phenomenon is entrenched 
within the functioning of the state. However, if we expand on Doty’s perspective while 
considering that the foundations of state racism stretch much further back in time, then we 
can begin to discuss the post-war period within a broader context. It was a reactionary 
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response to heightened immigration from the Commonwealth in the early 1960s and the 
perceived tensions between West Indian and Pakistani migrants and the white 
communities they were seen to have overrun. Media representations of West Indian and 
Pakistani involvement in the 1958 riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill centred on racial 
tensions, though actual involvement of ethnic minority groups was limited. Nevertheless, 
Conservative MPs like Peter Griffiths gained electoral traction by representing the 
disturbances as ‘race riots’ (see: Hirschler, 2012). Coupled with an increase in the rate of 
Commonwealth immigration into Britain, which rose from 21,600 in 1959 to 136,400 by the 
end of 1961 (CAB 129/121, 1965: Annex C, s(1-2)), the perception that Commonwealth 
citizens presented a threat to the British culture and population gave rise to calls for 
further controls. Cyril Osborne and Norman Pannell were perhaps the most vocal 
advocates. Osborne once challenged a fellow MP: ‘Does the unrestricted immigration of 
coloured people into this country cause my right hon. Friend no anxieties at all?’ (Hansard, 
1961b: c1392). Pannell asserted that ‘Commonwealth immigrants are responsible for 
practically the whole of the drug traffic in this country’ (Hansard, 1961a: c1967). Home 
Secretary R.A. Butler eliminated any illusion that proposed legislation was race neutral 
when praising the virtues of the proposed voucher scheme planned for the 1962 Act:!!
The great merit of this scheme is that it can be presented as making no 
distinction on grounds of race or colour. […] We must recognise that, although 
the scheme purports to relate solely to employment and to be non 
discriminatory, its aim is primarily social and its restrictive effect is intended to, 
and would in fact, operate on coloured people almost exclusively. This will be 
[…] laboured by some of our critics but there is no escape from it and at least 
such critics will not be able to sustain any suggestion that the scheme is 
inherently discriminatory.!
(CAB 129/107, 06 October 1961: s.4)! !
! Such views, however, stood in stark contrast with the lingering myth of the British 
Commonwealth, which many still clung to out of a sense of paternal obligation or 
imperialist nostalgia. The perception that citizens of the Commonwealth were citizens of 
Britain ran deep. Nevertheless, with the passage of the 1962 Act, the Commonwealth’s 
demise was finally secured with the introduction of patriality in the 1971 Immigration Act 
and the removal of British birthright in the 1981 British Nationality Act. Tyler (2010) 
highlights the significance of the latter with a quote from Enoch Powell, marking the 1981 
Act as ‘the end of our brief imperial episode … and the laying of that ghost, the Common-
wealth’ (quoted in Dixon, 1983 in Tyler, 2010: p. 64).!
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! There exists a parallel between the repulsion of Commonwealth citizens during the 
1960s and the restrictions placed on asylum seekers throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
Where once the existence of the Commonwealth was largely viewed as sacrosanct and 
unquestionable, fears of racial incursion and the exploitative nature of foreigners lead to 
the constriction of British citizens’ entry into the United Kingdom and eventually their 
outright rejection. Similarly, prior to 1993, no law existed that separated asylum seekers 
from other migrants in Britain (Bloch, 2000: p. 30) and the right to seek asylum remained 
enshrined within the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its 1967 protocol. This supposed dedication to the 
rights of refugees was undermined with the passage of the 1993 Asylum and Immigration 
Appeals Act, which marked the first in a recurring series of policies designed to restrict 
asylum seekers’ entry and delimit their access to employment, benefits and housing. 
According to Alice Bloch (2000), this new emphasis on reining in asylum applications was 
a response to the significant rise in claims during the early 1990s. The 26,205 applications 
received in 1990 compared to 11,640 the year before and only 3,998 in 1988. By 1991, 
the rate increased to 44,840, a 71 per cent rise over the previous year (Bloch, 2000: p. 
30). This frequency of arrivals contrasted greatly with that of previous years; the number 
of asylum applications received between 1980 and 1984 averaged just under 3,500 per 
year (UNHCR, 2001: p. 16). This concern with numbers - specifically numbers of non-
white migrants - was precisely what preoccupied Enoch Powell when he estimated that 
the number of Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants living in Britain in 2000 
would account for ‘one-tenth of the total population’ (Powell, 2007). It disturbed Margaret 
Thatcher, who in 1978 declared that British residents feared being ‘swamped by people 
with a different culture’ (Bourne, 2013: p. 88). It remains implicit in the Conservative 
Party’s foundering goal of reducing net immigration to below 100,000 per year (BBC, 
2014). The basis for inclusion in British society rests on the upholding of a racial and 
cultural ideal and the persistence of an imagined ‘Golden Age’ in which Britain was 
untarnished by the malignancy of foreignness. However, as I demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, such a ‘Golden Age’ never existed.!!
3.2 Immunisation and Domopolitics!!
! Two theoretical approaches help explain the processes involved in the expulsion of 
foreignness from the ‘body’ of the British state: Roberto Esposito’s exposition of the 
relationship between community and immunity and William Walters’ concept of 
‘domopolitics’, which likens state governance to that of the home. These provide important 
launching points for the subsequent discussion of biopolitical tactics intended to 
disincentivise asylum seekers from entering the country; they also allow room for a 
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conception of power that extends beyond the state and is manifested in the relationship 
between states, contractors and non-state organisations. In other words, the work of 
Esposito and Walters remains firmly wedded to the idea of governmentality, which 
Foucault defines as:!!
[…] the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very 
complex, power that has population as its target, political economy as its 
major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential 
technical instrument.!
(Foucault, 2007: p. 108)! ! !!
! In introducing the concept of biopower at the outset of Bíos (2008), Esposito 
explains that the term likely originated with Rudolph Kjellén, the Swedish political scientist 
who conceptualised the state as a living body and described bíos as comprising ‘not only 
natural and physical life, but perhaps just as significantly cultural life’ (Kjellén, 1920 quoted 
in Esposito, 2008: pp. 16-17). Foucault too maintains life ‘at the centre of the frame’, but 
for Esposito, Foucault remains ambiguous in his representation of biopolitics, because he 
does not clearly explain whether it represents a power of life or a power over life (ibid., pp. 
29, 32). This acknowledgment goes some way in explaining why such differing 
interpretations of biopower exist; it might also account for Agamben’s reinstitution of 
sovereignty in his determination that ‘the production of a biopolitical body is the original 
activity of sovereign power’ (Agamben, 1998: p. 6). Nevertheless, Esposito believes he 
can fill in the gaps left by Foucault by introducing his concept of immunity, which can be 
understood in the biomedical sense as the introduction of a ‘tolerable portion of [disease]’ 
in order to inoculate the body against a full fledged infection (Esposito, 2013: p. 61). The 
coalition government’s agreement to admit 500 Syrian refugees as a token of its 
commitment to addressing human rights grievances serves as a useful example of this 
form of immunity in action (Wintour, 2014). Whereas allowing greater numbers through 
might be construed as threatening to British culture, the government’s admittance of such 
a small number of refugees can allow politicians to appear magnanimous while 
maintaining a commitment to British self-interest. Immunity can also be interpreted, 
Esposito explains, in ‘political-juridical language’ as ‘a temporary or definitive exemption 
on the part of subject with regard to concrete obligations or responsibilities that under 
normal circumstances would bind one to others’ (Esposito, 2008: p. 45). The community, 
which is defined by its internal obligations to ‘care for the other’ is exempted from having 
to protect those that exist outside; immunity is the antithesis of community and it offers 
individuals a freedom from their responsibilities to others (Esposito, 2013: p. 59; Esposito, 
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2008: p. 50). In Agambenian terms, the exception is incorporated into the rule of law, so 
that life deemed outside the bíos can be abandoned; the rule of law remains unbroken as 
the allowance for abandonment is included within. Similarly, immunity allows for the 
abandonment of some life on the basis that it is preserving the life and well-being of the 
community.!
! Biopolitics exists at the juncture between the preservation of life and its 
abandonment, and the dispositifs of security, or rather the ‘apparatuses, institutions, and 
rules’ (Foucault, 2004: p. 27) that ensure the defence of the population, are the tools of 
immunisation. In relation to the governance of asylum in the UK, dispositifs entail the 
Home Office and its subsidiary departments, detention facilities, initial accommodation 
centres, specific legislation and immigration rules, and organisations the government 
enters into contractual agreements with to oversee the management and oversight of 
asylum seekers. Dispositifs might also include the processes by which individual data is 
collected, such as the issuing of biometric residents permits and the expectation that 
asylum seekers regularly check in with reporting centres. The term captures the essence 
of biopower - the how of biopower - that illustrates not only the relationships of power 
between individuals and organisations, but the way in which that power is demonstrated 
and reaffirmed.!
! This dissertation is chiefly concerned with the question of how biopower is 
exercised within the housing of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers’ experiences living in 
COMPASS housing provide insight into how the relations of power play out in the 
management of the COMPASS contracts and the treatment of those living in houses 
provided through G4S, Serco and their subcontractors. For instance, the transplantation of 
asylum seekers from city centres where support networks and community ties are strong 
to distant locations where services are piecemeal and integration less advanced, is an 
example of biopolitical dispositifs in operation. Furthermore, the fact that these regions 
tend to be areas of preexisting deprivation, asylum seekers’ exposure to uncertainty and 
extremity serves to further isolate them from hospitable environments. From the individual 
subcontractors, such as Jomast in the North East, to housing officers, transportation 
providers and tenancy agreements, these apparatuses of security and population 
management reflect a diffuse but ubiquitous biopower in operation. Esposito introduces 
the concept of immunity to show that the dispositifs of security now exist in ‘all sectors and 
languages of our lives’ (Esposito, 2013: p. 59). However, ‘immunity’ and marketisation are 
at odds; the warehousing economy of asylum markets has taken on its own neoliberal 
imperative and the grounds upon which the state aims at immunising itself against foreign 
elements has arguably been superseded by the dictates of the market economy. The entry 
of G4S and Serco into the asylum housing market raises questions as to whether that 
market expansion will eventually extend to social housing more generally. Indeed, Jeremy 
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Stafford, former CEO for Serco in the UK and Europe alluded to this when he responded 
to MP Keith Vaz’s question as to whether or not the relatively small returns on investment 
in the asylum housing sector were worth Serco’s effort. Stafford said:!!
We are very focused on building an accommodation business, and we believe 
that by taking on regions of the COMPASS service, we could establish the 
right team to do that and we felt that we could establish the platform that we 
felt was scalable … and take [it] to other geographies.!
(Jeremy Stafford quoted in House of Commons, 2013b)!!
! The perception that G4S and Serco are part of the extension of the detention 
industry model to asylum housing is reflected in the concerns of asylum support staff and 
asylum seekers living within COMPASS accommodation. A resident of COMPASS housing 
in West Yorkshire reflected on his belief that G4S was an inhumane company and felt that 
the Home Office’s decision to enter into a contract with the firm amounted to an ‘abuse of 
human rights’ (Jabril, Interview, 22 August 2013). In an interview with Emma Crossley, 
Project Manager of Meeting Point, a Leeds-based refugee and asylum support charity, 
she stated that she and others were filled with ‘complete dread’ when they first discovered 
that G4S was going to take over the housing of asylum seekers in Yorkshire (Crossley, 
Interview, 22 July 2013). Crossley explained that prior knowledge of G4S’s ‘involvement 
with removals’ left her worried about the experiences of asylum seekers housed under the 
firm’s watch. The position of G4S as a component of the immunising apparatuses of 
securitisation are reflected in her observation that a culture of deterrence is ‘embedded’ in 
the practices of the firm:!!
Before, when it was the local authority, I guess I had more faith in a local housing 
support officer than I do in a G4S security officer. You know, it’s embedded in a sort 
of G4S firm; it’s about deterrence, that these people shouldn’t be here, and it just 
creates that culture of resentment, which is so unwelcoming to our clients. I guess 
as an advisor, you fear what goes on when [G4S] do turn up at the door and ring 
[asylum seekers] to ask questions - you know, harassment and intimidation - 
because you know what they’re thinking about them. They’re not a sympathetic 
firm.!
(Crossley, Interview, 22 July 2013)! !!
! This perception that G4S is involved in the exposure of unqualified life to torment 
and abandonment demonstrates a concern that Foucault’s ‘racism’, the establishment of 
‘the break between what must live and what must die’ and the creation of ‘a biological-type 
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caesura within a population’ (Foucault, 2004: pp. 254-255), is a chief propellant behind the 
securitisation of destitute asylum seekers. Esposito writes that ‘a truly fatal leap occurs 
when [an] immunitary turn in biopolitics intersects with the trajectory of nationalism, and 
then racism’ (Esposito, 2013: p. 71). Migrants’ subjection to oversight and surveillance, he 
states, ‘marks an additional step in the biopolitical’ (Esposito, 2013: p. 75). However, 
again, it is necessary to expand Esposito’s formulation to a degree that allows for the 
inclusion of market imperatives in this immunising process; for the ‘disease’ to be entirely 
irradiated would then destroy the whole of the market built upon and profiting from the 
containment of these foreign antigens. I turn now to another concept, which adopts much 
of the spirit of Esposito’s immunisation in its focus on security and the protection of the 
population from the vulnerabilities that make it susceptible to invasion: William Walters’ 
notion of ‘domopolitics’.!
! Walters (2004) adopts the term ‘domopolitics’ to highlight multiple elements of the 
state’s approach to governance (Walters, 2004: p. 241). He adopts domus as an allusion 
to the home and domo as a reference to the state’s repression of populations within its 
boundaries. ‘At its heart’, he writes of domopolitics, ‘is a fateful conjunction of home, land 
and security’; it also evokes the sense of ‘home as hearth, a refuge or a sanctuary in a 
heartless world’ (ibid., p. 241). Domopolitics contrasts ‘community, trust, and citizenship, 
with […] a chaotic outside - illegals, traffickers, terrorists’ (ibid., p. 241). Here we can see 
the parallels with Esposito’s concepts of immunity and community in which the latter is 
inoculated against the harmful effects of foreign bodies through a process of exemption 
and exception. Like immunity, domopolitics is concerned with the ‘technologies of 
“managed” borders, identity checks, and its archipelagos of detention’ - dispositifs - which 
are instrumental in ‘defining who we are, what kind of state it is that governs us, how we 
are to be governed (ibid., p. 243). Jonathan Darling employs the concept of domopolitics 
in relation to the housing of asylum seekers within Britain prior to the introduction of the 
COMPASS project. He demonstrates that the housing policies introduced in the 1999 
Immigration and Asylum Act, which brought support for asylum seekers under the purview 
of the central government, provided the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) 
‘significant power in disciplining and controlling lives’ both at the national level and locally 
(Darling, 2011: p. 268). Domopolitics, Darling explains, ‘acts as a mode of governmentality 
which produces, delineates and defines a population to which its power is applied’ (ibid., 
p. 266).!
! With Esposito’s immunitary model, the community is freed from its obligation of 
reciprocity with those on the outside. Similarly, domopolitics relieves the oikos, or 
household, from its duty of xenia, or ‘guest-friendship’ (Walters, 2004: p. 241). The 
perceived need to securitise and protect the population supersedes the state’s obligations 
to protect those fleeing from their country of origin to a host state. The introduction of a 
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‘safe countries’ list in Section 94A of the 2002 Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act, for 
instance, allowed Britain to reconfigure the nature of its adherence to Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states that ‘everyone has the right 
to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.’ This is now a qualified right 
if a discretionary determination is made on the part of an immigration officer that an 
asylum applicant is from a country where potential exposure to harm is limited.!!
3.3 Uncoupling sovereignty from the human rights debate!!
! In charting the development of immigration legislation over time, representations of 
the state and sovereignty are occasionally substituted for totalising terms that are used to 
encompass the entirety of government action and reaction. If weaknesses can be 
identified in the models of domopolitics and immunity, it is that Walters and Esposito 
default to a representation of the state as a totalising force; they have left little room for 
the agency of the excluded, the organisations advocating for minorities’ rights or the 
national and international legal institutions consistently challenging the state’s treatment of 
asylum seekers and other vulnerable groups. Darling reinstates state sovereignty in his 
representation of domopolitics; he declares that domopolitics has led to the ‘production of 
sovereign power through the creation of subjects of such a power’ (Darling, 2011: p. 268). 
Once again, asylum seekers are relegated to the level of zoē. This remains a particular 
difficulty when developing genealogies of British immigration policy, as the state assumes 
the default role of an implacable monolith moving toward an ever more exclusionary 
agenda. Foucault shuns the pervasive conceptualisation of the state as a ‘cold monster’ 
and ‘totalizing institution’ (Foucault, 2004: pp. 109, 119). The ‘“governmentalization” of the 
state’, he explains, is expressed through tactics and the distinction between what is 
located inside and outside ‘the state’s domain’. When Foucault entertains the notion of the 
state as a ‘mythicized abstraction’ and declares that the ‘importance’ of the state is 
perhaps ‘less than we think’, he is not suggesting that the state is in retreat or curtailed by 
the rising strength of a supranational order or multinational organisations (ibid., p. 109). 
Rather, he is suggesting that employing the state as a frame of analysis is less productive 
than focusing on governmentality (ibid., p. 108). When British immigration policy is 
considered within the context of these targets, the institutions and tactics of government 
reveal a commitment to marketisation and the deployment of security as both a form of 
social control and an extension of population management. However, the proliferation of 
globalisation literature over the last two decades has reframed the state and sovereignty 
into parcelled units of debate that diminish the complexity of both. In these renditions of 
sovereignty, human rights protections become antagonisms against the state and 
immigration controls are positioned as desperate expressions of state resistance to the 
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protections afforded to refugees and asylum claimants within international agreements like 
the European Convention on Human Rights.!
! In the globalisation literature, governments’ immigration policies represent one of 
the few remaining forms of sovereign expression left to states in the face of globalisation, 
which includes the rise of international regimes and the proliferation of non-governmental 
organisations. While such arguments help qualify the claim that the state is in retreat or 
has lost a great deal of sovereignty to the market and international organisations, they 
unhelpfully frame the state as a single operating unit rather than address the push and 
pull factors operating within the state that both reinforce and resist modes of governance 
employed by state and non-state actors. Anthony Giddens’ (2000) prominence as both a 
globalisation theorist and the author of New Labour’s Third Way agenda places his work in 
a unique position in relation to the development of government responses to immigration 
and the management of asylum seekers. Giddens does not dethrone states from their 
position as ‘the most important agents on the international scene’, but he questions the 
resilience of state sovereignty in the face of ‘globalization from below’ and a ‘growing 
number of non-governmental organisations’ (Giddens, 2000: pp. 122-123). His stance on 
the corporatisation of state services is tepid, as he is unwilling to fully commit to a 
marketisation of state services, but also declares that the sometimes requisite ‘reinventing 
of government […] sometimes means adopting market-based solutions’ (Giddens, 1998: 
p. 75).!
! The United Kingdom’s obligations to recognise refugees’ human rights are 
associated with its adoption of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
Under Article 13, anyone has the right to leave his or her own country, and while the 
UDHR is not a binding document, it reflects a formal acceptance of the view that refugees 
are a political and global reality. Article 14 of the UDHR, which guarantees the right to 
seek asylum, became the foundation of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees (Edwards, 2005: p. 296). It is within the 1951 Convention and 
subsequent 1967 Protocol that Britain’s formal obligations to refugees are established 
(Fekete, 2005: p. 65); when asylum seekers are granted asylum in Britain, they are 
admitted as ‘either Convention refugees or under the discretionary category of 
“exceptional leave to remain”’ (Hatton, 2005: p. 726). Article 33 disallows ‘Contracting 
State[s]’ from returning a refugee to a location where his or her ‘life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion’.!
! While the right to seek asylum is established within these agreements, significant 
latitude is afforded to individual states and their sovereign ‘right’ to manage their borders 
independently. While the UDHR asserts refugees’ right to leave their country of origin, 
Article 13 does not include a ‘corresponding right to immigrate’ (Billings, 1998: p. 36). In a 
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sense, states that adopted the UDHR were under no obligation to accept refugees that 
presented at their borders; they simply were expected to acknowledge refugees’ right to 
exist as such. More binding legislation, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, also 
provides states with considerable discretion when deciding suitable candidates for entry or 
removal. Though Section 1 of Article 33 binds states to a non-refoulement agreement, 
Section 2 leaves it up to states to decide the ‘reasonable grounds’ for which refugees 
might be removed from the state if they are perceived to be a ‘danger to the security of the 
country’ or have ‘been convicted […] of a particularly serious crime’ (UN General 
Assembly, 1951). The major caveat included in Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), which ensures that everyone has the right to ‘his private and 
family life’, is a state’s authority to disregard this right under certain subjective conditions. 
An exception is therefore incorporated directly into the rule:!!
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.!
(ECHR, Article 8(2))!!
The determination as to what is lawful and what constitutes a danger to the state is left 
largely in the hands of state governments. As Morris (2010) explains, Article 8 must be 
viewed as a ‘qualified right’, and she cites the position taken by the UK’s Immigration 
Advisory Service to reinforce this point: ‘[T]here isn’t currently a right to family life 
conferred by primary legislation. It is granted under the immigration rules’ (Immigration 
Advisory Service quoted in Morris, 2010: p. 413).!
! It is within this context of qualified rights that Agamben’s critique of international 
human rights agreements is perhaps most compelling. For Agamben, the development of 
human rights represents the complete transition from monarchical to national sovereignty 
as states establish the distinction between bare life and political life. In so doing, the state 
further consolidates its position of ‘legitimacy and sovereignty’ while differentiating 
between the rights for citizens and the qualified rights of foreigners (Agamben, 1998: pp. 
127-130). Agamben problematises human rights, because he interprets them as products 
of the sovereign state of exception, in which the divide between citizen and outsider is 
sustained through an inclusive exclusion within the rule of law. However, as Gündoğdu 
(2012) indicates, Agamben’s misrepresentation of biopower and his insistence upon the 
reemergence of sovereignty is less nuanced than a Foucauldian perspective, which 
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positions human rights laws as ‘tactics of governmentality’ that are ‘used in the regulation 
and management of populations’ (Gündoğdu, 2012: p. 10). For Agamben, international 
human rights agreements are developed by states and therefore primarily serve to 
reinforce state sovereignty. However, this notion is challenged as human rights laws, 
including Article 8 of the ECHR, have been employed in opposition to state tactics with 
varying degrees of success. Common grievances levelled against the use of Article 3 and 
Article 8 of the ECHR would be inexplicable if states’ establishment of human rights 
represented the source of their sovereignty rather than an obstacle to it.!
! This distinction between formal acknowledgement of refugees and tailored state 
responses to their entry has remained a mainstay of successive British governments’ 
application of human rights commitments when deciding asylum applications; it has 
afforded the state the discretion to deny entry and respond with exceptional powers to 
those it deems to be living in the United Kingdom unlawfully. Some of the offences 
itemised in Section 72 of the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002 NIA) are 
directly related to the discretion afforded the state in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Refugees exempt from protection include those convicted of an offence 
within or outside the United Kingdom who have received sentences of two years or more; 
anyone convicted by the Secretary of State and sentenced similarly is also excluded from 
protection of the Act (ibid., s72(1-5)). The language of ‘offender’ and ‘criminal’ therefore is 
embedded in state immigration policy and frames asylum seeking within a presumption of 
deviance and deception.!
! While the construction of asylum seekers as criminal is seemingly widespread 
within media accounts, counter representations do exist. An array of integration networks 
in Glasgow have sought to offer support for asylum seekers as well as foster 
communication and tolerance within local communities (see: chapter 7; Wren, 2004; 
Wren, 2007), and drop-ins located in dispersal cities invite local volunteers and community 
representatives to engage with and support asylum seekers living in the area. Traditional 
news outlets do report on some of the critical positions taken against the treatment of 
asylum seekers within the immigration, housing and detention processes. The Guardian 
reported on the Home Affairs select committee finding that asylum seekers are kept in 
‘“appalling” housing conditions’ (Press Association, 2013) and highlighted the poor 
conditions some female asylum seekers are exposed to within privately contracted 
housing within the UK (Williams, 2012). Merrill (2014) featured a Syrian refugee’s 
experience as a detainee in Britain who felt as if he was being ‘treated like a 
criminal’ (Merrill, 2014), while Morrison (2014) reported on the Women for Refugee 
Women charity’s investigation into female asylum seekers’ experiences of rape and 
torture prior to their arrival in Britain and subsequent detention within asylum removal 
centres (Morrison, 2014). Also writing for The Independent, Cahal Milmo (2014) stated 
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that migrants were ‘needed to fuel a fragile [UK] economy’  (Milmo, 2014). These stand in 
stark contrast to headlines like those in the Daily Mail, which lament ‘soft-touch 
Britain’ (Kelly, 2012) and the cost to the taxpayer for supporting failed asylum seekers 
(Gye, 2014). The entrenched construction of asylum seekers as benefits scroungers and 
strains on the public purse remain key elements of popular representations within media. 
The perception that failed asylum seekers remain in the United Kingdom to reap the 
financial rewards of the state tend to neglect other factors prohibiting their return, such as 
a receiving state’s unwillingness to permit their re-entry or the British government’s 
inability to pursue a safe route of return for failed asylum seekers. Negative 
representations of asylum seekers also serve to reinforce official efforts to exclude them 
from access to state welfare provision. For instance, Home Secretary Theresa May’s 
declaration in October 2015 that asylum seekers who have ‘spurned the chance to seek 
protection elsewhere’ have forfeited their right to settle in Britain was criticised by the 
Institute of Directors on the grounds that she was ‘pandering to anti-immigration 
sentiment’ (Wilkinson, 2015), a sentiment largely reinforced through provocative headlines 
and articles (for examples, see: Hall, 2015; Parfitt, 2015).!
! In this chapter, I have proposed different theoretical approaches for 
conceptualising the state’s apparatuses and practices of inclusive exclusion. Foucault’s 
description of ‘state racism’ provides a useful framework in understanding the imperatives 
informing societal identity construction through the identification of the outsider. Indeed, 
this may be considered one of the first political actions of the state, as it delimits the 
boundaries of belonging. Esposito’s concept of ‘immunity’ and Walters’ likening of state 
action to a form of ‘domopolitics’, or a politics of the home, highlight the exclusionary 
aspects of state policy, but they do not adequately address the reasons for which asylum 
seekers’ presence within the United Kingdom remains essential to the state’s promotion of 
neoliberal agendas. It is necessary, then, to recognise the inherent ‘paradox’ of the state’s 
commitments to neoliberalism while at the same time maintaining its outward commitment 
to exclusionary tactics. In the following chapter, I demonstrate how this dual-purpose 
approach is being achieved in the context of asylum accommodation provision through the 
promotion of a securitised - and privatised - housing strategy. !  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Chapter 4: Asylum service provision and the consolidation of 
securitised (and marketised) mechanisms of social control!
!
! In its 1998 White Paper, Fairer, Faster, Firmer, the Home Office outlined the 
problems it perceived within the asylum system. Three primary areas of concern included 
the large backlog of undecided cases, the pervasiveness of ‘bogus’ asylum claims, and 
the pressures local authorities in London faced in continuing to support asylum seekers 
under current legislation. In the preface, the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, suggested that 
a more careful distinction between asylum seekers and ‘economic migrants’ needed to be 
made in the interest of ‘fairness’, and the illegitimacy of asylum claims remained a 
consistent theme. Section 1.14 states simply: ‘Many claims are simply a tissue of 
lies’ (Home Office, 1998). Straw viewed the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act as an 
ineffectual effort to bring about reform to the asylum system that resulted in greater delays 
and loopholes for fraudulent claimants. Following his announcement of the publication of 
the White Paper, Straw stated that the 1996 Act left ‘genuine asylum seekers […] in limbo 
for years while their applications were considered, while the very delays that the Bills had 
established enabled bogus asylum seekers to come, claim benefit, work and carry on 
ripping off the system’ (Hansard, 1998: c40). Justifications for a centrally administered 
asylum support service rested on the need to ‘relieve the burden on provision in 
London’ (Home Office, 1998: s8.22). This document also reveals early aims to coordinate 
with third parties and the private sector in the provision of accommodation. Section 8.23 
reads:!!
The Government envisages that this will involve contracting with a range of 
providers to secure accommodation, including voluntary bodies, housing 
associations, local authorities and the private sector. The Government is 
particularly concerned to explore the ways of harnessing the energy and 
expertise of voluntary and independent sector bodies in providing the safety 
net.!!
! The White Paper reflects a commingling of neoliberal logics and retaliatory 
attitudes toward perceived abuses of the asylum system, principles that formed the 
bedrock of subsequent immigration policies and asylum support strategies. The creation 
of the National Asylum Support Service and the implementation of the dispersal policy 
introduced in the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act went beyond streamlining state 
oversight of asylum seekers; they constituted a punitive containment agenda designed to 
free the City from its social welfare responsibilities to give way for free-market expansion. 
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During a third reading of the Immigration Bill in November 1999, Lord Warner advocated 
housing asylum seekers in cheaper accommodation stating that a ‘concern is whether we 
should end up spending money from the public purse on keeping asylum seekers in very 
high-cost accommodation areas in London and the south east when there is perfectly 
satisfactory, lower-cost accommodation elsewhere’ (Hansard, 1999: c833). Attempts to 
challenge the logic of dispersal ultimately failed, though some efforts were made to do so. 
Neil Gerrard, the MP for Walthamstow questioned whether chasing cheap and available 
housing best served the interests of asylum seekers:!!
If we are to disperse to places where there is no shortage of housing, it is 
almost inevitable that those places will be deprived areas which are suffering 
unemployment and economic problems; that is why there is empty housing. 
We must look at how we provide support, legal advice, education and medical 
help, and at whether £7 a week […] is sufficient to maintain any dignity for 
someone living on vouchers.!
(Hansard, 1999, c86)!!
! The policies advanced in the 1998 White Paper, which also promoted a greater 
role for detention and an expansion of immigration officers’ discretionary power, 
represented exclusion by design, a point affirmed by Malloch and Stanley (2005) who 
write: ‘The emphasis on separating asylum seekers from local communities, was initially 
signalled in the White Paper […]. This policy document represented a firm attempt to 
increase the use of detention, particularly in terms of asylum ‘reception’ to deter future 
applications’ (Malloch and Stanley, 2005: p. 62). Underlying the proposals of Fairer, Faster 
and Firmer were designs of discomfort and disembeddedness; the penalty for being a 
destitute asylum seeker was a life of unease and insecurity. This is reflected in the 
proposed no-choice housing policy later adopted in the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act: 
‘Asylum seekers would be expected to take what was available, and would not be able to 
pick and choose where they are accommodated’ (Home Office, 1998: s8.22). A retributive 
management system was intended to affect all destitute asylum seekers rather than only 
those guilty of exploiting the state’s support system. Justifications for cashless support 
were informed by the assumption that the whole of the asylum seeking community was 
prone to abusing state generosity: ‘The Government intends to explore further the extent 
to which support of this kind [cashless support] might be provided through vouchers or 
other non-cash means, so as further to reduce the incentive to abuse of the asylum 
system’ (Home Office, 1998: s8.21). In centralising asylum support the state was able to 
intensify its management and oversight of asylum seekers and further segregate 
illegitimate residents from those whose presence was accepted. Rosemary Sales writes 
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that the operation of a centralised support agency, formerly NASS, is founded upon ‘the 
presumption that the majority of asylum seekers are “bogus” and “undeserving”, while the 
minority granted Convention status are the “deserving”’ (Sales, 2002: p. 463). Employing 
Walters’ concept of domopolitics, the governing of the state ‘like a home’ (Walters, 2004: 
p. 237), Darling (2011) highlights the distinctly biopolitical nature of the government’s 
asylum management agenda. The inclusion of private firms, local authorities and housing 
associations in the administration of the centralised support system represented a 
broadening of state oversight. Immigration control did not begin and end with Home Office 
representatives, but individual housing officers and anyone tasked with supporting asylum 
seekers. Addressing the White Paper’s proposal for a national asylum support system, 
Darling writes:!!
A biopolitical machinery of welfare provision and the maintenance of a 
population is thus merged with a filtering and discretionary machinery of 
border control. Accommodation becomes articulated as both a hospitable and 
humanitarian provision to those ‘in need’ and a device for managing, 
monitoring and ‘warehousing’ (Fekete, 2005), those under review by 
domopolitics. The machinery of NASS thus acts as a mechanism of 
assignment, of positioning asylum seekers within the nation.!
(Darling, 2011: p. 267)!!!
! With the introduction of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, much of the 
proposed ‘machinery’ within the White Paper was enshrined in law. Under Section 95, the 
Home Office is empowered to provide support for destitute asylum seekers during the 
period in which an asylum seeker’s application is being decided. Support may be in the 
form of financial assistance to meet essential living needs or housing if the applicant 
cannot secure adequate accommodation, or both. The restriction on an asylum seeker’s 
choice of accommodation is found in Section 97, which states that the Secretary of State 
may ‘not have regard to […] any preference that the supported person or his dependents 
(if any) may have as to the locality in which the accommodation is to be provided’ (IAA 
1999, s97(a)). Section 101 introduces ‘reception zones’, otherwise known as dispersal 
regions, and the delegation of accommodation provision to local authorities, registered 
social landlords and housing associations is established in Section 100. A number of the 
interviews that feature in subsequent chapters were with asylum seekers whose asylum 
claims were rejected or were pending appeal. These individuals may have previously 
been supported under Section 95, but were receiving assistance under Section 4 at the 
time of their interviews. Section 4 grants the Home Office the discretion to provide 
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accommodation support for those released from detention or those temporarily admitted 
into the UK without necessarily being detained (IA 1971, Sch. 2 s.21).!
! The 1999 Act extended the biopolitical framework of population management and 
securitisation to the administration of refugee populations. Among the restrictions placed 
on asylum support, the 1999 Act also expanded Home Office powers of detention and the 
liabilities carriers faced for facilitating ‘illegal’ entry into the country. Responsibility for the 
oversight of asylum seekers rested with the state, given the consolidation of service 
provision under NASS, but it further extended the policing of asylum seekers to those 
agencies and organisations contracted to carry out state policy. Restricted access to 
support that was both contingent on an asylum seeker’s acceptance of no-choice housing 
and continual occupation of the accommodation provided served to reinforce assumptions 
of asylum seekers’ deviance, an representation often promoted through local and national 
media reporting (see: Finney and Robinson, 2008; Ferguson and Walters, 2005; Banks, 
2008; and Coole, 2002).!
! !
4.1: Dispersal and its effects!
!
! Since its inception, the UK government’s dispersal policy has incited criticism 
amongst researchers and advocates within the asylum support community, while some 
service agencies have simultaneously played a crucial role in ensuring the continued 
operation of the dispersal programme through government contracts. In this section, I 
examine literature highlighting asylum seekers’ experiences of dispersal prior to the 
introduction of the COMPASS housing programme and acknowledge the conditions under 
former dispersal regimes. An engagement with this research allows for some points of 
comparison to be made between the experiences of asylum seekers living under 
COMPASS and those living under the previous contracts with local authorities, housing 
associations and private landlords. It also aids in evidencing state tactics of discomfort, 
which employ the services of third-party providers in carrying out the segmentation and 
isolation of asylum seeking communities. !
! Kissoon (2010) describes Britain’s asylum support strategy as ‘operating within a 
larger political objective of appearing in control and not a “soft touch”’, which ‘has 
institutionalised the difference between citizens and “others,” while the asylum process 
and welfare pol ic ies punish choice as “asylum shopping” and “benefit 
scrounging”’ (Kissoon, 2010: p. 22). Some of those interviewed for the purposes of this 
project lived in Home Office-allocated housing prior to the awarding of the COMPASS 
contracts to G4S and Serco in 2012; these respondents’ views on conditions before and 
after COMPASS often reinforced general assumptions that life under COMPASS had 
worsened, but at times challenged such perceptions. For instance, in response to a 
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question regarding prior housing experiences, a woman living with her family in Glasgow 
stated: ‘NASS accommodation was very, very good. They repair[ed] when something was 
wrong. NASS was good for us’ (Falis, Interview, 12 June 2013(a)). She went on to state 
that the home she occupied for two years was located near important services and 
resources and that NASS provided her with enough money for bus fare. Others 
highlighted some of the poor conditions in government-contracted accommodation prior to 
COMPASS. A man living in Leeds described his experience in a local authority property as 
very poor: ‘It [had] old carpets. No one was listening about changing the carpet. There 
was no shower. For more than a year, we had cockroaches - they’re still there’ (Mehdi, 
Interview, 29 July 2013). Observations such as these help supplement prior research and 
serve as a launching point for a discussion of COMPASS and the subsequent experiences 
of those living within housing subcontracted by G4S and Serco.!
! The dispersal programme introduced in the 1999 Immigration Act established 
twelve regions around the UK as reception areas for asylum seekers granted 
accommodation support while their applications were decided. The rationale for the 
scheme was to ease the ‘burden’ asylum seekers were placing on local authorities in 
London and the South East (Phillips, 2006: p. 542). The responsibility for housing asylum 
seekers rested with regional consortia, which often involved partnerships between local 
authorities, housing authorities and private landlords. While the intention was to disperse 
asylum seekers to areas where connections could be made with people who shared a 
common language or ethnic background (IAA explanatory notes, 1999 cited in Dawson, 
2002: p. 10), the reality was that asylum seekers were often isolated in areas lacking in 
ethnic diversity with few pre-existing support networks (Strang and Ager, 2010: p. 597). 
There was, perhaps, greater emphasis placed on the availability of accommodation in 
places where ‘social housing stock had diminished’ (Robinson et al, 2003 cited in Dwyer 
and Brown, 2008: p. 205). The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee declared 
in its 2009 report on the management of asylum applications that the Home Office ‘does 
not have a set formula for dispersing asylum applicants around the United Kingdom. The 
primary criterion is the availability of accommodation, which can result in individuals 
becoming isolated’ (House of Commons, 2009: Conclusions and recommendations, para. 
9). The introduction of asylum seeking populations with specific support needs presented 
a challenge to some of the dispersal regions that had little prior experience hosting 
immigrant communities. Dawson (2002) cites the readily available accommodation in Hull 
as a primary reason for the city’s involvement in the dispersal programme, but notes that 
the areas designated for dispersed asylum seekers suffered from economic deprivation 
and remained largely ‘monocultural’ (Dawson, 2002: p. 10). He writes that ‘[t]he possibility 
of asylum-seekers establishing significant networks of extended family, friends and 
religious, ethnic or national groups is limited. The potential for social tensions, and in 
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particular racial tension to emerge through dispersal is high’ (ibid., pp. 10-11). In Glasgow, 
ten integration networks were established to coordinate service provision between 
statutory and voluntary agencies to assist asylum seekers following their arrival to the city. 
As the only city in Scotland to have entered a NASS contract in 2000 (Netto and Fraser, 
2009: p. 13) and with no prior history of receiving large numbers of asylum seekers, the 
voluntary sector had to mobilise quickly in order to address the needs of incoming 
residents. While there now exists an established support network in Glasgow, at the 
outset of dispersal, there was little adequate service provision. Karen Wren (2004) writes:!!
The [integration networks] were not in place when the dispersal policy was first 
implemented as there was no city-wide strategy to facilitate a co-ordinated 
response from the voluntary sector. When dispersal began, many areas 
lacked any structure or forum for the voluntary sector to address the needs of 
asylum seekers (Scottish Refugee Council, 2001). The networks have 
therefore developed locally in a piecemeal fashion across the city during the 
period 2000-2002.!
(Wren, 2004: p. 23)!!
! Supporting Wren’s assessment of the lack of robust support in Glasgow 
immediately following dispersal, an organiser within the voluntary support community 
explained in an interview that support networks were non-existent in 2000. She criticised 
some of the voluntary organisations existing at the time for excusing their non-action in 
regards to refugees and asylum seekers by asserting that they were not funded for that 
purpose. Some of the earliest support, she explained, came from residents’ associations 
(Sahla, Interview, 17 May 2013). The lack of established support strategies and unified 
responses from the voluntary sector was not unique to Glasgow during the initial stages of 
dispersal. The concentration of asylum seekers in London was due in part to the mature 
support networks that existed in the capital; the forwarding of asylum seekers to new 
areas before agencies could respond in a concerted way led to strains and gaps in service 
provision. Kissoon writes that ‘organisations to help refugees did not necessarily have the 
same level of expertise that could be found in larger urban centres with larger and more 
established RCO-NGO networks (Zetter, Griffiths, Sigona, 2005 cited in Kissoon, 2010: p. 
19). Assistance was often provided on an ad-hoc basis before more advanced service 
strategies had the opportunity to develop.!
! As dispersal regions have remained the same following the transition to the 
COMPASS programme, some points of comparison can be made with dispersal patterns 
of previous years. Since 2001, the number of asylum seekers receiving accommodation 
support under Section 95 of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act has generally trended 
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downward. Figure 1.1 illustrates that in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2002, the number of 
asylum seekers housed under Section 95 peaked at 54,045. By Q4 2006, that number 
decreased by about one third to 36,363; following a decrease of nearly 9,000 in the year 
between Q4 2007 and Q4 2008, the number dropped to its lowest point, 17,594 asylum 
seekers, in Q4 2012 before increasing to 23,459 the following year. The distribution of 
asylum seekers to different regions of the United Kingdom has not remained consistently 
even, though a number of regions have regularly received a greater number of dispersed 
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Figure 1.1: Number of dispersed asylum seekers under Section 
95 (1999 IAA) from Q4 2001-Q4 2013
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Figure 1.2: Percentage of total number of asylum seekers in 
receipt of accommodation support under Section 95 Support 
(1999 IAA) by region: Q4 2003 through Q4 2013
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asylum seekers than others. The three regions with consistently high reception rates 
include: the North West region, which has on average received 21.8 per cent of the total 
number of accommodated asylum seekers across the UK under Section 95 per year from 
2001 to 2013; Yorkshire and the Humber averaged 17.5 per cent and the West Midlands 
averaged 15.4 per cent. During the same period, Glasgow received an average of 11.6 
per cent of per cent of dispersed asylum seekers receiving accommodation support per 
year. From 2003 through 2013, the North East region received an average of 9.6 per cent 
of the total. The variation in dispersal patterns across these regions in the ten years 
between 2003 and 2013 is reflected in Figure 1.2.!
! Asylum seekers’ experiences within dispersal accommodation are by no means 
uniform and are often contingent upon dispersal location, housing conditions and the 
support networks available to them. The expectation that asylum seekers accept 
accommodation on a no-choice basis has led to a variety of consequences. Experiences 
of isolation, depression, deprivation and racism have all been cited as outcomes of the 
government’s dispersal policy (see: Silove et al, 2000; Phillips, 2006; Bowes et al, 2009; 
Mynott, 2000; Spicer, 2008 and Netto, 2011). Athwal and Bourne (2007) write:!!
[Dispersal] took asylum seekers away from communities where they had kith 
and kin and access to support structures, including legal advice, and 
deposited them in poor, often all-white neighbourhoods where resentment was 
keen and legal advice often non-existent.!
(Athwal and Bourne, 2007: p. 108)!!
! Warfa et al (2006) conducted a series of qualitative interviews with Somali 
refugees living in social housing within the United Kingdom; while their research was not 
on the dispersal of asylum seekers within the Home Office’s dispersal programme, the 
findings are illustrative of the psychological impacts refugees and asylum seekers endure 
under uncertain housing conditions. The disparity in respondents’ experiences reflected a 
‘chaotic’ existence and constant moves were associated with feelings of ‘“stress’, 
‘distress’, ‘worry’ and ‘anxiety”’ (Warfa et al, 2006: p. 510). This research project revealed 
the incongruity of the housing experiences of single people compared to those of families; 
single refugees were more likely to face sudden accommodation transfers (ibid., p. 508). 
This selected quote from an interviewee demonstrates the impact these moves had on her 
state of mind:!!
Everything turns upside down when you change your current accommodation. 
It is not an easy thing. When you know one area very well, when you know a 
lot of people in that area, who could help you with your problems and all of a 
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sudden, you go to another area that puts on you a lot of pressure and this 
pressure brings stress with it. Going to a new area is not an easy thing.!
(female interviewee quoted in ibid., p. 511)!!
In addition to the anxiety induced as a response to housing conditions, many refugees 
and asylum seekers enter ‘host’ countries with histories of emotional and physical trauma. 
Poor housing conditions or strained community relations may exacerbate preexisting 
stress, a point that Silove et al (2000) address in an article on the mental health conditions 
of asylum seekers in Australia. Citing previous research, the authors highlight the impact 
of ‘premigration trauma’ on Tamil asylum seekers, which was linked to symptoms of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (Silove et al, p. 606). They write that Begley et al’s 1999 study 
‘found that 20 of 40 asylum seekers in Ireland had symptoms consistent with major 
depression and 23 suffered significant levels of anxiety’ associated with prior and existing 
traumatic experiences (Begley et al, 1999 cited in Silove et al, 2000: p. 606).!
! Dispersal policies result in similar feelings of unease and depression; many 
asylum seekers interviewed for this research explained that unexpected or frequent 
moves resulted in heightened levels of psychological stress. Between March 2010 and 
March 2011, for instance, the Home Office was notified of asylum seekers’ attempts at 
suicide on four occasions in Glasgow alone (House of Commons, Written Answers, 7 
March 2011). In the case of families, this concern extended from parents to children and 
were exhibited by the children themselves. A woman living in Serco-contracted 
accommodation in Glasgow explained that her family had been moved twice in nine 
months. Her children, she stated, were particularly affected as a result of the moves. She 
described her younger son as ‘very depressed’ and her older son as ‘all the time, crying’. 
Serco allegedly refused the woman’s transfer request; the Home Office intervened and 
the family was moved, though this led to new stresses, as her sons faced another school 
transfer (Sahla, Interview, 29 May 2013). The experiences of asylum seekers under 
previous housing regimes were similar in regards to their expected acceptance of no-
choice housing, though as Grayson (2012) explains, forced moves within the COMPASS 
programme may have escalated due to the market-driven nature of the contracts. 
Grayson states that ‘[m]oving house is reckoned to be one of the most stressful events in 
the life of the average British family’; for the 182 asylum seekers rehoused to substandard 
housing during the transition to COMPASS, ‘the abstract concept of asylum housing 
privatisation’ results in further traumatisation ‘in the lives of already traumatised asylum 
seekers and their families’ (Grayson, 2012).!
! The placement of asylum seekers in economically deprived areas throughout 
Britain has been cited as contributing to community strain as well as feelings of further 
isolation and abandonment on the part of asylum seekers. Pointing to prior research, 
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Deborah Phillips (2006) suggests that ‘[e]vidence not only indicates that community 
tensions may arise when asylum seekers arrive in an area unannounced, but that the 
newcomers feel forced to move elsewhere if they face hostility (Phillips, 2006: p. 546). 
While one must be cautious in suggesting that a move to an economically depressed area 
will necessarily result in strained community relations - at times solidarity amongst 
migrants and ‘native’ residents is stronger when both groups share in their adversity, as I 
will later highlight - dispersal has nevertheless resulted in troubling encounters between 
some residents and newly arriving asylum seekers. Rosemary Sales’s 2002 Critical Social 
Policy article, ‘The deserving and the undeserving? Refugees, asylum seekers and 
welfare in Britain’, is a cornerstone in academic writing on the British asylum experience, 
given its reflections on the early years of dispersal. Sales describes UK asylum legislation 
as representative of a ‘punitive system’ that is ‘preoccupied with control’ (Sales, 2002: p. 
456). The effects of dispersal, she writes, ‘have separated asylum seekers from 
mainstream society’ (ibid., p. 457). This isolation has resulted in exposure to racist abuse 
(ibid., p. 457) and the casting of asylum seekers as ‘“bogus” and “undeserving”’ (ibid., p. 
463).!
! Experiences of racism and bigotry have often marked asylum seekers’ 
experiences in the post-dispersal environment. The widely publicised murder of a Kurdish 
asylum seeker, Firzat Dag, highlighted apparent racial tensions in Sighthill, an 
impoverished area of Glasgow in 2001. Accommodation in the area was difficult to let and 
Glasgow City Council decided to house over three thousand asylum seekers in Sighthill 
properties. Hill (2001) suggests that residents in the area felt sidestepped in favour of 
foreigners as homes were outfitted with new materials for the incoming asylum seekers. 
Whether such discontent was causally related to the stabbing of Dag by two white males 
is debatable, but cultural tensions are often cited as contributing factors to racist violence. 
Athwal and Bourne (2007) affix a number to the instances of racist murders since 
dispersal, stating: ‘Eighteen asylum seekers have died at the hands of racists, many in the 
areas to which they had been “dispersed”’ (Athwal and Bourne, 2007: p. 108). They 
include both Firzat Dag and Wei Wang, an asylum seeker murdered in Sighthill in 2006, in 
that number. Elinor Kelly (2002) suggests that racist tension is fuelled through negative 
representations of asylum seekers in the media and through the continued stigmatisation 
of asylum seekers as a matter of policy. Critical of the Labour government’s ‘dangerous 
experiment’, Kelly suggests that the lack of adequate financial support, a voucher scheme 
offering 70 per cent of income support levels to asylum seekers, and the government’s 
lack of consideration for asylum seekers’ appropriate placement throughout the country 
have resulted in a volatile environment for vulnerable migrants. Kelly apportions much of 
the blame to Home Secretary, Jack Straw, stating:!!
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[Straw] took no responsibility for the fact that if large numbers of foreigners are 
moved (under conditions that resemble influx) into neighbourhoods where no 
community development has been undertaken to prepare the way, there would 
be a reaction of a kind that was shaped by the negative propaganda and 
stigmatising that he had initiated.!
(Kelly, 2002: p. 3)!!
Invoking the language of the 1998 White Paper, Kelly continued: ‘Jack Straw’s new 
regime is undoubtedly “firmer”, and soon became “faster”, but it is not “fairer” because he 
exposed asylum seekers to unacceptable levels of risk’ (ibid., p. 4). Violence is not always 
perpetrated from the British population; it can come from others within the asylum-seeking 
community due to insensitivities in the placement of asylum seekers from different 
religious or cultural backgrounds. The Home Office has at times transferred asylum 
seekers away from areas of racist violence, but this often comes after much effort and 
endurance on the part of individuals or their representatives. An asylum seeker 
interviewed in Sunderland described his experiences of religious violence while living in 
Halifax in early 2012. As a practising Christian, Jahan wore a cross around his neck and 
was once attacked on the basis of his faith by a number of men, one of whom used a 
hammer. He attempted to defend himself and following the assault, the police escorted 
him home. Jahan contacted the then UKBA and requested a transfer, which was granted; 
he was sent to Wakefield where he felt welcomed and supported by the community and 
found happiness in attending church. He described his baptism there as ‘the best 
experience’ of his life, and was ‘grateful’ for the relationship he formed with the church 
minister (Jahan, Interview, 06 February 2013). While Jahan’s experience shows the Home 
Office’s acknowledgement of the danger he faced, it also reflects the potential outcomes 
of its relative disregard when initially dispersing asylum seekers to areas around the 
country primarily on the bases of availability and cost effectiveness.!
! The quality of dispersed accommodation has been a perennial concern for asylum 
seekers and their advocates since the programme’s inception. The focus on sourcing 
inexpensive and available housing has resulted in significant disparities in the conditions 
of specific properties alongside relative poverty in the areas the accommodation is 
located. In 2010, the Daily Mail, Telegraph and other news outlets reported that a family 
had been issued a £2 million privately rented house in Notting Hill by the Kensington and 
Chelsea Council. Much emphasis was placed on the fact that the family had once been 
asylum seekers. The Sun went as far as to state in its headline: ‘Asylum seekers get 
£2.1m pad’ (Phillips, 2010). Abdi and Sayruq Nur were not asylum seekers when they 
were moved from their property in Brent to Notting Hill; under current legislation, asylum 
seekers do not have access to mainstream housing benefits and are not housed under 
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homelessness legislation. The image of Somali foreigners living lavishly in an upscale 
London borough at the taxpayer’s expense reinforced a popular representation of asylum 
seekers as liars and ‘scroungers’; the latter was the word the Express used to describe 
the Nurs and the ‘hundreds of other[s]’ like them (Hall, 2012). Housing conditions for 
asylum seekers supported under 1999 IAA are perhaps best marked by a lack of 
uniformity in quality, though accommodation is often substandard for a variety of reasons; 
key issues include structural degradation, lack of maintenance, the presence of mould or 
infestations, overcrowding, presence in poor or deprived locations, and distance from 
support networks, schools, markets and key services. The often unsuitable state of 
asylum housing has been associated with government strategies to disincentivise asylum 
seekers from wanting to remain in the United Kingdom. Phillips (2006) writes that ‘[t]he 
housing conditions and experiences of refugees clearly play an important role in shaping 
their sense of security and belonging, and have a bearing on their access to healthcare, 
education and employment (Phillips, 2006: p. 539). As part of a ‘deterrence-based UK 
immigration regime’ (Hintjens, 2012: p. 88), dispersal to challenging locations reflects an 
attempt to undermine asylum seekers’ sense of security and home within the United 
Kingdom. For Darling, this practice is indicative of the state’s attempt at ‘producing 
discomfort’ (Darling, 2011: p. 268). Employing an Agambenian notion of sovereignty, 
Darling argues that accommodation ‘forms part of what Bigo (2002) terms the 
“governmentality of unease”, through which an image of the nation as a domos is 
managed via the shifting convergence of governmental, disciplinary and sovereign modes 
of power’ (ibid., p. 268). The tactics of ‘unease’ are demonstrated in the living conditions 
asylum seekers are expected to endure; their exposure to various forms of extremity are 
features of the dispersal regime rather than anomalies. Ed Mynott (2000) states that initial 
concerns surrounding dispersal was that it would, in practice, result in the ‘“dumping” [of] 
people in areas where they would be isolated from the specialist legal advice and support 
(such as that for victims of torture) they needed’ (Mynott, 2000: p. 318). He continues:!!
There was a suspicion that [dispersal] was a deliberate ploy to make it harder 
for asylum seekers to make their claim and that they would in fact be dumped 
in areas where other people chose not to live, such as run-down council 
estates and blocks which were hard to let.!
(ibid., p. 318)!!
! Research into the experiences of those living within asylum housing illustrates the 
extent of asylum seekers’ exposure to extreme environments, both in regards to 
community responses to their presence and the nature of the housing they are expected 
to occupy on a no-choice basis. For instance, Sales points to research conducted by the 
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National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns (2001), which illuminated the racial 
abuse and substandard living conditions asylum seekers faced in areas of Liverpool 
following dispersal (Sales, 2002: p. 465). Citing early research into the dispersal 
experiences of asylum seekers throughout the country, Phillips (2006) explains that 
housing has often been marked by overcrowding and poor conditions (Garvie, 2001 and 
Wilson, 2001 in Phillips, 2006: p. 545). The Shelter research document Phillips cites, Far 
From Home, provides an analysis of asylum seekers’ experiences within the private 
rented sector. Garvie (2001) uses the 1996 English House Condition Survey to address 
the general unsuitability of private rented housing across the United Kingdom, explaining 
that ‘30 per cent of private tenants live in housing conditions which are unfit, in substantial 
disrepair or lack modern facilities’ (Garvie, 2001: p. 31). The impact on asylum seekers, 
Garvie states, is substantial due to preexisting physical or psychological harms many 
have endured prior to arrival. She also indicates that asylum seekers may not know the 
‘standards of accommodation they should expect’ (ibid., p. 32). These sorts of issues 
highlight problems of the Home Office’s dispersed housing programme under a previous 
regime. Following the cessation of contracts between the Home Office and regional 
consortia providing housing for destitute asylum seekers, a new model was adopted, 
which placed significant emphasis on corporate competition and competing firms’ ability to 
deliver cost-savings to the delivery of housing services. By early 2012, the ‘preferred 
bidders’ for the COMPASS programme included G4S and Serco, two private security firms 
with no history of housing provision that had each established themselves as providers of 
detention and transportation services in separate contracts with the UK government. The 
degree to which the humanitarian concerns related to the dispersal programme would 
decrease, remain or intensify would not be fully apparent until after the transition to 
COMPASS was complete nearly a year later.!!
4.2 COMPASS: Securitising and marketising asylum service provision!!
! The asylum housing contracts between the Home Office, local authorities, housing 
associations and private landlords first established in 2000 were fixed-term. After the first 
five years, new contracts were agreed with many of the same providers, though rates 
were lowered. In 2005, the Labour government renegotiated the contracts on the basis 
that fewer asylum seekers were entering the country and that the Home Office was 
coming to initial decisions more speedily. Tony McNulty, then Minister of State for 
Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality, said:!!
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‘As as a result of these achievement we are renegotiating contracts, saving 
£37m in 2004/2005 and remain on track to cut asylum support costs by a third 
by the end of 2005.’!
(Tony McNulty, quoted in BBC News, 2005).!!
The reduction in funding for asylum housing was also justified on the grounds that some 
private landlords were receiving money even when rooms were empty. In 2005, a Home 
Office investigation into the contracts was launched following allegations that one of the 
providers, Angel Group, was receiving money for the same properties from the Home 
Office and as subcontractors to Leeds city council (Pallister and Bowcott, 2005). The 
executive summary of the 2005 National Audit Office report analysing NASS provision for 
asylum seekers declared that ‘the contracts [NASS] let originally with accommodation 
providers in 2000-1 have not always proved to be value for money’; NASS aimed to 
achieve savings of ‘£37 million in payments in 2004-05’ (NAO, 2005: p. 2). While these 
circumstances provided the basis for renegotiating the contracts, the extended effects of 
reduced funding was increased strain on providers and local authorities already providing 
support. Shifts in providers also introduced concerns and stresses for asylum seekers 
who faced moves. For instance, the Home Office’s decision to end its contract with Safe 
Haven in Yorkshire and Humberside led to uncertain outcomes for nearly 1,500 asylum 
seekers dispersed in the region. In addition to redundancies, workers feared that the new 
contracts would lead to social instability and troubling experiences for asylum seekers. 
The manager of the North East Consortium of Asylum and Refugee Support Services 
expressed concern about ‘moving families that might have been in accommodation for as 
long as 10, 12 or 15 years’ and a director for the West Midlands Consortium described the 
adoption of new contracts as a ‘doomsday scenario’ (Ricketts, 2005).!
! The asylum housing landscape changed considerably in the lead-up to the 2010 
contract negotiations. Given the reduced rates introduced in 2005, a number of local 
authorities sought sustained or increased funding in order to continue their asylum 
services. This was at odds with the government’s attempts to further reduce costs within 
the system and agreements began to deteriorate. In 2010, for instance, Birmingham City 
Council ended its contract with the Home Office expressing an interest to offload housing 
to private sector organisations. A rhetorical acknowledgement that the needs of British 
people should outweigh those of asylum seekers was also used to justify the 
abandonment of the contracts. A cabinet member for housing, John Lines, stated that the 
city needed to reserve its housing stock ‘for our own people’ (BBC News, 2010). The 
Home Office and Glasgow City Council could not agree to a deal when negotiating the 
contracts in 2010; a spokesperson claimed that the reduction in the number of asylum 
seekers to the city resulted in its inability to sustain its housing obligations at competitive 
 108
rates (Twinch, 2010). The renegotiation was part of a contractual agreement, which 
required UK Border Agency and Glasgow City Council to reexamine the contracts terms if 
the numbers of dispersed asylum seekers dropped below 3,198. As the terms could not 
be agreed, the contract was terminated effective 02 February 2011. The government 
stated that ‘contingency plans’ were arranged to negotiate with another provider in 
Glasgow, Ypeople (formerly YMCA), to carry on housing asylum seekers (Scottish Affairs 
Committee meeting, 2011). From 2010 to 2012, Ypeople continued accommodating 
asylum seekers until the COMPASS programme was finalised and implemented. In the 
North East of England, subcontractors carried the bulk of the housing provision through 
2012. Jomast Developments, which defines itself as an ‘investment and regeneration 
specialist’ on its website (Jomast website 2015), continued housing asylum seekers in the 
interim period; they were subsequently subcontracted by G4S under COMPASS.!
! By 2011, the Home Office was accepting bids from new prospective 
accommodation providers under a new project title: the Commercial and Operational 
Managers Procuring Asylum Support Services (COMPASS). One of the aims of the new 
programme was to reduce the number of providers to reduce the 22 separate contracts in 
place with a total of thirteen suppliers across a variety of public and private sectors. It was 
a decision that the Public Accounts Committee later determined was ‘at variance with 
wider Government efforts to increase the use of small and medium size enterprise (SMEs) 
and to reduce dependency on a handful of larger suppliers’ (House of Commons, Public 
Accounts Committee Fifty-Fourth Report, 2014: s1(3)). In addition, the Public Accounts 
Committee suggested that excessive dependency on a small number of providers might 
result in greater risk for the government and the asylum seekers in its care. In the 
conclusion to its report, the committee declared:!!
[The Home Office] no longer has the diversity of provision it once had, nor the 
specialist providers, and has fewer alternative options available if a contractor 
fails. Any failures by a single contractor under COMPASS would impact on a 
greater number of asylum seekers.!
(ibid., Conclusions and recommendations, s2)!!
These observations had the benefit of hindsight. By October 2013, the Home Affairs 
Committee on Asylum were ‘very concerned’ and ‘unimpressed’ with the conduct of 
COMPASS providers G4S and Serco (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on 
Asylum, 2013a: para. 93). It is perhaps more significant that any dissenting voices that 
may have existed in 2010 and 2011 were not able to alter the trajectory of future asylum 
housing contracts. Instead, by December 2011, three private security firms - G4S, Serco 
and Reliance - were the ‘preferred bidders’ for the COMPASS contracts. During a ‘due 
 109
diligence’ period in which the UKBA assessed if there were any risks with awarding G4S 
with the asylum housing contract, the UKBA and representatives from G4S met with 
community members and academics in Sheffield to discuss concerns that a private 
security firm responsible for detaining and transporting asylum seekers was to be 
awarded a multi-million pound contract to house them. During this meeting on 24 
February 2012 at the city’s Northern Refugee Centre, Stephen Small, Managing Director 
of Immigration & Borders at G4S, explained that the bidding process was comprised of 
two different sets of criteria: technical and financial. A 60 per cent weighting was attributed 
to the technical offerings of bidders, while 40 per cent was aimed at the financial 
competitiveness of the offers. Small stated that G4S was not the lowest bidder financially, 
but that it was seen as the most technically capable of reducing costs, such as utilities 
costs. As a large corporation, Small argued, G4S could exercise extensive purchasing 
power and leverage (Meeting, Sheffield Northern Refugee Centre, 24 February 2012).!
! During this meeting, I asked the G4S representatives how they might respond to 
perceptions that the company was acting as an arm of the UK government’s immigration 
strategy given its presence in other areas of immigration control. Stephen Small objected 
to any links made between the UKBA and G4S stating that the security firm was not in any 
way responsible for immigration decisions. He further explained that G4S was sensitive to 
asylum seekers’ perceptions and indicated that the firm had made efforts to minimise its 
visibility; G4S employees in direct contact with asylum seekers in COMPASS 
accommodation would not be wearing G4S uniforms, only ties bearing the company’s 
logo. Responding to another participant’s questions about the potential moves families 
would be expected to make during the transition to the COMPASS project and whether 
any risk assessments had been conducted with Local Safeguarding Children Boards 
(LSCBs), Andrew Gray, an accommodation manager with G4S, stated that special 
consideration would be given to families with children to limit moves where possible. 
However, both G4S and UKBA representatives stated that there existed no duty to consult 
with LSCBs and that any formal duties had been addressed within the terms of the 
contract.  The meeting also revealed the neoliberal logic underpinning the decision to 4
extend offers to three private security firms. !
! While previous asylum housing agreements included contractors within the private 
sector, there remained a social welfare element to the provision, particularly with the 
inclusion of local authorities who had historically been the bodies responsible for providing 
accommodation prior to the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act. In excluding local 
 Of the statutory requirements listed within Schedule 2 of the COMPASS project, section 4
1.1.3 states that ‘[t]he Provider shall comply with the duties imposed on them by section 
55 of the Border, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, and the children’s duty, to 
safeguard children from harm and promote their welfare’ (COMPASS Project, Schedule 2, 
Accommodation & Transport - Statement of Requirements: s1.1.3, p. 4).
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authorities altogether from the contracts, the Home Office effectively provided a point of 
entry for the privatisation of social housing more generally. The first evidence of this was 
revealed in Stephen Small’s passing reference to an emerging ‘asylum market’ during the 
meeting. John Grayson, who was also in attendance, has referred to Small’s comment as 
a reflection of a multifaceted strategy on the part of the government to expose asylum 
seekers to an increasingly securitised environment while supporting the expansion of 
private sector control over abject communities. Grayson states that Small’s reference to 
‘asylum markets’ reinforced ‘the view already held by some analysts that it is G4S’s 
intention to continue expanding its management of prisons, criminal justice and 
immigration “estates”, while managing a housing contract (with effectively no legal rights 
for tenants), and to use this dubious base to expand into the wider privatised housing 
market’ (Grayson, 2012). Further evidence supporting Grayson’s observation was 
revealed during oral evidence given in a Home Affairs Committee meeting on asylum 
housing. Stephen Small of G4S and Jeremy Stafford, former Serco Chief Executive of UK 
and Europe, were interviewed as part of the Home Affairs Committee on Asylum’s 
investigation into the COMPASS contracts on 25 June 2013. The committee chair, Keith 
Vaz, asked Stafford why Serco would ‘bother’ contracting its services under the terms of 
the COMPASS project if the firm was receiving just 21 pence in profits per asylum seeker 
per night, a claim Stafford made in an earlier response. Stafford replied:!!
Because we are very focused on building an accommodation business and we 
believe that by taking on regions of the COMPASS service we could establish 
the right team to do that. We felt that we could establish a very good platform 
that we felt was scalable. You are probably aware that some of the services 
we develop in the United Kingdom we then go and take to other geographies. 
For example, the court escorting service we operate in London and the South 
East is operated in Western Australia. For us, we felt accommodation 
management was an important development area.!!
! ! (Stafford, quoted in House of Commons, 2013b)!!
There are two notable aspects to this response. The first is a conspicuous absence: 
Stafford does not suggest any possible corporate objective for the care and wellbeing of 
asylum seekers. In fact, asylum seekers are not even mentioned. Second, the 
expansionist neoliberal logic is clearly evident, but it is telling that Stafford referred only to 
‘accommodation management’ rather than ‘asylum accommodation management’ or 
indeed ‘prisoner accommodation management’. If asylum housing is to be the stepping 
stone for expansion into social housing more broadly, then concerns about the quality, 
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management and underlying ethic of something like the COMPASS programme has 
implications for citizens and non-citizens alike. In any case, it is worth exploring some of 
the initial trepidations asylum seekers and their advocates had in the period before 
transitioning to new providers and some of the possible foundations for those concerns.!
! Initial alarm expressed within the asylum support community following the 
announcement of G4S and Serco as preferred bidders on the COMPASS contracts 
centred largely on four concerns: 1) the companies’ current contracts with the government 
to detain and transport asylum seekers; 2) perceived human rights abuses by 
representatives from both firms; 3) both companies’ inexperience in delivering large-scale 
housing provision; and 4) the market-driven (rather than socially focused) motivations for 
each firm’s entry into the COMPASS contracts. A fifth issue, incompetency, was a concern 
that existed prior to COMPASS, but was more defined following contractual failings and 
other public displays of ineptitude and fraud, such as G4S’s inability to meet its 
contractual obligations during the 2012 London Olympics and both firms’ cases of 
defrauding the government in overcharging for prisoner tracking tags. These are issues I 
will return to, but I will first address the concerns as they existed prior to the transition to 
COMPASS.!
! G4S and Serco are each contracted by the government to carry out the 
management of detention facilities around the United Kingdom and have both been 
involved in the transport of asylum seekers to and from detention upon arrival and to their 
deportations. The 1971 Immigration Act established detention as a key element to the 
management of immigrant populations. Discretion is afforded to individual immigration 
officers in the decision to grant or refuse entry and no ‘upper time limit on detention’ is 
specified (Silverman, 2012: p. 1138). As part of its delivery strategy, the Home Office 
extended the opportunity to manage these facilities to private firms as well as HM Prison 
Service. Of the twelve immigration removal centres in the United Kingdom operating at the 
time of writing, nine are privately operated. G4S manages two, Tinsley House and Brook 
House; Serco manages another two, Colnbrook and Yarl’s Wood. HM Prison Service 
operates three centres: Dover, Haslar and Morton Hall. Asylum seekers’ experiences in 
these facilities have been the focus of many research projects, academic analyses and 
advocacy efforts (see: Jackson, 2003; Silverman, 2012; Welch and Schuster, 2005; 
Weber, 2012; Tyler, 2006; Keller et al, 2003; Hassan, 2000; Freedman, 2010; Webber, 
2011; Bosworth, 2008; Tyler, 2010; Stewart, 2005; Nandy, 2006; Giner, 2007; Athwal, 
2010; Sales, 2002; Hintjens, 2012; Menz, 2009). In their cross-sectional questionnaire 
study of 67 asylum seekers living in UK detention facilities, Robjant, Robbins and Senior 
(2009) found ‘high levels of anxiety, depression, and PTSD symptoms’ amongst asylum 
seekers in immigration detention (Robjant et al, 2009: p. 275). Malloch and Stanley (2005) 
have highlighted the vulnerabilities of women living in mixed environments, given possible 
 112
prior histories of sexual violence (Amnesty International, 1999 in Malloch and Stanley, 
2005: p. 62).!
! The incarceration of children in detention facilities has been particularly 
problematised. In her study of work conducted by the charity, Bail for Immigration 
Detainees, Anna Jackson (2003) provides examples of children’s experiences within 
detention; in one case, a woman and toddler were held for four months before being 
released following the medical examiner’s determination that the child faced a ‘failure to 
thrive’ (Jackson, 2003: p. 120). The work of nation-wide advocacy groups, such as the 
End Child Detention Now (ECDN) campaign, have achieved some successes in 
illuminating the issue and in impacting policy. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg declared 
in December 2010 that the practice of detaining children would end by May 2011. ECDN 
has also garnered the support of notable celebrities including Colin Firth and Russell 
Brand in calling for an end to child detention (ECDN website, 2015). Since 2009, there 
has been a significant reduction in the number of children in immigration detention. From 
its height of 1,119 children in detention in 2009, in 2015, the number had fallen to 99 
(Home Office, 2014a; see Figure 1.3). Limitations to the amount of time children can be 
detained within pre-departure centres were introduced in the 2014 Immigration Act. 
Section 5 limits the individual detainment period of unaccompanied children to 24 hours 
and Section 6 restricts the detainment of families with children to a maximum of 72 hours 
or seven days. In her general observations of the conditions asylum seekers face in 
detention, Bosworth (2008) questions whether ‘it is fair or justifiable to utilise detention as 
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Figure 1.3: Children in UK immigration removal centres from 2009 to 
2014
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a means of border control, when, particularly given the complexities in determining asylum 
cases, such a strategy must perforce result in some innocent and even victimised parties 
being incarcerated’ (Gibney, 2004 cited in Bosworth, 2008: p. 207).!
! It remains necessary to distinguish between detention, dispersal and, to a lesser 
extent, deportation. Detention is ostensibly a statutory control on migrants deemed to be 
in the United Kingdom illegally. It represents a technique of state power that actively 
excludes migrants from society and operates as a key component of the state’s 
deportation regime. This is evident in the language of the 1971 Immigration Act, which 
explicitly outlines the appropriate use of detention as it relates to deportation: ‘Where a 
deportation order is in force against any person, he may be detained under the authority 
of the Secretary of State pending his removal or departure from the United Kingdom’ (Sch. 
3, para. 2(3)). However, this basis for the continued use and development of detention 
facilities is challenged by the fact that many asylum seekers detained are never deported. 
As, Welch and Schuster (2005) explain:!!
[T]he majority of detainees in those facilities are eventually released, either 
because they cannot be removed because of the conditions in the country of 
origin, because travel documents for the persons to be removed cannot be 
issued, because they are allowed to appeal, because they are released on 
bail, because they are granted leave to remain on compassionate grounds or 
because their claim for asylum is eventually allowed.!
(p. 403)!!
The extent to which detention serves its intended purpose is questionable given the high 
numbers of asylum seekers that leave removal centres without being deported. Other 
functions of detention must therefore be considered. The containment of asylum seekers 
within detention facilities and their transfer between removal centres represent, according 
to Nicholas Gill (2009), deliberate efforts to represent asylum seekers as an ungrounded, 
temporary population. Detention serves to reinforce perceptions that asylum seekers are 
‘transitory, fleeting and depersonalised’ (p. 186). The effect of this construction, Gill 
argues, is that objectivity is more difficult to achieve in relationships between detention 
centre staff and the asylum seekers they oversee; ‘the construction of actors who hold 
influence over asylum seekers is […] achieved through the presentational effect arising 
from detainees’ mobility’ (ibid: p. 195). Within this context, the value of asylum seekers’ 
individual identities are secondary to the imperatives of managing a large, mobile 
population. This administrative approach is normalised and the reduction of asylum 
seekers’ humanity becomes a feature of a management regime. Additionally, the 
undermining of asylum seekers’ sense of belonging facilitates government strategies of 
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unease. Bosworth (2012) explains that detention serves to remind asylum seekers that 
they remain outsiders, an illegitimate population marked by their ‘absence of 
citizenship’ (p. 134). The logics of surveillance and exclusion permeate throughout the 
asylum experience; they are not sealed hermetically within the detention estate. 
Therefore, while it is imperative to distinguish between detention and dispersal, it is also 
necessary to regard these techniques of control as related and mutually informing.!
! In addressing private security firms’ role in the delivery of the state’s asylum 
detention programme, Gill (2009) highlights the fact that privatisation has resulted in the 
normalisation of detention through the bureaucratic mundanity of market imperatives. He 
writes that the ‘legacy of immigrant incarceration facilities, coupled with the layers of 
private accountability to public bureaucracy that surround it, serves to normalise and 
routinise the incarceration of immigrants’ and that the ‘practice has become banal, with a 
focus more upon its operationalisation than upon its justification’ (Sidaway, 2003 in Gill, 
2009: p. 187). As this bureaucratic tradition is brought into the realm of asylum housing, 
the focus on ‘operationalisation’ has become increasingly evident. Indeed, much of the 
criticism levelled against G4S and Serco in the National Audit Office’s report on the status 
of COMPASS housing included problems related to ‘organisational change’ and the firms’ 
inability to meet ‘key performance indicators’; data from interviews and focus groups with 
‘service users’ were conspicuously absent (NAO, 2014: pp. 5, 23 & 37). Similarities 
between detention experiences and those within COMPASS are also evident in asylum 
seekers’ interactions with housing staff and in the conditions faced within dispersed 
accommodation. Describing the conditions that led to disturbances at Yarl’s Wood 
detention centre in early 2002, Molenaar and Neufeld (2003) address the enmity arising 
between Group 4  staff and detainees within the facility:!5!
[D]etainees complained that they were being treated without respect, like 
prisoners, and that they often had to wait for health care and other services. 
Staff were concerned about lack of appropriate training, low salaries and 
inadequate staffing levels.!
(p. 134)!!
Following the transition to the COMPASS programme, asylum seekers have had more 
direct interaction with representatives of the project’s subcontractors rather than those of 
the main contractors, G4S and Serco. However, similar concerns and anxieties exist 
about employees’ lack of concern for the asylum seekers they oversee. The fear of having 
 Group 4 was one of two companies that eventually merged to become G4S in 2004. In the 5
context of Molenaar and Neufeld’s (2003) writing, ‘Group 4’ was likely a shortened version of Group 
4 Falck, a combination of Group 4 and Falck, two security firms that merged in 1999. In 2004, 
Group 4 Falck and Securicor merged to create Group 4 Securicor, or G4S (G4S website, 2015).
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private security personnel directly responsible for asylum seekers’ housing is captured in 
one asylum seeker’s response to the news that G4S was a preferred bidder on the 
COMPASS contract: ‘I do not want a prison guard as my landlord’ (quoted in Grayson, 
2012).!
! The basis for this concern goes beyond the fact that G4S and Serco manage 
detention centres; both companies have been implicated in the ill treatment of asylum 
seekers under their care. An inquest into the 2011 death of an asylum seeker in Colnbrook 
Immigration Removal Centre, which was under the management of Serco, determined 
that ‘neglect by immigration detention centre staff’ in not immediately contacting 
emergency services contributed to his death (Taylor, 2012). Serco was again implicated in 
the questionable treatment of a detainee in 2013 when Khalid Shahzad died within a few 
hours of his release from Colnbrook. Given his health problems while in detention, 
Shahzad’s death so soon after being discharged raised questions as to whether his 
release was ‘an abdication of Serco’s responsibility for his welfare’ (Coles cited in Allison, 
2013). G4S has also been associated with the mistreatment of asylum seekers, perhaps 
most publicly following the death of an Angolan asylum seeker during his deportation from 
the United Kingdom. Three G4S security guards constrained Jimmy Mubenga on a flight 
in October 2010. Despite his pleas to be released, Mubenga continued to be held until he 
died of ‘cardiorespiratory collapse’ (Ullah, 2015). Though the guards were charged with 
manslaughter, they were ultimately acquitted of criminal wrongdoing. Frances Webber 
(2014) writes that the judge’s decision to omit racist texts found on defendants’ phones 
suggests that institutional racism is both embedded in the state’s asylum regime and that 
the private actors carrying out its detention and deportation services, in this case G4S, 
enjoy a degree of immunity from prosecution. Extreme events, such as the death of 
Mubenga during his deportation and the death of detainees within immigration removal 
centres, reveal a blurring of lines between the branches of the UK government’s asylum 
regime, as each sector is dominated by the same firms - each contracted to carry out the 
state’s programmes of surveillance and removal.!
! Detention, deportation and now dispersal have to be understood as existing on 
part of the same continuum, though they remain differentiated by unique experiences 
within each programme. The fact that the same contractors operate on all three levels of 
the state’s asylum management system problematise attempts to depict these 
programmes as separate and distinct. In the conclusion of a Home Affairs Committee 
report titled ‘Rules governing enforced removals from the UK’, the committee suggested 
that the relationship between the Home Office and its contractors might indeed be harmful 
to asylum seekers under their supervision. Citing the comfort with which private security 
employees used racist language in the presence of UK Border Agency staff and 
representatives of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons, the committee posited that ‘[i]t is 
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possibly the result of a relationship between the Agency [UKBA] and its contractors which 
had become too cosy’ (HM Government, 2012: para. 32). Given the extent to which the 
UK government has aligned itself with the business interests of the private security sector 
in all three areas of asylum management, associations between the detention, deportation 
and dispersal experiences may be expected. For those asylum seekers with prior 
knowledge of companies like G4S and Serco or for those who have spent time under their 
surveillance, the firms’ broader reputations challenge attempts to differentiate between the 
services for which each is contracted to deliver. Jabril, an asylum seeker dispersed to 
West Yorkshire, recounted his view of G4S and its relationship with the Home Office:!
! !
‘I heard about G4S before, because - obviously - G4S is a security firm, as I 
used to know. I’m not sure what happened - [how] they end up being a 
housing provider. I understand how abusive G4S has been. When this project 
was won by G4S, before they started moving people, there were […] many 
campaigns about G4S [being] incapable of treating people with dignity. But, 
the Home Office, for them, they feel they are always right even if they are 
wrong, which is out of ethics [unethical]. It is an abuse of human rights, 
anyway.!
(Jabril, Interview, 22 August 2013)!!
4.3 Introducing selected dispersal regions!!
! As with the previous dispersal programme, asylum seekers housed under Section 
95 and Section 4 of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act are widely dispersed across the 
United Kingdom under the terms of the COMPASS housing project. The current major 
dispersal regions include: London and South; Wales; Midlands and East of England; North 
East, Yorkshire and Humberside; North West; Scotland and Northern Ireland. By the end 
of 2013, 20,687 asylum seekers were housed within dispersed accommodation under 
Section 95 and a further 4,831 were supported under Section 4. For the purposes of this 
doctoral research project, practical limitations and a qualitative research agenda 
necessitated the purposive selection of regions of study. Establishing the criteria for a 
dispersal region’s inclusion in the study involved determining the time and cost of travel, 
the representativeness of potential interview data, the willingness of research participants 
and the prospect of developing comparative data between regions. It was important that 
experiences under at least two of the firms contracted under the COMPASS agreement 
were represented within the research, as I wished to reflect asylum seekers’ experiences 
within G4S-managed housing as well as accommodation subcontracted by Serco.!
! Random sampling was not a preferred method of gaining access to asylum 
seekers for the purpose of in-depth semi-structured interviews, as such engagement 
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depended upon the establishment of trust through gatekeepers’ facilitation. The selection 
of Glasgow, the North East of England and West Yorkshire was therefore purposive, but 
intended to provide a diversity of experiences within the practical limits of finite resources 
and research strategies. Ritchie et al (2003) explain that ensuring diversity in samples - 
even those selected purposively - is important, as it ‘optimises the chances of identifying 
the full range of factors or features that are associated with a phenomenon’ and ‘it allows 
some investigation of interdependency between variables such that those that are most 
relevant can be disengaged from those of lesser import’ (p. 83). With an aim toward 
allowing for natural comparisons to arise from the interview data, I selected Glasgow, the 
North East of England and West Yorkshire as my primary research regions. Glasgow is 
unique given its series of integration networks, which serve a welcoming and support 
function for refugees and asylum seekers. As the primary site of dispersal in Scotland in 
which Serco is the sole contractor for asylum housing, the city serves as an important 
region in the study of COMPASS housing. In the North East of England, dispersal trends 
are moving away from the urban centre of Newcastle into outlying areas including 
Sunderland and Middlesbrough. Discussions with asylum seekers and charity workers in 
these regions helped develop a clearer understanding of the effects of geographical and 
social marginalisation from the city centre where fewer or less developed support 
networks exist. As in the North East, G4S is the primary contractor in West Yorkshire, 
though the main subcontractor in the region during the period of study was Cascade 
Housing rather than Jomast, as it was in the North East. The inclusion of Leeds, which is 
within the West Yorkshire dispersal region, widened the geographical scope of the project 
and provided further evidence of asylum seekers’ experiences within G4S-contracted 
housing.!
! In this section, I provide an outline of current dispersal data as it pertains to each 
of the dispersal regions included in this research. The size of current asylum-seeking 
populations as well as their percentage of the total population of asylum seekers within 
the United Kingdom are presented alongside descriptions of subregional populations. 
Within each overview, I explore longitudinal trends of dispersal within the regions and 
discuss developments within housing, and refugee and asylum support in these areas 
subsequent to the introduction of dispersal. I address a number of social and historical 
features of each location and draw on interview data from workers within the field of 
asylum support in order to develop an overview of past and current migrant experiences 
within the dispersal regions. Finally, I present demographic features of my sample of 
interviews with asylum seekers to draw some comparative elements of the regional data.!!
4.3.1 COMPASS and dispersal trends!!
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! Asylum seekers’ distribution around the country has altered since the introduction 
of the COMPASS programme; the initial stages of this movement were apparent during 
the period of transition to COMPASS from previous asylum housing contracts. The 
National Audit Office report on asylum housing published in January 2014 cites housing 
availability as a major contributing factor to the movement of over 2,000 asylum seekers 
during the transition to COMPASS. The disruption in the North East, for instance, is 
attributed to a failed ‘late stage’ agreement between United Property Management (UPM) 
and G4S leaving the security firm in a position in which it ‘had to look for alternative 
housing stock at short notice’ (NAO, 2014: s. 28, p. 20). What is not reflected adequately 
in this report is the fact that UPM was already performing a sub-contractual function with 
G4S subsequent to the introduction of COMPASS, but the company was dropped as an 
accommodation provider due to major contractual failings relating to substandard housing 
(Salsbury, 2012). Disturbances between G4S and its subcontractors continued beyond the 
transitionary phase. In a leaked letter from G4S’s Stephen Small to the company’s 
shareholders, Small explained that relations with subcontractors were tenuous and he 
stated that an accommodation provider, Mantel, had withdrawn its agreement with G4S to 
house asylum seekers. Small continued, stating: ‘It has become increasingly evident over 
the past few months that a number of our accommodation partners are finding it difficult to 
manage aspects of this contract, for example their ability to address the high number of 
property defects’ (Small quoted in Rawlinson, 2013). Small acknowledged that 
subcontractors Cascade and Live ‘have also expressed similar concerns to 
Mantel’ (Sambrook, 2013). Contractual upheaval partially explains the disruption to the 
implementation of the COMPASS contract, but the substandard conditions of asylum 
housing as described within the NAO report are better understood as symptomatic of 
attempts to marketise asylum welfare provision.!
! The promise of profitability and an aim to extend housing provision to new markets 
create an environment in which undesirable - or unliveable - conditions may be expected 
as a possible outcome of marketisation. Such developments are prevalent in the wider 
social housing environment as well. In the decades since massive privatisation of social 
housing commenced in the late 1980s, individual tenant experiences have not been 
universally positive. In Ginsburg’s (2005) analysis of the privatisation of council housing, 
she writes that fewer than half of those responding to a government review of tenant 
satisfaction during the Large Scale Voluntary Transfer process believed ‘that their landlord 
had met all of their promises’ (DETR, 2000 in Ginsburg, 2005: p. 126). Additionally, black 
and minority ethnic communities’ access to social housing diminished following 
privatisation (Mullins and Simmons, 2001 in ibid: p. 127). Disparities in tenant experiences 
within privatised housing suggests that the lack of uniformity of care provided by local 
authorities was not ameliorated through privatisation. In the case of asylum housing in 
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each of the three regions studied, inequality in provision marks individual asylum seekers’ 
experiences and is reflected in the observations of those working closely with asylum 
seekers in a support capacity. These views will be considered in further detail later in this 
chapter and subsequent chapters, however it is worth detailing the current size of the 
asylum seeker population and their distribution across the three primary dispersal regions 
investigated in this study.!!
4.3.2 Glasgow!!
! Much of the support infrastructure that currently exists for asylum seekers in 
Glasgow was fledgling to non-existent in the early years of the dispersal programme. The 
speed and degree to which the city’s ‘integration networks’ developed in the decade and a 
half following the introduction of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act are unique, given 
the relative cohesiveness of Glasgow’s support environment and its networks’ concerted 
integration objective. This is due in part to the devolved powers of the Scottish Executive 
and Scottish Parliament, which include their discretionary delivery of asylum services, 
despite the fact that dispersal remains within the remit of Her Majesty’s Government. 
Bowes et al (2009) describe the Scottish Executive’s ‘approach to asylum seekers and 
refugees’ as ‘somewhat different from that of the prevailing UK public discourse […] 
whereby asylum seekers in particular are seen as a threat to society’ (p. 28). In the initial 
stages of dispersal, the Scottish Executive placed particular emphasis on integration and 
service delivery (ibid, p. 28). The creation of specific avenues of support, such as the 
integration networks, was a fundamental strategy within the integration agenda.!
! During the networks’ early development, Karen Wren (2004) observed that the 
rapid rate of change in Glasgow challenged the networks’ ability to ‘meet the needs of a 
maturing asylum seeker population’, a population that had risen to 10,000 asylum seekers 
since 2000 (pp. 1-2). The level of growth strained both housing agencies’ ability to deliver 
their statutory duties and gave rise to tensions in areas around the city (Scottish 
Executive, 2003 in Phillips, 2006: p. 543). As statutory agencies and voluntary 
organisations were establishing a network of services to facilitate asylum seekers’ 
integration into their new communities, instances of racial violence were negatively 
impacting Glasgow’s welcoming image in the media. The 2001 murder of Firsat Yildiz 
Dag, a dispersed asylum seeker living in Sighthill, illuminated levels of extreme hostility 
asylum seekers sometimes faced in dispersal areas. In response to this violence, 
advocates of asylum seekers engaged in a series of marches to develop community 
awareness and promote mutual respect (Malloch and Stanley, 2005: p. 65). Smith and 
Bowes (2007) describe the death of Dag - and the publicity that followed - as a ‘catalyst’ 
that spurred locals into challenging media portrayals of Glasgow as a hostile environment 
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to those dispersed to the city on a no-choice basis (p. 735).!
! Rachel (Interview, 17 May 2013), a woman active in asylum advocacy since the 
beginning of the dispersal programme, described the conditions in Sighthill as tumultuous 
prior to dispersal; she stated that the British National Party was responsible for fomenting 
anti-migrant sentiment, which explained some of the added tension in the region. Rachel 
became very involved in a fledgling organisation called Glasgow Campaign to Welcome 
Refugees (GCtWR), which developed in direct response to the BNP’s negative depictions 
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Figure 1.4: Number of Dispersed Asylum Seekers in Glasgow by Year
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Figure 1.5: Percentage of Total UK Dispersed Asylum Seekers in Glasgow by!
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Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f D
isp
er
se
d A
sy
lum
 S
ee
ke
rs
 
wi
th
in 
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
0.00%
6.25%
12.50%
18.75%
25.00%
Year
Q4
 20
01
Q4
 20
02
Q4
 20
03
Q4
 20
04
Q4
 20
05
Q4
 20
06
Q4
 20
07
Q4
 20
08
Q4
 20
09
Q4
 20
10
Q4
 20
11
Q4
 20
12
Q4
 20
13
11.8%
10.5% 11.2%
14.2%
15.3%
13.8%
11.4% 11.3% 10.4% 10.7% 11.4% 10.0% 10.7%
Home Office, 2004. Control of Immigration Statistics, United 
Kingdom 2003; Home Office 2005. Control of Immigration: 
Statistics, United Kingdom 2004; Home Office 2014. Immigration 
Statistics, July to September 2014 (Asylum data tables immigration 
statistics July to September 2014 vols. 1 & 2 available at: https://
www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-july-to-
september-2014-data-tables).
of asylum seekers. GCtWR participated in one of the demonstrations against the 
vilification of asylum seekers following Firsat Dag’s death. According to Rachel, the 
responses of other voluntary organisations were ambivalent to outright resistant at this 
time. She said that support networks akin to those now operating in Glasgow were simply 
non-existent and that other voluntary organisations defended their inaction through 
assertions that refugee support was not within their funding remit. Signs of progressive 
community action were evident early on, though, as Rachel explained that the first support 
for asylum seekers dispersed to Glasgow arose out of residents’ associations. 
Subsequent to an emergent, localised structure of informal support, ten integration 
networks were developed to provide a level of assistance to asylum seekers not offered 
by the local authority. Some networks’ development was facilitated by the Scottish 
Refugee Council, and out of the initial ten, nine  networks continue to operate throughout 
the city. Their aim, according to Wren (2004), is:!!
[…] to facilitate joint working across both statutory and voluntary sectors and 
to co-ordinate and, in some cases, to provide services for asylum seekers and 
refugees at a local level. They also seek to build bridges between asylum 
seeker and host communities through various community development 
initiatives and social and cultural events. The networks have supported the 
development of drop-ins, language teaching and other services, and have also 
initiated various projects designed to bring together asylum seekers and host 
communities at a local level.!
(Wren, 2004: p. 25)!!
As Wren (2007) later observed, the integration networks developed primarily in response 
to specific needs within local communities; drop-ins provided asylum seekers with the ‘first 
point of contact with the host community’ (p. 403). These objectives remain core strategies 
in the networks’ current support approach. For instance, the Greater Pollock Integration 
Network offers activity space for children while parents access support or English 
language training. Computers with internet access are available for service users so they 
can keep in touch with friends and family and make appointments. The Maryhill 
Integration Network conducts engagement programmes designed to raise asylum 
seekers’ awareness of their options and to strengthen trust and community cohesion. One 
of the aspects Wren observed about the integration networks that was noticeable within 
the context of the interviews for this thesis was the fact the integration networks were 
mostly accessed by women (Wren, 2004: p. 2). This is significant, because my 
dependence upon integration network staff as ‘gatekeepers’ facilitating contact with 
asylum seekers resulted in a sample of respondents that was almost entirely comprised of 
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females. One possible explanation for the higher proportion of female service users was 
due to the nature of services offered by the integration networks, including child care and 
organised women’s groups.!
! The capacity for integration networks to deliver a fairly standardised service to 
asylum seekers since 2000 is perhaps due in part to the fact that the dispersal rate to 
Glasgow has been reasonably steady during that period, though funding challenges in 
recent years have contributed to a greater sense of insecurity, as I detail in Section 5.1.1. 
While numbers have fluctuated over time, Glasgow’s dispersal rates as an overall 
percentage of asylum seekers dispersed nationwide have remained relatively static. 
Between 2004 and 2006, Glasgow received its highest proportion of dispersed asylum 
seekers, averaging 14.4 percent over three years. Alongside decreased numbers of 
dispersed asylum seekers across the UK, the percentage dispersed to Glasgow dropped 
to between 10 and 11 per cent from 2007 onward. The numbers of asylum seekers 
dispersed to Glasgow fell from a high of 5,790 in Q4 2004 to 2,209 in Q4 2013, a small 
increase from the number of 1,764 dispersed asylum seekers in the city in Q4 2012. 
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 illustrate these trends.!
! These figures alone do not fully highlight the level of change that has occurred in 
Glasgow following the introduction of the COMPASS project. At first glance, it would seem 
that the ‘burden’ of service on Glasgow’s voluntary sector is waning, given the general fall 
in numbers of asylum seekers and Glasgow’s receipt of a relatively level proportion of the 
nation’s dispersed asylum seekers over time. However, developments within the city 
following the privatisation of asylum housing and a political will to demolish the city’s 
famous Red Road high-rises have resulted in shifting geographies; increasingly, asylum 
seekers are being moved to peripheral regions of the city where cheap housing is more 
readily available for Serco’s subcontractor, Orchard and Shipman. This has led to new 
challenges for asylum-seeking residents, as essential services are more distant, travel 
times longer and more expensive, and children’s schooling disrupted through moves.!!
4.3.3 North East of England, Yorkshire and Humber!!
! The development of asylum support strategies in the North East of England and 
Yorkshire and Humber varied from those in Glasgow. This was in part due to the size of 
the regions. The dispersal areas are geographically large and span a number of urban 
centres, such as Sheffield, Newcastle and Leeds. Another factor affecting dispersal 
patterns in these regions is the population shift to new geographies as accommodation is 
allocated in cheaper, readily available properties. Support networks that were once locally 
accessible in urban centres are now further afield for asylum seekers dispersed to 
peripheral regions. While this is occurring in Glasgow with asylum seekers being moved to 
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areas like Easterhouse, the distances are greater for those dispersed, say, to the North 
East; dispersal rates to Newcastle and Sunderland are falling while the rate of dispersal to 
Middlesbrough is increasing. In researching asylum seekers’ experiences in 
Middlesbrough and Sunderland in the North East and Leeds in Yorkshire, I aim to highlight 
conditions within COMPASS housing managed by G4S and subcontracted by Jomast in 
the North East and Cascade in Leeds.!
! The number of asylum seekers dispersed to the North East of England was 
highest in the years immediately after the introduction of the dispersal policy. In the ten 
years between 2003 and 2013, the population of dispersed asylum seekers was 4,930 in 
Q4 2003, remained over 3,000 through 2007 and dropped to its lowest number in 2010 at 
1,690. By Q4 2013, the number of asylum seekers in the region rose to 2,144 (see Figure 
1.6). As a percentage of the overall asylum seeking population, the rate of dispersal to the 
North East of England remained relatively static through 2011. By the end of 2012, the 
rate rose to 10.8 per cent from 9.6 per cent the year before (Figure 1.7). As the transition 
to COMPASS occurred between Spring and Winter 2012, the corresponding increase in 
the dispersal rate in this region may reflect the movement of asylum seekers into areas 
where Jomast, a subcontractor to G4S, has available properties. This is further illustrated 
through an analysis of the dispersal rates to individual localities within the region.  Figure 
1.8 reveals the rate of asylum seekers dispersed to Newcastle, Sunderland and 
Middlesbrough as a percentage of the total rate of asylum seekers dispersed to the North 
East of England. Between 2011 and 2012, the rate of asylum seekers dispersed to 
Newcastle and Sunderland fell while the rate dispersed to Middlesbrough rose 
precipitously during the same period and through 2013. The availability of low cost 
housing in Middlesbrough has been identified as a contributing factor of the rise.!
! Richard Horniman, a representative of Middlesbrough Council, stated in 2014 that 
the rise in the rate of dispersal to the city is attributable to ‘Government-funded regional 
contracts’ (Jeeves, 2014). In a Mirror article citing Middlesbrough as ‘England’s asylum 
seeker capital’, the Middlesbrough Council is reported as stating that ‘“lower value 
housing” made it cheaper for asylum seekers [to be housed]’ (Armstrong, 2014). These 
statements alongside government statistics on dispersal rates reveal that the pursuit of 
cheap, available housing has resulted in pockets of extreme increases in dispersal rates 
in areas that do not have the support infrastructure to accommodate high numbers of 
asylum seekers arriving in a relatively short span of time. A recent Home Office report 
outlining current housing and financial support strategies for asylum seekers reiterates the 
policy aim that the asylum population in dispersal areas does not exceed one in 200 
residents (Gower, 2015: p. 6). The proportion of asylum seekers in Middlesbrough 
exceeds this limit by nearly 1.5 times (Armstrong, 2014). Therefore, the ostensible aim of 
‘burden sharing’, which underpins the logic behind the dispersal programme is undone 
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Figure 1.6: Number of dispersed asylum seekers in the North East of England!
                  by year
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Figure 1.7: Percentage of Total UK Dispersed Asylum Seekers in the North!
                  East of England by year
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Figure 1.8: Rate of asylum seekers dispersed to Middlesbrough, Newcastle!
                  and Sunderland as percentages of the overall dispersal rate to!
                  the North East of England by year
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through a marketised approach toward asylum housing. In addition, support organisations 
in Middlesbrough have had to respond to a rapid rise in service users accessing advice 
and support services. Unlike Newcastle, and to a lesser extent, Sunderland, 
Middlesbrough does not have a robust asylum support network; support is limited to local 
charities and churches providing basic assistance, such as a food bank and donated 
clothing.!
! While asylum seekers dispersed to Glasgow or Newcastle can count on a series of 
agencies dedicated to servicing refugees and other migrants, the same is not necessarily 
as true in areas like Middlesbrough and Sunderland. The impact this has on individual 
asylum seekers is revealed in interview respondents’ references to emotional strain. What 
is notable about the sample of respondents living in the North East was that all were 
single adult males. Whereas in Glasgow, integration networks were predominantly 
accessed by women, the drop-ins in Sunderland and Middlesbrough were largely 
comprised of men. As drop-in services were limited in scope by virtue of limited resources 
and high numbers of service users, the ability to cater to specialist needs was 
correspondingly limited. The degree to which this affected the following outcomes was 
beyond the scope of the research, but there were some conditions largely unique to the 
experiences of asylum seekers dispersed to the North East. For instance, of the 
interviewees that explicitly described a sense of depression, half (6) of these respondents 
were living in the North East of England. Like others in COMPASS housing, asylum 
seekers dispersed to Middlesbrough cited feelings of stress, isolation and fear. The impact 
of shared housing felt uniquely acute for respondents in the North East; over 60 per cent 
of respondents reporting problems with housemates were residents in Middlesbrough or 
Sunderland. Two respondents explained that they felt that the managers of the COMPASS 
programme were insensitive to the cultural and religious differences of residents, and that 
it seemed as if no consideration was made for such factors when dispersing people to 
individual properties.!
! The experiences in West Yorkshire were similar in some respects to those in the 
North East of England, but whereas access to larger charitable organisations was limited 
for those dispersed to Sunderland and Middlesbrough, asylum seekers living in Leeds had 
access to drop-ins, the Red Cross and PAFRAS, a charity that provides access to mental 
health support, casework support and general advice. In the early days of dispersal, the 
Yorkshire and Humber region received the largest proportion of dispersed asylum seekers 
(21 per cent). However, the rate steadily declined through the 2000s and the region now 
hosts just over 11 per cent of asylum seekers dispersed across the UK (Home Office, 
2001; Home Office, 2014a). Leeds has has historically received a relatively low number of 
asylum seekers compared to surrounding cities. For instance, Bradford and Barnsley have 
typically received far greater numbers, though since the introduction of COMPASS, 
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Bradford has seen a precipitous rise in the number of asylum seekers dispersed to the 
city. Between Q4 2012 and Q4 2013, the dispersed asylum seeker population in Bradford 
increased by over 250 per cent from 742 in 2012 to 2,034 in 2013 (Home Office, 2014a). 
Similar to the experience in the North East of England, this is largely explained by the fact 
that subcontractors in the region pursued readily available, cheap housing. The interview 
data presented in chapters 5 through 8 are limited to asylum seekers’ living in Leeds, 
though future research warrants an exploration of dispersed residents’ experiences in 
Bradford and elsewhere. With the broad trends of the studied dispersal regions now 
explored, I turn to more specific accounts within each region, relying on interview data 
from workers within the field of asylum and refugee support. Their views articulate some 
of the distinctions between regions and also illuminate the extent to which the delivery of 
the COMPASS contract differs on the bases of housing availability, the attitudes of 
housing provider staff and the support of other statutory and voluntary agencies. 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Chapter 5: Views of COMPASS from the asylum service sector!!
! As the field of asylum support is broad, the delivery of asylum and refugee services 
is largely varied; the nature and degree of support are contingent upon factors such as 
location, staff expertise, funding dependencies, agency objectives and levels of affiliation 
with the Home Office. Referring to the asylum support ‘sector’ in general terms runs the 
risk of conflating a multitude of organisations’ diverse aims and motives. The Scottish 
Refugee Council (2014) states on its website that it views Scotland as a place ‘in which all 
people seeking refuge are welcome’ and until April 2014 the charity received money from 
the government to assist asylum seekers with advice and information. The City of 
Sanctuary movement, which aims to ‘build a culture of hospitality’ for asylum seekers 
through awareness-building activities with communities, schools and local government, 
nominally supports campaigns against deportation and child detention, but stops short of 
offering its own brand of activism. Squire and Darling (2013) suggest that the movement, 
which began in Sheffield in 2005, may serve to legitimate government constructions of 
asylum seekers rather than challenge them:!!
City of Sanctuary may formally call for an expansion of the remit of hospitality, and 
it may accept the need to be responsive to intertwined histories of injustice, but 
this in itself does not disrupt a statist account of politics and sanctuary. […] City of 
Sanctuary stretches the limits of hospitality, but does not exceed its limitations in 
any disruptive sense.!
(Squire and Darling, 2013: p. 69)!!
! Other organisations have been implicated in directly facilitating a punitive approach 
toward suspected immigration offenders, such as the children’s charity Barnardo’s, which 
operates a childcare facility at Cedars pre-departure centre near Gatwick Airport. The 
chief executive of Barnardo’s, Anne Marie Carrie, backed the British government’s 
deportation efforts stating in 2011 that ‘enforced departure’ was necessary, as was 
Barnardo’s involvement in offering services at the centre (Scammell, 2011). Francis 
Webber writes that despite the charity’s purported efforts to improve conditions within 
Cedars, its presence within the centre legitimates the practice of child detention, a policy 
the coalition government pledged in 2010 that it would end (Webber, 2014; Dugan, 2014). 
Refugee Action is similarly scrutinised for administering the government’s voluntary 
returns programme, which includes the Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration 
Programme (VARRP), through its Choices scheme. Suggesting that the contract between 
Refugee Action and the Home Office challenges the charity’s ability to remain impartial 
and best serve the interests of its service users, Webber (2012) states that ‘a contract with 
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the Home Office means you are acting to legitimise and to enforce Home Office policy, 
which is fundamentally at odds with what [human rights advocates] are about’ (Webber, 
2012: p. 97). In Written Evidence submitted to the House of Commons Select Committee 
on Asylum, Refugee Action advised the government of ways in which it might increase the 
number of asylum seekers leaving the country, stating that the Home Office needed to 
acknowledge the ‘many barriers’ keeping people from opting for Assisted Voluntary Return 
and suggested that the government use Refugee Action ‘key workers’ to discuss the 
option of voluntary return with asylum seekers early in the asylum application process 
(House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Asylum, 2013: Ev w64-65). !
! Nevertheless, Refugee Action reports that it held 10,000 individual advice sessions 
with refugees and asylum seekers accessing its One Stop Service from April 2012 to 
March 2013 and continues to offer integration support to vulnerable refugees through its 
Gateway Protection Programme (Refugee Action, 2013: pp. 5-6). Larger charities face 
criticism, because their autonomy is viewed as contingent upon their contractual 
obligations to the state. As major programmes like the One Stop Service are transitioned 
to other providers, there is always the possibility that these views may change. The 
Refugee Council, which lost its bid to offer support and assistance to adult asylum 
seekers in England, seems committed to its advocacy work; its CEO, Maurice Wren states 
that despite losing the contract, the organisation ‘remains resolute in its commitment to 
defend and promote the rights of refugees in the UK and will continue to work with the 
Government to convince it that fairness and the respectful treatment of people […] are 
essential prerequisites for an efficient, cost effective and credible asylum 
system’ (Refugee Council, 2014).!
! A number of organisations and movements have remained critical of government 
policy while maintaining a degree of independence from the state allowing them to engage 
in more active dissent. Stephanie Silverman (2012) highlights a few of these, which 
include No One is Illegal, Medical Justice and Student Action for Refugees; Silverman 
explains that the net effect of each NGO’s campaign against immigration policies and 
practices that are ‘complementary to immigration detention - including dispersal and the 
destitution of failed asylum seekers’ is to ‘help fuel the moral outrage toward the practice 
in the United Kingdom’ (Silverman, 2012: p. 1145). The Glasgow Campaign to Welcome 
Refugees (GCtWR), which like City of Sanctuary aims to change public attitudes toward 
asylum seekers, also participates in direct action and protests. When asylum seekers 
housed by Ypeople, the primary accommodation provider in Glasgow prior to COMPASS, 
were threatened with eviction, the GCtWR partnered with other organisations to ensure 
that many were rehoused. (Burnett, 2012). Similar organisations in England, like the 
South Yorkshire Migration and Asylum Action Group (SYMAAG), have contributed 
evidence to parliamentary committees to demonstrate asylum seekers’ experiences with 
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dispersal and living in destitution. Later in this chapter, I discuss how some of the 
organisations contacted as part of this dissertation approach the issue of advocacy and 
dissent in various ways. A full list of respondents interviewed in order to develop the 
perspectives presented in this chapter can be found in Appendix 4.!!
5.1 The role of the refugee and asylum support sector in Britain!
!
! Charities dedicated to providing assistance to asylum seekers and refugees largely 
vary in their support capacities. In Glasgow, refugee and asylum support agencies 
constitute a collaborative integration network and receive continued, though diminishing, 
financial support from the Glasgow City Council. In other cities, particularly areas in which 
COMPASS housing providers have expanded their accommodation provision into the 
fringes of dispersal areas, such as Stockton, Sunderland and Middlesbrough, support is 
limited to individual ‘drop-ins’, which cater to a variety of needs including the provision of 
clothing, food, English language learning, guidance and signposting to other services. 
Steady funding is not always a guarantee for these agencies, which Zetter et al (2005) 
suggest limited many from gaining charity status in the years immediately following the 
dispersal programme (Zetter et al, 2005: p. 174).!
! One of the immediate effects of the deployment of the UKBA’s dispersal programme 
was that asylum seekers arriving in newly formed dispersal areas found themselves 
devoid of significant support networks of the type and variety that had been established in 
London and the South East. Many of the locations selected as dispersal areas were not 
necessarily prime destinations for asylum seekers in the past. Wren (2004) explains that 
as the availability of housing was the ‘primary criterion’ in the selection of dispersal areas, 
the placement of asylum seekers has been in poorer areas and has ‘generally occurred 
(with some exceptions) in areas with no pre-existing BME [black and minority ethnic] 
communities’ (Wren, 2004: pp. 19-20). As a result, local authorities’ capacity to respond to 
the specific needs of a destitute asylum-seeking population were limited. In response to 
the perceived needs of the asylum-seeking communities dispersed to these new areas, 
small voluntary entities quickly mobilised in an effort to offer support for asylum seekers 
who could no longer rely upon the extended friendship and support networks of London 
and the South East. The expansion of voluntary upstart agencies varied from region to 
region, and levels of support were not uniform across all dispersal areas.!
! The dispersal of asylum seekers to Glasgow gave rise to the creation of integration 
networks, which aimed to support asylum seekers, build awareness and foster community 
fellowship in reception areas (ibid., p. 5). The dearth of refugee support options in the city 
meant that the development of a city-wide strategy was a gradual process with many 
services initially serving basic functions. Citing a 2001 Scottish Refugee Council report, 
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Wren writes that the networks ‘were not in place when the dispersal policy was first 
implemented as there was no city-wide strategy to facilitate a co-ordinated response from 
the voluntary sector. When dispersal began, many areas lacked any structure or forum for 
the voluntary sector to address the needs of asylum seekers’ (ibid., p. 23). Those working 
within Glasgow’s reflected on their organisations’ histories and their rapid maturation:!!
The [Maryhill Integration Network] was established in 2002 due to the lack of 
support [for] integration after the scheme [established] by the UKBA to disperse 
asylum seekers to Scotland, particularly Glasgow as the main city. So, people 
found at that time that there were no groups - community groups - for refugees 
available to them or no support available to them to help them to integrate into 
Scottish society. And, at that time, it was found that it is important to have charity 
organisations or registered groups established to be available for these people. 
That is the reason our organisation was established - as a result of the situation of 
asylum seekers who were really struggling.!
(Souidi, Interview, 17 May 2013)!!
[The] Govan and Craigton Integration Network [has] been a registered charity 
since 2010, but it has existed since 2001 after Glasgow became a city of 
dispersal. A lot of the people that were being dispersed in Glasgow were being 
housed in areas such as Govan and Craigton and so really, this was set up by 
local people and community organisations and also the local government just to 
try and provide some initial support and a kind of welcome space for people 
coming to Glasgow and to Govan and Craigton especially. […] When we were 
established officially as a charity, the organisation’s role went from being 
something that was more informal in terms of having a sort of drop-in with food, 
tea and coffee to something actually more concrete in terms of service provision.!
(Harland, Interview, 10 June 2013)!!
Greater Pollok Integration Network started in 2001 as a response to the Home 
Office dispersal through the UK. It tended to be kind of grassroots organisations 
and concerned individuals that got together as people or organisations to provide 
services to asylum seekers to help them “integrate into the community”. […] In 
2007, the kind of committee got together and constituted and became a charity at 
that point. We also got funding and community flats downstairs. That’s when we 
started with an administrator, a project coordinator and a part-time volunteer 
development worker.!
(McWilliam, Interview, 13 June 2013)!
 131
!
! Some preexisting organisations had to be repurposed in order to meet the needs of 
new arrivals. The Kingsway Health and Wellbeing Centre, which operates out of a group 
of tower flats four miles northwest of Glasgow city centre, was not initially established for 
asylum seekers. A support worker for the project, Jassim Johe, explains that the 
organisation was founded in 2000 as a health project focusing on issues of ‘inclusion, 
deprivation, alcoholism [and] drug mistreatment’ within the local community (Johe, 
Interview, 19 July 2013). When asylum seekers began arriving in the region following 
dispersal, it became clear that the organisation would need to be adapted to address the 
needs of a broader community. Johe describes the sudden impact of dispersal on the 
organisation:!!
One night, two buses full of people were dropped in this area with no prior 
knowledge or information. [The workers] were swamped, as the asylum seekers 
coming here didn’t know where the shops were or what’s what. So, they started 
coming to the centre. The management committee were helping as much as they 
could. They found that there were a lot of asylum seekers and refugees with lots 
of different issues and they never dealt with asylum seekers or refugees. They 
decided that they needed a specialised service to deal with the issues of asylum 
seekers and refugees.!
(Johe, Interview, 19 July 2013)!!
5.2 The impact of financial cuts and funding dependencies!!
! Charities and non-profit organisations supporting refugees and asylum seekers in 
the United Kingdom depend on funding from a variety of sources including lottery funds, 
charitable trusts, banks, faith-based organisations and individual donations. Grant money 
is often distributed on a conditional basis for a specific project or allocated for a finite 
period. Government contracts account for another important source of income, as such 
funding has traditionally supported country-wide refugee and asylum advice services. The 
Scottish Refugee Council, the North of England Refugee Service (NERS), the West End 
Refugee Service (WERS), Justice First and Solace have received funding from charitable 
bodies like the Big Lottery Fund, Comic Relief, Northern Rock Foundation, Greggs 
Foundation and the J. Paul Getty Junior Charitable Trust. In the 2012 financial year, 
Refugee Action received funding from the government, public authorities, the Refugee 
Council, the Sigrid Rausing Trust, Comic Relief, Trust for London and others (Refugee 
Action, 2013: p. 21). The Asylum Support Partnership, which consists of the Refugee 
Council, Refugee Action, the North of England Refugee Service, the Scottish Refugee 
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Council and the Welsh Refugee Council, was formerly responsible for operating a ‘One 
Stop Service’ providing advice and support to asylum seekers and refugees within the 
organisations’ respective regions. In Autumn 2013, the Asylum Support Partnership lost its 
bid to continue with the One Stop Service and the management of the service was 
transferred to Migrant Help, a charity that G4S subcontracted in 2012 as a ‘strategic 
partner’ from the voluntary sector to aid in its delivery of the COMPASS housing project 
(Scottish Refugee Council, 2013; Grayson, 2012; G4S, 2012). Critics of the new 
programme warn that it will diminish asylum seekers’ support offerings, as Migrant Help 
will no longer provide advocacy support for asylum seekers and will transition from a 
customer-facing service to one based on telephone and web-based access (Duffy, 2014; 
Molloy: 2014).!
! There exist concerns that the encroaching state presence in the voluntary sector 
and the government's abandonment of the current refugee support infrastructure 
represents a consolidation of social control techniques through cost-saving measures and 
the co-option of voluntary agencies. Such was the view promoted amongst the asylum 
and refugee support community following revelations that Barnardo’s had entered into a 
contract with G4S to provide family support services at Cedars pre-departure 
accommodation centre in 2011. Ahlam Souidi, an employee at the Maryhill Integration 
Network, voiced her frustration with Barnardo’s involvement at Cedars:!!
‘Why is Barnardo’s charity involved in this way? Why is a charity to support 
families […] making sure that people are going to be deported?’ The UKBA 
said: ‘No, no, no, no. Their job is for the welfare of the people and children 
there. They are going to support them there at the pre-departure centre.’ But it 
is a detention centre. The Scottish Refugee Council went [to inspect a pre-
departure centre] and they saw the [conditions]. They said: ‘It is detention. 
Why is it called pre-departure?’ [The UKBA] said: ‘No, it’s [Barnardo’s] role to 
make sure that the children are okay in the pre-departure centre and the 
family are all right.’ But no. To be honest, I was so disappointed. I used to 
support Barnardo’s, but not anymore. I was so disappointed. Many people 
were disappointed and said: ‘We don’t support Barnardo’s anymore’. They 
should never have been involved. They are a charity supporting vulnerable 
people. It means that you can no longer trust any charity organisations in this 
case.!
(Souidi, Interview, 17 May 2013)!!
Charities’ implication in propping up the government’s immigration policies and practices 
is also extended to those receiving funds to offer advice and support services. For 
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instance, the Refugee Council and Refugee Action have received additional support from 
the Home Office to offer specialist advice services to refugees and asylum seekers. From 
April 2011, Refugee Action provided repatriation assistance under its ‘Choices’ scheme, 
which was previously titled the ‘Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme 
(VARRP) when it was overseen by the International Organization for Migration (Blinder, 
2012: 5). Refugee Action has faced criticism from others in the asylum and refugee 
support community due to the fact that its desire for a ‘better, fairer asylum system’ is at 
odds with its facilitation of the government’s removal of unwanted migrants. Webber 
(2012), a retired barrister of immigration and human rights law, explains that the use of the 
word ‘voluntary’ is a misnomer. She states:!!
There is a more fundamental objection with the ‘assisted voluntary returns’ 
programmes, which is that they are not genuinely voluntary. […] The UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), in its guidelines on voluntary repatriation, 
states that the ‘principle of voluntariness is the cornerstone of international 
protection with respect to the return of refugees’, and it must be viewed in 
relation to both (a) conditions in the country of origin (calling for an informed 
choice) and (b) the situation in the country of asylum (permitting a free 
choice). Virtually none of these schemes currently operating as ‘voluntary 
return programs’ from the UK meets these criteria for voluntariness. Voluntary 
return is frequently offered as a less painful alternative to continued destitution 
followed by (inevitable) compulsory return, and it is generally impossible for 
the returnee to have an informed choice about the country they are returning 
to.!
(Webber, 2012)!!
! Webber’s observation highlights the sometimes duplicitous nature of mainstream 
asylum and refugee support offerings. Organisations like Refugee Action, which are 
financially beholden to the state, exist as both agents of complicity and instruments of 
resistance; in addition to providing voluntary returns assistance, Refugee Action 
campaigns to ‘bring back dignity’ to asylum seekers (Refugee Action website, 2014). 
Refugee Action’s activism in challenging perceived injustices within the asylum system is 
perhaps undermined by its acceptance of grant money from the very institutions it seeks 
to contend with. In an ongoing research project, Anderson and McGhee question this role 
of non-governmental organisations in the provision of voluntary returns and explore the 
blurred distinction between ‘facilitation’ and ‘encouragement’ of repatriation (COMPASS 
website, 2014).!
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! The contracts between the Home Office and regional consortia comprised of local 
authorities, housing associations and private landlords were criticised for providing 
substandard housing for asylum seekers in receipt of NASS support. Robinson et al 
(2003) referred to the dispersal programme as ‘little more than a scramble to locate 
vacant and reasonably priced accommodation’ (Robinson et al, 2003 quoted in Dwyer and 
Brown, 2008: 204), and in their study of asylum housing in Leeds, Dwyer and Brown 
(2008) found that much of the available accommodation was provided by private 
contractors including Angel Group and Clearsprings (Dwyer and Brown, 2008: p. 208). 
Fifty per cent of the respondents in their research, which included asylum seekers living in 
NASS accommodation, reported ‘serious shortcomings’ in the delivery of NASS housing 
and the research findings suggested that those in private accommodation perceived their 
experiences more negatively than those in local authority accommodation (ibid., pp. 
209-210). Beth Humphries (2004) describes Steve Cohen’s vision of the NASS dispersal 
program as one that reflected a ‘modern poor law, based on coercion, without choices or 
protection against eviction’ (Cohen, 2003 in Humphries, 2004: p. 101). The role of 
statutory agencies and charities in the implementation of state policy remains 
complicated; charities that are dependent upon government funding for their continued 
operation may find their values compromised in the interest of retaining financial support. 
Arthur Carr, a former support worker for the North of England Refugee Service (NERS) 
and a current volunteer at its satellite drop-in service in Sunderland, explained that the 
organisation was in a troubling position given its dependency on central government 
funding. He explained that there remained pressure to ‘toe the party line’ and follow 
government agendas in relation to the management of refugees and asylum seekers; Carr 
believed this situation would intensify as the fear of cuts increased (Carr, Interview, 30 
January 2013).!
! Beyond contracting asylum service and housing provision to agencies outside of the 
asylum support sector, state funding cuts to statutory and charitable services have 
introduced new challenges to asylum service organisations, even those that receive 
funding from sources outside the state. Two trends arising out of interviews with workers 
within these organisations included the perception that service quality and capacity has 
diminished due to funding cuts and a belief that the voluntary sector has become the 
primary (and often only) service provider for asylum seekers, particularly ‘failed’ asylum 
seekers. Grants have become more difficult to secure, as a greater number of 
organisations are applying for smaller amounts of money. Emma Crossley, Project 
Manager of the support charity Meeting Point in Leeds, explained that the demands on the 
voluntary sector cannot keep up with the funding available. Speaking of statutory 
agencies’ dependence on the voluntary sector, she stated:!!
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You will get people referred to us by the Job Centre, by the local authority, for 
huge needs and it’s expected that we’ll pick it up. And we just don’t have the 
resources or capacity to do that. So, there’s definitely an expectation. The 
expectation has increased, but what we actually have to work with is 
decreasing. The level of need is increasing, the expectation is increasing, but 
our capacity to be able to deliver is decreasing. I think people are very 
stretched. It’s very stretched, and agencies are struggling to continue or 
having to combine resources and [form] partnerships, either formerly or not, 
just to try to keep doors open.!
(Crossley, Interview, 22 July 2013)!!
! Meeting Point volunteers serve a variety of purposes at the drop-in including 
collecting food donated by local stores, assisting with paperwork, signposting other 
support organisations, providing advocacy support, organising activities, and cooking 
meals for those accessing the drop-in. Much of the subsistence-level support, particularly 
for ‘failed’ asylum seekers, is not offered elsewhere. As the Asylum Support Partnership 
no longer provides face-to-face advice and information to asylum seekers and refugees, 
smaller charities, which are primarily involved in offering support and signposting, are 
likely to become the first point of direct contact for refugees and asylum seekers on 
Section 95 and Section 4 support. As Crossley suggests in the quote above, this 
outsourcing of advanced advice functions to small voluntary services has already begun. 
While volunteers from a variety of professional backgrounds provide expertise with which 
to assist asylum seekers in managing casework documentation and interpreting letters 
sent by the Home Office and housing providers, the capacity for providing a sustained 
level of quality service is uncertain, as funding for continued training is increasingly 
unavailable. Carr highlights his concerns for the future of the voluntary sector (notably 
prior to NERS losing the One Stop Services contract):!!
With the cuts that are being imposed now and the obvious reduction in support 
staff numbers, [NERS workers] cannot really afford to give the same amount 
of time that they could previously, because they have that and a lot of other 
things to deal with. Therefore, there has to be a deterioration in the amount of 
assistance that can be given to the appellant in these cases. […] To a certain 
extent, especially now that resources are stretched, for people who are 
actually paid to do the work, there’s no way they could do everything. […] 
What Sunderland is dealing with is that [the drop-in is operating] without the 
benefit of paid employees. [Support work] is left to volunteers like myself and 
others. Even within the refugee service, volunteers are becoming more and 
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more necessary to provide a service. They’ve always been there, and they’ve 
always provided a brilliant service. The need for them has increased - I would 
say exponentially - because of the way things are. […] In Sunderland, asylum 
seekers ‘don’t have the same level of support, because - there’s myself who’s 
trained to a certain extent, but my training is not ongoing. Therefore, there will 
be a stage where I have to say: ‘Sorry, I don’t know enough about this to assist 
you’. If we get involved in something that is termed ‘casework’, […] we would 
have to refer that to Newcastle, for instance. Because that’s the only place 
where the expertise is available.!
(Carr, Interview, 30 January 2013)!!
! After the introduction of the COMPASS housing contract, local authorities’ 
responsibilities to asylum seekers are now limited to assisting those eligible under Section 
21 of the 1948 National Assistance Act and Section 20 of the 1989 Children Act (Burgess, 
2010: pp. 129-130). As few asylum seekers meet the stringent criteria for this support, 
dedicated asylum support teams within local authorities have diminished over the last 
decade. These departments are expected to all but disappear in the wake of the 
COMPASS contracts as housing stock and service users are moved on to the private 
sector. Rosanna Longley, Service Manager for the Red Cross Refugee Services across 
Yorkshire, explained that charities’ reduced funding coupled with a move away from local 
authority housing provision has resulted in a significantly altered support landscape:!!
A lot of organisations have lost their funding and it’s been really, really tough 
for a lot of charities, as well as in the statutory sector; it’s not a good time […]. 
The asylum team in the local authority in Leeds is gone now. It just doesn’t 
exist anymore. That’s definitely changed. I can’t really comment on where it’s 
been picked up, but it’s something that does concern me. When the local 
authority was providing housing, they were quite proactive in their approach. 
They organised the multiagency meetings, for example. They really 
encouraged collaborative working, I’d say. And they had expertise in that area, 
working with refugees and asylum seekers. It was a shame when that was 
lost.!
(Longley, Interview, 12 August 2013)!!!
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5.3 Comparing social welfare considerations before and after COMPASS!!
! With the creation of dispersal regions following the introduction of the 1999 
Immigration and Asylum Act, local authorities partnered with housing associations and 
private housing providers to carry out the government's dispersal policy; these Regional 
Consortia were funded by the National Asylum Support Service (Zetter et al, 2005: p. 
171). As asylum seekers were deposited in areas with little prior experience of receiving 
refugee communities, the arrival of dispersed asylum seekers challenged local authorities; 
these authorities were expected to promote integration and inclusion while attempting to 
mitigate the negative effects of discrimination and social exclusion. Local authorities were 
also faced with the task of coming up with adequate accommodation. A 1999 National 
Audit Office report estimated that the first year of NASS funded dispersal accommodation 
would require ‘37,120 units of accommodation’ and it sought to source 40 per cent of its 
accommodation from consortia partnerships and 60 per cent from its contracts with private 
landlords and social housing providers (Audit Commission, 2000: p. 47). Balancing out the 
immediate need to source properties quickly and the statutory duty to ensure that housing 
was ‘appropriate for the accommodation of persons supported under [the 1999 Act]’ 
proved difficult (1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, s101(8)(c)). Results varied between 
areas and asylum seekers’ experiences were hardly uniform. Aims at clustering migrant 
groups within communities with shared heritage were, as Dawson (2002) explains, 
‘undermined when dispersal [was] carried out under contract between NASS and private 
accommodation providers, and between the local authorities at points of origin and private 
accommodation providers at sites of dispersal’ (Dawson, 2002: p. 11). A fragmented 
approach resulted in a ‘dispersal programme [that] was, by and large, disorderly, 
authoritarian, involving minimal consultation with local communities in dispersal sites and 
seriously under-resourced (Fekete, 2000 in ibid., p. 11).!
! For some, the dispersal policy was closely linked to the expansion of deterrence 
tactics that marked the UK government’s aims to disincentivise refugees from making 
asylum claims in the country. Bloch and Schuster (2005) explain that dispersal, like 
detention and deportation, is an act of exclusion. It ‘takes away asylum seekers’ freedom 
to choose where they settle in Britain and so doing it removes them from kinship and other 
social networks as well as community organisations that are known to be crucial in the 
early stages of settlement’ (Carey Wood et al, 1995; Bloch, 2002; Robinson et al., 2003 in 
Bloch and Schuster, 2005: p. 493). Disparities in the quality of housing provision led, at 
times, to inadequate conditions. Dwyer and Brown (2008) highlight the observations of a 
manager at a charity in Leeds, who explained that the quality of local authority 
accommodation under the original dispersal contracts was generally of an acceptable 
standard, but the multitudinous levels of subcontracting with little oversight that occurred 
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amongst private providers resulted in ‘conditions [that] were pretty much appalling’ (Dwyer 
and Brown, 2008: p. 210). Dwyer and Brown cite NASS’s ‘inexperience in managing 
housing, and its willingness to devolve power to individual private contractors (who then 
subcontract to others)’ as contributory factors that ‘led to variable and, on occasions, sub-
standard provisions’ (ibid., p. 210).!
! While the Home Office remained nominally committed to housing asylum seekers 
in groups in order to mitigate experiences of isolation and social exclusion, Kissoon (2010) 
writes that, in practice, dispersal locations were determined primarily by housing 
availability. She describes the effects of dispersal on those made to live in far-flung 
locations:!!
Asylum seekers were made to occupy undesirable units in areas away from 
close social ties for the duration of their claim, which could take years. The 
uncertainties of being dispersed to a strange area away from one’s networks 
made people feel powerless, afraid, and isolated, and these feelings were 
compounded by rising local tensions as the look of neighbourhoods changed.!
(Kissoon, 2010: p. 19)!!
The movement of asylum seekers into deprived areas of Britain also gave rise to concerns 
of racism and discrimination. Spicer (2008) explains that racial discrimination was 
‘compounded by the public’s negative attitudes to asylum-seekers and refugees, 
reproduced by hostile media coverage’ (Spicer, 2008: p. 493). He describes interviewees’ 
assessments of their experiences in discriminatory environments. In one instance, a 
respondent reported that her children were subjected to physical and verbal abuse while 
in public; another mother described her children’s apprehension of going outside because 
of their fear of abuse (ibid., p. 496). Asylum seekers’ exposure as outsiders, identified as 
conspicuous minorities in economically disadvantaged communities and initially marked 
by their receipt of vouchers rather than cash support,  resulted in ‘social exclusion and 6
stigmatisation’ which, according to Sales ‘damage[d] their chances of settling’ (Sales, 
2002: p. 474).!
! Those interviewed for this dissertation noted that dispersal had continuously been 
a source of concern regarding the wellbeing of asylum seekers and refugees, but they 
suggested that some of the most negative aspects of dispersal, such as isolation and 
stigmatisation, were exacerbated by the move toward the COMPASS contracts. Beyond 
assumptions that G4S and Serco were seeking cost-cutting strategies by moving asylum 
seekers into substandard housing on the outskirts of dispersal areas, respondents 
 The voucher scheme was terminated in 2002, but asylum seekers on Section 4 support still 6
receive cashless support on an Azure card (Bloch and Schuster, 2005: p. 506; Reynolds, 2010).
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suggested that a breakdown in interagency communication following the COMPASS 
transition led to a deterioration in the housing service. Arthur Carr of NERS explained that 
he had more faith in previous contracts with regional consortia and the primary 
subcontractor, Jomast, because regular meetings were held between the UK Border 
Agency, housing service providers, victim support representatives and children’s services 
workers. These meetings, he suggested, helped improve transparency and ensured that 
concerns regarding issues related to discrimination and housing conditions were 
addressed more holistically; he suggested that these meetings were no longer occurring 
since the COMPASS transition, despite the retention of Jomast as a subcontractor (Carr, 
Interview, 30 January 2013). !
! Kath Sainsbury, Project Manager for Justice First, an advocacy and support charity 
located in Stockton, explained that the involvement of local authorities in the previous 
contracts meant that those in the refugee services sector received regular updates on 
policy changes and accommodation provision was more focused on individual service 
users rather than ‘statistics’ alone; she implied that the transition to COMPASS resulted in 
a more impersonal approach (Sainsbury, Interview, 06 June 2013). Pete Widlinski, the 
Information and Communications Manager for the North of England Refugee Service, 
explained that the first five-year contract following the launch of the dispersal programme 
provided enough funding for regular outreach and was managed through various multi-
agency meetings. He explained that the second five-year contract resulted in less money 
and included fewer local authorities in the North East than the previous contract. Widlinski 
viewed the involvement of private providers during this period as superior to public 
offerings in some respects, as providers like the Kimberley Group allowed residents to 
remain in properties during transition periods or immediately following a negative decision. 
The local authorities, he stated, were much less flexible in this regard (Widlinski, Interview, 
26 June 2013). A director for another refugee service in the North East of England 
expressed a similar view, stating that Newcastle and surrounding regions were unique in 
the fact that private providers were quicker to get on board with the dispersal programme 
than local authorities, but the respondent acknowledged that the initial implementation of 
the dispersal programme was marked by ‘a lot of trouble’ (Interview, 18 June 13).!!
5.3.1 The changing nature of inter-agency collaboration!!
! In its 2000 report on dispersal, the Audit Commission detailed the expectations of 
the regional consortia tasked with housing dispersed asylum seekers across the country. 
Central to the implementation of dispersal, the Audit Commission argued, was an attention 
to asylum seekers’ needs beyond the ‘provision of shelter and subsistence’, which it 
viewed as ‘necessary, but not sufficient’ (Audit Commission, 2000: p. 20). The Audit 
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Commission recognised that asylum seekers’ experiences would vary across regions and 
communities and sought to mitigate the possible negative effects of exclusion and 
‘hostility towards the new arrivals’ through the promotion of inter-agency cooperation 
between local authorities, schools, charitable organisations, health services and housing 
providers; a portion of grant money distributed to regional consortia was intended to 
‘facilitate liaison and joint working between local agencies providing support’ (ibid., pp. 
20-21). By extension, inter-agency collaboration ensured that accommodation was 
suitable and the possibility for discrimination minimised through regular communication 
and cooperation. Government targets aimed at safeguarding the welfare of children (See 
Children Act, 2004: S. 10) and reinforcing public sector duties under the Equality Act 2010 
could be addressed through information sharing amongst statutory and charitable 
organisations.!
! During the years prior to the COMPASS housing programme, local authorities 
often liaised with other local services including the police, health services and housing 
associations to ensure that asylum seekers' placement within designated accommodation 
was appropriate and adequate. In addition, some authorities monitored their adherence to 
the Equality Act by conducting Equality Impact Assessments prior to depositing asylum 
seekers in dispersal housing. The degree to which these considerations protected 
vulnerable people from discrimination or social harm is debatable, as housing conditions 
and asylum seekers’ placement in certain communities have been criticised as unsuitable 
and exclusionary in their own right (see: Cohen, 2002: p. 534; Sales, 2002: p. 465). The 
practice of conducting collaborative meetings did not necessarily result in improved 
conditions; Dawson (2002) states that ‘despite regular “inter-agency” meetings’ during the 
initial stages of dispersal, ‘poor channels of communication within the [Regional Asylum 
Consortia] and between different departments within the local authority […] led to 
considerable uncertainty concerning responsibility for asylum-seeker affairs’ (Dawson, 
2002: p. 12). Still, respondents from the refugee and asylum service sector suggested that 
the frequency and representativeness of inter-agency meetings had declined following the 
COMPASS transition, leaving asylum seekers more exposed to discrimination and the 
effects of poor housing conditions. !
! Respondents in all three case study regions suggested that multi-agency meetings 
were still occurring to their knowledge, but that the nature and frequency of those 
meetings had altered since the transition to the COMPASS programme. In his observation 
of the situation in Sunderland, Carr suggested that since G4S took over the asylum 
housing contract in early 2012, there had been a steady decline in inter-agency 
communication with the police. In addition, Carr stated that the standard procedure of 
notifying Children’s Services when moving families into new areas was no longer being 
regularly practiced (Carr, 30 January 2013). Sainsbury observed that some agencies in 
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Stockton were still involved in collaborative meetings that occurred once every six weeks, 
but she stated that the ‘dynamic has changed’:!!
When [inter-agency meetings] were chaired by the local authority, […] it was 
more holistic, I think. There was a lot more updating of information; policy 
changes […] were always shared and we were all kind of kept on top. When 
the local authority lost the contract, the focus is much more on housing. Within 
that, it’s very statistical. We work with human beings; they work with 'X' 
number of people arriving each week going into 'X' number of houses.!
(Sainsbury, Interview, 06 June 2013)!!
A project manager for a refugee support agency in the North East explained that in multi-
agency discussions conducted prior to the COMPASS contract, police, health care 
representatives, and local authorities ‘were all around the table’ and that the process was 
‘quite good’ in identifying ‘patterns and trends’. The respondent suggested that the 
proactivity of previous years had diminished over time, but that ‘links with police and 
health [representatives]’ had been retained following the initiation of the COMPASS 
contract (Melanie, Interview, 18 June 2013).!
! Widlinski noted significant changes in the conduct of inter-agency meetings 
following the transition to G4S-managed asylum housing in the North East of England 
(Widlinski, Interview, 26 June 2013). Prior to COMPASS, he explained, multi-agency 
meetings were regular and well-attended. The inclusion of police in these meetings was 
relevant, he stated, because ‘issues were being raised that they needed to know about.’ 
The police were in a position to inform housing providers of areas where asylum seekers 
would, for instance, be more vulnerable to discrimination and could offer alternative 
recommendations. For Widlinski, meetings were ‘much better’ during the period when 
local authorities held the asylum housing contract. In the two-year period between the end 
of the contract with the local authority and the start of the COMPASS contracts, the 
housing subcontractor in the region, Jomast, continued the multi-agency meetings, though 
local authorities and the police attended less often. Widlinski noted that a city-wide group 
functioning more broadly, which includes G4S, Jomast and the police still exists, but 
explained that Jomast seeks to exclude voluntary organisations from these discussions. 
According to Widlinski, Jomast has rebuffed his requests for basic information, such as 
the number of residents being housed in Newcastle, stating that it would need permission 
from the Home Office before releasing such data. In Widlinski’s words, the state of inter-
agency cooperation since the transition to the COMPASS contract ‘is certainly not as good 
as it was’ (Widlinski, Interview, 26 June 2013).!
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! Crossley asserted that multi-agency meetings were still occurring in the Leeds 
area and, to her knowledge, included G4S and Cascade, the subcontractor in the region, 
although acknowledged that she had not been to one of the meetings herself (Crossley, 
Interview, 22 July 2014). Longley explained that local authorities were regularly present at 
inter-agency meetings prior to COMPASS, and specifically cited Huddersfield as being 
‘very proactive in terms of ensuring that we had a multi-agency approach to helping 
refugees and asylum seekers’ (Longley, Interview, 12 August 2013). While multi-agency 
meetings were still occurring in Leeds following the COMPASS transition, the dissolution 
of dedicated refugee and asylum teams had resulted in diminished participation on the 
part of local authority representatives during multi-agency meetings. When asked if G4S 
or subcontractors to the COMPASS programme attended the meetings, Longley replied: 
‘At the last multi-agency meeting in Leeds, there wasn’t a G4S representative or housing 
providers and I have yet to see one at any meeting I have attended, but that’s not to say 
they’re not there, it’s just the meetings I’ve been to’ (Longley, Interview, 12 August 2013). 
In Glasgow, there was some evidence of participation on the part of Serco and its 
subcontractor, Orchard and Shipman, in meetings organised by the integration networks 
in the region (Harland, Interview, 10 June 2013), but few respondents acknowledged 
whether regular inter-agency meetings were taking place. In one instance, an interviewee 
suggested that meetings were still conducted following the transition to COMPASS, but 
she doubted the usefulness of them (Anonymous, Interview, 17 May 2013).!
! The implications of a breakdown in inter-agency collaboration in the delivery of 
asylum and refugee services include the possibility of asylum seekers’ further marginality 
and increased vulnerability. Zetter and Pearl (1999) highlight the need for cooperation 
between agencies in ensuring the well-being of asylum seekers, stating that ‘partnership 
and collaboration offer the best way through the legislative and procedural maze which 
now characterises the social housing sector for refugees and asylum seekers’ (British 
Refugee Council, 1987 and Refugee Council, 1997 cited in Zetter and Pearl, 1999: pp. 
250-251). In Diamond’s (2010) review of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s 2008 report 
on community cohesion, he explains that collaboration between organisations is 
dependent upon the establishment of trust and that alliances between agencies may rely 
on promoting solutions based on only a small number of shared principles (Diamond, 
2010: p. 13). Reduced collaboration between agencies responsible for ensuring the well-
being of asylum seekers may diminish the perceived value of shared ideologies. !
! Aims of reducing discrimination and ensuring the protection of vulnerable 
populations are difficult to achieve if the precise nature and degree of vulnerability 
remains unknown due to a lack of communication. Interview respondents’ views of the 
COMPASS programme suggest that cost-savings and a culture of deterrence may be 
contributing factors to the reduced engagement between housing contractors and refugee 
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and asylum welfare agencies. A former employee of a housing subcontractor on the 
COMPASS project explained that the programme was dominated by a desire to reduce 
costs; capitalistic ‘attitudes and values’ resulted in the programme operating more as ‘a 
business rather than a service’ (Katherine, Interview, 10 June 2013). Crossley stated that 
an ideology of ‘deterrence’ is embedded within the operating ethos of G4S; the move to 
privatised asylum housing was, in her view, an ‘intentional move by the government to 
create a deterrence culture’ (Crossley, Interview, 22 July 2013). Such an aim is 
undermined within a robust and communicative support environment; diminished inter-
agency collaboration is likely to result in a reduction in shared knowledge across 
organisational boundaries leading to possible redundancy of services and diminished 
specialised support.!!
5.3.2 Assessing equality impact in a post-COMPASS environment!!
! The Equality Act 2010 consolidates previous UK anti-discrimination legislation and 
four EU Directives into a single policy. Hepple (2010) explains that ‘the overriding aim of 
the Equality Act 2010 is to achieve harmonisation, simplification, and modernisation of 
equality law’ (Hepple, 2010: p. 14). Section 4 itemises nine ‘protected characteristics’ 
including age, sex, disability, race and religion or belief; subsequent sections describe 
prohibited discriminatory conduct, the duties of employers and the responsibilities of 
schools in enforcing non-discriminatory policies. Particularly important to the discussion of 
asylum housing policy is Section 149, the ‘public sector equality duty’. This section 
dictates that a ‘public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to 
the need to […] eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation’ and any other 
prohibited conduct, ‘advance equality of opportunity’ and ‘foster good relations’ between 
those with protected characteristics and those without (Equality Act 2010, Section 149(1)
(a-c)). Critically, subsection 2 extends this duty to ‘a person who is not a public authority 
but who exercises public functions’ (ibid., Section 149(2)).!
! When asylum housing was administered through contracts with regional consortia, 
which included local authorities, it was clear that, as public authorities, city councils had a 
duty to ensure that ‘due regard’ was given prior to accommodating asylum seekers in 
certain residences or areas to avoid discrimination, harassment and all other forms of 
victimisation covered within the Act. Local authorities are expected to conduct equality 
impact assessments (EIAs) when making a decision in which an individual or group may 
face an equality concern. EIAs may take the form of a written document or checklist, but 
assessments can also extend to the general process of decision-making. EIAs are 
described on the Sheffield City Council website as ‘a way of systematically assessing the 
effects that a policy, project or decision is likely to have on different people within the city’; 
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they ‘are intended to aid good decision making and ensure that the services we provide 
are fair and accessible to all. They are also a legal requirement under equality 
law’ (Sheffield City Council website, 2014).!
! While the responsibilities of local authorities are explicit, the specific duties relating 
to non-public bodies are less readily apparent. For instance, in observing the deployment 
of the COMPASS contracts, it is not immediately clear whether contractors and 
subcontractors are legally required to administer EIAs or if that responsibility rests solely 
with the Home Office as the public authority overseeing the contracts. Subsection 2 of 
Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 suggests that contractors carrying out government 
work may indeed be expected to give due regard to equality issues. Schedule 2 of the 
COMPASS project contract (Home Office, 2012c) makes such considerations binding 
contractual obligations. Section 1.1 states that '[t]he Provider in delivering all the services 
defined within this Schedule 2 shall ensure that it complies with all relevant mandatory 
and statutory requirements […] including but not limited to housing’ and ‘equal 
opportunities’. Section 1.2.1.1 further details the duties of the contract holder:!!
The Provider shall understand the background and needs of the Service User 
and understand that some Service Users will have particular characteristics 
and special needs that require the provision of particular accommodation or 
accommodation in a specific locality, and/or the provision of transport that is 
suitable for their needs.!
(Home Office, COMPASS contract, Sch. 2, 2012)!!
There exists a clear reference to the language of the Equality Act 2010 in the use of the 
word ‘characteristics’, which alludes to Section 4's ‘protected characteristics’ highlighted 
earlier. In addition, Clause 33.1 prohibits contractors’ unlawful discrimination as defined 
within the Equality Act, and Clause 33.3 states clearly:!!
The Provider shall comply with the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 as if it 
were listed as a public authority under Schedule 19 of that Act.!
(Home Office, COMPASS contract, Sch. 1, 2012)!!
! In response to a Freedom of Information request I placed with the Home Office in 
November 2013, Mark Addison, a business manager for the COMPASS programme, 
indicates that the newly formed UK Visas and Immigration division is ‘responsible for 
providing accommodation, transport and related services through its outsourced providers 
via the COMPASS contract’ and ‘ensuring housing decisions are made with regard to the 
public sector Equality Duty, detailed in Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010’ (Addison, FOI 
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29588, 2013). Addison reaffirms contract holders’ duties to operate as if they are a public 
authority under Schedule 19 of the Equality Act. These statements do not suggest that 
contractors are the equivalent of public authorities in relation to the Equality Act, but only 
that they operate as if they are equal in order to remain compliant with the terms of the 
contract. The duty under the Equality Act remains with the public authority: the Home 
Office. This raises questions as to the extent to which the Home Office can be held liable 
for private firms’ contractual noncompliance on the COMPASS project. In addition, there is 
no explicit expectation that contractors carry out written EIAs, a point that Addison again 
confirms:!!
The COMPASS contract does not require a specific paper-based assessment 
to be made in relation to every dispersal, but it expects these to work with 
agreements made with local authorities. Accommodation requests that cover 
the individual needs of an applicant are formally issued to providers by the 
Home Office on a secure system. Providers are made aware that asylum 
seekers have a range of individual needs and may be vulnerable. They must 
take account of all those matters in delivery of the services and observe all 
discrimination legislation whilst doing so.!
(Addison, FOI 29588, 2013)!!
5.4 Agency of the excluded? Asylum Seekers and Refugees as volunteers!!
! Volunteering can afford asylum seekers the opportunity to engage in some form of 
active work despite being disallowed from seeking paid employment. Darling explores the 
effects in his observations of a drop-in centre in Sheffield, explaining that ‘a life lived in 
limbo and with no right to work, boredom naturally became a factor in the lives of many 
asylum seekers’ (Darling, 2011: p. 413). Volunteering is sometimes presented as a 
preferred method of enhancing English language skills, boosting confidence and 
mitigating the effects of boredom due to asylum seekers’ prohibition from paid 
employment. Tomlinson (2010) writes that ‘refugees are encouraged to become 
volunteers or to undertake unpaid work placements instead. Voluntary work is advocated 
as a means for refugees to gain UK work experience, improve their use of the English 
language and gain skills and confidence’ (Tomlinson, 2010: p. 279).!
! The role asylum seekers played in the direct operations of the charities and non-
governmental associations varied in relation to location and the nature of the service. 
While participation was generally encouraged within the organisations approached for this 
thesis, some respondents acknowledged that there existed room for growth in this area. In 
Glasgow, participation of asylum seekers varied across networks and other service and 
 146
advocacy groups. Community InfoSource, a non-profit consultancy agency designed to 
assist migrant communities and organisations in developing service strategies, counted 
four asylum seekers amongst its initial six directors (Anonymous, Interview, 17 May 2013). 
The charity Positive Action in Housing, which provides advice and economic support to 
destitute minority groups within Glasgow, involves volunteers in the operation of its service 
and includes former refugees on its staff, but its executive director, Robina Qureshi, 
acknowledged that there was more that could be done in terms of sourcing asylum 
seekers’ perspectives on service strategies. She stated that the organisation aimed to 
improve its consultations with its service users:!!
At the moment, a lot of the work that we’ve done in terms of campaigning - in 
terms of speaking out on certain issues - has come from our case work. […] 
We’re also wanting to make it so we can have user groups who will more 
regularly inform the perspective of the organisation in a more structured 
manner. [We aim to] track people’s experiences along the life of a project, 
during the life of the project, and kind of use that to gauge how we deliver the 
services that we do.!
(Qureshi, Interview, 21 March 2013)!!
! Respondents from Glasgow’s integration networks suggested that participation of 
service users increased as the services expanded into new areas of advice and support. 
Jassim Johe of the Kingsway Court Health and Wellbeing Centre described asylum 
seekers’ expanded role in the operation of the service:!!
In the beginning, [service users] were not [involved]. As the years went on, a 
lot of asylum seekers and refugees became involved in the management 
committee and as board members. There are quite a few of them. In one year, 
in fact half of them were from the BME community - some of them were 
asylum seekers, some of them were refugees and some of them were from 
the BME community. We still have a few on the board of directors.!
(Johe, Interview, 19 July 2013)!!
Diane McWilliam, the project coordinator for the Greater Pollok Integration Network in 
Glasgow, acknowledged that asylum seekers’ direct involvement with the network had 
diminished following reductions in the numbers of asylum seekers dispersed to the area. 
McWilliam also explained the engagement of some current and former service users 
decreased as they moved on with their lives:!!
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They’re probably less involved than they used to be. In terms of the kind of 
volunteers, I think we’re less dependent now than we used to be, and that’s 
probably a reflection of the fact that our client group as a whole - that the 
proportion of asylum seekers and refugees - has dropped.!
(McWilliam, Interview, 13 June 2013)!!
! Asylum seekers’ involvement in the operations of service organisations range from 
contributing toward the cooking of weekly meals to holding positions on charities’ board of 
directors. Respondents from refugee and asylum service organisations highlighted the 
fact that current asylum seekers’ participation on the board of directors was important for 
representative purposes and for legitimising the service offered. McWilliam initially 
responded to the question of service users’ involvement in the operation of the network by 
stating: ‘Well, we have an asylum seeker and a refugee on our board, so that's two out of 
five’ (McWilliam, Interview, 13 June 2013). Margaret Sweeney, a volunteer with the Govan 
and Craigton Integration Network, viewed membership on the board of directors as an 
important signal of the network's inclusiveness: ‘The chairperson of our organisation is 
one of the current asylum seekers, so there is a clear participation by asylum seekers in 
the operation of that service’ (Sweeney, Interview, 18 May 2013). Kath Sainsbury of 
Justice First suggested that the involvement of past and present service users was 
essential to the successful operation of the organisation. She explained that a former 
asylum-seeker was a current board member and that this inclusion was indicative of the 
charity's aims to ‘get that balance on the level of the board of directors and at the 
volunteer level. We could not operate without volunteers’ (Sainsbury, Interview, 06 June 
2013).!
! Not all organisations had an established target for service user inclusion in the 
administration of each service, but the participation of current and former asylum seekers 
and refugees was widely viewed as valuable. Within drop-ins, asylum seekers and 
refugees contributed to the cooking of meals, the distribution of food packs and the 
organisation of activities. Their work was at times so fundamental to the operation of each 
service, particularly within the drop-ins, that it seemed appropriate to view the charities 
and organisations as services of asylum seekers and refugees as much as services for 
them. However, direct input by service users was typically limited to basic service 
functions rather than more complicated matters, such as the delivery of English language 
teaching or the interpretation of documents related to individuals’ casework. This is 
reflected in Isobel Harland's observation of service users’ work within the Govan and 
Craigton Integration Network in Glasgow:!!
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A lot of it is just setting up, welcoming people, helping with clearing up or 
serving or cooking - a lot of our volunteers cook as well. So, again, bringing in 
different kinds of cuisine and people like that, because they get to taste dishes 
from all over the world.!
(Harland, Interview, 10 June 2013)!!
In my observation of drop-ins, asylum seekers took on similar roles helping in logging 
visitors’ arrivals, distributing donated clothes and other goods, and preparing and serving 
food. Sometimes service users contributed to more advanced service functions, such as 
the provision of language interpreting and activity planning. McWilliam noted that the 
men’s and women’s support groups were operated almost entirely by the service users 
themselves, stating that ‘the refugees and asylum seekers kind of set their own 
agendas’ (McWilliam, Interview, 13 June 2013). Service users were involved in 
signposting other support services and assisting in the supervision of various activities. 
For instance, an asylum seeker was tasked with organising a fundraising event centred 
around teaching Scottish dancing and another served as a football coach for an informal 
team (Sweeney, Interview, 18 May 2013; Harland, Interview, 10 June 2013).!
! Workers within the charity and non-profit service sector generally viewed 
volunteering as an important element in service users’ experiences within the asylum 
process; it was seen as aiding in the development of skills while mitigating the negative 
effects of forced unemployment. It was also suggested that volunteering provided a sense 
of purpose and facilitated integration and socialisation. Harland stated that the 
participation of service users in the operations of the service:!!
[It] is really important for us and it’s kind of part of our objectives as to 
[integration]. It builds community as well. What’s kind of happened is, for 
example, people have been coming to the drop-in for years and they may not 
stay in Govan and Craigton anymore. They might have their status and they’ve 
moved elsewhere, but they still see it as their community. Because they are a 
volunteer, they see it as their responsibility as well to encourage people to 
come along and to involve them. So, I think it works for everyone.!
(Harland, Interview, 10 June 2013)!!
Crossley explained that former service users’ continued volunteering at the drop-in was 
testament to the community solidarity fostered by the organisation’s members and 
volunteers. She also revealed the importance of work to people whose lives had been 
placed on hold and self-worth devalued due to their prohibition from employment:!!
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Last month, there was a guy who had only been coming a couple of weeks. 
He saw someone cooking and he said: “Can I do that next week?” I said: “Yes, 
of course.” He didn’t have anything else to do with his time, so he was trying to 
find something that he could [do]. [The drop-in] is very much about involving 
everybody - not “us” and “them”. That’s why we have quite a lot of refugees 
still coming, even though they don’t need a food parcel, they don’t need 
clothes, they don’t necessarily need a hot meal, because they have that at 
home, but they want to come because it’s a nice place for them to come. It’s 
like a big family.!
(Crossley, Interview, 22 July 2013)!!
Longley indicated that the involvement of asylum seekers and refugees in the functions of 
the advice and support service was an objective of the charity. She stated that current and 
former service users bring with them a unique set of experiences, which they can then 
apply to their work:!!
[T]hey understand the process and know what it’s been like. They’ve been 
through it themselves, so they can really relate to the service users. They have 
the skills and expertise in that area. Also, we want to help refugees build their 
skills so they can, once they have their status, access jobs. It’s good for them. 
Volunteering is a two-way process, basically.!
(Longley, Interview, 12 August 2013)!!
! While it was common for respondents to speak of the benefits of volunteering, 
there was less acknowledgement of the possible drawbacks of service users’ participation 
in the operation of each organisation. This is perhaps due to the seemingly unproblematic 
nature of tasks like distributing food and taking attendance. As the responsibilities of 
participants were considered to be more involved, concerns for service users’ perceptions 
of their work became more acute. A staff member working for a charity specialising in 
offering psychological support for refugees and asylum seekers explained that service 
users' involvement in the operation of the service was difficult, because most service 
users were accessing the charity for assistance with their own mental health needs. 
Despite acknowledging that one of the organisation's volunteers was also a service user, 
the staff member stated:!!
The kind of work we do - I guess it's difficult for current service users to get 
involved in volunteering, because it's sensitive and [there are] confidentiality 
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issues, and people that are currently accessing the service are experiencing 
so many traumas in their own lives.!
(Allison, Interview, 13 August 2013)!!
The danger of re-traumatisation through volunteering was a central concern for the project 
director of a charity in the North East of England, who explained that the inclusion of 
service users as volunteers was complicated due to the possibility of exposing them to 
potentially destabilising experiences. The respondent explained that sourcing refugees 
and asylum seekers for awareness-building events was an important, but equally delicate 
endeavour:!!
We have a lot of volunteers. About twenty-seven or twenty-eight per cent of 
our volunteers are clients or ex-clients, which is really important. […] We are 
developing the awareness-raising programme with - not necessarily getting 
refugee speakers - if we find some, that’s great, but you have to be so careful 
of people being re-traumatised. It has to be very finely judged. But getting their 
input in the preparation of material and stuff like that.!
(Melanie, Interview, 18 June 2013)!!
Sainsbury provided an example of a volunteer whose initial experience in her role at the 
charity was marked by unease:!!
We did have a volunteer who came to us primarily because she needed the 
therapeutic effect of feeling valued. [Volunteering] helped with her English and 
it got her out of the house and it gave her some structure. However, in her 
early days, if somebody came to the door who was also very distressed or had 
suffered, she couldn’t deal with that at all. It was too much and too [reflective] 
of her own experience, but gradually, she built her confidence and her 
resilience and she became an amazing volunteer.!
(Sainsbury, Interview, 06 June 2013)!!
! While this concern for service users’ wellbeing is considerate of the potential 
dangers of volunteering for those at risk of re-traumatisation, it does not address the 
barriers to inclusion, such as lack of English language proficiency or issues of self 
confidence. Harland acknowledged that some of the tasks available to asylum seekers 
and refugees within the organisation were limited to those ‘whose level of English is quite 
strong’, such as signposting services to other users (Harland, Interview, 10 June 2013). In 
the accounts above, volunteering is seen as a way of increasing confidence and 
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enhancing English language skills, but the lack of either may be a barrier for entry at the 
outset. In addition, the benefits of volunteering can at times overshadow the fact that 
asylum seekers are not being remunerated for their efforts, and remain prohibited from 
accessing paid work.  The statutory reliance on the charity and non-profit sector extends 7
to the service users themselves whose free labour continues to bolster a support 
environment increasingly atrophied through budget cuts and contract variations. An 
asylum seeker dispersed in the North East expressed his frustration with the assumption 
that volunteering was inherently rewarding in its own right: ‘It’s not necessarily people’s 
desire to do volunteering work - they are forced [to] by circumstances’ (Benjamin, 
Interview, 21 August 2013a).!
! !
5.5 ‘Shadow State’ or opportunities for resistance? Refugee agencies, activism 
and the risks of co-optation!
!
! The support work provided through charities and non-profit organisations remains 
an integral part of the asylum process. These agencies bolster the state’s asylum 
programme by filling in gaps in service provision. The distribution of clothing, food parcels 
and emergency accommodation addresses the immediate needs of asylum seekers and 
is often the primary source of support for those asylum seekers who have received 
negative decisions. Interviewees working within local refugee agencies viewed the support 
of the voluntary and charitable sector as indispensable. Carr explained that the services of 
the local NERS drop-in in Sunderland were necessary, but undervalued by the Home 
Office:!!
It’s not a matter of the work that the UKBA refuses to do - they’ve always 
refused to do it. This is work which is necessary but not recognised.!
(Carr, Interview, 30 January 2013)!!
Sainsbury explained that local authorities’ diminished role in providing support for asylum 
seekers had resulted in an extended reliance on the voluntary sector (Sainsbury, 
Interview, 06 June 2013). This was corroborated Crossley, though she also felt it 
necessary to distinguish between agencies receiving government contracts and smaller 
charitable organisations funded independently. The latter, she argued, were tackling the 
most immediate needs of asylum seekers:!!
 Under Paragraph 360 of the 2012 Immigration Rules, asylum seekers may apply for permission to 7
seek paid work if they have waited beyond 12 months for an initial decision on their application 
(Home Office, 2012e).
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[Statutory agencies] are completely reliant on the voluntary sector. Completely. 
The Refugee Council and Refugee Action [are] both funded by the 
government. Every single other agency or charity is in the refugee sector and, 
for the most part, doing everything. We’re housing, we’re feeding, we’re 
clothing and we’re supporting both emotionally, practically and financially in 
some cases. I think without that, I think there’s a lot [of people] that might be 
dead, or there would be a lot more homelessness in Leeds. I think the reliance 
on the voluntary sector is certainly increasing in the last few years. There’s 
almost an expectation by the local authority now that we’re there to support 
people rather than something on the side. We’re now the main source of 
support and that’s [viewed as] completely acceptable.!
(Crossley, Interview, 22 July 2013)!!
When asked whether or not statutory agencies in Glasgow were dependent upon the 
charitable and voluntary sector, Harland responded frankly: ‘Completely. It’s increasingly 
so, and they try and fob everything off on us as much as they can get away with’ (Harland, 
Interview, 10 June 2013). These observations suggest a resignation to the current state of 
asylum support in the United Kingdom, but they also indicate a belief that statutory 
responsibilities are being increasingly shouldered by the voluntary sector. Whereas 
organisations like Refugee Action are implicated in the implementation of state 
immigration control practices due to the contracts they hold with the government, smaller 
organisations might be equally culpable as they prop up the statutory support framework. 
While at once these agencies are forces of resistance to the state by aiding asylum 
seekers with appeals documentation, building community bonds, and mitigating the 
effects of destitution by providing subsistence support, the government benefits from the 
labor of refugee agency workers and volunteers without the need to fund the services 
directly.!
! Gill et al (2013) highlight some of the strategies used by migrant and asylum 
support groups to challenge British immigration detention practices through direct action 
and the maintenance of a physical presence at deportation sites and court hearings (Gill 
et al, 2013: pp. 375-376). These efforts, they explain, ‘do not explicitly challenge the 
political ideologies and systems of border controls that have led to the abjection of asylum 
seekers and migrants’ (ibid., p. 379). Rather than actively challenging state approaches 
toward asylum seeker management, the actions of migrant and asylum support groups 
threaten!!
[…] the possibility of being coopted by states. For example, providing welfare 
to destitute migrants arguably enables governments to diminish welfare 
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support. These kinds of “humanitarian” tactics arguably reduce “protest to a 
contest over ‘the possible’ which can only ever mean, at a fundamental level, a 
conservative acceptance of the existing framework for grasping problems and 
their solutions”!
(Rigby and Schlembach, 2013 and Tyler, 2013 in Gill et al, 2013: p 379)!!
! Jennifer Wolch (1990) uses the concept of the ‘shadow state’ to demonstrate that 
the restructuring of the welfare state throughout the 1980s was dependent upon an 
outsourcing of labour to the voluntary sector. The neoliberal policies of Reagan and 
Thatcher were legitimated through the rhetoric of a ‘“mythical Golden Age of voluntary 
sector purity” uncontaminated by government funding’ (Salamon, 1987 quoted in Wolch, 
1990: p. 200). Under the guise of expanded individual choice and the benefits of localised 
expertise, voluntarism fills the gaps left by a diminished welfare state and gives rise to a 
shadow state, which Wolch describes as a ‘para-state apparatus with collective service 
responsibilities previously shouldered by the public sector, administered outside traditional 
democratic politics, but yet controlled in both formal and informal ways by the 
state’ (Wolch, 1990: pp. 199, 201). In July 2010, David Cameron extolled the virtues of 
voluntarism, stating that a move toward a ‘Big Society’ less reliant on ‘local authorities or 
central government’ signalled a ‘liberation’ allowing for the ‘most dramatic redistribution of 
power from elites in Whitehall to the man and woman on the street’ (Cameron, 2010). !
! The ‘Big Society’ has been criticised on the grounds that it was a thinly veiled 
attempt to mask the reality of the coalition government’s austerity measures, with local 
governments suffering the brunt of the cuts. Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) explain that 
the ‘Big Society’ is founded on the principle that civil society and the state are mutual 
exclusive. They caution that the push for increased voluntarism ‘may be as much the 
corollary of savage public spending cuts and the need to externalise responsibility for 
performance failure as the outcome of a principled commitment to more autonomous local 
governance’ (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: pp. 32, 38). The expansion of the charitable 
sector in the wake of the government’s dispersal policy and restrictions on asylum 
seekers’ right to work might suggest that refugee organisations are, in effect, reinforcing 
policies and practices they seek to challenge by supplementing state support offerings. 
Squire and Darling (2013) argue that it may not be necessary to challenge through ‘major’ 
political acts, but organisations can do so through minor efforts, such as reframing asylum 
seekers’ ‘rightful presence’ within the state. However, they acknowledge that movements 
like City of Sanctuary remain bounded by ‘statist rationalities’ (Squire and Darling, 2013: p. 
71). A break from such bonds may involve a more active form of resistance.!
! I explored the notion of active resistance with workers within asylum support 
agencies to determine if their support offerings were accompanied by attempts to critique 
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current asylum practices or encourage new or expanded avenues of support. Generally, 
campaigning was not a priority for many of the agencies I engaged with. Common 
reasons given for a lack of involvement in demonstrations or other active resistance 
included the need to maintain an image of impartiality and to avoid upsetting funders 
whose grant money had been secured on the basis of service provision rather than 
activism.!
! While the name of the Stockton organisation, Justice First, implies a degree of 
campaigning alongside service provision, Sainsbury explained that the agency is not 
involved in activism in an overt sense. Her justification signalled a consideration for 
funding commitments and the need to remain politically neutral: !!
We are not overtly political. We need to retain impartiality, and also because 
we don’t receive any government money; we have to apply to charitable trusts 
for our funding in addition to what we can raise through our own fundraising 
efforts. If you actually submit a funding application saying that your primary 
aims are A, B and C, […] it’s quite a dishonest position to suddenly go off on a 
tangent with campaigning activity, for example. That’s not what we’re funded 
for. However, we do believe that if we identify a pattern of need or a pattern of 
injustice amongst groups of asylum seekers, it would be unhelpful to our 
clients not to flag that up.!
(Sainsbury, Interview, 06 June 2013)!!
A similar sentiment was expressed by Diane McWilliam at the Greater Pollok Integration 
Network, although she suggested that other integration networks in Glasgow were more 
active in their campaign efforts. She stated:!!
[Campaigning] is probably one of the areas we’re weakest in, to be honest. I 
look at some of the others - Govan [and Craigton Integration Network] and 
others in the North are much more organised in terms of campaigning. Part of 
that is because when I started, the board was quite antsy about charitable 
status and what we were going to do and what we weren’t going to do and I 
probably kind of picked that up a wee bit. So, some of those kind of online 
campaigns and postcard campaigns and stuff - we’ve done stuff in here, but 
we’ve not made a huge song and dance. We will have picked it up with 
women’s group and that kind of thing - signing postcards and sending them 
off. !
(McWilliam, Interview, 13 June 2013)!!
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McWilliam’s colleague, Yvonne Docherty, explained that she initially struggled with the fact 
that the organisation was not very involved with campaigning and other forms of activism. 
For Docherty, the neutral approach did not fit with her personal affinity towards direct 
advocacy. She described the ways in which she encouraged resistance by directing 
people interested in campaigning to services with a greater focus on activism:!!
I came here when I was a second year student. I was aware of the fact that I 
couldn’t push the boundaries, but for the sake of university, I had to look for 
ways of challenging policies or supporting people to take a stand. My way of 
doing that was signposting. So, I signposted a few people to the Glasgow 
Welcomes Refugees Campaign and Poverty Alliance.!
(Docherty, Interview, 13 June 2013)!!
While Docherty’s personal view was to embrace activism, Sweeney explained that she 
had become disillusioned with campaigning, as her prior attempts to raise awareness for 
the needs of asylum seekers had been ignored. When I asked about the degree to which 
campaigning played a role in the operation of the Govan and Craigton Integration 
Network, she replied:!!
[Activism is not] not something I’ve been heavily involved in. I’m very practical 
rather than political or philosophical. There is a little element of [campaigning] 
happening through these organisations, but it’s not been my main 
involvement. In fact, I’ve given up on that. I found that I was wasting effort - I 
was trying to get letters published frequently in newspapers like the Herald, 
which is the big Glasgow newspaper. I never succeeded, so I’ve given up.!
(Sweeney, Interview, 18 May 2013)!!
! Refugee and asylum support agencies remain an important conduit for asylum 
seekers to express their complaints to G4S, Serco and the Home Office, but their ability to 
actively resist state immigration policies is constrained by their commitments to political 
neutrality. The limits of refugee organisations’ advocacy are clearly detailed in the 
responses above, though some activities demonstrate that resistance remains possible, 
albeit limited, and often within a framework of official discourse. For instance, while many 
of the agencies I engaged with were not involved in explicit campaigning, some had 
forwarded their observations and concerns to the Home Office and provided written 
evidence for parliamentary committee meetings. Ahlam Souidi at the Maryhill Integration 
Network explained that the network developed a document on housing and support in 
partnership with the Refugee Women’s Strategy Group, which was backed by the Scottish 
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Refugee Council. The submission of the document prompted an invitation to Westminster, 
where she and other members ‘gave evidence’ describing how the current asylum support 
and housing model ‘is degrading and how it is not meeting their needs’ (Souidi, Interview, 
07 May 2013). While Kath Sainsbury of Justice First stated that the charity sought ‘to 
retain impartiality’, she explained that one of the organisation's trustees, Catherine 
Ramos, developed a report in 2011 which challenged the government's position on 
returning asylum seekers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Sainsbury explained:!!
The idea behind [the report] is to say to the government: ‘Stop removing 
people to the Congo. Review your policy. It's not safe.’ Because it's been 
launched into the public forum and we've also circulated it to MPs, the House 
of Lords, faith groups, and it's got quite a lot of growing support and also 
barristers have used it in asylum hearings, she's now been invited to attend 
the Home Affairs Select Committee, which is meeting next week […]. 
Catherine Ramos has, herself, been asked to give evidence to the committee.!
(Sainsbury, Interview, 06 May 2013)!!
! Many charities and refugee agencies provided written evidence detailing asylum 
seekers’ experiences to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Asylum, 
which was printed alongside the committee's report in October 2013. Ramos’ research on 
‘unsafe returns’ was the third listed piece of written evidence; it was accompanied by 
statements from the Refugee Council, the British Red Cross, Refugee Action, Still Human 
Still Here and Serco. Amongst the additional written evidence were reports from Tiffy 
Allen, the national co-ordinator of City of Sanctuary, Dorothy Ismail and Arthur Carr from 
the Sunderland drop-in, Justice First, Medical Justice, the Scottish Refugee Council and 
Positive Action in Housing (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Asylum, 
2013a: pp. 51-53). Recommendations ranged from specific appeals - the Refugee Council 
sought cash support for pregnant asylum seekers on Section 4 support (ibid., Ev 120) - to 
more general recommendations. The Red Cross stated that it sought a ‘fair, effective and 
efficient asylum system that treats people with respect and dignity and upholds the UK's 
responsibilities to provide safety for refugees’ (ibid., Ev 125). Representatives from the 
Sunderland drop-in and the North of England Refugee Service declared that the Azure 
card support system was detrimental to asylum seekers’ experiences; they stated that 
‘[t]he refusal to give cash support is unnecessary and causes hardships’ (House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee on Asylum. 2013a: Ev w44). Criticism for the cashless 
Azure card system is extensive within the asylum and refugee support sector; in 2010, the 
Asylum Support Partnership, which previously held the ‘One Stop Services’ contract with 
the Home Office, explained that the Azure card left people with inadequate means of 
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subsistence support and unable to purchase essential items while contributing to 
stigmatisation (Refugee Council, 2010: p. 2).!
! While public campaigns do not always feature heavily in the support agendas of 
refugee agencies and small drop-in services, the experiences and grievances of asylum 
seekers are reflected through agencies’ involvement in enquiries and committee meetings. 
Alternative constructions of asylum seekers are made possible through the participation of 
these agencies in official discourses; this engagement ‘allow[s] for creative human 
capacity and a multiplicity of subverting projects to resist dominating constitutions of 
power-relations’ (Stierl, 2012: p. 429). An ethos of inclusiveness can therefore challenge 
the policies of deterrence and destitution the government is sometimes criticised of 
pursuing (Morris, 1998: p. 969; JCHR, 2007: p. 17). Stierl explains that while ‘sovereign 
governmentality seems at times all-encompassing, there remains room for revolt’ (Stierl, 
2012: p. 432). The participation of refugee agencies in providing feedback to government 
enquiries may not be considered ‘revolt’, as responding to a call for evidence is hardly a 
revolutionary action, but it does signal the possibility for limited feedback and critique. 
Sometimes this results in re-evaluation of current practices. Following a review of the 
written evidence criticising cashless support for ‘failed’ asylum seekers, the Home Affairs 
Committee on Asylum, the committee reported:!!
We are not convinced that a separate support system for failed asylum 
seekers, whom the Government recognised as being unable to return to their 
country of origin, is necessary; Section 4 is not the solution for people who 
have been refused but cannot be returned and we call on the Government to 
find a better way forward.!
(House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Asylum, 2013b: p. 36)!!
! In reflecting the views of asylum and refugee support workers within the context of 
this chapter, it has been possible to develop a broad overview of the conditions of the 
COMPASS housing programme while also illustrating region-specific challenges to 
addressing the needs of asylum seekers. Support organisations differ in both their 
capacity to deliver assistance to asylum seekers and their willingness to engage in direct 
political advocacy. However, aims of individual betterment and integration are largely 
apparent across all services. In the next chapter, asylum seekers respond directly to 
questions of their accommodation experiences within the COMPASS housing programme. 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Chapter 6: The context of asylum housing: past trauma and the transition to 
COMPASS !!
! Asylum seekers’ experiences in dispersed accommodation cannot be viewed as 
existing within a context-independent environment. The stresses and strains many endure 
as a result of living in unsuitable housing or far from adequate support networks are 
compounded by the emotional and physical trauma they may have experienced 
elsewhere in the United Kingdom, during their initial journey and within the country they 
originally departed from. Refugees come from all socio-economic backgrounds; there is 
no ‘model’ refugee, and as such there is perhaps little utility in treating every refugee the 
same. However, the dispersal programme has largely resulted in a blanketed approach 
toward refugee housing. Fixed support payment amounts and no-choice accommodation 
has arguably led to insensitivities to asylum seekers’ past experiences. !
! In a marketised support environment, there is often a limited degree to which 
individual circumstances are considered prior to housing placement. Past traumas and 
specific vulnerabilities, such as those experienced by the elderly or women and men with 
histories of sexual abuse, can - and have - at times been neglected, as housing 
availability and decreased costs remain primary objectives. John Grayson of the South 
Yorkshire Migration and Asylum Action Group (SYMAAG) has illustrated this in his many 
articles about the unsuitability of accommodation for asylum seekers with specific needs. 
Describing conditions he observed within a hostel opened in Stockton for the purpose of 
housing asylum seekers, Grayson writes that ‘oppressively small’ rooms and a lack of 
facilities for children to play illustrates the fact that ‘no thought or respect seems to have 
been given in UKBA inspections to the reality of the lived traumatic experience of women 
and children housed there’ (Grayson, 2012). In written evidence submitted to the Home 
Affairs Committee on Asylum, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Housing and 
Migration Network criticised the Home Office and its major contractors for their handling of 
the transition to COMPASS and for favouring cost-savings over attention to specific 
needs, stating: ‘In practice, the imperative for contractors was to secure accommodation 
quickly at the lowest possible cost. […] Knock-down prices inevitably produced a low-
grade service. Little consideration was given to asylum-seekers’ wider needs beyond 
accommodation’ (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Asylum, 2013b: Ev 
w208).!
! Within Schedule 2 of the COMPASS contracts, service providers are expected to 
‘acknowledge and agree’ that asylum seekers may have experienced adverse conditions 
prior to their being accommodated in dispersed housing. Section 1.2.1.2 states that 
‘service users’ ‘[n]eed to be managed with sensitivity. They may have suffered trauma, be 
suspicious or frightened of authority figures and/or be afraid of other Service Users and 
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strangers’ (COMPASS contract, North East, 2012: s1.2.1.2). The extent to which an 
acknowledgement and agreement of these imperatives have been demonstrated in 
practice is a subject I address in Section 6.4 of the current chapter. It is worth highlighting 
here that a contractual obligation exists, which suggests that the Home Office at the very 
least maintains a superficial consideration for asylum seekers’ past experiences. There is, 
however, little acknowledgement that the suspicions or fears of ‘authority figures’ may 
largely relate to asylum seekers’ experiences with Home Office officials or indeed, with 
private security officers - perhaps from the very firms now tasked with accommodating 
them - in detention facilities.!
! In this chapter, I explore asylum seekers’ views of life before COMPASS and 
during the transition into the new asylum housing programme. Dispersal represents one 
element of the asylum experience, albeit a very significant one. For many asylum seekers, 
the dispersal experience exists within a continuum of events that shape and contextualise 
their perceptions of the asylum process as a whole and the degree to which they have 
been able to settle and integrate within receiving areas. These perspectives matter within 
the context of the thesis, because they illuminate the extent to which surveillance and 
social control strategies serve to dehumanise or, at the very least, depersonalise those 
awaiting asylum decisions or the outcome of an appeal. For instance, in section 6.2, 
asylum seekers’ experiences within detention are perhaps best described in Agambenian 
terms. Foucault’s ‘state racism’ helps articulate the logics of exclusion operating within the 
detention estate and, perhaps, informing deliberate policies and practices of deterrence. 
Asylum seekers’ reports on the transition experience reveal the degree to which 
respondents had prior knowledge of the firms tasked with accommodating them under the 
terms of the COMPASS contract; they also reveal some of the outcomes of a marketised 
approach to asylum housing, which do not always coalesce with humanitarian 
considerations. Before delving directly into an analysis of interview data, the next section 
is intended to provide a detailed overview of the anonymised demographic features of the 
sample. I also address the coding strategies employed in my thematic analysis of the 
interview data.!
! As discussed within the methodology section of the introduction to this thesis, the 
interviews conducted with 26 asylum seekers were semi-structured in format. As the 
thesis has specific aims, such as an analysis of asylum seekers’ reported experiences 
within COMPASS housing, it was important that questions about COMPASS experiences 
were explicitly asked. In total, interviews consisted of the following eight themes: arrival 
and post-arrival experiences; housing experiences prior to COMPASS; current housing 
experiences; understanding and knowledge of COMPASS and its contractors; community 
experiences; conditions of COMPASS housing; relations with housing providers; and 
views on levels of support within dispersal areas. Each theme was divided into a series of 
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questions and sub-questions specific to each topic area. For example, within the theme 
‘conditions of COMPASS housing’, prompts included:!!
b) Please describe the condition of the property when you moved into it (i.e. 
state of repair, cleanliness, availability of working facilities, etc.).!!
c) Please describe the size of the property and the room you have available to 
you. In your view, do you believe that you have enough room for yourself and 
any family members?!!
As these questions were presented within conversational conditions and not delivered to 
respondents prior to the interview, it was sometimes necessary to adjust the wording of 
each question, particularly in situations in which a respondent’s English language 
acquisition was relatively recent or still being developed. While it remained important that 
all major themes were explored, it was sometimes more appropriate to allow a respondent 
to provide a detailed response following an initial prompting; I would then follow up with 
clarification questions where needed.!
! Following the transcription of interview data, I used NVivo Version 10 for Windows, 
a software suite designed for the analysis of qualitative data, to code the interview 
documents and develop themes based on the questions initially developed and themes 
arising in a more emergent fashion throughout the course of each interview. In NVivo, 
these themes are called ‘nodes’. I have adopted this terminology to refer to individual 
themes; broader topics comprising a number of nodes are referred to as ‘clusters’ (see: 
Marshall and Rossman, 2011: p. 213).  By the end of the coding process, I identified 
fifteen clusters, which were subdivided into a multitude of nodes. For instance, within the 
cluster ‘COMPASS Experiences’ were seven nodes including: CHLDRN, CMPSXP+, 
CMPSXP-, CULT-RELIG-SENSITIVITY, MOVESEF, PRISON-LIKE, and TRANSXP. A full 
list of the clusters, nodes and their descriptions can be found in Appendix 3. By the end of 
the coding process, there were a total of 15 clusters and 79 nodes. Some nodes were 
closely related. For instance, CMPSXP+ was attributed to statements in which a 
respondent viewed their overall experience in COMPASS housing as generally 
favourable; CMPSXP- represented respondents’ views that found their experiences within 
COMPASS accommodation to be unfavourable. An analysis of these nodes forms the 
basis for the subjects explored in the following chapters. Some nodes were selected due 
to the frequency with which they arose from the interview data. For instance, 19 out of 26 
respondents (73 per cent) reported poor housing conditions (HSNGCON-) and 21 
respondents (80 per cent) suggested that they had had negative experiences with staff of 
either G4S, Serco or one of their subcontractors (RELSTAF-). I discuss other themes 
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arising from the interviews that were not as widely distributed within the interview data, but 
facilitate an understanding of the transition process and the degree to which asylum 
seekers felt supported and informed during their move into COMPASS housing. For 
example, at the end of the present chapter, I illustrate the constraints asylum seekers face 
in accessing local facilities in dispersal regions due to the incompleteness of welcome 
packs provided through COMPASS contractors. Thematic coding also provides the 
possibility for comparisons of asylum seekers’ reported experiences across different 
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Name 
(anonymised) Sex
Declared 
Age 
Range
Dispersal!
Area
Declared 
Country of 
Origin
Marital !
Status
Children !
in UK
Time in 
UK!
(years)
Time since 
1st!
Asylum 
Claim!
(years)
Housing 
Provider Subcontractor
Khalil Male 35-39 North East Algeria Single No 1-3 1-3 G4S Jomast
Mahmoud Male 30-34 North East Libya Single No <1 7-9 G4S Jomast
Hassan Male 50-54 North East Pakistan Single No 7-9 1-3 G4S Jomast
Ibrahim Male 30-34 North East Sudan Single No <1 <1 G4S Jomast
Jahan Male 25-29 North East Iran Single No 1-3 1-3 G4S Jomast
Benjamin Male 35-39 North East Kenya Single No 1-3 1-3 G4S Jomast
Arif Male 30-34 North East Lebanon Single No <1 <1 G4S Jomast
Alexander Male 35-39 North East Liberia Single No 4-6 1-3 G4S Jomast
Sahir Male 25-29 North East Syria Single No <1 <1 G4S Jomast
Cassandra Female 25-29 Scotland China Married Yes 7-9 1-3 Serco
Orchard & 
Shipman
Fimi Female 25-29 Scotland Congo Single Yes 4-6 Undisclosed Serco
Orchard & 
Shipman
Beatrice Female 30-34 Scotland Ghana Single Yes 7-9 1-3 Serco
Orchard & 
Shipman
Sahla Female 40-44 Scotland Pakistan Married Yes 4-6 Undisclosed Serco
Orchard & 
Shipman
Mubin Female 25-29 Scotland Pakistan Single Yes 7-9 4-6 Serco
Orchard & 
Shipman
Lucy Female 45-49 Scotland
Sierra 
Leone Single No 4-6 <1 Serco
Orchard & 
Shipman
Falis Female 30-34 Scotland Somalia Single Yes 1-3 1-3 Serco
Orchard & 
Shipman
Jonathan Male 50-54 Scotland Uganda Single No 7-9 1-3 Serco
Orchard & 
Shipman
Daya Female 45-49 Scotland Zimbabwe Single No 4-6 1-3 Serco
Orchard & 
Shipman
Mary Female 45-49 Scotland Zimbabwe Single No 4-6 4-6 Serco
Orchard & 
Shipman
Jabril Male 40-44
West 
Yorkshire Gambia Married Yes 4-6 1-3 G4S Jomast
Jacqueline Female 20-24
West 
Yorkshire Guinea Single No 4-6 4-6 G4S Jomast
Mehdi Male 35-39
West 
Yorkshire Iran Single No 10-12 10-12 G4S Jomast
Gabrielle Female 30-34
West 
Yorkshire Kenya Single No 7-9 7-9 G4S Jomast
Olufemi Female 35-39
West 
Yorkshire Nigeria Single Yes 13-15 1-3 G4S Jomast
Tariq Male 45-49
West 
Yorkshire Pakistan Single No 7-9 7-9 G4S Jomast
Joseph Male 20-24
West 
Yorkshire Rwanda Single No 1-3 1-3 G4S Jomast
Figure 1.9: Demographic data of interview participants (asylum seekers)
regions of study. Where appropriate, I address the varied experiences of respondents’ 
living in each of the dispersal areas.!
! The analyses of interview data within this chapter are based upon four different 
themes or nodes. In Section 6.1, asylum seekers’ past traumas (PRTRAUM) are 
addressed in an effort to highlight some of the some of the unique psychological and 
sometimes physical stresses destitute asylum seekers carry with them into their dispersal 
experience. The following section chronicles some respondents’ previous experiences 
within detention and develops some of the associations they make, if any, with private 
security firms in the capacities of both prison management and housing provision. Section 
6.3 and its subsections develop an overview of asylum seekers’ transition into the 
COMPASS housing programme, particularly their views on the transition experience 
(TRANSXP) and the extent with which they found informational material (WLCMPAK) 
provided through housing providers as useful, inappropriate or incomplete.!
! Of the 26 asylum seekers interviewed for this project, 10 were living in dispersed 
housing in Glasgow, 9 in the North East and 7 in West Yorkshire. Ninety per cent of 
respondents in Glasgow were female, whereas respondents in the North East were 
exclusively male; in West Yorkshire, females comprised just under half of the respondents 
(3), and males just over half (4). As explained in Chapter 5, there were possibly more 
female respondents than male respondents in Glasgow, because women were more likely 
to access the drop-ins provided through integration networks (Wren, 2004: p. 2). In 
Sunderland, most of the asylum seekers accessing the local drop-in were male, while in 
Middlesbrough, there was a greater distribution of males and females. Respondents’ 
countries of origin varied significantly; aside from one person from China, the remainder 
originally departed from states in Africa and the Middle East. The vast majority of 
respondents were in the UK as single persons (88 per cent), though eight respondents 
had children living with them in the UK and a further four had left children in their country 
of origin. Respondents ranged between 22 years of age and 52 with an average age of 
36. Further demographic information about the sample can be found in Figure 1.9, which 
is ordered by dispersal area. Some information has been generalised to ensure greater 
anonymity for respondents.!
!
6.1 Pre-migration trauma!!
! The memory and relived traumas of past experiences shape and impact asylum 
seekers’ interpretation of their contemporary condition within a ‘host’ country. In their study 
of the psychiatric symptoms displayed amongst Somali refugees in the United Kingdom, 
Bhui et al (2003) stress the need to acknowledge the personal histories asylum seekers 
carry with them throughout the asylum process. These can be as unique and 
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individualised as the asylum seekers themselves, or they can be traumas shared by whole 
communities and populations. At the outset of their research, Bhui et al state that ‘[c]are 
should be taken not to generalise because of great variation in cultural backgrounds, 
degree of persecution and conditions of exile. […] Torture and civil wars before migration, 
and the experience of poverty, displacement, unemployment and racism in a host country 
may each contribute to the risk for developing psychiatric disorders’ (Lavik et al, 1995; 
Burnett and Peel, 2001 and Health of Londoners Project, 1999 cited in Bhui et al, 2003: p. 
35). The results of interviews conducted with 180 Somali refugees living in Greenwich 
suggested that ‘pre-migration trauma is an independent risk factor for anxiety and 
depressive states’ (ibid., p. 41). In earlier research consisting of interviews with 40 asylum 
seekers in Sydney, Australia, Sinnerbrink et al (1997), 78 per cent of respondents 
‘reported exposure to a major trauma related to persecution or organised violence in their 
countries of origin’, including the murder of a friend or family member, separation from 
family, and exposure to near-death conditions (Sinnerbrink, 1997: pp. 466-468). Faze, 
Wheeler and Danesh (2005) conducted a systematic review of 20 interview-based studies 
covering nearly 7000 refugees living in seven countries, including the United Kingdom; 
following a meta-analysis of aggregated details from each study, the authors determined 
that ‘about one in ten adult refugees in western countries has post-traumatic stress 
disorder, about one in 20 has major depression, and about one in 25 has a generalised 
anxiety disorder, with the probability that these disorders overlap in may people (Brady et 
al (2000) cited in Faze, Wheeler and Danesh, 2005: p. 1312). !
! An engagement with prior research helps situate UK asylum seekers’ experiences 
within broader international trends. It also highlights the realities of pre-migration trauma, 
which contribute to compounding discomfort and ontological insecurity for those living in 
adverse conditions within dispersed housing. I turn now to some of the past experiences 
described to me during interviews with asylum seekers in COMPASS housing. It is worth 
noting that not every interviewee was forthcoming with discussions of their pre-arrival 
experiences; it was a subject I left up to the discretion of respondents, as I wished to avoid 
conflating pre-migration experiences with current views on the COMPASS housing 
experience, though some interviewees made the links themselves. While most 
respondents described troublesome conditions in their country of origin as the reason they 
sought refuge in the United Kingdom, four respondents (three from Glasgow and one from 
the North East of England) provided specific details of their experiences prior to arriving in 
the United Kingdom. I coded these reflections under the node ‘PRTRAUM’, which 
indicated that the accounts were about experiences occurring prior to their arrival in the 
United Kingdom or entry into the COMPASS housing programme. !
! For some recent arrivals, stories of pre-migration trauma were very fresh and 
visually affected respondents’ moods and demeanours. For Sahir, a Syrian asylum seeker 
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living in the North East of England, reflections on violence in his country of origin informed 
much of our discussion (Sahir, Interview, 06 June 2013). His description of experiences 
living within Jomast housing, a subcontractor to G4S in the region, were interspersed with 
autobiographical details about his departure from Syria and the conditions many of his 
friends and family faced who were still living there. Sahir explained that his family raised 
thousands of pounds to send him to the United Kingdom to avoid military duty that would 
likely have resulted in his having to kill someone, something he objected to as a principle 
of his faith and personal character. He was eager to show me photos of Aleppo before and 
after attacks on the city by President al-Assad’s military. In one image, a marketplace 
Sahir had once frequented was a pile of rubble. In another, he stood with a family member 
in front of the Citadel of Aleppo and explained that the architecture in the background - 
intact in the photo - was now in ruins. !
! For Sahir, concern for family, friends and culture was very acute and incorporated 
into his daily routine; he explained that he maintained communication with those in Syria 
via Skype, a voice-over-IP (internet protocol) communication service, on a daily basis. His 
laptop, one of his few possessions, held all of his photos and was his primary means of 
maintaining contact with friends and family. Evidence of these experiences was invisible in 
the confines of his sparsely furnished room, which he described as ‘very clean and 
spacious’. He seemed generally pleased with the items issued to him by Jomast, which 
included a duvet, towels, utensils and ‘two times new of everything’. Sahir acknowledged 
that his experience might be unique in that the furnishings and overall state of his room 
were in good repair. However, he explained that he had no contact from Jomast or G4S 
since moving in.!
! To demonstrate the general lack of support he had received upon entering the 
property or, indeed, general advice as to where to access essential services, Sahir 
produced a document titled: ‘G4S Dispersed Accommodation Briefing Pack’. The booklet 
serves as a general reference guide for new residents within G4S accommodation. 
Information is offered in English and another language, ostensibly that spoken by the 
resident. General advice and expectations of service users are detailed in full. Information 
specific to the communities asylum seekers are dispersed in, such as the location of the 
local post office or advice services, are left blank for a staff member to fill in. In Sahir’s 
copy of the pack, each of these editable fields were left blank. There was no information 
pertaining to the location of ‘Local Health Services’, ‘Walk-in Centres’, ‘Local Immigration 
Advice’, ‘Places of Worship’, ‘Advice and Support’ or ‘Local Supermarkets and Halal 
Shops’. The only populated field was that of the ‘housing manager’; Sahir explained that 
this was the man who had provided him with the keys to the property. He stated that no 
information had been given about the rubbish collection dates, so he called the G4S 
helpline. The staff member did not know the answer, so Sahir asked a neighbour. Sahir 
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noted that the person who moved him in indicated that he would be visited once or twice a 
week; Sahir stated that he had not been visited once in the four months he had been in 
the property. He summed up his support experience by stating: ‘If I need help, I do it 
myself’ (ibid.). What is revealed in Sahir’s situation is not necessarily the ways in which his 
pre-migration experiences have shaped his perceptions of dispersed housing. Instead, 
Sahir’s living conditions illustrate his anonymity within the COMPASS housing system; 
considerations of his specific needs are simply overlooked or left unacknowledged.!
! While Sahir’s pre-migration experiences preceded his time in COMPASS housing 
by a matter of months, the persistent memories of traumatic events continued to plague 
some respondents years after arriving in the United Kingdom. At an integration network in 
Glasgow, Lucy, originally from West Africa, explained that she traveled to the United 
Kingdom in 2007 under extreme duress following a prolonged sexual assault by a number 
of officers of her state’s security service and a received a direct threat against her life 
(Lucy, Interview, 19 July 2013). Lucy stated that she did not know about asylum 
procedures before arriving in the UK and upon arrival lived with a family member.  After 8
several months of maltreatment and exploitation by her relative, Lucy began living 
sporadically at friends’ homes until she was eventually approached by UK Border Agency 
officers in the street some years later and taken into detention. When she was ultimately 
dispersed to Glasgow, Lucy explained that she was relieved to finally have a place of 
constant residence; when she first saw the house, she was ‘happy, because I thought of 
how I was straining in London, going from one friend one week to another friend another 
week’ (ibid.). Lucy declared that she had never experienced outward discrimination in 
Glasgow and found it nice to be able to talk with her roommate. She said, however, that 
she struggles at times when she’s faced with being alone: ‘I make sure I occupy myself in 
various ways. If I stay at home, my blood pressure was rising. […] If people are 
experiencing bad things, they have to share, [otherwise] it will affect them’ (ibid.). Lucy 
filled her week visiting the YWCA, attending the ‘Women’s Library’ and volunteering at 
 Lucy’s claim of not knowing UK asylum legislation and practice before her arrival is consistent 8
with research conducted on the subject of asylum seekers’ knowledge of the UK asylum system 
prior to their entry into the United Kingdom. For instance, in their survey of 87 asylum seekers from 
Afghanistan, Columbia, Kosovo and Somalia, Gilbert and Koser (2006) found that ‘respondents 
knew virtually nothing about official policies towards asylum-seekers and few appear to have 
abused them’ (Gilbert and Koser, 2006: p. 1214). In Robinson and Segrott’s 2002 Home Office 
research report, ‘Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers’, their interviews with 65 
asylum seekers revealed that ‘[m]any of those in the sample were fleeing persecution, violence or 
threats of violence. They were therefore more concerned about escaping from their country of 
origin than they were about which country they would eventually seek refuge in’ (Robinson and 
Segrott, 2002: p. vii). The decision to select one country over another, as Gilbert and Koser 
suggest, can be down to multiple considerations and may not always be the asylum seeker’s 
choice at all. 43 per cent of the respondents in their survey reported that it was the smuggler’s 
decision as to where they would be transported. Another 21 per cent were motivated by friend or 
family connections in the United Kingdom (Gilbert and Koser, 2006: p. 1215).
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Barnardo’s. Other asylum seekers, she suggested, were not as fortunate in their selection 
of activities to occupy their time: ‘Some friends have problems where they stay’ (ibid.).!
! The implications of moving into areas with few support options or a lack of free and 
accessible activities can limit an individual’s ability to cope with past and current 
hardships. The placement of asylum seekers increasingly far from city centres to areas 
removed from established support networks, for instance to Easterhouse outside Glasgow 
or Middlesbrough and Stockton rather than Newcastle, increases pressures on small 
community-based drop-ins, which do not necessarily have the capacity to address some 
of the emotional support needs of those living within the area. In addition, as drop-ins may 
occur only once to a few times per week, the availability of places or activities that can 
serve to distract asylum seekers from memories of past traumas is critical to their 
wellbeing, particularly given their prohibition from taking up employment. In an Oxfam 
Research Report, Crawley et al (2011) investigate the different coping strategies destitute 
refused asylum seekers adopted to help manage the situations they found themselves in. 
Among the strategies described, access to ‘human resources’ remained critical. The 
research suggests that access to enrichment activities was a key determinate in 
establishing general wellbeing. Crawley et al state:!!
‘Although many of the research participants talked about the importance of 
“luck” and “fate” in determining outcomes, it is clear that opportunities are 
structurally determined, and arise from being well-connected, educated, 
experienced, and having a grasp of the English language. “Luck” and “fate” 
are not opportunities that can be seized if individuals do not have these 
human resources or are experiencing poor mental health, trauma or 
depression.’!
(Crawley et al, 2011: p. 51)!!
As is clear from Lucy’s revelation of her own needs - the desire to distract her mind from 
the trauma of past events - support networks, volunteering activities and entertainment 
options remain important for those on Section 95 support as well as ‘refused’ asylum 
seekers on Section 4 or those receiving no support at all.!!
6.2 Experiences within the ‘detention estate’!!
! The use of detention as a means of managing asylum populations remains one of 
the UK government’s primary tools for controlling asylum seekers and is often associated 
with aims of deterrence and punishment for unwanted populations. Following hunger 
strikes at Harmondsworth detention centre in early 2014, a Home Office spokesperson 
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stated that ‘[d]etention remains an essential element in protecting the UK’s borders and 
maintaining an effective immigration control’ (quoted in Dutta, 2014). In their briefing on 
immigration detention in the United Kingdom, Silverman and Hajela (2015) explain that 
‘[t]he UK immigration detention estate is one of the largest in Europe. From 2009 until the 
end of 2013, between 2,000 and 3,500 migrants have been in detention at any given time. 
[…] The single most common category of immigration detainees is people who have 
sought asylum in the UK at some point’ (Silverman and Hajela, 2015: p. 2). From 2009 to 
2013, roughly half of the immigrants in detention were asylum seekers and the average 
number of adult asylum seekers in detention per year during the same period was 13,671. 
While the detention of child immigrants has decreased over time from 1,119 in 2009 to 
228 in 2013, child asylum seekers have accounted for 75 per cent of the average number 
of children in detention over that period (Home Office, 2014a). Liza Schuster (2003) 
indicates that immigration in the United Kingdom is unique when compared to other 
European states in that there is ‘no legal limit to the time a person may be held’ (Schuster, 
2003: p. 249). In addition, she highlights the fact that the ‘majority of those held in 
detention centres […] are eventually released’; in Schuster’s estimation, the practice of 
detention can only be based on an arbitrary expression of state power or ‘the 
unacceptable [goal] of deterring potential asylum-seekers from entering EU states to seek 
refuge’ (ibid, p. 249). Detention is also notable for its exclusionary function; it serves as a 
literal demarcation of the boundary between those who belong and those who do not. In 
the case of asylum seekers, while deportation might represent a literal removal or 
exclusion, detention is an exclusion from within.!
! It is illustrative to employ Agamben’s description of ‘bare life’ to demonstrate the 
manner in which asylum seekers lives are controlled through an included exclusion by 
way of detention. For Agamben, ‘one of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics 
is its constant need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what 
is inside from what is outside’ (Agamben, 1998: p. 131). Refugees in their contingent 
status as asylum seekers represent a threat to state order; ‘by breaking the continuity 
between man and citizen, nativity and nationality, they put the original fiction of modern 
sovereignty into crisis’ (ibid, p. 131). It is this need to exclude, or separate out political life 
from ‘life that does not deserve to live’, that an internal exclusion arises. Agamben uses 
the notion of the ‘camp’ as a way of describing the ways in which populations have been 
subjected to an existence outside of the ‘normal juridical order’ despite being held within 
state boundaries where the rule of law otherwise operates (ibid, p. 169-170). While I later 
problematise the use of the ‘camp’ as a model that accurately reflects asylum seekers’ 
experiences in detention and within dispersed accommodation, it is helpful in initially 
highlighting the abject existence of those held within the detention estate. Jonathan 
Darling has employed the concept of the ‘camp’ to demonstrate the UK government’s use 
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of exceptional powers to deprive populations of destitute, ‘failed’ asylum seekers of 
protection under the ‘normal remit of rights and responsibilities, and crucially of a political 
voice’ (Darling, 2009: p. 652). He suggests that detention is a method of dehumanising 
asylum seekers: ‘for bare life the predominant relation is one either of the inhospitable, of 
confinement, refusal, and rejection, or of a conditioned temporary refuge centred almost 
exclusively around the need to not be “too welcoming”’ (Malkki, 1996 and Pugliese, 2002 
cited in Darling, 2009: p. 656). In this context, detention serves an important function, a 
function that both isolates asylum seekers through an exclusionary function but also 
displays to the outside the fact that an ‘illegitimate’ community has been punished for its 
presence, even though the majority of asylum seekers are ‘eventually released’, due to an 
inability to send them back to their country of origin, their initiation of an appeal against an 
immigration decision or because their asylum claim has been legitimated and they have 
been granted temporary or permanent leave to remain (Schuster, 2003: p. 249). Imogen 
Tyler (2010) describes the demonstrative function of asylum detention in the following 
way:!!
‘[D]etention centres have a visible and instrumental existence; they physically 
separate citizens and non-citizens, keeping apart those who deserve to be 
protected by the British state from the abject - those who do not’.!
(Tyler, 2010: p. 69).!!
! The management of asylum seekers is very much embedded within a carceral 
logic; their identity is framed around subjects of illegality and criminality. The concern for 
security and the preservation of national identity informs the practices operating to 
exclude asylum seekers from the normal protections of the state. Aims at securitising the 
state against foreign intrusion form the bedrock of detention practices, a point Malloch and 
Stanley (2005) make in their discussion of the threat or ‘risk’ asylum seekers are seen to 
pose to the state. Detention, they write, is used as a form of deterrence, but it is also ‘a 
fundamentally punitive method to assuage public fears concerning supposed “risk” and 
potential dangers to “security”’ (Malloch and Stanley, 2005: p. 53). The fact that detention 
centres, or in the parlance of the British government, ‘immigration removal centres’, 
function and are managed in a manner similar to prisons suggests a conflation of the 
‘immigrant’ with the ‘criminal’. In his brief article, ‘The criminalisation of diversity’, Jon 
Burnett discusses the process of articulating migrants and asylum seekers as criminal. 
‘[T]he increased criminalisation of those seeking asylum’, he writes, ‘has been fostered 
through a rising tide of “xeno-racism”’ (Burnett, 2008: p. 27). The use of ‘criminal law’ has 
become a tactic of state in order to ‘“manage” global movements of people’ during a time 
when an ‘attack on multiculturalism’ is becoming ‘synonymous with the instigation of the 
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“war on terror”’ (ibid, p. 27). Using Foucault’s concept of ‘state racism’ to frame citizenship 
within a biopolitical context, Tyler writes that British citizenship has been ‘designed to fail 
specific groups and populations. Failure […] is a design principle of British citizenship, in 
the most active and violent sense of the verb to design: to mark out, to indicate, to 
designate’ (original emphasis in Tyler, 2010: p. 62).!
! Detention, in its capacity to physically remove asylum seekers from the ‘legitimate’ 
community further entrenches their position as outsiders and, through a process of 
securitisation, their identification as threats to state security. In Agambenian terms, the 
management of asylum seekers is representative of a ‘politics of exception’, which 
Huysmans and Buonfino (2008) describe as a process that ‘focuses on the state of threat 
to the life of the nation, the legitimacy of exceptional policies justified by this threat and the 
ensuing trade-off between security and liberty that it produces’ (Huysmans and Buonfino, 
2008: p. 767). The governance of asylum seekers insofar as it both excludes and controls 
through a set of rules applying specifically to them, such as indefinite detention, can 
therefore be likened to zones of exception where the rule of law is, if not suspended, 
certainly in stasis. For Agamben, this state of exception ‘no longer appears as the 
threshold that guarantees the articulation between an inside and an outside, or between 
anomie and the juridical context, by virtue of a law that is in force in its suspension; it is 
rather, a zone of absolute indeterminacy between anomie and the law, in which the sphere 
of creatures and the juridical order are caught up in a single catastrophe’ (Agamben, 
2005: p. 57). To perceive asylum detention in such absolute terms is perhaps not entirely 
useful given avenues of resistance and forms of external support sometimes available to 
asylum seekers. The work of activist lawyers and organisations like Movement for Justice 
in advocating and acting on behalf of detainees undermine a purely Agambenian view of 
detention as one in which asylum seekers’ political lives are laid entirely bare. Asylum 
seekers, too, have taken measures to raise political voices in response to the their 
conditions in detention, though the methods available to them are limited. For example, in 
January 2015, asylum seekers detained in Papua New Guinea at an Australian facility 
sewed their lips shut as a response to their treatment; the year before, detainees staged 
riots in a detention centre on Manus Island (Siegel, 2015). In the UK, asylum seekers 
have employed the use of hunger strikes to draw attention to their experiences in 
detention. As recently as March 2015, hunger strikers at Harmondsworth protested their 
lack of freedom and the prospect of indefinite detention (Gelblum, 2015). These types of 
demonstrations reveal a political voice amongst lives that have been ‘banned’; it is for this 
reason that Agamben’s use of zoē (bare life) and bios (political life) is not necessarily 
reflective of the conditions asylum seekers face, though there is perhaps little doubt about 
the abject conditions asylum seekers face in the United Kingdom’s detention estate.!
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! A recent Channel 4 exposé on the experiences of asylum seekers in one of the 
UK’s immigration removal centres, Yarl’s Wood, offered some substantiation to asylum 
seekers’ claims of abuse by the institution’s staff. The television investigation highlighted 
levels of negligence and ill treatment on the part of Serco employees, who staff the facility 
as part of a contracting deal between Serco and the Home Office. Some of the staff 
members filmed during the production of the programme referred to detainees as ‘animals’ 
and ‘bitches’ and in one instance, the medical needs of a woman suffering from a 
miscarriage were reportedly neglected by Serco staff and the G4S employees working at 
the centre’s healthcare facility (Channel 4, 2015). The treatment of asylum seekers in 
Yarl’s Wood and other detention centres around the United Kingdom - many of which are 
managed by G4S and Serco - has featured in other reports as well. In a September 2013 
article in the Observer, a former detainee at Yarl’s Wood claimed that Serco guards had 
targeted female detainees for ‘unwanted sexual advances and abuse’ (Townsend, 2013). 
Conditions of Yarl’s Wood were the subject of scrutiny in an investigation led by Women 
for Refugee Women, which cited that over 85 per cent of the 46 women interviewed for 
the research project ‘had been raped or tortured before reaching Britain’ (Morrison, 2014). 
Speaking of the desperation of women who had attempted suicide within Yarl’s Wood, one 
of the respondents stated: ‘I would honestly die rather than go back to Yarl’s Wood’ (ibid.). 
An investigation into the death of Muhammed Shukat in Colnbrook resulted in the 
determination that Serco staff’s neglect of his health needs had contributed to his death 
(Taylor, 2012).!
! Concerns about the treatment of asylum seekers is not limited to conditions under 
Serco’s management alone; G4S has been implicated in a number of human rights 
concerns, perhaps most notably in recent years, the death of Jimmy Mubenga, an 
Angolan asylum seeker, during his deportation flight on 12 October 2010. Witnesses on 
the flight reported that during Mubenga’s restraint by G4S guards, he complained about 
not being able to breathe and subsequently lost consciousness and died. The Crown 
Prosecution Service initially determined that the three guards involved in the incident 
would not face charges (Lewis and Taylor, 2012). Subsequent charges brought against 
the G4S officers ultimately resulted in a jury’s decision to clear them of manslaughter in 
Mubenga’s death (Taylor and Booth, 2014). A judge in that trial disallowed a series of text 
messages to be used as evidence against the accused guards, though the messages 
reflected a frame of mind governing the G4S officers’ views of the people they were 
responsible for overseeing. One text read: ‘Fuck off and go home you free-loading, benefit 
grabbing, kid producing, violent, non-English speaking cock suckers and take those hairy 
faced, sandal wearing, bomb making, goat fucking, smelly rag head bastards with 
you’ (cited in Booth, 2014). Given its extensive presence as a global security firm, G4S 
has faced further scrutiny for perceived human rights abuses elsewhere; in 2008, an 
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Australian Aborigine man died of exposure due to extreme temperatures in the back of a 
G4S van during his transport across Western Australia (Sambrook, 2011). With the 
growing exposure of each firm’s maltreatment of asylum seekers and other detainees, 
reactions to the announcement that G4S and Serco were preferred bidders on the 
COMPASS housing contracts included speculation about their suitability to run an 
accommodation service given their inexperience in housing provision; other concerns 
centred around the firms’ reputations of abuse. John Grayson, a researcher and 
campaigner for asylum seekers’ welfare, wrote in April 2012: !!
Private security firms with records of abuse in managing detention centres and 
escorting asylum seekers are about to take over as asylum housing landlords 
and disperse asylum seeker tenants into poor quality private rented housing. 
This is just part of the relentless rise of the private security company and their 
networks of privatised taxpayer-funded prison and welfare contracts.!
(Grayson, 2012)!!
In his article, Grayson draws attention to the ‘campaign’ of Yorkshire asylum organisations 
involved in protesting a ‘moral outrage’, fuelled in part by a sentiment expressed by a 
Zimbabwean asylum seeker who, upon learning of the potential deal between the Home 
Office and G4S, stated: ‘I do not want a prison guard as my landlord’ (Grayson, 2012).!
! One of the initial objectives of this thesis was to determine how reflective this 
statement was of widespread views or the degree to which asylum seekers living in 
COMPASS housing had prior knowledge of G4S, Serco and their respective reputations. 
The extent of concern that already existed about these firms’ practices or, indeed, asylum 
seekers’ first-hand experiences within detention facilities managed by G4S or Serco, may 
have influenced their initial views about the COMPASS transition. Two trends emerged in 
the responses to my questions about asylum seekers’ knowledge of G4S and Serco prior 
to their being housed by each company: 1) prior knowledge of the security firms and their 
activities was limited to nine respondents and eight stated that they had not heard of the 
firms before, and 2) most respondents’ individual interaction with housing officers was with 
representatives from companies subcontracted to provide accommodation under the 
COMPASS agreements. In total, three respondents confirmed having been detained at 
least one time within an immigration removal centre. The emotions asylum seekers 
described upon learning that G4S and Serco were going to be responsible for their 
housing ranged from disappointment due to the companies’ public failures to fear 
stemming from knowledge of the firms’ questionable human rights histories or their 
relationship with the Home Office. Olufemi, an asylum seeker living in West Yorkshire, 
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specifically cited the death of Jimmy Mubenga and G4S’s transportation and detention 
contracts with the Home Office as reasons she feared being housed by the security firm.!!
I got a letter from the Home Office - UKBA - saying that G4S were taking over 
[asylum housing]. That really, really scared me to death, because, why would 
a prison company be my landlord? What does that say? That we’re going to 
be watched every now and then or, probably, to make it easier for the UKBA to 
get me arrested? Since G4S is my landlord, it can bring in a prison van and 
come and get me out of the house. So, I felt like I’m in prison. None of us were 
actually happy, to be fair, because every asylum seeker knows that G4S is a 
prison guard company. […] Especially with what happened to Jimmy 
Mubenga. That really worries me, because if I’m having G4S as my landlord, 
what’s going to happen to me or other people if we didn’t do what they wanted 
us to do? Probably they will just come and, you know, bundle us into a prison 
van. At the end of the day, they are our landlord. Why did the UKBA give G4S 
that contract to be our landlord? Are they trying to make it easier on them and 
make it harder for us? To get locked up? Because when a prison guard 
[company] is your landlord, it makes it very easy for them to just come and get 
you in your house.!
(Olufemi, Interview, 22 August 2013a)!!
! Olufemi’s statement reveals the extent to which some asylum seekers and their 
advocates view G4S as an extension of the Home Office. It was precisely this perception 
that G4S’s Stephen Small countered during a meeting with academics and the Home 
Office in March 2012, which I detailed in chapter 4. Olufemi’s comments were very similar 
to those expressed by the Zimbabwean asylum seeker Grayson (2012) cited in his article 
describing some of the fundamental concerns surrounding a housing service operated by 
a security firm whose reputation in the United Kingdom was partly built upon its contracts 
with the Home Office to manage asylum seeker populations within detention centres, 
transport them to and from detention and accompany them during their deportation. What 
emerges from Olufemi’s response is an apprehensiveness to the panoptic gaze of the 
state and the possibility of its full knowledge of asylum seekers’ whereabouts and actions 
through the use of G4S and its subcontractors as surrogate border officials. In effect, it is 
a fear of what Foucault calls the ‘mechanism of security’: the ‘maintenance of the relation 
of forces and development of the internal forces of each element, linking them 
together’ (Foucault, 2007: p. 296). From this perspective, the agreement between G4S 
and the Home Office to house asylum seekers is interpreted as a unification of securitised 
practices in the management of asylum-seeking populations with the ultimate aim of 
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securing and protecting ‘legitimate’ populations from the ‘threat’ of asylum seekers. The 
following statement from another asylum seeker in West Yorkshire, Jabril, captures the 
degree to which this state strategy is interpreted as a deliberate objective:!!
I heard about G4S before, because obviously, G4S is a security firm - as I 
used to know. I’m not sure what happened [for G4S] to end up being a 
housing provider. Obviously, I understand how abusive G4S have been. When 
this project was won by G4S, before they started moving people, there were 
many campaigns about G4S [being] capable of hassling people with their 
dignity and all that. You know what I mean? You know, Home Office - for them 
- they feel that they are always right even if they are wrong. So, it is obviously 
out of ethics. It is an abuse of human rights. So, again, they contacted us to 
say that we are going to move. They contacted us a day before to say that the 
next day that we are going to move.!
(Jabril, Interview, 22 August 2013b)!!
! For Jabril, the Home Office’s capacity for human rights abuses is an inevitability. 
The Home Office is viewed as maintaining a singular objective, which is to employ a 
security firm to physically manoeuvre abject populations in an effort to unsettle them; 
there is little recourse available once the Home Office has made a decision in this regard. 
Jabril’s resignation to the fact that he and fellow asylum seekers were to be moved with 
little notice reflects an expectation of a particular outcome: as an asylum seeker, a person 
is at the whim of the Home Office and its aims are achievable through the use of 
companies like G4S. It was G4S’s methods in carrying out its agreement with the Home 
Office that respondents were particularly concerned about. Gabrielle, living in Leeds, 
explained her shock upon learning that G4S was going to be responsible for managing the 
COMPASS contract in the region:!!
A case worker told me - even though they were not supposed to tell me: ‘Oh, 
you guys are going to be moved, because a contract has been [agreed] with 
G4S. I said, ‘G4S? No way! Because I know about them, because I have 
spent time in a detention centre. I knew about G4S! I knew they were a 
security firm. When you are going to go to ‘wherever’, they are the one who 
take you, and things like that. I saw how they were beating people. The council 
wrote to me and say that you are going to move, but we don’t know when, so 
you just prepare yourself that G4S are taking over.!
(Gabrielle, 06 September 2013)!!
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Respondents’ concerns about the prospect of being housed by G4S or Serco extended 
beyond the companies’ practices of monitoring asylum seekers within the detention 
estate; some were aware of the firms’ missteps in other contexts. For instance G4S’s 
failings during the 2012 London Olympic Games were viewed as evidence of the potential 
for incompetence in carrying out the COMPASS contracts. G4S was unable to fulfil the 
conditions of its contract with the government to provide security at the Olympics. Despite 
being awarded a £236m contract, G4S faced staffing difficulties and relied upon support 
from 3,500 military troops to fill personnel gaps. G4S’s losses amounted to about £70m 
and market confidence in the firm dipped in response to the affair (Chan, 2013 and BBC 
News, 2013). The chairman of the Olympics, Lord Coe, stated that G4S ‘failed to 
understand the size and complexity’ of its agreement with the government (Travis and 
Gibson, 2012). In addition, asylum seekers expressed reservations regarding the fact that 
the companies had no established expertise in housing or housing support led to 
questions as to why G4S and Serco the Home Office selected them as preferred bidders. 
This lack of confidence in G4S is illustrated with Khalil’s (Interview, 26 June 2013b) 
comment:!!
The first time when I heard about [G4S] was in when they failed in the 
Olympics - their contract. This is when I first heard about G4S. While I was still 
in the process, I saw that and thought: ‘Welcome to [my] troubles!’. […] After 
that, they told me about G4S. I didn’t know that they did this housing; I knew 
them as private security. I knew that they ran prisons. I don’t know what they 
[are doing] with housing. […] I know that they do transport as well.!
(Khalil, Interview, 26 June 2013b)!!
! The uncertainty about G4S’s abilities in managing a housing programme is 
compounded by the perception that its motivations are solely economic. Amongst asylum 
seekers in their care, G4S is not viewed as a particularly social-conscious organisation. 
This perception is amplified by the conditions asylum seekers find themselves living in, 
whether in relation to the quality of their housing, the relative poverty of the area they are 
dispersed or the distance they are from city centres. The fact that G4S and its 
subcontracts may be pursuing cost-savings strategies is not lost on those within their 
care. For instance, Jomast, G4S’s subcontractor in the North East of England houses 
asylum seekers in properties in Middlesbrough and Stockton that are located in 
impoverished areas. In Leeds and West Yorkshire, the subcontractor in the region, 
Cascade, places asylum seekers in accommodation in areas that would otherwise be 
difficult to let due to the condition of the properties and their location in deprived areas. 
Jahan, who was living in Sunderland at the time of our interview, suggested that G4S and 
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Jomast were involved in the COMPASS programme for ‘the money - and [did not intend] 
to spend any of it on asylum seekers’ [welfare]’ (Interview, 06 February 2013). I visited 
Tariq at his property outside Leeds city centre; his assessment of G4S and Cascade was 
that each company was more concerned about profits than the welfare of those within its 
care. Throughout the course of the interview, he reflected on his prior knowledge of G4S 
and the economic logic he felt underpinned its decision to enter the COMPASS contract:!!
Things have been getting worse with the other companies and this [G4S] is 
the last [latest] company we are experiencing now. […] G4S - we used to have 
a negative perception of G4S from media [reports], such as the mishandling of 
Olympics security and there are public opinions about their political affiliations 
with the politicians of our government, so most of the contracts they get, you 
could say, are on political grounds. Then there are other, you can say, opinions 
that say that [G4S] have offered the lowest price to the Home Office and that’s 
why they have been granted this contract. This is where I am concerned. If this 
contract is based on the lowest bid, and they have handed us over to another 
company [subcontractor]. So, two companies making profit out of one deal 
and not providing any property facility or basic, you can say, requirements of 
their housing. We are the people who suffer. Not Cascade, not G4S. G4S is 
definitely making some money - that’s why they have the contracts. And 
Cascade are making a lot of money as well. Most of their properties are in 
slum areas. This is the most deprived area - where we are housed. [It is] a 
very antisocial environment here. People are mostly, you know, alcoholics, 
drug users; [it’s] a high crime rate area, low-price rent and cheap properties.!
(Tariq, Interview, 07 September 2013)!!
! Tariq’s assessment of the COMPASS experience suggests a commingling of 
market-driven practices (i.e. the placement of asylum seekers in low-cost accommodation) 
alongside politically-motivated securitisation practices. The decision to use G4S as a 
primary housing provider on the COMPASS programme is, in this view, not limited to 
reasons of cost-savings alone, but of delivering a service that promises to reinforce the 
public-facing government agenda of appearing tough on immigrants, especially those so 
often portrayed in the popular media as ‘bogus’ and ‘undeserving’. Tariq’s perception of 
COMPASS and the operation of the service is complex; it reflects many of the primary 
criticisms of the COMPASS programme levelled against G4S and Serco. For instance, in 
written evidence provided as part of the Home Affairs Committee report on asylum, Ismail, 
Carr and Nikolyorakis (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Asylum, 2013b) 
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addressed some of the effects the movement of asylum seekers into impoverished areas 
was having on residents’ ability to access necessary resources:!!
The provision of housing is part of the support offered to asylum seekers. We 
find that people are being moved round the country to suit the housing 
providers’ search for profit maximisation via cost reduction, with little or no 
regard for the extra pressures this brings to bear; pressures caused by, for 
example, having to find and start again with new solicitors (because it’s too 
expensive to keep travelling to the old ones), new medical support and the 
process of having to start again trying to build whatever fragile social support 
networks they can find.!
(Ismail, Carr and Nikolyorakis in House of Commons!
Home Affairs Committee on Asylum, 2013b: Ev w44)!!
The period of transition into the COMPASS contracts, a span of about nine months 
between Spring and Autumn 2012, resulted in an outcome quite different to the one 
intended as part of the initial agreement. Disruptions, which were supposed to have been 
minimised, were frequent; moves were more the mainstay than the exception. The Home 
Affairs Committee on Asylum addressed a number of the problems of transition in its 2013 
report, stating that G4S failed to re-house asylum seekers in Yorkshire leaving hundreds 
in local authority housing far longer than it had agreed to (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee on Asylum, 2013a: para. 91). The 12 November 2012 deadline G4S 
was meant to have met in rehousing asylum seekers passed with 339 asylum seekers still 
accommodated by local authorities in Kirklees, Leeds and Barnsley (Twinch, 2012). The 
Home Affairs Committee noted that G4S faced no financial penalty for its inability to meet 
a contractual commitment (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Asylum, 
2013a: para. 91). In the next section, I address asylum seekers’ experiences throughout 
the transition process. Moving from perceptions of G4S, Serco and their subcontractors to 
the lived experiences of those involved in the transition from the older Target contracts to 
COMPASS helps develop an image of the transition period from individual perspectives 
rather than macroscopic overviews of the ‘effects’ of the transition.!!
6.3 Life in transition!!
! The inclusion of private security firms in the management and oversight of asylum 
seeking populations presents a possible challenge to the state’s obligations under Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that ‘[e]veryone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence’ (ECHR, 
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Article 8(1)). If the contractors on the COMPASS project provided an informal surveillance 
function for the Home Office, as Olufemi (cited above) feared, then the intrusion of a 
private security firm into the lives of destitute asylum seekers not in detention might 
represent a breach of one’s right to a private life. In order to remain eligible for housing 
support, destitute asylum seekers must not abandon the property designated to them. In 
practice, determining what institution - either the Home Office or one of its contractors - is 
functionally involved in ensuring asylum seekers are in their allocated accommodation 
may prove difficult to determine. Equally, forms of institutional surveillance are not limited 
to organisations serving an explicit social control function, as Foucault elucidates in his 
description of disciplinary power, which depends on both formal and informal institutions in 
conducting surveillance and performing a systematic pursuit of population management 
(see: Foucault, 1995). Concern about the role of local authorities, private landlords and 
housing associations in acting as an ‘arm of the state’ during previous dispersal housing 
contracts was a concern as well. Steve Cohen (2002) problematised local authorities’ role 
in carrying out the state’s dispersal strategy, and suggested that local governments 
involvement represented a ‘Big Brother-type surveillance and control over accommodated 
asylum seekers’ (Cohen, 2002: p. 534). Cohen explains that it is effectively the local 
authority’s task to ensure asylum seekers are not ‘absent for more than seven 
consecutive days and nights or no more than at total of 14 days and nights in any six-
month period’, as stipulated within the Asylum Support Regulations 2000 (ibid., p. 534). 
For Cohen,!!
[T]he forced dispersal of asylum seekers and the linking of essential local 
authority administered welfare services to immigration status represent the 
integration of the local state into internal immigration controls and the 
transformation of local government into an arm of the Home Office.!
(Cohen, 2002: p. 518)!!
Cohen concludes, stating that ‘the central role of local authorities in arguing for and 
implementing the dispersal scheme has become immune from criticism. […] [T]he active 
involvement by local authorities in an involuntary dispersal scheme is highly problematical’ 
(Cohen, 2002: p. 541).!
! Much of the academic literature about asylum housing and the dispersal 
programme produced throughout the 2000s demonstrates how this ‘problematical’ 
relationship between local authorities and the Home Office resulted in negative outcomes 
for the asylum seekers living within NASS accommodation. In Dwyer and Brown’s 2008 
study of asylum seekers living in NASS accommodation in Leeds, five of six respondents 
viewed their accommodation unfavourably. A further 50 per cent of respondents that had 
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left NASS accommodation found accommodation to be poor or lacking (Dwyer and Brown, 
2008: p. 209). The research outcomes suggested that experiences were worse with 
private firms than they were under local authorities. Citing these companies’ lack of 
expertise in housing, Dwyer and Brown explain that ‘complaints were more prevalent 
among those migrants that were housed by private companies rather than the local 
authority’ (ibid, p. 210). Further problems with the dispersal system were noted by Lisa 
Hunt in her analysis of interviews carried out with 21 asylum seekers living in dispersed 
accommodation in West Yorkshire. For respondents in her study, dispersal meant 
separation from support and family networks and some accommodation was deemed 
‘inappropriate’ based on asylum seekers’ specific needs, particularly women with children 
(Hunt, 2008: p. 286). In Sim and Bowes’ study of asylum seekers living in dispersed 
accommodation in Glasgow, a service provider in the region acknowledged that ‘the 
dispersal pattern for refugees has been determined by the location of void housing stock. 
This stock is generally within communities of multiple deprivation’ (quoted in Sim and 
Bowes, 2007: pp. 734-735). These studies provide a sample of the significant amount of 
work performed in the research of asylum housing experiences; they reveal the extent to 
which the quality of accommodation and effects of dispersal under pre-COMPASS 
conditions perhaps failed to best serve those within the care of the state, local authorities 
and other agencies contracted to house them.!
! To condemn COMPASS providers in normative terms without recognition of the 
problems asylum seekers faced under previous dispersal regimes would be inappropriate. 
However, the question of whether or not conditions have worsened or improved since the 
transition to COMPASS remains. As the transition occurred during the research process 
for the current study, an opportunity arose to speak to asylum seekers who had previous 
experience in housing not provided through G4S, Serco or one of their subcontractors. 
Their descriptions of life before and after COMPASS help reveal asylum seekers’ 
perspectives on the transition experience and their assessments of life under current and 
former dispersal environments. In the following section I will discuss some of these 
perspectives through respondents’ views of the transition process. These observances are 
separated into three categories: 1) comparisons between COMPASS experiences and 
those of previous providers; 2) reflections on the degree of notice asylum seekers 
received prior to being rehoused and the information they were provided; and 3) 
assessments of their treatment by housing staff. These accounts provide an insight into 
how housing conditions have changed since the introduction of the COMPASS 
programme and provide a foundation for a more detailed investigation into living 
conditions in chapter 7.!!!
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6.4 The beginning of ‘all of the chaos’: experiences during the transition to COMPASS!!
! Of the 26 asylum seekers interviewed as part of this dissertation, 25 were current 
residents within dispersal accommodation provided through one of the subcontractors to 
G4S and Serco. Respondents living in Glasgow were housed by Orchard and Shipman, 
while respondents in West Yorkshire and the North East of England were housed by 
Cascade Homes and Jomast respectively. One respondent was a current resident in a 
Home Office-allocated property, but had vacated the property. Another respondent had 
received refugee status and no longer lived in COMPASS accommodation, but offered 
perspectives on the time he spent in a Cascade property. It is worth noting that at the time 
the interviews were conducted, between May and September 2013, Cascade was still a 
primary service provider in West Yorkshire. However, due to Cascade’s failings under the 
terms of the COMPASS contract, G4S took over over all management and support 
functions of Cascade’s 370 properties across Yorkshire and Humber in February 2014 
(Spurr, 2014). Respondents interviewed were either on Section 95 support following an 
initial asylum claim or were receiving Section 4 support as they had been initially refused 
asylum and were awaiting an appeal or were unable to return to their country of origin. !
! The period of time each respondent had been in the United Kingdom varied 
greatly, as had the amount of time that had passed since their first asylum claim, with one 
respondent having claimed as recently as two months prior to the interview date and 
another who first claimed asylum 12 years prior to the interview. Eight respondents made 
initial claims within 12 months of the interview and five made claims within seven months 
or fewer; as result, these participants could compare experiences in COMPASS housing 
with those in initial accommodation, but were not in a position to compare the conditions 
of their housing or the location of their placement with conditions under the former asylum 
housing regime. The remaining 18 respondents had been in dispersed housing for a year 
or more and were therefore able to comment on the transition period and make 
comparisons between COMPASS and previous housing experiences.!
! At the outset of the interviews, participants discussed the conditions of their 
accommodation before being transitioned or transferred into housing provided through 
subcontractors on the COMPASS contract. Respondents broadly favoured the 
accommodation experience provided through local authorities or other providers over that 
of COMPASS, though that did not translate into universal praise for local authority 
provision. Eighteen respondents responded to questions about experiences living in 
dispersed accommodation prior to the transition to the COMPASS contract. Their 
comments were coded to reflect a generally positive view (PRECMP+) or a generally 
negative opinion (PRECMP-). While scope was allowed for neutral views, all respondents 
expressed an opinion that could be categorised within either node. A greater number of 
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respondents (10) regarded their pre-COMPASS housing experience as negative, while 
eight respondents used positive descriptions of their previous accommodation 
experiences. However, in all instances in which an asylum seeker compared their 
COMPASS experience to local authority accommodation, COMPASS was considered 
inferior. If a respondent had been previously housed by a private agency, opinions were 
not as clearly dichotomous, as is evidenced in Jacqueline’s response below. Preference 
for local authority housing over COMPASS extended from the quality of housing, location, 
and community experience to their interaction with housing officers and the quality of 
service they felt they received. Though there were a few exceptions to these trends, 
nearly all respondents in a position to compare COMPASS with previous contracts felt that 
there was an overall degradation of quality to the service; many felt mentally and 
physically strained during the transition period. While interview participants with children 
experienced specific stresses related to moving schools or having to provide emotional 
support to dependents, single asylum seekers also experienced feelings of abandonment 
and isolation. This often contrasted with their memories of conditions prior to COMPASS.!
! Benjamin, a single asylum seeker living in Sunderland at the time of our interview, 
stated that his accommodation experience with the local council was ‘very good’. He 
noted that local authority (LA) representatives visited often and were quick to respond to 
repair requests and performed maintenance tasks shortly after being notified. Benjamin 
stated that it was a ‘very nice, nice environment’ and that ‘there was nothing to complain 
about’; the experience was ‘impressive’ (Interview, 21 August 2013). According to 
Benjamin, his time in LA accommodation compared favourably to his time in initial 
accommodation at Angel Lodge in Wakefield, which he described as ‘the worst situation 
one can imagine - it was like a prison’. He reflected on what it was like to live under 
constant surveillance, stating that his ‘movement was always being monitored’. Benjamin 
stated, however, that it was the transition from LA accommodation to Jomast that marked 
the point at which ‘all of the chaos’ began. Benjamin suffers from a medical affliction and it 
was on the basis of this medical need that he was housed with the local authority. When 
he was moved into a Jomast property, he reported that his medical health was greatly 
affected. He was concerned about hygienic conditions in a property occupied by others, 
but stated that his complaints to Jomast went unanswered. He contacted the Home Office 
and was told that he could move, but that it would be ‘anywhere’, as it was on a no-choice 
basis. It was at that point that he was moved to Sunderland to a property that lacked a 
reliable boiler or a working oven and grill. He exclaimed: ‘I suffered a lot! I was recovering 
from an operation, and I had to use a metal pot to wash - to clean myself!’.!
! Jacqueline, a woman living in Leeds described her initial housing experience living 
with Angel Group in West Yorkshire as ‘really horrible’, as there were multiple occupants 
per room. When she complained to staff about her inability to wash her clothes due to the 
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lack of a washing machine at one of the properties she was housed in, she was told that 
she could ‘use my hands’ to wash my clothes. Under Angel Group, Jacqueline was moved 
around a ‘number of times’ until the firm lost its contract with the Home Office. She 
described her subsequent experience living in a property operated by Leeds City Council 
as ‘quite good’, emphasising the fact that she was housed in a self-contained flat. This 
was crucial, Jacqueline explained, because she needed to sleep with the lights on due to 
the nightmares she suffered from about past traumas. From her perspective, the local 
authority considered her mental needs whereas Angel Group did not. She reported that 
the council was also very good about initiating repairs as soon as they were needed. 
Following the transition to G4S and Cascade, Jacqueline’s circumstances altered 
significantly. She claimed that Cascade staff refused to help her take her belongings to her 
room in a shared property, so they were left in the sitting room; they were then stolen by a 
housemate. A friend of Jacqueline’s working for the Refugee Council exclaimed that the 
area she was being moved into was ‘the worst - it is horrible’. Jacqueline then visited the 
property on her own prior to being housed there and stated that the ‘stories about [G4S’s 
accommodation practices] were true’. When she told Cascade staff of her concerns and 
that she could not share a property due to her specific medical needs, she was made to 
sign the housing agreement and told that the Home Office would be notified if she 
refused. The explicit threat, she explained, was that her support would be dropped if she 
refused to accept her accommodation:!!
I told them that I cannot move into that property, but they forced me - 
threatened me to sign. If not [they said], they would stop my voucher - my 
support.!
(Interview, 06 September 2013)!!
Jacqueline’s description of her treatment by Cascade staff at first appears to lend support 
to the view that G4S and its subcontractors operate as a limb of the state, that the asylum 
housing programme exists as a mechanism of control ensuring the enforcement of the 
Home Office’s immigration policies. However, the lines between formal, informal and 
unsanctioned delegations of state authority are blurred; it would be difficult to determine if, 
for instance, the Cascade housing officer was granted the authority to make such a threat 
or was acting entirely discretionarily. Nevertheless, the effect is the same: Jacqueline felt 
coerced into signing a tenancy agreement for a property that was, in her view, unsuitable 
for her needs. !!
What can I do? In the end, I have no choice. If I maybe got my status, I will 
find a nice place to live, but because I don’t have my status, I have no choice. 
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I have to stay wherever they dump me. Do you know what is ‘dump’? They just 
take us [asylum seekers] and dump us wherever they feel like. It’s like … we 
died, but they didn’t bury us yet. I am struggling inside.!
[Jacqueline, Interview, 06 September 2013)!!
Jacqueline’s words echo Agamben’s formulation of ‘bare life’ in which he describes zoē as 
‘a living dead man’ (Agamben, 1998: p. 131). From her perspective, the transition to 
COMPASS-managed accommodation resulted in her being ‘dumped’ like a form of human 
detritus. It is a condition Jacqueline acknowledges other asylum seekers share with her 
and one that operates exclusively against them; to be granted refugee status is to be 
reanimated, to once again be allowed to live.!
! As is clear from the Home Affairs Committee’s determination that G4S failed in 
achieving its re-housing target, the transition to COMPASS from previous providers was 
not a smooth process. What is not as immediately evident in the discussions of 
‘contractual failures’ is the lived effects of contractual mismanagement. This is something 
John Grayson attempts to address in his articles about individual asylum seekers’ 
experiences during the transition process. For instance, Grayson describes an instance in 
which a woman was moved into a Cascade property infested with cockroaches, one of 
which ended up inside her baby’s milk bottle (Grayson, 2012b). The observations of 
asylum support agencies also provide an insight into the experiences during transition. An 
employee of the Maryhill Integration Network in Glasgow explained that the transition to 
COMPASS housing under Serco and its subcontractor in the region, Orchard and 
Shipman, resulted in asylum seekers being moved into ‘harsh’ areas and at a great 
distance from schools and GPs. She explained that the moves were particularly difficult 
for families with children and that consideration for the mental health needs for asylum 
seekers was evidently neglected. The representative explained that in one instance a 
family was forced to move after establishing itself in the community over the course of six 
years (Interview, 17 May 2013).!!
6.5 ‘Welcome Packs’ and Information about Dispersal Areas!!
! The transition into COMPASS housing often corresponded with asylum seekers 
moving location or, at the least, a turn-over in housing providers. Exceptions included 
some instances where the provider in the region, for instance Jomast in the North East of 
England, was already contracted to house asylum seekers and continued to do so as 
subcontractors to G4S. In Glasgow, most asylum seekers lived under the support of 
Ypeople before the switch to Serco and its subcontractor, Orchard and Shipman. One of 
the elements marking asylum seekers’ transition to COMPASS was that they were to be 
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provided with welcome packs that provided information about the area and offered 
important contact information for housing providers or emergency services. In many 
instances, these packs were either incomplete or absent altogether, leading to asylum 
seekers reporting that they did not have a good understanding of the services available to 
them; they often had to seek this information out on their own or through asylum and 
refugee support agencies. Asylum seekers’ comments about welcome packs were coded 
under the cluster ‘Contract Compliance’ under the node, WLCMPAK. Thirty-eight per cent 
of respondents mentioned welcome packs in their descriptions of the transition experience 
into COMPASS accommodation. Seven respondents described the welcome packs as 
unhelpful or incomplete (WLCMPAK-), while two believed that they were useful for the 
purposes of orientation (WLCMPAK+).!
! Some respondents noted a significant difference between the move-in experience 
under local authority management and the experience following the COMPASS transition; 
whereas under the old contracts a housing officer would drive residents around the area 
to point out basic services, such as their local GP or post office, this was largely not 
occurring under the COMPASS contract. For instance, Tariq (Interview, 07 September 
2013) stated that a local authority social worker showed him around the community, but 
when he moved into a Cascade-managed property in West Yorkshire, he was only 
provided a welcome pack, which contained basic information. Hassan, living in the North 
East of England, explained that while he and his family were given a brief tour of the 
surrounding area, the G4S welcome pack he received from Jomast was provided in 
English. He observed that ‘not everybody speaks English’ and the welcome pack was not 
further explained to him (Interview, 26 June 2013). In Glasgow, the situation was 
somewhat different. Falis explained that the information pack she received from Ypeople, 
the previous provider, was very helpful and that she was given the opportunity to attend 
an induction session, which provided further information about the community (Falis, 
Interview, 12 June 2013b). Mubin, too, found the information pack to be ‘useful’; he was 
able to use the pack to contact an Orchard and Shipman employee to take him to the local 
post office (Interview, 16 June 2013). In responding to her views on the information 
provided within the welcome pack she received from Orchard and Shipman, Lucy 
acknowledged that it contained some practical information, but she felt that it put too much 
emphasis on what was expected out of the resident and not enough on the provisions the 
resident might expect from the housing provider (Interview, 17 June 2013).!
! From the perspective of Katherine, a former Orchard and Shipman employee, the 
information pack was problematic. Katherine, who had worked with Orchard and Shipman 
from the beginning of the COMPASS programme, felt that the main reason the company 
was awarded the contract was because of the cost-savings it could promise to the Home 
Office. Katherine felt that Orchard and Shipman’s experience with private sector housing 
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may have contributed to its acquisition of the contract, but that it had no previous 
experience housing asylum seekers. The welcome pack they provided was, in Katherine’s 
eyes, ‘very poor’. She stated that the packs often didn’t include a translation in the 
resident’s preferred language and she sometimes ‘felt embarrassed’ about giving them to 
residents. Katherine said that the packs lacked detail or information specific to the local 
area asylum seekers were dispersed in and found the ‘local map’ to be ‘utterly 
useless’ (Interview, 10 June 2013). At this point in the interview, she searched in a drawer 
full of documents and produced a copy of the welcome pack. The map she described was 
a grainy, black and white map of the whole of Glasgow; no streets were discernible and 
neither was there any evidence of key information like the location of shops, post offices 
or GP practices. This lack of attention to the prospective needs of asylum seekers moved 
into an unfamiliar area without a support network suggests that the wellbeing of residents 
is largely a secondary concern for the firms currently operating the COMPASS contract. It 
perhaps also reflects that cost-savings objectives have also led to a deterioration in the 
overall quality of housing and support provided to asylum seekers moved into dispersal 
areas, a subject I return to in the next chapter. When assessing the conditions of Orchard 
and Shipman housing and the corporate ethos driving the firm as a housing provider, 
Katherine said:!!
I was quite optimistic […] at the start and that I could just play a role in the 
service, but it just never happened like that, to be honest. Because I’ve always 
come from the voluntary sector, I think there is quite a difference in people’s 
attitudes and values. They [O&S] took people on who didn’t have experience 
with asylum [seekers] and vulnerable people. […] It was very much a business 
rather than a service. A lot of stuff around appearance, and I played into that a 
wee bit, because I wanted to have a job. […] I think the people I moved in and 
the people I went to see - I hope that I gave them - I was courteous and 
understanding. I think I helped them rather than…[ends].!
(Katherine, Interview, 10 June 2013)!!
! In this chapter, the breadth of experiences asylum seekers face within the asylum 
system have been explored in an effort to represent the cross-cutting nature of emotional 
and physical duress experienced before and during asylum seekers’ entry into the UK 
asylum system. Past traumas and the strain of transition experiences are not isolated 
events within asylum seekers’ lives and therefore impact their abilities to cope with the 
sometimes extreme conditions of their dispersed housing. In the following chapter, the 
details of those accommodation conditions are explored, specifically within the context of 
COMPASS housing in Glasgow, the North East of England and West Yorkshire. 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Chapter 7: Experiences within the asylum housing ‘estate’!!
! The historical context of British immigration controls reveals an official objective of 
exclusion and disruption that aims to deter future migrants from entering the United 
Kingdom and incentivise the departure of those migrants already living within the country. 
In addition, the governmentality of securitisation has framed both the logic behind 
immigration control and the tactics employed in its implementation. These objectives have 
faced resistance, either in the form of dissenting voices within government or in judicial 
rulings and international criticism, but the policies ultimately adopted have largely 
restricted access to entry, benefits, housing, health care, freedom of movement and have 
introduced a host of other limitations and prohibitions. Asylum seekers are specific targets 
for these restrictions; their prohibition from seeking paid work, the limitations placed on the 
level of support they are able to receive, the prospect of detention and their expectation to 
accept accommodation on a no-choice basis demonstrate an entrenchment of tactics of 
insecurity. Explicit actions, such as the government’s ‘Go Home’ campaign, have 
presented asylum seekers and other migrants with a clear message - a message painted 
on the side of a lorry billboard: ‘Go home or face arrest’. (Sparrow, 2013). These 
strategies appear at odds with integration efforts and purported commitments to building 
social solidarity within communities. Instead, migrants are blamed for creating a ‘kind of 
discomfort and disjointedness’ if they have not mastered English or have not adopted the 
cultural norms of ‘British’ society (David Cameron quoted in Watt and Mulholland, 2011). 
The move toward the use of private security in the management of asylum seeker 
populations, whether in the areas of detention, transportation or housing can be seen as a 
method for controlling against cultural intrusion. By separating asylum seekers from 
communities and limiting their opportunities to integrate due to their placement outside of 
metropolitan or urban centres, they can be sequestered into deprived areas away from full 
view.!
! There are, perhaps, neoliberal logics at work beyond the marketisation of asylum 
services that include the protection of spaces of capital accumulation from the ‘discomfort’ 
of the realities of enforced destitution and abject poverty. It is a point Coleman (2004) 
makes in his analysis of social control tactics in urban centres, which place greater 
emphasis on isolating and excluding undesirable populations in order to ‘forge a 
distinctive image … to create an atmosphere of place and tradition that will act as a lure to 
both capital and people “of the right sort”’ (Harvey, 1990 quoted in Coleman, 2004: p. 24). 
Within the context of maintaining an attractiveness for capital investment, exclusionary 
practices are double-edged; they serve to disincentivise building social solidarity and 
feelings of home while concealing neoliberalism’s attendant inequalities. The shift to the 
use of Serco and G4S in the management of asylum dispersal achieved both of these 
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aims. Increasingly, asylum seekers were moved outside of city centres to deprived areas 
where community solidarity remained tenuous. In addition, they were further away from 
market centres and exposed to housing experiences that produced feelings of 
helplessness and psychological insecurity. The extent to which a full exposure to abject 
conditions was possible was limited by interjections from the asylum support community 
and official inquiries into the conduct of G4S, Serco and their subcontractors. However, in 
analysing asylum seekers’ observations of their living conditions within COMPASS 
housing and their community experiences, it is possible to draw some conclusions about 
the impact of the government’s current dispersal programme.!
! In this chapter, I refer to the work of Bigo (2002), Darling (2011) and Bagelman 
(2013) in developing an analysis of state-produced policies of ‘discomfort’. Each writer 
interprets ‘discomfort’ in different ways; Bagelman believes that we must move beyond 
descriptions of state tactics as producing ‘discomfort’ and instead consider how advocacy 
programmes like ‘City of Sanctuary’ create a politics of ‘ease’, which enable the state to 
keep asylum seekers in a state of limbo. I then address respondents’ interpretations of 
their housing experiences covering their observations on the conditions of their housing 
and their community experiences to determine the extent to which ‘discomfort’ is the end 
result if not an explicit aim of the current UK dispersal programme. This discussion is 
reinforced with reference to academic interpretations of the impact quality of housing has 
on mental and physical health. In Section 7.5, I address some of the other observed 
struggles asylum seekers reported as a result of being moved outside of urban centres, 
such as the impact such moves have had on children’s schooling, individuals’ ability to 
access food to meet dietary or cultural requirements and diminished availability of support 
networks.!!
7.1 Zones of discomfort!
!
! In his 2002 article, Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the 
Governmentality of Unease, Didier Bigo develops an image of state apparatuses that 
capitalise on conditions of risk and uncertainty to fuel a securitisation agenda and 
reinforce politicians’ mandate for maintaining the cultural sanctity of the national 
population. The reinforcement of the concept of the state as a single bodily unit is 
important within this process. Bigo states that ‘[s]ecuritisation of the immigrant as a risk is 
based on our conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity.’ The language 
of insecurity helps reproduce a manufactured need for security, because it is a ‘structure 
of unease in a “risk society” framed by neoliberal discourses in which freedom is always 
associated with its limits with danger and (in)security’ (Bigo, 2002: p. 65). In other words, 
the independence and freedom of citizens is contingent; freedom is not a guarantee and it 
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is the state’s role to manipulate this fear to make itself appear indispensable to its 
domestic population. The construction of the citizen - or those who belong - is dependent 
upon the identification of the ‘outsider’ and the fabrication of the ‘immigrant’ on the basis of 
different norms and values that run counter to those of the ‘national standard’ (ibid., p. 67). 
Bigo asserts that the securitisation of immigrants is made possible through the use of 
‘everyday technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than 
exceptional, through political struggles, and especially through institutional competition 
within the professional security field’ (ibid, p. 73).!
! Elements of Beck’s ‘risk society’, Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’ and Agamben’s ‘state 
of exception’ can be discerned in Bigo’s development of the securitised environment 
operating in the control of migrant populations. The uncertainty and ‘incompleteness’ of 
identity and the ‘in-built transience […] of power relationships’ (Bauman, 2001: pp. 138, 
140) marks the contemporary period and has culminated in cultural insecurity in the face 
of globalisation phenomena. The risks attendant in this ‘liquid’ environment are difficult to 
discern; their scale is beyond traditional (local) forms of measurement. This environment 
is marked by the confrontation between the local and the ‘outside’ or, in Beck’s estimation: 
‘The experience of global risks is an occurrence of abrupt and fully conscious 
confrontation with the apparently excluded other. Global risks tear down national 
boundaries and jumble together the native with the foreign’ (Beck, 2006: p. 331). !
! Bigo suggests that the conditions of ‘risk’ provide politicians with an exploitable 
tool; they are not burdened by the onus of having to produce evidence for the types of 
existential threats societies face. They are therefore able to make claims and institute 
policies without the same degree of scrutiny they may otherwise be subjected to; 
immigration is framed as a loosely defined threat ‘considered as invisible and 
diffuse’ (Bigo, 2002: p. 74, 78). The control of immigration then becomes a testing ground 
for new security strategies and methods of population control. !
! Bigo states: ‘For the managers of unease, immigration is immediately seen as a 
useful target for the use and experimentation of their technologies, and only secondarily 
as an aggression toward a boundary they need to protect’ (ibid., p. 77). In this model, the 
management of asylum seekers, is conducted within a hermetic arena where techniques 
of social control can be tested without significant oversight in a zone of exception. Indeed, 
the structure of responsibility within the COMPASS housing programme is a self-
contained loop with subcontractors answering to primary contractors and those 
contractors to the Home Office. In effect, the Home Office has full discretionary power 
over the conditions of asylum seekers’ housing. External scrutiny on the part of the Home 
Affairs Select Committee on Asylum or the National Audit Office’s report on the failings of 
COMPASS prove an exception to this rule, but it is notable that, to date, G4S and Serco 
have not faced financial penalties for their contractual noncompliance.!
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! Jonathan Darling (2011) expands on Bigo’s ‘politics of unease’ by linking it to 
Walters’ concept of ‘domopolitics’ - the framing of state governance through the model of 
the home - where security is used as a justification for maintaining the wellbeing of the 
domestic population (Walters, 2004 in Darling, 2011: p. 264). However, Darling’s 
employment of the term ‘unease’ differs from Bigo’s. While in Bigo’s writing, ‘unease’ 
refers to the ontological insecurity affecting whole populations, in the context of Darling’s 
article, ‘unease’ (or ‘discomfort’) is a political stratagem aimed at undermining asylum 
seekers’ sense of belonging within the United Kingdom. The ‘politics of discomfort’ is thus 
the ‘affective positioning of asylum seekers as those forever at the border’ (ibid., p. 264). 
Discomfort is, in Darling’s use of the term, a deliberate condition of asylum seekers’ 
accommodation experience. He writes: ‘[A]ccommodation itself [is] a form of governance 
through which modes of sovereign power are reinserted into a regime of governmentality 
to forge an affective politics of discomfort’ (ibid., p. 268). Finally, Darling describes 
‘discomfort’ as a tactic of separating legitimate citizens from illegitimate interlopers, stating 
that ‘[t]he discomfort and marginality of those seeking sanctuary in the UK might thus be 
seen as a product of governmental configurations of domopolitics, as discomfort is 
practiced as a marker of those not yet admitted to the nation’ (ibid., p. 269). !
! The use of discomfort as a tool implicates the Home Office and those responsible 
for carrying out its dispersal policies in actively promoting deliberate policies of unease 
rather than insecurity simply existing as an outcome of negligence or contractual 
mismanagement. The placement of asylum seekers in substandard housing or 
inhospitable neighbourhoods therefore serves a disembedding function; the ‘welcoming’ 
they may receive from local drop-ins or community organisations is challenged by their 
situation in unbearable conditions or hostile neighbourhoods.!
! Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I will address asylum seekers’ 
estimations of their living conditions within COMPASS accommodation and some of their 
views of the areas they have been dispersed to in an effort to further reflect the outcomes 
of active policies of discomfort. I will also address some of the struggles many 
respondents reported resulted from their placement far from support networks. However, I 
first address a third and final perspective on the ‘politics of unease’, which approaches the 
subject from a different angle and challenges some of the support apparatuses purporting 
to offer asylum seekers ‘sanctuary’ from interminable periods of unpredictability while 
reinforcing state practices of ‘discomfort’. In my estimation, Jennifer Bagelman’s (2013) 
‘politics of ease’ offers greater critical analyses of asylum seekers’ experience within 
dispersed housing and problematises the role of support organisations that are effectively 
co-opted into state control agendas through their attempts at ameliorating the negative 
effects of insecure and inhospitable living.!
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! Departing from Darling’s reinterpretation of ‘unease’, Bagelman returns to Bigo’s 
development of the ‘politics of unease’ before countering it with an altogether different 
perspective. She addresses the popularity of Bigo’s concept in framing asylum seekers’ 
immigration experiences, describing Bigo’s as a ‘politics of preemptive prediction, 
whereby […] control is normalised, and indeed rendered necessary, through the projection 
of migrants as would-be criminals’ (Bagelman, 2013: p. 50). From her interactions with 
asylum seekers living in Glasgow, Bagelman contends that what in fact marks asylum 
seekers’ experiences is a ‘power of unpredictability: where the future is suspended and 
deferred, continually unknown’ (original emphasis, ibid. p. 50). !
! Bagelman describes a play organised and performed by asylum seekers at the 
Govan Integration Network drop-in called ‘the Roundabout’, which portrayed asylum 
seekers’ experiences as an unending cycle between the drop-in centre and the Home 
Office punctuated by periods of ‘uncertain waiting’. For those Bagelman interviewed, the 
dependence on the drop-in is frustrating (ibid. p. 51). From this point, Bagelman launches 
her analysis of the practice of ‘sanctuary’ and the consequences of promising hope and a 
certain promise of an improved future. Bagelman acknowledges assessments of efforts, 
such as the City of Sanctuary movement, that present sanctuary in a positive light, as they 
can provide ‘connection and reprieve from an otherwise bureaucratic and marginalising 
experience of waiting’ (ibid. p. 54). She explains, however, that a secondary effect of 
sanctuary and, the one more impactful on asylum seekers’ experiences, is a process of 
‘easing, or domesticating, of the problems tied to waiting’; she describes the opportunities 
offered through the City of Sanctuary as ‘a myriad of internship positions’ (original 
emphasis, ibid. pp. 55-56). Bagelman cites an asylum seeker who described his 
participation in support activities as ‘just little hopes, little things that keep me busy, keep 
me from making some really different life’ (Jamal, 2012 quoted in Bagelman, 2013: p. 56). 
Bagelman concludes, stating: ‘While the City of Sanctuary may extend a particular kind of 
hope, in so doing it risks sustaining a state of deferral, troublingly rendering it more 
durable and paralysing’ (ibid. p. 58). Bagelman’s ‘politics of ease’ allows for greater critical 
reflection on the convoluted dynamics of social control and the extent to which discomfort 
is reinforced through methods of distraction.!
! Some responses from participants in the current research project contrasted with 
Bagelman’s assessment of ‘sanctuary’, particularly in the value they found in 
organisations that provided a function beyond simply welcoming outsiders. For instance, 
Jacqueline (Interview, 06 June 2013) described Solace, a Leeds-based charity offering 
psychological support for people suffering from prior trauma, as ‘very important to me’. 
She stated: ‘If I didn’t have [Solace] here, I would have already died. […] Solace helped 
me to be alive again’. Joseph, an asylum seeker living in West Yorkshire, stated that local 
organisations including PAFRAS, RETAS and Meeting Point, were all ‘really important, 
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because they are keeping me busy’. He also noted that he was learning and practicing 
valuable life skills by participating in each organisation (Interview, 13 August 2013). 
However, a minority of responses reflected precisely the type of dissatisfaction with 
waiting that Bagelman describes in her article. For instance, when I asked Benjamin about 
his views on the support networks available to him in the North East of England and the 
opportunities some of the organisations in the area offered in relation to volunteering or 
activities, he replied: ‘It’s not necessarily people’s desire to do volunteering work - they are 
forced to [volunteer] because of circumstance’ (Interview, 21 August 2013). Jabril resented 
the idea that he should consider volunteering when he was capable of performing paid 
work:!!
I do volunteering, but […] the problem about the volunteering… I’ve been 
doing volunteering - and I left it - because I feel angry. Sometimes I will leave 
my house, want to go to do something, for example go and volunteer, but 
when I just leave my house and walk a little distance, I will feel angry and 
come back, because why should I volunteer? If I’m strong enough to work as a 
volunteer, why wouldn’t I be strong enough to do a paid work? I don’t need 
their benefits. It’s silly for the Home Office to tell me that I have no right to take 
any paid employment, but I can do a voluntary job! I think if it is illegal for me 
to do any paid work, it must be illegal for me to do any kind of job, no matter if 
it is voluntary or whatever!!
(Jabril, Interview 22 August 2013)!!
While throughout the remainder of this chapter, I will be focusing primarily on examples of 
the ‘politics of unease’ as it is experienced by asylum seekers living in COMPASS 
housing, Bagelman’s perspective on the secondary consequences of Home Office 
practices also include the co-option of support structures ostensibly aimed at shielding 
asylum seekers from the worst effects of deprivation and isolation.!!
7.2 Quality of COMPASS accommodation !!
! For respondents living in COMPASS housing, a primary source of discomfort was 
the condition of the accommodation they were dispersed to. While many issues, such as 
community experience, distance from support networks and interaction with housing 
officers compounded the largely negative experiences asylum seekers reported, the one 
area in which there was significant consensus amongst respondents was their belief that 
they were placed in substandard housing. The physical and emotional impacts of asylum 
seekers’ experiences in distressing living environments became a central feature of the 
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interviews; the inaction of subcontractors in carrying out necessary repairs or ensuring 
living conditions were sanitary proved major sources of frustration. Here, the ‘politics of 
unease’ was at its most visual, and for many, its most impactful. While asylum seekers 
cited friendships, involvement in support networks and participation in volunteering 
opportunities as positive experiences counteracting some of the worst elements of life 
within the asylum system, the issue of housing remained a source of consistent grief. 
Given their disallowance from seeking paid work and the fact that drop-ins and other 
activities only occurred a few times a week, respondents reported that they spent a 
significant amount of time in their allocated properties; this was particularly the case for 
single adult males. Complaints about housing quality crossed all geographic boundaries, 
though respondents in Glasgow focused more heavily on the location of housing (i.e. its 
distance from the city centre) than on problems associated with the physical condition of 
the properties or the level of repair of facilities within them. However, general disrepair and 
health and safety concerns were considerable sources of angst for some respondents.!
! A number of codes were used to develop an overview of people’s experiences 
within COMPASS accommodation. To develop a broad representation of respondents’ 
views, I coded explicit statements of dissatisfaction with the COMPASS experience with 
the node, CMPSXP-. Likewise, positive views were given the node, CMPSXP+. Eleven 
respondents clearly defined their COMPASS experiences as negative, while only one 
stated that they viewed their experience as positive. There were no neutral views on the 
housing experience, given that satisfaction or dissatisfaction with COMPASS housing was 
also measured in a variety of other ways. For instance, six respondents explained that 
they believed the management of COMPASS lacked an awareness to cultural or religious 
sensitivities - a mandate of the COMPASS contract. Twelve asylum seekers described 
feelings of depression and fear linked to their housing experiences and four likened the 
current dispersal regime as prison-like. Fifteen respondents described complaints made 
about their living conditions and 16 stated that necessary repairs were needed within their 
properties. There was general parity across the three main regions of study. The one 
declaration of explicit satisfaction with COMPASS accommodation came from a 
respondent in Leeds.!
! Daya, a resident in an Orchard and Shipman property in Glasgow explained that 
when she was initially moved into the property following the transition to COMPASS, it 
was very clean and she considered it to be habitable. However, one night while she was 
sleeping, the ceiling over her bed collapsed. She exclaimed: ‘I had to jump on the bed and 
was screaming! I thought somebody had [broken] into the house.’ Daya called Orchard 
and Shipman the same night to report the incident and was told that no one was available 
at that hour and that someone would come by the property in the morning. According to 
Daya, no one arrived the next morning. She made continuous efforts to get somebody to 
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come to the house - ‘I phoned, and I phoned and I phoned, and nobody came.’ It was only 
after she went to the Unity Centre, an agency providing support for asylum seekers in 
Glasgow, that she felt that her situation was being adequately considered. One of the 
Unity representatives came by the house and took pictures and contacted Orchard and 
Shipman. When an Orchard and Shipman staff member arrived, Daya was told that it was 
a job for the landlord. She continued living in the house for two weeks and was moved to 
temporary accommodation for a further four weeks before she was able to return to the 
property. When she returned, it was evident that the workers who fixed the ceiling did not 
clean up after themselves and Daya stated that she cleaned everything and that all of her 
belongings had been covered in dust. In the entire time she had been at the property, 
there were no curtains installed and she reported that her bed was broken and a source of 
discomfort (Interview, 28 May 2013).!
! Another Orchard and Shipman resident, Falis, explained that a damaged door and 
broken intercom were the source of concern for Falis and her family (Interview, 12 June 
2013b). Shortly after moving into the property, at that time under the management of 
Ypeople, somebody set fire to her neighbours’ recycle bin. Falis’s front door and the 
intercom into the property were both damaged as a result of the fire. However, according 
to Falis, Ypeople refused to repair the damage, because they were in the process of 
handing over management responsibility to Orchard and Shipman; representatives 
described it as a ‘housing problem’ and one that Orchard and Shipman should take care 
of as the new providers. Falis stated that Orchard and Shipman believed it was still the 
responsibility of Ypeople, as the event happened before the transition to the new contract. 
Ultimately, Ypeople replaced her door, but Falis stated that the maintenance staff did not 
include the peephole, which she had in the previous fitting. Falis explained that this was 
distressing, because she relied on the peephole to determine who was coming to the door 
and is afraid to open it to anybody due to concerns for her children’s safety. As the lower 
level intercom was also broken and never fixed, Falis lost the ability to screen entrants 
using the intercom making her more reliant upon a peephole that was not replaced along 
with the door. She stated that it was very common for other residents to simply let people 
into the building without knowing who is entering. While the lack of peepholes and 
intercoms may at first appear trivial, to those asylum seekers fleeing violence, such 
security measures can affect their sense of safety in the accommodation they have been 
made to live in. For Falis, the lack of these facilities was particularly distressing due to her 
wariness of other residents and the questionable activities she witnessed them engaging 
in.!
! Other accommodation experiences in Glasgow were generally positive and 
contrasted favourably to experiences in initial accommodation and detention. Mubin, a 
woman in her mid-twenties with a young child spent time in Yarl’s Wood, which is 
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managed by Serco, and described the experience as ‘like prison’ (Interview, 19 July 
2013a).!!
They took me and put me into a detention centre for two weeks. It was a 
horrible experience being in detention. […] It’s like prison, I would say. You get 
a certain time, and certain food, and you get to go out at a certain time and 
that. It’s similar, but it’s more horrible than prison. Women [don’t] have any 
rights. However, they do come and check rooms. So, if I’m lying or sleeping or 
something - in some rooms, there may be two girls - they just come and open 
the door. Anybody. They have no respect for the women that are there.!
(Mubin, Interview, 19 July 2013a)!!
Mubin’s experience on Section 4 support after her time in detention was, in her view, 
chaotic. Following a fresh claim in 2012, she was unable to secure housing and spent two 
nights with her newborn baby sleeping on the street. Mubin attributed some of her 
struggle to the inexperience of Glasgow City Council (GCC) staff, stating that ‘they are not 
trained enough’ and ‘don’t take anything very seriously’. Mubin was told that she should 
seek accommodation in Lanarkshire, because she had once stayed with friends there. 
While she was still in the hospital following the birth of her child, a social worker called the 
Home Office on her behalf and Mubin explained that the Home Office was immediate in 
their response to secure her accommodation. She described the Home Office as having a 
‘kind of fair policy - they don’t accept anything over the phone - if you have paperwork - 
“this is the proof” - they will give [accommodation] to you straight away.’ Mubin’s 
observation of the Home Office’s ‘fairness’ is notable given her experiences within the 
asylum system, but it demonstrates her satisfaction in achieving a desirable result. When 
she was finally housed in Orchard and Shipman accommodation, Mubin found the 
housing provider to be ‘kind of nice. […] The housing provider [employee] took my stuff 
with me and took me in a taxi and dropped me off my house. And he gave me […] £120 in 
vouchers straightaway. The house is fine. Everything is fine. They come and check [on 
me] every four weeks’ (Interview, 19 July 2013a).!
! Jonathan, a male resident in the United Kingdom for nearly a decade who made 
an initial asylum claim within a couple years prior to our interview, described his Orchard 
and Shipman accommodation as liveable and did not have any major complaints about 
the quality of his housing, particularly as it related to his experience in a number of 
detention facilities. Jonathan described his experience living in Harmondsworth 
Immigration Removal Experience as ‘claustrophobic’ (Interview, 14 June 2013). ‘I am 
asking myself, “if a fire broke out now, what would I do if there was a fire? How do we all 
get rescued if we are all locked within these iron doors?” You can’t break them down.’ 
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Jonathan’s views of Harmondsworth mirrored those expressed in the HM Chief Inspector 
of Prisons’ report on the conditions within the facility. That report found that ‘[s]tandards of 
repair and cleanliness were variable across the establishment. Some accommodation was 
overcrowded’ (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2013: s15, p. 15). It also described the site as 
‘divided between austere prison-like accommodation and run-down accommodation. […] 
Double rooms were used to house three men but contained insufficient furniture’ (ibid., 
s17, p. 15). When Jonathan was released from Harmondsworth and arrived in Glasgow, 
he was moved into a Ypeople property before management switched over to Orchard and 
Shipman. In comparison to his experience in detention, Jonathan presented the conditions 
within his accommodation as adequate:!!
I wouldn’t say that [the property] was in the best condition, but it was in a 
workable [state], where everything was working. The sinks were clean, the 
kitchen was okay. The toilet was flushing properly. The showers and 
everything in the bathroom was working. There was no problem with that.!
(Jonathan, Interview, 14 June 2013)!!
! These comparatively positive descriptions of conditions within Orchard and 
Shipman properties belie the full extent of asylum seekers’ experiences within O&S 
accommodation. As I address in section 7.5, the relative comfort of some O&S facilities 
are coupled with great geographical distance from support and social networks, which 
respondents described as distressing. Jonathan and Mubin lived in relatively close 
proximity to Glasgow city centre and were able to access many of the same services and 
facilities they had available to them prior to the O&S takeover. Others that were moved 
further afield found the distance to be difficult to cope with. Also, the physical condition of 
a property was not always the basis for residents’ interpretation of their housing 
experience. For instance, Sahla (Interview, 28 May 2013c) described her O&S property as 
‘very clean, very nice’, particularly as it compared to the accommodation experience she 
had in an Angel Group property, which she stated was ‘very dirty’ and ‘unhygienic’. 
However, Sahla also stated that the surrounding environment at her current O&S property 
was ‘not very nice’. She described it as ‘full of junkies’, indicating that there was a 
significant amount of illicit drug use in the area. The strains of being housed at a distance 
were likely to affect more people living in Glasgow following the interviews due to ongoing 
demolitions and greater pressure for Orchard and Shipman to move people out of 
accommodation managed by Angel Group. A local asylum project organiser explained that 
the main reasons asylum seekers were being moved were because of the demolition of 
the Red Road flats and the move away from Angel housing (Interview, 17 May 2013). 
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Shortages in staffing at Orchard and Shipman, she explained, were resulting in increased 
wait times for home repairs and the replacement of furnishings.!
! In preparation for our interview (18 May 2013), Margaret Sweeney, a volunteer 
with the Govan and Craigton Integration Network and founder of Glasgow Night Shelter, 
asked a number of asylum seekers she worked with to comment on their Orchard and 
Housing experience so she could relay that information on to me. One out of seven of 
those respondents had ‘no complaints’. Three respondents stated that problems with 
essential facilities including a heater, gas cooker and washing machine went unresolved 
for weeks. In one case, a respondent had waited six months for a repair despite repeated 
phone calls and in-person complaints to Orchard and Shipman. Two women cited 
overcrowding as particularly distressing, as both shared accommodation with another 
woman and her children; this led to constant arguments and feuds between children over 
toys and other items. These kinds of conditions have led to sustained discomfort for many 
living in Orchard and Shipman properties and with the difficulties in persuading staff to 
acknowledge such issues in a timely fashion has led to greater insecurity for residents. 
During a meeting with the recently established Scottish Asylum Seekers Residents 
Association (SASRA) held on 17 May 2013 at the Unite union’s main offices in Glasgow, 
attendees discussed the need to develop an organised reporting scheme for asylum 
seekers to discuss their housing experiences for the purposes of seeking action on a 
number of common grievances. As recently as February 2015, a non-profit company, 
Community InfoSource, teamed with SASRA to develop the Asylum Seeker Housing 
Project (ASHP). This project, which is run by volunteer asylum seekers, has stated aims of 
assisting asylum seekers to report common housing problems and identifying ‘gaps in 
service provision’ (ASHP information leaflet, 2015). Given that the transition to COMPASS 
housing completed in late 2013, the current need for an organisation such as ASHP 
suggests that discomfort or discontent with the living conditions within Orchard and 
Shipman properties remains for destitute asylum seekers housed in Glasgow.!
! In responses to questions about their housing experience, asylum seekers living in 
West Yorkshire and the North East of England cited their living conditions to be a 
significant source of discomfort. Asylum seekers living in West Yorkshire were housed by 
Cascade Homes Group Limited, a Leeds-based accommodation provider. In the North 
East of England, respondents were housed by Jomast. Asylum service workers described 
these companies in largely negative terms. For instance, Emma Crossley, the project 
manager at Meeting Point in Leeds, described the conditions within CASCADE properties 
to be unsuitable and ‘extremely poor’ for a variety of reasons:!!
The contract was far too far too big for [Cascade]. The houses that they did 
have were obviously the cheapest, because they were the worst. It’s very clear 
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that they don’t have the manpower for this contract. […] [Housing conditions] 
are extremely poor, extremely poor accommodation either in unsuitable areas 
that are, you know, very white and working class. Therefore, racism and abuse 
is a lot higher. Unsuitable for the people being housed there, so perhaps 
children being on a main road, or steep drops or steep steps without gates. It’s 
sort of not thought through about who is going into each property. Sometimes, 
they clump people together, so you’ll have an entire street filled with NASS 
accommodation and that can create problems as well, and can create 
resentment from the local population. But the conditions in [the properties] - 
they’re damp, they’re drafty, bedbugs - you know, dirty. When people are 
moving in - pests - [there are] a lot of pest control issues even when children 
are concerned.!
(Crossley, Interview, 22 July 2013)! !
! Similarly, asylum support workers in the North East of England described Jomast 
accommodation to be inappropriate and cited poor housing conditions as a chief 
complaint amongst asylum seekers accessing their services. Arthur Carr, an organiser of 
the Sunderland branch of the North of England Refugee Service (NERS) believed that this 
was in part due to the fact that Jomast was looking to cut costs in order to make a profit in 
the COMPASS contract. As Jomast was a provider throughout the transition period and 
had provided asylum housing before as part of the previous housing contract with the 
Home Office, many asylum seekers remained within the same properties, but according to 
Carr, the ‘level of maintenance’ had worsened:!!
It’s the level of maintenance that raises my concern. Quite a lot of the 
properties are the same. Therefore, you can’t say that the housing has 
deteriorated, but by the same token, the upkeep of the properties is 
deteriorating. Therefore, the property itself is deteriorating. In that respect, it’s 
worse, obviously. There’s also, as always, the cost element. Properties that 
[Jomast] was willing to pay for before, they are no longer willing to pay for. So, 
although I don’t have any figures or any way of actually comparing [conditions 
before and after the COMPASS transition], I would suspect properties asylum 
seekers are getting now are not as good as the ones they were getting before.!
(Carr, Interview, 30 January 2013)!!
Carr explained that this change was perhaps most apparent in Tees Valley, where Jomast 
is based and where the company ‘owns the most properties’. He stated that G4S provided 
money for Jomast to buy properties in the Sunderland area, but in his view the amount 
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was insufficient for buying a ‘decent home’. For Carr, the focus on cost-savings within the 
COMPASS contract had resulted in a diminished service for dispersed asylum seekers. 
The results of these changing conditions are reflected in responses by asylum seekers 
living within Jomast properties in the North East of England.!
! For Benjamin, a single male living in Sunderland, broken appliances and 
inadequate facilities contributed to added stress during his asylum experience (Interview, 
21 August 2013a). Benjamin lived in a shared house in which he was the only male, a fact 
he suggested may have been inappropriate in itself. A broken washing machine took 
‘months’ to be repaired and Benjamin resorted to washing his clothes in a sink, which he 
described as ‘too small to do the washing’. He said that Jomast did not provide him with 
any bedding or cutlery; the cupboards in the kitchen were falling apart. There was no 
dining table upon which to eat meals and Benjamin stated that old paint was peeling off 
the walls in the bathroom, which ‘fell on top of [residents]’ while they bathed. Benjamin 
was visibly fatigued in recounting these conditions and stated: ‘Once they put you in the 
house, that’s it. You get old with the house. I never saw Jomast anymore’ (Interview, 21 
August 2013a). !
! Alexander, another Jomast resident, described his reaction upon arriving at his 
accommodation in Sunderland: ‘They dumped me in a rubbish house. It wasn’t a house - 
it was garbage’ (Interview, 21 August 2013b). Alexander said that he used nearly the 
entire £90 he was allotted in an initial support payment on cleaning the property. The room 
was ‘so stinky’, he exclaimed, ‘I couldn’t breathe’. Alexander stated that he cleaned the 
house so thoroughly that a Jomast employee commented on how improved it was and 
promised to reimburse Alexander for the money he spent on cleaning materials. According 
to Alexander, he never received reimbursement.!
! Schedule 2 of the COMPASS contract requires service providers to ‘provide safe, 
habitable, fit for purpose and correctly equipped accommodation’ (Home Office, 2012c: 
s2.1.1, p. 14). In addition, providers are required to ‘ensure that accommodation is 
maintained and serviced to the required standards’ (ibid., s2.1.3, p. 14). These accounts 
of conditions within COMPASS housing in the North East of England raise questions 
about contractors’ compliance with Home Office requirements. In its January 2014 report 
on the state of the COMPASS contracts, the National Audit Office stated that during the 
transition, ‘Serco and G4S took on housing stock without inspecting it, and subsequently 
found that many of the properties they had taken on did not meet the contractual quality 
standards’ (NAO, 2014: s2.16, p. 22). Evidence of each firms’ negligence in this area is 
further demonstrated in the views of asylum seekers living in West Yorkshire, where 
Cascade Homes was contracted to procure and manage asylum accommodation. When 
Joseph arrived at his Cascade house, it was in a state of disrepair (Interview, 13 August 
2013). Old carpet had been removed without being replaced and he described one room 
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in particular as ‘very dirty - very bad’. The shower was broken when he moved in and in 
the nine months between Joseph’s entry into the property and the date our interview, the 
shower had not been repaired. During that time, Cascade inspected the property two 
times and on both occasions assured Joseph that the shower would be repaired. Joseph’s 
bed was broken upon arrival. He explained that this made it extremely difficult to sleep: 
‘Every time, I [woke] up in pain.’ Joseph used the little money allocated to him in his Home 
Office support stipend to buy himself a new bed and mattress.!
! Beyond the discomfort associated with dilapidated homes and broken or 
nonexistent furnishings, building architecture and other features of the home led to 
distressing outcomes for some respondents. For instance, in describing her property, 
Olufemi cited barred windows and security gates as sources of concern for her welfare 
and reminded her of prison-like conditions. She stated:!!
The property - I was concerned, because the windows - you [could not] 
properly open [them]. There was a chain, so when you opened it, you could 
only open it a certain extent. So I asked [Cascade staff]: ‘Why do you have this 
chain?’ They didn’t give me a good answer. They said: ‘Oh, you know, it’s just 
there.’ It’s because they didn’t want to tell me that it is a rough area! That’s 
why it’s got a chain. And there were like gates, iron gates, to the entrance. So, 
that got me worried. So that’s why I thought: ‘G4S - they are a prison 
company.’ So, it felt like I was in prison. And there were like [bars] on the 
windows as well. Those chains got me worried, like, if there was a fire in the 
house, for example […]. Even the environmental [officer], when they came, 
they were like: ‘This is not right. This is a health hazard. Why do you have 
chains on the window you can’t even open?’ It’s all the windows. Not just one.!
(Interview, 22 August 2013)!!
For Olufemi, the similarities between prison and the securitised features of her Cascade 
property signified the housing provider’s lack of consideration for her past experiences 
and exposed her to abuse and a sensation of incarceration. Given the racist discrimination 
and violence she also described, which was instigated by other minority groups living in 
the same area, Olufemi felt insecure and vulnerable: ‘That really got me worried, 
especially where I’m coming from and what has happened to me before. So I got really, 
really scared.’ Beyond concerns for her safety, Olufemi described other conditions of the 
house, which she referred to as ‘disgusting’:!!
The house was damp as well, which is not good for human health - living with 
a baby in a really damp house. And there were cockroaches, slugs, rats. There 
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were heaps of rubbish at the back, where it’s supposed to be like the garden 
area. […] I complained and complained and complained. All they said to me 
was that they were going to get the pest control guy to come and fumigate the 
house. […] The pest control guy came and he just put, like, boxes out. He 
said: ‘Those boxes will trap the cockroaches.’ I said: ‘I’m talking about 
thousands of cockroaches in this house!’ He said: ‘Oh, if you have any 
problems, speak to Cascade.’!
(ibid.)!!
Olufemi stated that acknowledgement of her living conditions and action in response to 
her complaints were contingent upon the involvement of a third party outside of 
COMPASS partners; in her case it was a health officer from the local authority:!!
When the City Council got involved, and the environmental health [officer] that 
came there and saw it with their own eyes, they said: ‘It’s not fit for human 
beings to live in this sort of property.’ It was a ‘Category 1 Hazard’, which is not 
fit for human beings. […] My baby had just started crawling and wanted to be 
on the floor, but I was too scared to leave him on the floor because of the 
cockroaches and slugs. […] When I complained, the staff from G4S came and 
said: ‘Even if your baby eats slugs, it’s not going to harm him.’ He thought he 
could get away with that because I am an asylum seeker. If I was English, he 
wouldn’t say that to me.!
(ibid.)!!
! Others living in COMPASS housing cited similar health concerns upon moving into 
their dispersed accommodation. Khalil, an asylum seeker living in Middlesbrough 
described the unhygienic conditions of his accommodation when he moved in, stating that 
the refrigerator contained, mouldy, ‘nasty’ food. He also found a ‘little mouse’, which he 
tried to trap but was unsuccessful (Interview, 26 June 2013b). Khalil explained that he did 
not have a frying pan, just a single sauce pan for the three residents living in the house. 
He noted that having only a single pan was difficult, due to the residents having different 
religious requirements:!!
We all got different people from different religions. They don’t eat the meat that 
I eat, because my meat is not halal and I eat pork. Them, they won’t eat pork. 
So, they prefer to have their own utensils.!
(Khalil, Interview, 26 June 2013b)!!
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On his first night in the house, Khalil explained that he was ‘scared’ as a freight train 
travelled past his window, which opened about thirty metres from the railway tracks: ‘The 
merchandise train run [after 10PM]. All the house was shaking. I thought it was the end of 
the world! [laughs]’ (ibid.). Jacqueline explained that her home in Leeds was infested with 
mice and said that the day before our interview, she and her housemate had ‘killed four’ 
mice that they found inside the house (Interview, 06 September 2013b). The lack of 
appropriate cleaning materials, such as vacuum cleaners, which are not provided under 
the conditions of the COMPASS contract, was a source of distress and discomfort for 
some. Tariq (Interview, 07 July 2013) explained that as a result of not being able to 
properly clean his property, he suffered from dust allergies that led to further ‘difficulties’. 
Of Cascade’s lack of acknowledgement of his health concerns, Tariq said that asylum 
seekers are ‘seen as less than human, […] they are just numbers’. When Fimi complained 
to her housing provider about the lack of a hoover, she states that she was told: ‘Buy one 
yourself’ (Interview, 12 June 2013a). These sorts of accounts suggest an antagonistic 
relationship between housing providers and residents within the COMPASS estate - a 
relationship that, for some, resulted in a greater sense of anxiety and diminished self-
worth.!!
7.3 The biopolitics of staff/resident relations!!
! Asylum seekers’ exposure to unhygienic environments, uncomfortable conditions 
and frequent placement in unwelcoming areas can be viewed as a perpetuation of a 
‘politics of discomfort’ either through negligence or through a deliberate attempt to 
incentivise their departure. Claims that a ‘politics of discomfort’ is a deliberate strategy by 
the state or its business partners may be difficult to validate, particularly as market-driven 
incentives toward cost-savings may equally impact asylum seekers’ living conditions. 
However, evidence of hostile treatment by housing providers’ agents may reflect a ‘politics 
of discomfort’ in practice if not necessarily through clear institutional intent. Indeed, 
maintaining a distinction between practice and intent - even if one does not exist - serves 
the state in presenting itself as hospitable while simultaneously allowing for the ill 
treatment of unwanted populations. In its role as the ‘protector’ of society, adherence to 
humanitarian objectives are at times secondary to securitisation aims. As Dunne and 
Wheeler (2004) address in their review of security and human rights practice, ‘national 
security and humanitarianism uneasily coexist in practice’ (Dunne and Wheeler, 2004: p. 
10). The state can be both humanitarian and exclusionary based on a divide between 
policy and practice, though in the relation to asylum and immigration control, this divide is 
perhaps not very pronounced. Further, to adopt a Foucauldian perspective is to eschew 
the image of the state as a leviathan with its own will and purpose. The conflict between 
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collective security and attention to humanitarian concerns is then easier to reconcile when 
power is viewed not only as a repressive mechanism, but as an expression of networks 
and relationships that ‘passes through individuals’ (Foucault, 2004: p. 29). !
! The ‘tactics of domination’ (ibid., p. 34) do not need to be delineated through 
stated aims of exclusion or repression; they can be expressed through the interaction 
between individuals. It is possible for Home Office to declare within the COMPASS 
contracts that ‘[s]taff (including volunteers and sub-contractor agents) shall be adequately 
trained in customer care, cultural awareness and conduct themselves in a polite, sensitive 
and orderly manner’ Home Office, 2012c: s1.2.3.4, p. 7), while leaving the oversight of 
housing employees to the internal review mechanisms of the agencies themselves: ‘The 
Provider shall […] [m]anage and administer the quality and level of service delivery and its 
own performance relating to the delivery of all services’ (ibid., s1.2.4, p. 7). Here, the 
‘tactic’ of domination is left to the discretion of the organisations tasked with carrying out 
the Home Office’s asylum housing programme. While oversight exists, and indeed the 
ultimate removal of United Property Management (UPM) in 2012 as a subcontractor to 
G4S was due in part to its failure to adhere to contractual requirements - the firm placed a 
mother and newborn daughter in a flat the Home Office deemed unsuitable ‘for mothers 
and babies’ - external, public pressure from media outlets and the South Yorkshire 
Migration and Asylum Group (SYMAAG) moved G4S to action (Salsbury, 2012). If 
biopower is understood as emergent through individual interaction, then a useful 
continuing point is to address the relationships between asylum seekers and those they 
were likely to be in direct contact with: the employees of firms subcontracted to G4S and 
Serco. In these interactions, the ‘politics of discomfort’ is perhaps better described as a 
‘politics of disregard’, as the most common complaint amongst respondents was that 
housing staff made empty promises in relation to repair tasks and did not initiate repairs in 
a timely fashion if at all. Aside from a few exceptions, complaints made to the primary 
contractors, G4S and Serco, went unanswered or responsibility was circulated between 
the contractor and subcontractor often with no practical result. In addition, some 
respondents felt that they were being patronised or treated dismissively.!
! It is worth noting that out of 26 interviews with asylum seekers living in dispersed 
properties, there were five examples of positive interactions between asylum seekers and 
staff working with subcontractors on the COMPASS project; these five were all living in 
Orchard and Shipman accommodation in Glasgow. I will address a few of these initially 
before moving on to the more dominant theme of discontent expressed by all respondents 
living in the North East of England and West Yorkshire and the remaining three living in 
Glasgow. One possible explanation for the variation in experience for residents in 
Glasgow is that many Ypeople employees transferred to Orchard and Shipman at the start 
of the COMPASS contract. Generally, if an asylum seeker had a positive experience with 
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a member of Ypeople staff and that particular staff member remained the resident’s 
primary contact at Orchard and Shipman, the relationship remained positive. Here, I am 
defining ‘positive’ as an experience that an interview respondent used descriptors such as 
‘good’ or ‘nice’ in their accounts of agency staff members’ attitudes or approaches. 
Commonalities for the five asylum seekers reporting a positive experience with Orchard 
and Shipman employees included remarks on staff members’ friendliness and expediency 
in resolving housing issues. For instance, Lucy (Interview, 19 July 2013) stated that she 
had a ‘good relationship’ with the O&S staff member assigned to her. She referred to a 
time when the cooker was not functioning: ‘One time, the cooker wasn’t working and my 
housemate called. [O&S staff] told when they were coming and they [quickly] changed it’. 
She cited another instance when a door handle had broken. She notified Orchard and 
Shipman and it was fixed within days. Mary (Interview, 12 June 2013) explained that O&S 
staff members were ‘nice’, particularly compared to Ypeople employees, which she 
described could sometimes be ‘harsh’. Sahla (Interview, 28 May 2013) spoke positively of 
O&S employees’ quickness in responding to repair requests, though she added that the 
vacuum cleaner was not functioning and no one on the O&S helpline had responded to 
any of her phone calls for over a week. For Jonathan, visits from O&S staff were helpful 
and informative:!!
I never felt like I had a bad experience with [Orchard and Shipman staff]. First 
of all, I knew they had a right to come and check. […] Their coming - I had no 
problem with it, because they would come to check on you as well. […] For 
them coming, if I needed something - although they were not part of the Home 
Office - they would explain that: ‘Okay, we don’t deal with this. I would advise 
you to do this or do that.’ If you asked them. And they were kind of a go-
between in a situation where you wanted to know anything. So, yeah, I never 
had a problem at all with them.!
(Jonathan, Interview, 14 June 2013)!!
! While these types of observations reflected respondents’ beliefs that their 
interaction with staff was positive on the whole, satisfaction with the conduct of O&S staff 
did not necessarily relate to full levels of satisfaction with the allocated property. The 
broader trend amongst the remaining 21 respondents were feelings of dissatisfaction with 
subcontractors’ response times, frustration with insincere and unfulfilled promises of repair 
action and disappointment with rude comments directed at residents.!
! In the North East of England, where all respondents had experienced living within 
Jomast accommodation, relationships between residents and staff members were 
markedly strained. Often asylum seekers expressed frustration about the fact that repairs 
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and property maintenance occurred rarely if at all; their complaints to Jomast or G4S 
frequently went unanswered. Mahmoud described his decision to go straight to the 
Refugee Council, as he was not able to get a response from Jomast following his 
complaints of not having any cooking utensils:!!
[I] go to the Refugee Council [to complain]. I haven’t [got materials] for 
cooking. I have been three or four times there with my friend, in Refugee 
Council. [Refugee Council staff] faxed to Jomast. […] No answer. No coming. 
Jomast house people. Just, that’s it. Paid. G4S pay Jomast for what? Really!!
(Mahmoud, Interview, 06 June 2013)!!
Mahmoud explained that on a separate occasion, he attempted to make a complaint 
about the discomfort he was experiencing sleeping with a thin duvet in cold weather with 
inadequate heating. His friend took a picture of the thermostat as evidence of the cold 
temperatures within the house, which they sent to Jomast. When Mahmoud received no 
reply, he again went to the Refugee Council. According to Mahmoud, despite the Refugee 
Council’s numerous attempts to contact Jomast, they received no response. Hassan, 
living in Middlesbrough, described a similar experience with Jomast. In the few visits 
Jomast employees made to his residence, Hassan stated that they seemed to have no 
time to hear his concerns about the property:!!
They don’t come regularly. I am in this house since January - almost six 
months. Nobody came as a regular check. They are incompetent, they are 
irresponsible, they are careless. [The staff] is not good [to me]. Most of the 
people, when they come, they are in such a hurry, they don’t want to talk.!
(Hassan, Interview, 26 June 2013a)!!
In Benjamin’s experience with Jomast in Sunderland, he found that no action was ever 
taken on matters that he felt impaired his well-being. During a visit by a Jomast employee, 
Benjamin pointed out that the cooker was not working. The response, he said, was one of 
insincere placation: ‘They [wrote] it down, but no action would be taken’ (Interview, 21 
August 2013).!
! Respondents’ estimations of Cascade, the primary subcontractor to G4S in the 
region prior to G4S’s management takeover, described similar scenarios when attempting 
to make complaints about the conditions of their housing. Tariq, a middle-aged asylum 
seeker living in a small room at the top of a terraced house, felt overlooked and ignored by 
Cascade staff, stating that ‘they have been in this property twice in the last [year]. That’s it. 
[…] If we complain about something that we need, sometimes they promise, and 
 204
sometimes they say that “we are not supposed to provide that”’ (Interview, 07 September 
2013). Tariq continued, saying that he made complaints directly to G4S by telephone and 
fax. He stated:!!
This has not been effective. This can only be effective with the involvement of 
a third party. Whenever there is a request or complaint through any advocacy 
organisation like Refugee Council or Solace or other, you can say, 
organisations - that is given some attention, otherwise not.!
(ibid.)!!
Respondents’ issues with housing staff were not limited to the inaction of employees, but 
also included incidents of verbal and emotional abuse. Gabrielle, an asylum seeker in her 
30s who had previously in Leeds, explained that she had been notified that she would be 
moved into a house in Bradford, which was confirmed by G4S, but on the day that she 
was due to be transferred, the Cascade employee said that she would be moved to a 
different property in Leeds:!!
They said: ‘Oh, no, no, no. You have a different address.’ We are taking you to 
Leeds. They showed me the list. Now the address was Leeds. I said: ‘No. I’m 
not going to Leeds. My address is Bradford.’ I had it - I had the letter with me. 
But who am I going to complain to? I don’t know anybody in G4S, I don’t know 
anyone in Cascade. But they just said I don’t even have a choice. A [female 
employee] even said that ‘I’m a destitute’, so I didn’t want to argue with her, 
and I became very stressed, because I didn’t even know where they were 
taking me.!
(Gabrielle, Interview, 06 September 2013)!!
General discontent or unease about staff treatment of residents dominated respondents’ 
narratives. A total of 21 interviewees described their experience with staff as negative. 
This theme was coded with the node RELSTAF-. Six respondents spoke of their 
experience with COMPASS staff - specifically employees of subcontractors - in positive 
terms (RELSTAF+); five of those respondents lived in Orchard and Shipman properties in 
Glasgow. One possible explanation for this, was that Orchard and Shipman took on some 
of the employees that had worked for Ypeople, the charity that had previously been 
responsible for accommodating dispersed asylum seekers; interviewees held generally 
positive views of their interaction with Ypeople staff members. Sixty per cent of 
respondents reported that they felt that their complaints or repair requests went ignored or 
unacknowledged (NONRESPONSIVE) and six respondents stated that housing 
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employees had arrived at their home unannounced. The disharmony associated with 
asylum seekers’ relationships with COMPASS staff underscores the disregard with which 
some residents are treated. Through either deliberate tactics of unease or as a secondary 
effect of an increasingly marketised form of service provision, the COMPASS programme 
reveals some of the consequences of shifting focus from welfare to profit.!!
7.4 Experiences of discrimination!!
! Another element of the COMPASS housing experience some respondents found 
troubling was the racial tensions in dispersal areas. Respondents cited examples of racial 
and cultural discrimination from British residents in the community and residents from 
other cultural backgrounds. Incidents included street confrontations or verbal abuse 
directed at the asylum seeker, often addressing the individual’s race or cultural heritage. 
In reproducing conditions of discomfort and unease, these experiences undermined 
asylum seekers’ feelings of welcoming and safety in the areas they were dispersed to on a 
no-choice basis. Liz Fekete (2001) suggests that racism is a feature of the British asylum 
policy, stating that a form of ‘xeno-racism became fully incorporated’ in asylum law 
following New Labour’s entry into power in 1998 (Fekete, 2001: p. 24). What marks the 
current period as different than previous eras, Fekete argues, is that ‘the national state is 
not [state racism’s] primary originator; rather, state racism is derived from a globalised 
racism which is designed to supranational bodies, incorporated into EU programmes and 
transmitted to the member states for inclusion in their domestic asylum and immigration 
laws’ (ibid., p. 29). This racism is manifest in the manner in which asylum populations are 
managed through the use of detention, the earlier issuance of vouchers and through 
dispersal policies; this xeno-racism is ‘legitimis[ed] even further [through] its populist and 
inflammatory expression in the press’ (ibid., p. 38).!
! In asylum seekers’ responses about their community experiences, it was more 
common for them to describe the poor conditions in their dispersal area and their 
perceptions of some of the people that loitered around buildings or on streets. On three 
occasions, respondents mentioned that drug use was a problem in their region. While 
there were reports of some racial discrimination in all three dispersal areas, these were 
largely described as one-off encounters and respondents seemed compelled to stress that 
many within the community were ‘nice’ or welcoming. In an interview in the North East of 
England, a respondent stated that she felt that her region was represented poorly in the 
media; she had always felt welcomed in the community. Speaking from her experience 
living in Glasgow, Lucy (Interview, 19 July 2013b) stated succinctly: ‘I’ve never 
experienced discrimination in Glasgow’. These sorts of descriptions counter other reports 
about asylum seekers’ treatment in dispersal areas, particularly in those regions, like 
Glasgow, which have received negative media attention about racially-motivated violence 
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in the past. However, there were a few reports of direct discrimination experienced 
elsewhere. In our interview, Benjamin (Interview, 21 August 2013) explained that 
discrimination was not always latent in Sunderland; it occasionally became very overt. He 
said: ‘Some people spit on the ground at us. This is not normal. They give you a 
message.’ !!
7.5 Life on the periphery: Experiences living outside support!!
! Following the transition to the COMPASS housing programme, the movement of 
asylum seekers to cheaper properties on the periphery of urban areas became more 
routine. It was a phenomenon support agency staff confirmed when describing the 
differences in the accommodation environments before and after G4S and Serco took 
over the asylum housing contracts. In Glasgow, newly arrived asylum seekers and those 
being transferred out of former Ypeople properties and buildings due for demolition were 
increasingly being moved to Easterhouse, an area outside of the city centre that had not 
developed a support infrastructure and was considered to be very isolating for residents. 
In addition, when an asylum seeker needed to sign with the Home Office - a routine 
requirement to ensure their compliance with immigration rules - they often had to travel 
using the limited income allocated to them; in the case of individual asylum seekers on 
Section 4 support, this amounted to a total of £36 per week. According to respondents, the 
Home Office institutes a three-mile rule, which means that they will fund travel to and from 
the Home Office building for the purpose of an asylum seeker’s signing if that distance is 
greater than three miles; apparently, this was strictly enforced and those living just inside 
the three-mile radius were ineligible for this financial assistance. Any travel to and from the 
city centre for other needs, including accessing GPs or one of the city’s integration 
networks for support and assistance, also required asylum seekers to dip into this small 
stipend of money, which was intended for food and other necessities. The integration 
networks often attempted to offer travel expenses where possible, but moves to the 
periphery of Glasgow introduced further hardship and feelings of isolation for asylum 
seekers dispersed to the area. Cassandra, a resident of Orchard and Shipman in Glasgow 
described the effort involved in accessing culturally specific foods. She explained that she 
had to walk 25 minutes to the bus stop. When the bus arrived, she remained on it for 45 
minutes before transferring to a train for a further 10 minutes (Cassandra, Interview, 13 
June 2013). This, she explained, made it very difficult to perform regular shopping trips. 
Cassandra’s experience was shared by others as well; respondents’ comments on the 
distance of their accommodation were coded using the node (HSNGDIST). In total, 58 per 
cent of respondents (15) explained that their lives were negatively impacted by the 
distance they had to travel from their housing to places of essential need, such as a 
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market where their Azure card was accepted or to the Home Office for signing. Only three 
respondents - one in Glasgow and two in the North East of England - confirmed that their 
housing was adequately situated for their needs.!
! As asylum seekers are moved further from city centres and established support 
networks to areas where inexpensive housing is more abundant, they are distanced from 
access to other necessities, such as dietary requirements as part of cultural practice or 
religious faith. Sixteen respondents cited a lack of easy access to stores that catered to a 
particular dietary need as a distressing feature of their COMPASS housing experiences. 
These responses were evenly distributed across all areas of study with five asylum 
seekers in Glasgow, five in West Yorkshire and six in the North East of England stating 
that travel to and from such stores was taxing physically and difficult given monetary 
constraints. This was compounded by the fact that many stores do not accept an Azure 
card, the cashless payment method given to asylum seekers on Section 4 support. 
Whether the decision to house asylum seekers further afield is based solely on economic 
imperatives or a deeper desire to create a ‘hostile environment’ (Home Secretary Theresa 
May quoted in Travis, 2013) for asylum claimants, the result reveals that little 
consideration is given toward asylum seekers’ religious and cultural needs.!
! Asylum seekers’ destitution remains a feature of the state’s current asylum regime. 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007) condemned the government’s deliberate 
attempts to ensure asylum seekers felt unsettled through an imposition of financial 
insecurity (pp. 40-42). Dwyer and Brown (2005) describe destitution amongst asylum 
seekers as a ‘real, if largely hidden, problem’ (p. 376). The support funds asylum seekers 
receive rests at 70 per cent of typical income support values, and further restrictions on 
asylum support are likely under new Home Office plans to reduce payments to asylum 
seekers with children by up to 30 per cent (Travis, 2015). For those awaiting decisions, 
subsistence is a relative luxury; for those who have exhausted their appeals, it is a 
tenuous hope. In interviews with those in COMPASS housing, respondents regularly 
brought up the hardships of being disallowed from paid work and having to rely on a very 
small sum to see them through each week. Fourteen interviewees explained that the cost 
of everyday living was prohibitive with the small amount of income they were receiving in 
Home Office support payments.!
! For many asylum seekers receiving Section 4 support due to receiving a negative 
decision on an asylum claim, their dependence on the Home Office-issued ‘Azure’ card 
represented a particular hardship. Current support payments amount to about £35 per 
week for individual asylum seekers. These are provided on an Azure card, which is limited 
to use in ‘specific shops to buy essential food and toiletries’ (Mullin, 2015). Two 
respondents living in Glasgow suggested that using the card was stigmatising, because 
store employees would immediately gauge that the customer was an asylum seeker. 
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Another common complaint about the Azure card was that it was limited to use on specific 
items and in certain stores. Things like mobile phone top-ups were not covered by the 
card, and a it was the only means of support for destitute asylum seekers on Section 4 
support, they found this very limiting. The second issue - limited access to specific shops - 
was exacerbated by the distances required to access stores pre-approved with the Home 
Office to accept them. One respondent explained that while one branch of Sainsbury’s 
may accept the Azure card, another may not. Another explained that employees who were 
unaware of their store policies would sometimes reject the card even if that establishment 
was listed as a partner on the Azure card scheme. Speaking of the difficulties in having to 
use the Azure card in Leeds, Jabril explained:!!
The problem is: we are close to normal shops. The problem is, we are given 
cards, Azure cards. So, those Azure cards - they’re not cash. You can use it for 
shopping. Where you can use it for shopping is far away from our house. And the 
funniest thing is, we are not allowed to buy certain stuff or get cash from these 
cards. So, how do you do to leave the house to the city centre, which is about half 
an hour bus drive. Get on the bus to go for the shopping in the city centre, to 
access shops way out, so you can use this card. […] As Muslims, it’s our culture to 
eat halal food. Most of this halal food cannot be bought through that card, 
because the shops that sell [halal food] don’t take those cards, the Azure card.!
(Jabril, Interview, 22 August 2013)!!
! What arises out of asylum seekers’ experiences with COMPASS housing staff, in 
some of their community experiences and in the isolating effects of being moved to areas 
outside urban centres is an exposure to the ‘politics of discomfort’, of strategies aimed at 
limiting individuals’ sense of belonging in the areas they are dispersed to. However, there 
still exists the opportunity for resistance to these experiences and through individual 
agency and accessing a variety of support networks, asylum seekers can also initiate a 
change to their conditions; this is explored in chapter 8. 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Chapter 8 and Conclusions: Challenging ‘bare life’: struggle and resistance 
within the securitised home!!
! The experiences of asylum seekers living in dispersed housing thus far addressed 
seem to validate Agamben’s formulation of ‘bare life’ rather than challenge it, as was my 
theoretical objective in chapter 1. The isolation of being moved out of metropolitan centres 
far from support, the emotional and developmental ramifications of constant moves for 
children in school, the unsanitary conditions in dispersed properties, feelings of being 
‘dumped’ and ignored by housing staff - these endurances suggest a life exposed to 
death, a ‘living dead man’ (Agamben, 1998: p. 131). It is reflected in respondents’ 
assessments of their time in COMPASS properties; of her experience in Cascade 
housing, Olufemi stated: ‘It’s a continuous mental torture’ (Interview, 22 August 2013a). 
Jabril said: ‘This life, seriously, it is not worth living for me’ (Interview, 22 August 2013b). 
Speaking of the unhygienic conditions her two children were exposed to in an Orchard 
and Shipman property, Fimi declared: ‘We know we are in the process of immigration, but 
we are human … we are not animals’ (Interview, 12 June 2013). In these examples, there 
exists a hint of desperation - even resignation - at the fact that each individual’s position 
as an asylum seeker exposed them to inhumane treatment. In Jabril’s case, he was 
adamant that the conditions he was faced with in Cascade housing represented an illegal 
act on the part of the Home Office and its contractors on the COMPASS project: !!
It’s all an abuse of my human rights. […] No one cares what the Home Office 
is doing to me and my family. Where is that problem from? Who caused it? 
People will not be honest enough to [say] that it is the fault of the Home Office. 
Instead, they’ll say it’s my fault. But I don’t care what they say.!
(Jabril, 22 August 2013b)!!
As Imogen Tyler (2006) demonstrates, the ‘abuse’ Jabril describes is not illegal, because it 
has been enshrined in law. The state has written itself out of its humanitarian obligations 
to asylum seekers: ‘Inscribing the category of asylum-seeker in British law through the 
enactment of a series of punitive asylum laws has enabled the British Government to 
manoeuvre around the rights of the refugee as prescribed by international law’ (Tyler, 
2006: p. 189). It is possible to say, then, that the category of asylum seeker is itself 
representative of a ‘state of exception’ - a state that still exists in a ‘juridical context’ 
despite its appearance of existing outside the law (Agamben, 2005: p. 32). It is therefore 
also possible to use the law - the laws of asylum and immigration - to generate and 
perpetuate the included exclusion. The tactics or techniques of the state are then 
understood as the ways in which this included exclusion is realised, i.e. through 
securitised environments and the use of contracted security companies for the 
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management of asylum-seeking populations. The demands of the market reinforce the 
maintenance of the interstitial space between belonging and full exclusion in which asylum 
seekers occupy. What is still missing from this framework, however, is the element of 
biopower Agamben overlooks or neglects in order to develop an image of the state as a 
monopolistic, punitive force: the capacity for resistance.!
! For Foucault, resistance was a central component of power, or rather, of a power-
effect. In describing biopower, Foucault’s more nuanced understanding of power relations 
better reflects asylum seekers’ experiences within a society of control; they are not devoid 
of agency, though their ability to exercise that agency may be hindered by the tactics of 
governmentality the state and its partners utilise in managing populations. The individual 
is, however, still a site of power. On this subject, Foucault explains:!!
One of the first effects of power is that it allows bodies, gestures, discourses, 
and desires to be identified and constituted as something individual. The 
individual is not, in other words, power’s opposite number; the individual is one 
of power’s first effects. The individual is in fact a power-effect, and at the same 
time, and to the extent that he is a power-effect, the individual is a relay: power 
passes through the individuals it has constituted.!
(Foucault, 2004: pp. 29-30)!!
It is on the subject of relays of power that I focus in this eighth and final chapter. To fully 
reflect asylum seekers’ experiences within dispersed housing, it is necessary to reattribute 
agency to asylum-seeking residents as individual sites of power and to address the role of 
other ‘individuals’ or organisations acting as relays of power resisting the seemingly 
dominant logics of control, containment and included exclusion. These secondary actors 
include individuals, charities, churches, support organisations, advocacy groups and legal 
representatives that use the law and other methods to challenge the ‘power-
apparatuses’ (Foucault, 2004: p. 13) employed in the attempted subjugation of bodies, 
specifically those of asylum seekers. To demonstrate this narrative of the asylum seeker 
as agent, I explore three themes emerging from the interview data: 1) asylum seekers’ 
active involvement in available personal development activities; 2) their estimation of the 
importance of third-party agencies as advocate and support options; and 3) examples of 
direct resistance on the part of individuals.!!!
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8.1 Avoiding stagnation: asylum seekers’ involvement in self-enrichment and 
entertainment activities!!
! The use of coping strategies has been addressed in research investigating asylum 
seekers’ means of dealing the psychological and physiological effects of living in 
destitution and isolation. Ruth Healey (2006) situates her analysis of asylum seeker’s 
experiences within the United Kingdom between agency and structure, explaining: 
‘Structural forces are the underlying structures of society which produce or shape human 
actions; whereas human agency is defined as “the capabilities of human 
beings”’ (Gregory, 2000 quoted in Healey, 2006: p. 258). Healey adopts Bloch’s (2000) 
‘structural and attitudinal factors’ in addressing the ways in which structural elements, 
such as state policies, affect refugees’ ‘aspirations and feelings’ about their immigration 
experience (Bloch, 2000a: p. 75). Healey focuses her analysis of asylum agency within 
the limitations of structural constraints, acknowledging that the impacts of structural 
constraints vary between individuals: ‘Asylum seekers and refugees respond in different 
ways to the opportunities and constraints available to them within the structures that they 
face’ (Healey, 2006: p. 260). It is worth adding that in each individual’s experience, the 
structural elements themselves can be considerably different. If structural effects are 
extended beyond the role of policy and are taken to also mean practical limitations 
induced by asylum seekers’ geographical placement, the conditions of their 
accommodation, and the degree of social cohesion and support within dispersal areas, 
then the divide between individual experiences can be significant.!
! In their study of Sudanese refugees living in Australia, Schweitzer et al (2007) 
highlight the importance of personal beliefs, familial and community support and individual 
attitudes as central to the degree to which refugees’ were able to cope with the memories 
of past experiences and hardships faced in their host country. Askland (2007) interviewed 
twelve young East Timorese asylum seekers in her study of their expressions of agency in 
response to the ‘structural circumstances and objective conditions of the host 
country’ (Askland, 2007: p. 242). Askland suggests that younger asylum seekers of school 
age were in a better position to adapt to their asylum experience, because ‘school 
provided access to a particular social field, which offered, although in varying degrees, 
socialisation and education in accordance with a standardised, institutionalised and 
gradual process (Bourdieu, 1995 cited in Askland, 2007: p. 244). Closely linked to 
schooling was the importance of the development of language acquisition. Given that 
language barriers are often ‘one of the major challenges facing newly arrived refugees’, 
Askland explains:!!
Language is paramount for inclusion in and participation within the new 
society. Enhanced language proficiency inaugurates social fields for 
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interaction and contributes to increased self-confidence and security, positively 
affecting general interaction with the community and feelings of belonging.!
(Hyman et al. 2000 cited in Askland, 2007: p. 245)!!
With older respondents, Askland found that the ability to access language acquisition 
opportunities was more limited due to the need to seek income and university fees were 
often prohibitively expensive (Askland, 2007: p. 246). In this section, I present some of the 
experiences of asylum seekers seeking to acquire skills-based training in order to improve 
their conditions and their ability to communicate and integrate within dispersal areas. 
Many asylum seekers participated in a range of activities that went beyond language 
training and included the development of other practical skills. As I addressed in the 
previous chapter, a small number of asylum seekers questioned the utility of volunteering, 
since it did not afford them remuneration for their work. Jabril was resistant to 
volunteering, because he was disallowed from accessing paid work (Interview, 22 August 
2013b). However, others viewed volunteering and involvement in support agencies’ 
development opportunities as an important way to improve their overall asylum 
experience. In total, eight asylum seekers indicated that they had current or previous 
experience with volunteering. Three respondents regarded the experience as positive, as 
it provided essential skills and an escape from the tedium of life within dispersed 
accommodation. Three others problematised volunteering, suggesting that it was 
exploitative or a weak substitute for paid work.!
! Joseph, a recently refused asylum seeker in his 20s, explained that he involved 
himself in a number of activities in West Yorkshire, which included studying English, 
participating twice a week at RETAS (Refugee Education Training Advice Service) to 
improve his computer and language skills, playing sports, attending church and accessing 
the weekly drop-in sessions at PAFRAS (Positive Action for Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers). In addition, he volunteered for another drop-in, Meeting Point, and at a local 
charity shop. Given his sports skills, he was also invited to teach volleyball at a local high 
school. In assessing the value of these activities, Joseph explained that ‘these are all 
really important to me. They are keeping me busy. I improve some skills because of these 
organisations’ and ‘I like to help people’. He also noted the increased importance of the 
organisations he was involved with following the refusal of his asylum application: ‘Now 
that I am refused, I can go to these organisations for help’ (Joseph, Interview, 13 August 
2013). For Joseph, keeping active was an important part of his coping experience, as it 
provided him access to social connections and avenues of support. His comment about 
enjoying helping people reflected a personal motivation beyond developmental aims to 
engage in voluntary support work. Sahla addressed a similar motivation behind her 
preferred activity. She explained that she spent time volunteering at a charity that provided 
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support for destitute people and met with other asylum seekers and refugees to organise 
visits from community members and local police (Sahla, Interview, 28 May 2013).!!
8.2 The role of support organisations in challenging the conditions of ‘bare life’!!
! For many respondents living in COMPASS housing, various organisations 
including support agencies, charities, churches and drop-ins served two roles: support 
and advocacy. I have included a discussion of asylum support organisations in this 
section, because asylum seekers’ agency was often facilitated through these 
organisations. For instance, if a resident had a problem with their dispersal property and 
could not manage to convince their housing provider, G4S or Serco to take action either 
because calls to support numbers went unanswered or due to unfulfilled promises that 
action would be carried out, many respondents reported that they then went to their local 
drop-in or other refugee organisation for assistance in achieving a desirable result. These 
agencies would place calls to housing providers urging for repairs or other problems to be 
resolved. At times, these organisations were successful in spurring housing providers into 
dealing with asylum seekers’ complaints, though a number of agency respondents 
explained that they found the process frustrating; they also explained that making 
numerous phone calls to housing providers on behalf of asylum seekers consumed the 
time they would otherwise have spent offering crucial support in other areas. 
Nevertheless, the position of these organisations in acting as a relay for asylum seekers’ 
complaints allowed asylum seekers a voice that was otherwise ignored. Examples of 
COMPASS residents’ use of these agencies in making complaints demonstrates that, 
despite their increasingly tenuous financial positions due to budget cuts and reduced 
access to charity grants, refugee and asylum support organisations fulfil an important role 
in providing asylum seekers a degree of agency and resistance to models of exclusion 
and isolation that exist within the COMPASS programme.!
! While support organisations were sometimes able to act on behalf of asylum 
seekers, having a third party involved in complaints procedures did not always result in a 
desired outcome, or indeed a response, from housing providers. Ahlam Souidi with 
Maryhill Integration Network in Glasgow explained that asylum seekers’ would often 
initiate complaints to Orchard and Shipman through the Scottish Refugee Council (SRC) 
rather than attempt to call the provider directly, as they believed their calls would likely go 
unanswered. However, Souidi explained that this was not often successful either:!!
If [asylum seekers] complain by themselves, first, they go to the Scottish 
Refugee Council. Scottish Refugee Council put in this request on behalf of the 
client, but normally they don’t get a response to the request. They are just 
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ignored. Not until there was massive support - when politicians were involved. 
You need to have a fight. It is not easy to get to them. […] It is a nightmare to 
get things done. It is getting worse with Serco now.!
(Souidi, Interview, 17 May 2013)!!
This account differed from those of a Scottish Refugee Council representative who wished 
to remain anonymous. In our interview, that representative explained that the number of 
complaints the SRC was receiving from asylum seekers regarding the conditions of their 
housing was decreasing since Serco’s take-over of the asylum housing contract. The 
employee followed with: ‘At least people’s ceilings aren’t falling in’ (SRC employee, 
Interview, 30 May 2013). It was only two days before (28 May 2013), in my interview with 
Daya, that she described her ceiling collapsing while she was sleeping; Daya lived in an 
Orchard and Shipman property subcontracted by Serco. Nevertheless, the SRC 
representative surmised that the reason the organisation received complaints from asylum 
seekers about their dispersed housing was that they did not know they could complain 
elsewhere. Isabel Harland with the Govan and Craigton Integration Network, described 
another reason asylum seekers may not be aware of the complaints procedures, or 
unwilling to approach Orchard and Shipman or G4S directly. The most effective way of 
voicing a complaint, Harland stated, was:!!
[…] going through a separate agency, such as ourselves [Govan and Craigton 
Integration Network] that are going to do the legwork to chase Orchard and 
Shipman up about it. Most people don’t even know anyway. So, it’s only if 
they’re people who regularly come to drop-ins, say, and are told that they can 
do that or that that’s a possibility. What we find is that most people don’t even 
try, because of their past experience or because the kind of perception they 
get when they receive [housing] inspections or when people come along, so 
they just think, ‘they’re not going to do anything’ by default because of 
negative past experience. I work hard with people to try and phone [Orchard 
and Shipman] and don’t really get very far. So, it kind of depends on the 
individual, I guess, how confident they are, how much they know or how kind 
of aware [they are] of their rights or how - language as well - all of these things 
have an influence. Generally, we find that those who are more willing to fight 
and sort of put their foot down about it will get something done if they go 
through an external agency. What we’ve done on a couple occasions like that 
is gone via the e-mail route via individuals [at Orchard and Shipman] who 
we’ve maybe had some contact with in the past. […] Persistence seems to be 
the key. We kept pestering them until they get fed up with us!!
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(Harland, Interview, 10 June 2013)!!
! Harland’s account of typical complaints proceedings reveal a number of features of 
the Scottish COMPASS housing experience. Like the Scottish Refugee Council employee, 
Harland suggests that many individual asylum seekers do not know about the complaints 
procedures in place. However, Harland is referring to residents’ lack of knowledge about 
the opportunity of support from the Govan and Craigton Integration Network rather than 
suggesting that asylum seekers are not aware of a complaints facility, i.e. a telephone 
number, through which residents can make a complaint directly to Serco about the 
conditions of their property or a broken appliance. This indicates that only those asylum 
seekers aware of the existence of the integration networks in Glasgow and who have the 
initiative, confidence or capability to access those services will be in a position to make 
use of the organisations’ offer of assistance in putting complaints forward to Orchard and 
Shipman or Serco. What is also revealed in Harland’s observation is the concern some 
residents have in directly contacting their housing providers about problems with their 
accommodation out of fear that such a complaint might negatively impact their asylum 
applications. This was precisely the concern Mary, an asylum seeker living in Glasgow, 
addressed when explaining why she had not made a formal complaint to Orchard and 
Shipman about the poor conditions of her housing, even with the assistance of a support 
agency:!!
My consultant wrote me a supporting letter [to Orchard and Shipman]. I 
haven’t delivered the letter. I’m scared of the repercussions. These days, it’s a 
bit dodgy, you know? Also, you don’t know how they [Orchard and Shipman] 
work with the Home Office. It’s like you’re in a cocoon. You’re afraid to speak 
out your mind.!
(Mary, Interview, 12 June 2013b)!!
! In other accounts, asylum seekers who were more comfortable with making 
complaints to their housing provider or directly to Serco and G4S explained that the role of 
support organisations was crucial for in achieving desired outcomes. For Jacqueline, the 
presence of support organisations in West Yorkshire meant the difference between hope 
and helplessness. In describing the importance of agencies, such as Solace, she stated:!!
They are always there for me, supporting and standing with me. If I didn’t have 
them in my life here, I would have already died. Because when I first came 
here, I [had] died already. Solace helped me to be alive again.!
(Jacqueline, Interview, 06 September 2013)!
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Beyond the emotional support provided through such agencies, Jacqueline also 
mentioned the ‘empowering’ nature of the support she received. She explained that 
whereas the Refugee Council had once arranged legal representation for her and 
assistance with her housing, that ended. It was Solace that ultimately came to her aid and 
helped her find another lawyer: ‘Solace gives the right advice. […] I think Solace is more 
helpful than [the Refugee Council]’ (ibid.). Alexander focused on the sense of 
cohesiveness involvement in support organisations provided; he felt that participation 
within these organisations helped in building solidarity with other people going through 
similar experiences. He stated that the organisations were ‘extremely’ important, because 
they ‘make you feel like a family, [which] makes you feel better’ (21 August 2013b). 
Benjamin noted that the absence of support agencies present a challenge; ‘life would be 
very difficult’. He stated that these agencies also represented a gateway to health care 
support and education. Without these organisations, ‘opportunities would be limited to 
locals [citizens]’ (Benjamin, Interview, 21 August 2013a).!!
8.3 Examples of agency and resistance within the society of control!!
! Individual empowerment was not necessarily dependent upon the support 
networks one accessed, though those networks often facilitated respondents’ own 
initiatives in seeking to bring about changes to their circumstances. While Mary 
acknowledged that many may not speak up due to fear of reprisals that would either 
threaten their housing situations or adversely affect their asylum applications, she affirmed 
the importance of ‘getting involved’ and expressing one’s dissatisfaction. She stated: ‘It’s 
the only way you can air your grievances. Sending out the message as well. […] When 
things are getting out of hand. My [activism] gives me more strength’ (Mary, Interview, 12 
June 2013c). Mary had been involved in a local campaign against Serco prior to its 
acquisition of the COMPASS contract. While it may be common for asylum seekers to 
want to avoid unnecessary exposure to the Home Office, Beatrice was adamant about 
meeting with Home Office representatives at every opportunity. She explained that she 
was a member of a women’s strategy group at refugee organisation in Glasgow. The 
group, she said, was involved in arranging activities and inviting speakers from the 
community to present to asylum seekers and refugees accessing the service. Each 
service user can opt to be part of a ‘group’ that is allocated one of these organisational 
tasks. When given the opportunity, Beatrice volunteered to be part of the delegation that 
went to the Home Office to express concerns on behalf of others in the community. She 
stated:!!
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When I go to the [Women’s Strategy Group] meeting, they ask you: ‘What part 
of the group do you want to go to? Do you want to meet the UK Border 
Agency at the Home Office? Do you want to meet the police? Do you want to 
meet the fire [services]? Do you want to meet the housing [representatives]?’ I 
said, ‘I would like to meet the UK Border Agency.’ To sit there and tell them my 
feelings, and tell them what I want! So they put me in [that group].!
(Beatrice, Interview, 28 May 2013b)!!
Others acknowledged some of the potential concerns with being outspoken. Jonathan 
explained that many people are ‘afraid to speak out’. He said that they may feel 
‘suppressed’ or believe that by voicing a complaint, they might ‘negatively impact [their] 
claim’ for asylum. Jonathan understood these reservations, but felt that it was personally 
important to him to help ‘build awareness’ of people’s experiences in order to bring about 
changes in asylum seekers’ conditions within the asylum ‘system’ (Jonathan, Interview, 14 
June 2013). Gabrielle discussed her coping strategies upon arriving in a new area and 
described her decision to overcome initial fears about actively pursuing complaints and 
getting involved in the community. She felt duty-bound to educate others in the community 
about asylum seekers’ experiences and to help transform common perceptions of asylum 
seekers that are promulgated in the popular press. When asked about her motivations in 
engaging in community awareness, Gabrielle stated:!!
Every time I go somewhere, I try to find as many organisations as I can and I 
try to join them. I was involved in so many. […] Because, I realised that many 
people, they don’t know - because there is a assumption about asylum 
seekers - it’s all about what you read in the papers. So, with these 
organisations, we start to go to schools speaking about our experiences, the 
reality, you know? Things like that. Raise awareness.!
(Gabrielle, 06 September 2013a)!!
Concluding Remarks!!
! Residents’ experiences within the COMPASS housing estate reveal a series of 
conditions and responses that do not entirely fit within a construction of asylum seekers as 
wholly subjected bodies. From the interviews collected in support of this doctoral thesis, 
common trends can be identified that seem to support an Agambenian construction of 
bare life. Residents’ exposure to adverse conditions, including the mental and 
physiological strain of living in unhygienic environments or dilapidated housing, the 
psychological and economic burden of being moved to areas lacking established support 
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networks or culturally specific food options, and the inability to easily bring about a change 
to their experience all appear to suggest that a ‘politics of discomfort’ and exclusionary 
tactics are governing the housing of asylum seekers in the UK. The inclusion of two global 
private security firms in the delivery of the Home Office’s dispersal programme, each with 
prior histories of detaining and transporting asylum seekers, may indeed reflect a ‘shifting 
away from an explicit concern with the human rights of asylum seekers and refugees and 
toward a primary concern with security and protecting the “nation”’ (Lynn and Lea, 2003 
and Moore, 2005; 2007 cited in Moore and Clifford, 2007: p. 462). Arguments employing 
rhetorical allusions to the population as a biological organism (Esposito, 2008; 2013) or 
home (Walters, 2004; Darling, 2011), which state defends against the onslaught of foreign 
‘others’ help provide a theoretical basis for legislative practices and border control aims. 
However, none of these approaches adequately reflect the processes and logics 
underpinning the introduction of a marketised dispersed housing programme. They also 
fail in appropriately acknowledging the capacity for agency, contingent though it may be, 
of asylum seekers in resisting total subjugation through individual action or accessing 
support services.!
! In this thesis, I have argued for a return to an understanding of power that both 
incorporates individual agency and is capable of including within its definition Hollifield’s 
‘liberal paradox’, which acknowledges the inherent conflict between the state’s aim to 
secure its borders and the neoliberal imperative of maintaining market openness 
(Hollifield, 2004: p. 885). Through a detailed historical analysis of English and British 
immigration legislation and population control practices dating to back to the thirteenth 
century, I have demonstrated that it is Foucault’s concept of biopower that remains the 
most appropriate frame within which to demonstrate the dynamic power interplay between 
the state, its agents, asylum seekers and the support and advocacy networks providing 
their support. Interviews with asylum seekers and support agency staff have elucidated 
residents’ experiences within COMPASS housing. While we might isolate out many of the 
deleterious effects of the COMPASS programme for scrutiny at a contractual and 
humanitarian level, the what is clear from the interview data, is that Agamben’s notion of 
‘encampment’ does not adequately reflect experiences within the asylum housing estate. 
The ‘camp’ is a zone of exception, a ‘space that is opened when the state of exception 
begins to become the rule’ (Agamben, 1998: p. 169). However, this thesis has 
demonstrated the continuing incursion and disruption of totalising ‘exceptional state’ logics 
by advocacy groups, committed human rights and immigration lawyers and at times the 
judiciary acting as a countervailing state power - as well as (it is important to insist) - the 
agency and resistance of those who despite being subject to often dehumanising 
immigration control experiences nevertheless succeed in asserting their humanity and 
right to remain.!
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! While successive UK policies have allowed for increased discretionary control over 
migrants, avenues of resistance still exist both at the individual level and through the 
facilitating efforts of support agencies; these challenge the construction of asylum seekers 
as beings devoid of political worth and the apparatuses of power governing their 
subjection. However, a recognition of agency cannot correspond with complacency. The 
budgetary cuts and limited funding options described in chapter 5 threaten asylum support 
organisations’ ability to continue providing asylum seekers with the same level of service 
they may have come to rely upon for advisory, social and emotional support. From an 
analysis of data collected through interviews with asylum seekers, it is evident that each 
resident’s ability to affect change when dealing directly with COMPASS housing providers 
is limited due to institutionalised neglectfulness or overextended market ambitions. 
Therefore, the reliance on organisations to help facilitate in the issuance of complaints or 
mitigate the emotional effects of poor housing conditions is greater at time when these 
agencies’ resources are stretched thin. Attention must be paid to the fact that while asylum 
seekers may not represent bare life in the strictly theoretical sense, the conditions of their 
experience may, in a practical sense, be largely indistinguishable from it (or perceived as 
such by the asylum seekers themselves).!
! Current and past dispersal regimes are established upon legislation designed to 
ensure that the government’s commitments to international human rights agreements are 
met in limited terms. Consecutive policies have introduced increasingly restrictive controls 
both upon asylum seekers’ ability to claim asylum and the conditions with which they are 
supported within the United Kingdom. Asylum seekers’ destitution remains a key feature of 
the state’s current asylum regime. As explained in Chapter 3, the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (JCHR) report on the treatment of asylum seekers (2007) established that 
the committee was ‘convinced that destitution is a deliberate tool in the operation of 
immigration policy.’ Continuing, the members stated:!!
We have been persuaded by the evidence that the Government has indeed 
been practicing a deliberate policy of destitution of this highly vulnerable 
group. We believe that the deliberate use of inhumane treatment is 
unacceptable. We have instances in all cases where the Government’s 
treatment of asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers falls below the 
requirements of the common law of humanity and of international human 
rights law.!
(Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2007: para. 120, p. 41)!!
Current plans to further cut destitute asylum seekers’ support funding by up to 30 per cent 
(Travis, 2015) suggest that the UK government is responding to popular representations 
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of asylum seekers as a public strain rather than acknowledging the criticisms levelled 
against it by the JCHR. Equally, the government’s decision to outsource its dispersal 
programme to private security firms highlights a lack of concern for the emotional and 
physical well-being of asylum seekers, given the firms’ previous histories of abuse and 
neglect, as outlined in chapters 4 and 6.!
! In itself, the dispersal programme is an exclusionary project, designed to 
undermine asylum seekers’ sense of security and belonging. Hynes and Sales (2009: p. 
53) refer to the dispersal experience as ‘policy-imposed liminality’. In their examination of 
asylum seekers’ experiences within dispersed accommodation prior to the introduction of 
the COMPASS programme, Hynes and Sales write that ‘the main experience of dispersal 
was a loss of control over their lives, creating a sense of liminality, or limbo’ (ibid: p. 53). 
However, crucially, Hynes and Sales also acknowledge the fact that this loss of control 
was not entirely concurrent with a loss of all agency, citing asylum seekers’ limited, though 
expressive forms of resistance, such as an abandonment of their dispersed property. In 
more indirect ways, Hynes and Sales’ respondents ‘resisted the dehumanising impact of 
the system’ through other strategies: ‘[t]hey learned the language, made friends from the 
“settled” population and participated in volunteering schemes when unable to take up paid 
employment’ (ibid: p. 54). Similar responses were observed in the interviews for this 
project. For instance, 15 respondents (58 per cent) described various enrichment activities 
they were involved in, which included participation in specialist groups like women’s 
groups, volunteering, and educational courses. Six respondents referenced their 
involvement in educational development and eight respondents described the importance 
of English language acquisition in building relationships within the United Kingdom and 
strengthening their ability to articulate concerns and interests. These acts are significant, 
because they challenge the valued depictions of asylum seekers as perpetual victims, 
which are reinforced through theoretical concepts like Agamben’s ‘bare life’. As I have 
advocated from the outset, a more nuanced view of power and resistance is required to 
reflect asylum seekers’ dispersal experiences.!
! In the introduction, I determined to qualify sovereign explanations of power through 
an inclusion of Foucault’s allowance for resistance within a biopolitical framework and an 
engagement with Hollifield’s ‘liberal paradox’, which better reflects the competing 
objectives of market liberalism and border restrictionism. The history of immigration 
legislation presented in chapters 2 and 3 maps a policy environment designed to disrupt 
migrants’ and asylum seekers’ sense of belonging within the United Kingdom. The effects 
of these policy endeavours are apparent in asylum seekers’ descriptions of their 
COMPASS housing experiences; the emotional and physical strain brought about by 
distance from support networks, living in destitution and exposure to poor housing 
conditions reaffirms representations of the UK’s asylum policy as one of deliberate 
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destitution and exclusion. However, the objectives of the COMPASS housing programme 
are not solely realised through state action alone, as they are also determined by the 
continued profitability of the dispersal contracts. The motivations of G4S and Serco to 
expand the ‘asylum market’ by first developing their accommodation experience within the 
realm of dispersed housing reveals the complexity of the state’s response to its population 
management agenda (see chapter 4). The UK government has embedded itself within two 
conflicting agendas; the government must appeal to political pressures seeking 
reassurance that the state is protecting the identity of the British population while at the 
same time must continue to promote the neoliberal vision of marketisation and 
privatisation.!
! In reviewing the data collected from interviews with asylum seekers and asylum 
and refugee support workers, it is apparent that asylum experiences within different 
regions of the UK vary based upon the support networks available and the conditions and 
placement of asylum seekers’ dispersed housing. This lack of uniformity in provision is 
reflective of government policies designed to undermine asylum seekers’ confidence and 
sense of belonging within the communities they are dispersed to. However, these 
agendas are challenged by the actions of asylum seekers themselves, the efforts of the 
charity and voluntary support sector, and the assistance and advocacy of legal 
practitioners and activist groups. If further challenges to government policy and its 
privatised accommodation regime are to be made, they will need to incorporate the direct 
participation of asylum seekers and those willing to support them in resisting state efforts 
to silence appeals to human rights and demands for a more humanitarian approach to 
refugee reception. 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For$Your$Information$
!
You!are!invited!to!take!part!in!a!study!about!
your!experiences!living!under!the!new!
COMPASS!housing!project.!!
What!is!the!study!about?!!This! study! seeks! to! gain! an! understanding! of! asylum! seekers’!experiences! living! under! the! management! of! new! housing!providers! within! Britain.! Early! last! year,! asylum! housing!support!across!the!country!became!the!responsibility!of!three!of!the!country’s! largest!private!security!firms!–!Serco,!Clearel!Ltd.!and! G4S.! Before! this,! local! authorities,! private! landlords! and!housing!associations!housed!dispersed!asylum!seekers.!Over!the!last! six! months,! many! asylum! seekers! have! been!moved! from!one!home! to! another.! If! you!have!been!asked! to!move!or!have!already!moved,!it!would!be!good!to!hear!about!your!experience.!!
Why!have!I!been!invited!to!participate?!!You! have! been! invited! to! participate! in! this! research! project,!because! your! experience! being! housed! by! one! of! the! new!contract!holders!is!important!to!this!research.!You!might!be!able!to! share! your! thoughts! on! a! recent! move! and! whether! your!experience!has!been!good,!bad!or!remained!the!same.!!!
Do!I!have!to!participate?!!No.! Your! participation! in! this! research! project! is! entirely!voluntary,!meaning!that!you!can!decide!to!stop!at!any!time!and!the! researcher! will! honour! this! request.! ! As! your! inclusion! in!this! interview! is! voluntary,! you! will! not! receive! payment! for!participating,! but! the! researcher! will! make! ensure! that! the!interview!is!conducted!at!a!convenient!time!and!location.!!
How!will!the!interview!work?!!If!you!agree!to!be!interviewed,!we!will!arrange!a!time!and!place!to! meet! that! is! best! for! you! and! you! will! be! asked! questions!regarding!your!experience!being!moved!from!your!old!home!to!your!new!one.!Even!if!you!have!not!been!moved,!you!are!invited!to!share!your!thoughts!about!the!place!you!live!and!the!level!of!support! you! have! access! to.! If! you! have! children,! you! might!discuss!whether!or!not! they!have!had! to!move! school! recently!and!what!affect!that!has!had!on!their!mood,!if!any.!!It!is!possible!that!our!discussion!may!bring!up!difficult!subjects!and! if! you!are!uncomfortable!discussing!your! experiences,! you!can!end!the!interview!at!any!time.!The!interview!will!last!about!an!hour!and!a!half,!but!it!might!be!shorter.!You!will!be!asked!to!sign!a!consent! form!prior! to! the! interview.! If!you!would!rather!not!sign!the!form,!you!will!have!the!option!to!do!so,!but!we!will!need!to!have!a!witness!present!to!confirm!that!you!are!happy!to!continue! with! the! interview.! If! you! would! like! to! have! a!translator!present,! that! can!be! arranged.! It!would!be!helpful! if!
we! could! record! our! conversation! so! the! researcher! can!make!sure!he!takes!accurate!notes.!!
What!will!happen!with!my!information?!!The! researcher! will! keep! all! of! your! personal! information!completely!confidential,!including!your!name.!Your!name!and!no!other! details! that! might! be! used! to! identify! you! will! be! made!publicly! available.! Once! the! research! project! is! complete,! all!recordings! and! notes! that! we! create! in! our! interviews!will! be!confidentially!destroyed.!!The! information! you! provide! will! be! for! use! toward! a! PhD!research!project,!which!will!include!data!by!other!people!willing!to!participate!in!the!study.!Information!published!in!this!project!may!be!used!in!other!publications!to!highlight!the!experiences!of!asylum!seekers!living!under!the!new!COMPASS!contracts.!If!you!would!like,!you!can!have!a!summary!of!the!research!project!once!it!is!complete!or!a!copy!of!the!full!report.!!
Who!will!be!asking!me!questions?!!Steven! Hirschler! is! a! PhD! student! at! the! University! of! York!carrying! out! a! study! for! his! doctoral! dissertation.! He! has!experience! volunteering! for! a! local! asylum! seeker! support!service!and! is!mindful!of! the!need! for!anonymity.! If!you!would!like!to!contact!Steven!about!any!part!of!this!research,!feel!free!to!do! so! (telephone:! 01904! 324! 397,! eYmail:!steven.hirschler@york.ac.uk).!
!
What!if!I!have!any!further!concerns?!!This!research!project!is!intended!to!be!of!very!little!risk!to!both!you! and! the! researcher! asking! the! questions.! Your! responses!will! be! considered! respectfully! and!with! full! confidence.! If! you!would! like! to! know! what! other! ethical! considerations! the!researcher!is!obliged!to!adhere!to,!feel!free!to!contact!the!Chair!of! the! Ethics! Committee! at! the! University! of! York,! Caroline!Hunter! (telephone:! 01904! 325! 806,! eYmail:!caroline.hunter@york.ac.uk).!!
For!further!information:!!If! you! have! any! further! questions,! you! may! also! contact! Dr!Simon!Parker,! Steven’s! PhD! supervisor! (telephone:! 01904! 323!557,!eYmail:!simon.parker@york.ac.uk).!!Department! of! Politics,! University! of! York,! Heslington,! York,!YO10!5DD!
Appendix 2: Information Sheet for Service Worker!
!
!
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Interview 
 
Information Sheet for Interview Participant 
 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed. Please remember that you can choose to end the 
interview at any time and that your participation is optional.  
 
Researcher Information 
 
This self-funded PhD research project is being conducted by Steven Hirschler, a third-year 
doctoral candidate within the Department of Politics and the Centre for Applied Human Rights at 
the University of York. 
 
Research 
 
This PhD research project arose in response to developments occurring within the United 
Kingdom’s asylum support sector, particularly the increasing privatisation of asylum housing 
services following the discontinuation of contracts between the Home Office and local authority 
consortia. Many of these contracts have been agreed to between the UK Boarder Agency and 
three of the country’s most prominent private security firms: Serco, Reliance and G4S. The UKBA 
refers to these companies as ‘preferred bidders’ within its COMPASS project,1 and all have 
previously been involved in the transportation or detention of asylum seekers either in the United 
Kingdom or abroad.2 The response to this development has been mixed, with a number of activist 
organisations around the country engaged in campaigns to resist the privatisation of asylum 
support services. Concerns exist that companies that have come under criticism for questionable 
human rights practices, either directly or indirectly through subcontractors, present a threat to 
asylum seekers’ mental and physical wellbeing at both the individual and collective level. 
 
The aim of this research is to determine the perceived and actual affects of privatising asylum 
housing services and to represent the different narratives surrounding asylum seekers’ legitimate 
or illegitimate presence in the country. The project will involve interviews with local authority 
officials, local service organisation volunteers, private security firm personnel and key 
government officials involved in the development of asylum policy and the management of 
asylum support services. The research has the following aims: 
 
1) To develop a chronology of immigration policies that have led to varying degrees of 
inclusion for persons subject to immigration control, including asylum seekers; 
2) To chronicle the role of local and voluntary services in providing support services for 
asylum seekers either alongside or in lieu of government programs; 
3) To determine the extent to which judicial rulings and the activities of civil society 
organisations represent a resistance to what the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
identified in 2007 as the state’s ‘deliberate’ policy of exclusion and destitution of asylum 
seekers.3 
 
Your role 
 
You have been approached about participating in this research because of your unique role in 
providing essential services to asylum seekers. Your views will be very important in informing this 
                                                
1 UKBA. (2012). COMPASS. See: 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/aboutus/workingwithus/workingwithasylum/compassprogramme/ [Accessed 03 August 
2012]. 
2 Townsend, M. and Grandjean, G. (2012). Reliance under scrutiny after deportees report injuries while being restrained by 
guards. The Guardian. See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/22/reliance-scrutiny-injuries [Accessed 04 August 2012]; 
Silverman, S. and Hajela, R. (2012). Briefing: Immigration Detention in the UK. The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford. 
See Page 3: http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Immigration%20Detention%20Briefing%20v2_0.pdf 
[Accessed 11 August 2012]. 
3 Home Office. (2007). The Treatment of Asylum Seekers. The Stationery Office Ltd: London. See: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtrights/81/81i.pdf [Accessed 03 August 2012]. 
  225
 
 
research project. Following our review of the consent form, you will be given the opportunity to 
sign and date it. In addition, you will have the option to record your vocal consent. It would be 
helpful if the interview could be digitally recorded in part or in its entirety in order to reflect your 
responses as comprehensively as possible. You will have the option to participate in such a 
recording fully or in part; you may also decline. If you decide against any form of recording, 
handwritten notes will be used exclusively. 
 
The use of your information 
 
In order to accurately represent your responses, I will take detailed handwritten notes during the 
interview and will keep them as anonymised as possible until they are transcribed in a secure 
digital format. The original notes will then be shredded. As mentioned, a digital recording is 
desirable, but you may opt out of this in part or entirely. Such a recording would be deleted from 
the recording device immediately following the interview’s transcription into a word processor. 
You are welcome to a copy of my transcribed handwritten notes and the notes taken from any 
recordings. I am also happy to provide you an encrypted copy of the digital recording if you desire 
it. All data, including digitised notes and recordings, will eventually be securely deleted following 
the completion of the research project and any related publications. If you decide to withdraw 
from the interview at any point, I will respect any explicit request to confidentially destroy or delete 
my notes and/or recordings prior to their use in my research project. 
 
All of the information you provide is intended for use in this single PhD research project. In the 
future, part or all of my PhD research project may appear in published form. You are free to 
declare what portion, if any, of your responses may appear within subsequent publications 
relating to my research. You have the option to have any amount of the information you provide 
remain confidential and anonymised, though attributable quotes and comments are preferred 
given the high-profile nature of your experiences, and the importance of those experiences to the 
development of this research. A copy of my research project can be made available to you upon 
request if and when it is completed. 
 
Contacts 
 
If you have any further questions regarding your participation in this research project, please feel 
free to contact Steven Hirschler (e-mail: steven.hirschler@york.ac.uk) at the Department of 
Sociology, Wentworth College, University of York, York YO10 5DD, telephone: 07932 739 664. 
 
You may contact Dr Simon Parker, my PhD supervisor (e-mail: simon.parker@york.ac.uk) at the 
Department of Politics, Derwent College, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, telephone: 01904 
323 577. 
 
You may also contact the Chair of the Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology 
departmental ethics committee, Caroline Hunter (e-mail: caroline.hunter@york.ac.uk), at York 
Law School, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, telephone: 01904 325 806. 
Appendix 3: Interview Coding Scheme (Asylum Seekers)!!
CLUSTERS & NODES DESCRIPTION
Agency and Self-Support Expressions of individual agency and self-support 
  CLEANING Respondents' reports of having to invest individual time and/or money in maintaining 
COMPASS properties
  SELFSUS Self-sustaining activities and actions (i.e. pursuing complaints, seeking assistance, 
etc.)
Agency Support Reliance upon and assistance received from voluntary and charity-sector agencies
  AGNYACVSM Activism endeavours on the part of support organisations to promote asylum welfare
  AGNYHLP Assistance and advice provided through various support agencies
  AGNYOP Respondents' opinions of the level and quality of support received through support 
agencies
  LEGAL Details regarding legal assistance, reliance on legal support and engagement with 
solicitors
Area Conditions Descriptions of conditions within dispersal areas
  AREACON Observations of the conditions within dispersal areas, including perceived safety 
levels, quality of life, etc.
  COMYXP- Generally negative views of community experiences within dispersal areas
  COMYXP+ Generally positive views of community experiences within dispersal areas
  DISCRM Reports of discrimination within dispersal areas
  DRUGS Reports of drug use within dispersal areas
  NODISCRM Explicit responses indicating that no discrimination was suffered in dispersal areas
  STIGMA Stigmatisation experienced or perceived within dispersal areas
Asylum Experience General views on the asylum experience overall
  AZURE Experiences using the Azure card (i.e. limitations, stigma, impracticalities, etc.)
  COST Cost of living and the limits of support for destitute asylum seekers
  DETXP Experiences within detention
  INITIALACCOMMXP General views on the initial accommodation experience
    INITIALACCOMM- Generally negative views of the initial accommodation experience
    INITIALACCOMM+ Generally positive views of the initial accommodation experience
  MEDIAREPRESENTATIONS Reflections on media representations of asylum seekers
  PRTRAUM Experiences of trauma before arriving in the UK and/or during the asylum process
  SECTN4 Self-described as an asylum seeker receiving Section 4 (1999 IAA) support
  SECTN95 Self-described as an asylum seeker receiving Section 95 (1999 IAA) support
Comparisons Points of comparison between different COMPASS experiences
COMPASS Experiences Respondents' descriptions of experiences within COMPASS housing
  CHLDRN Parents' reflections and reports of children's experiences within COMPASS housing 
and during transition
  CMPSXP- Generally negative views about the COMPASS experience
  CMPSXP+ Generally positive views about the COMPASS experience
  CULT-RELIG-SENSITIVITY Reflections on the level of cultural, religious (etc.) sensitivity of the COMPASS 
programme
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  MOVESEF Observations on the emotional and practical effects subsequent to being moved by a 
COMPASS contractor
  PRISON-LIKE Descriptions of COMPASS accommodation as prison-like
  TRANSXP Experiences during the transition into COMPASS housing
COMPASS Knowledge Level of knowledge and awareness of COMPASS and its contractors
  PREKNOW(N) Respondent did not have prior knowledge of COMPASS or its contractors (G4S or 
Serco) and subcontractors
  PREKNOW(Y) Respondent had prior knowledge of COMPASS and the programme's contractors; 
opinions
COMPASS Opinions Individual perspective on the COMPASS programme
  BARELF Descriptions (and terminology) of experiences resembling Agamben's 'bare life' 
  MARKET Recognition and/or perception of asylum housing as driven by market imperatives
Contract Compliance Examples in which providers' contract compliance may be in question
  COMPLNT Explanation of complaints procedures; perception that complaints were left unresolved
  REPAIRS Description of repairs frequency
  WLCMPAK General observations regarding the Welcome Packs provided by contractors and/or 
subcontractors
    WLCMPAK- Belief that welcome packs were unhelpful or lacked important information
    WLCMPAK+ Belief that welcome packs were useful and helped with orientation in new dispersal 
environment
Emotions Respondents described feelings and emotions regarding housing experiences
  DEPRESSION Feelings of depression
  FEAR Expressions of fear
  FRUSTRATION Frustration
  ISOLATE Feelings of isolation
  LIMBO Respondents' representation of lives in limbo; unsettled
  STRESS Stress as a response to conditions, treatment, etc.
  SATISFACTION Feelings of general satisfaction
Enrichment Activities Activities, education and pasttimes of asylum seekers
  EDUCTN Education and learning
  ENGLANG Formal and informal English language acquisition and perceptions of its value
  ENRICH Enrichment activities
  ENTRTN Entertainment activities
  VOLUNTEERINGXP Descriptions of volunteering experience
    VOLUNTEERING- Views of volunteering as negative and/or unfulfilling
    VOLUNTEERING+ Views of volunteering as useful and constructive
Housing Conditions 
(COMPASS)
Specific housing conditions within COMPASS accommodation
  DIRTY General dirtiness and poor upkeep
  FACILITIES- View that facilities are inadequate, broken or otherwise unsatisfactory
  FACILITIES+ View that facilities are adequate and satisfactory
  FOODNDS Description of specific food needs; views that dietary needs are not being met or 
difficult to access
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  HLTHCON Concerns surrounding individual or family health due to specific housing conditions
  HSNGCON- General view that housing conditions are unsatisfactory or harmful
  HSNGCON+ General view that housing conditions are satisfactory
  HSNGDIST- Distance of dispersed accommodation too far from essential services, stores, etc.
  HSNGDIST+ Distance of dispersed accommodation adequate for respondent's needs
  INSECTSVERMIN Reports of insect and vermin infestations within dispersed accommodation
  OVERCROWDING Views and descriptions of life within overcrowded accommodation
  SHAREDACCOMM Experiences and/or struggles observed in shared accommodation
Inspection Frequency Degree to which regular inspections of COMPASS properties were occuring
  INSPECT- Inspections occurring irregularly or not at all
  INSPECT+ Inspections occurring at regular intervals; adequate
Pre-COMPASS Experiences Reflections and observations of housing experience prior to COMPASS programme
  COMMS_LA- Poor communication with local authority representatives
  PRECMP- Generally negative views of the pre-COMPASS dispersal experience
  PRECMP+ Generally positive views of the pre-COMPASS dispersal experience
  PRECOMPSTAFF- Negative experiences with housing staff prior to COMPASS transition
  PRECOMPSTAFF+ Positive experiences with housing staff prior to COMPASS transition
Relationships with COMPASS 
Staff
Descriptions of staff/resident relations within COMPASS accommodation
  EMPTYPROMISES Perception that promises made by housing staff are baseless and/or not followed 
through on
  NONRESPONSIVE Housing staff does not respond to repairs requests and/or complaints
  PROVCOM Reflections on general communication with housing providers (contractors and 
subcontractors)
  RELSTAF- Generally negative view of relations with COMPASS housing staff
  RELSTAF+ Generally positive view of relations with COMPASS housing staff
  SHORTNOTICE Experiences of being given short notice before being moved to a different COMPASS 
property
  UNANNCD Reports of staff arriving unannounced at COMPASS properties
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Appendix 4: Interviewed Asylum and Refugee Support Workers!!
!
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Region Representative Role Organisation
Glasgow Robina Qureshi Director Positive Action in Housing
Glasgow Ahlam Souidi Community Support 
and Advice Worker
Maryhill Integration Network
Glasgow Rachel (anon) Volunteer Glasgow Campaign to Welcome 
Refugees
Glasgow Margaret 
Sweeney
Volunteer Govan and Craigton Integration 
Network
Glasgow Janice (anon) Employee Scottish Refugee Council
Glasgow Katherine (anon) Former Employee Orchard and Shipman
Glasgow Isabel Harland Project Development 
Worker
Govan and Craigton Integration 
Network
Glasgow Diane McWilliam Project Coordinator Greater Pollock Integration 
Network
Glasgow Yvonne Docherty Community 
Development Worker
Greater Pollock Integration 
Network
Glasgow Jassim Johe Welfare Advice and 
Support Worker
Kingsway Court Health and 
Wellbeing Centre
North East of 
England
Norman Arthur 
Carr
Volunteer North of England Refugee 
Service (Sunderland Drop-In)
North East of 
England
Kath Sainsbury Project Manager Justice First
North East of 
England
Melanie (anon) Employee West End Refugee Service
North East of 
England
Pete Widlinski Information and 
Communications 
Manager
North of England Refugee 
Service
North East of 
England
George (anon) Employee West End Refugee Service
Yorkshire and 
Humber
Emma Crossley Project Manager Meeting Point
Yorkshire and 
Humber
Rosanna Longley Service Manager Red Cross - Refugee Services 
Yorkshire
Yorkshire and 
Humber
Allison (anon) Employee Solace
Yorkshire and 
Humber
Max Farrar Secretary David Oluwale Memorial 
Association
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